WEBVTT Kind: captions Language: en 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:04.350 align:start position:0% foreign 00:00:04.350 --> 00:00:04.360 align:start position:0% 00:00:04.360 --> 00:00:13.730 align:start position:0% [Music] 00:00:13.730 --> 00:00:13.740 align:start position:0% 00:00:13.740 --> 00:00:16.730 align:start position:0% knowledge<00:00:14.700> airdrop<00:00:15.179> in<00:00:15.900> which<00:00:16.080> you<00:00:16.500> enable 00:00:16.730 --> 00:00:16.740 align:start position:0% knowledge airdrop in which you enable 00:00:16.740 --> 00:00:18.349 align:start position:0% knowledge airdrop in which you enable Anonymous<00:00:17.220> governance<00:00:17.640> where<00:00:18.060> people's 00:00:18.349 --> 00:00:18.359 align:start position:0% Anonymous governance where people's 00:00:18.359 --> 00:00:20.090 align:start position:0% Anonymous governance where people's votes<00:00:18.720> aren't<00:00:18.960> impacted<00:00:19.440> by<00:00:19.680> other<00:00:19.800> people's 00:00:20.090 --> 00:00:20.100 align:start position:0% votes aren't impacted by other people's 00:00:20.100 --> 00:00:21.769 align:start position:0% votes aren't impacted by other people's votes<00:00:20.460> where<00:00:21.180> people<00:00:21.480> can<00:00:21.600> vote 00:00:21.769 --> 00:00:21.779 align:start position:0% votes where people can vote 00:00:21.779 --> 00:00:23.269 align:start position:0% votes where people can vote independently<00:00:22.260> and<00:00:22.439> they're<00:00:22.619> only<00:00:22.800> revealed 00:00:23.269 --> 00:00:23.279 align:start position:0% independently and they're only revealed 00:00:23.279 --> 00:00:25.250 align:start position:0% independently and they're only revealed once<00:00:23.880> you<00:00:24.000> want<00:00:24.119> to<00:00:24.240> tally<00:00:24.420> the<00:00:24.660> votes<00:00:24.900> or<00:00:25.019> once 00:00:25.250 --> 00:00:25.260 align:start position:0% once you want to tally the votes or once 00:00:25.260 --> 00:00:27.410 align:start position:0% once you want to tally the votes or once the<00:00:25.320> voting<00:00:25.500> period<00:00:25.740> is<00:00:25.859> over<00:00:26.039> in<00:00:26.939> order<00:00:27.119> to<00:00:27.240> do 00:00:27.410 --> 00:00:27.420 align:start position:0% the voting period is over in order to do 00:00:27.420 --> 00:00:29.150 align:start position:0% the voting period is over in order to do this<00:00:27.599> to<00:00:27.960> do<00:00:28.140> a<00:00:28.260> zero<00:00:28.500> knowledge<00:00:28.680> airdrop<00:00:29.039> you 00:00:29.150 --> 00:00:29.160 align:start position:0% this to do a zero knowledge airdrop you 00:00:29.160 --> 00:00:31.550 align:start position:0% this to do a zero knowledge airdrop you need<00:00:29.279> a<00:00:29.400> way<00:00:29.460> to<00:00:29.640> avoid<00:00:30.000> double<00:00:30.480> claiming<00:00:31.019> that 00:00:31.550 --> 00:00:31.560 align:start position:0% need a way to avoid double claiming that 00:00:31.560 --> 00:00:33.290 align:start position:0% need a way to avoid double claiming that is<00:00:31.740> people<00:00:32.040> can<00:00:32.460> anonymously<00:00:32.940> claim<00:00:33.180> their 00:00:33.290 --> 00:00:33.300 align:start position:0% is people can anonymously claim their 00:00:33.300 --> 00:00:35.090 align:start position:0% is people can anonymously claim their tokens<00:00:33.480> to<00:00:33.660> an<00:00:33.780> unlinked<00:00:34.140> account<00:00:34.260> but<00:00:34.980> still 00:00:35.090 --> 00:00:35.100 align:start position:0% tokens to an unlinked account but still 00:00:35.100 --> 00:00:37.310 align:start position:0% tokens to an unlinked account but still there's<00:00:35.399> some<00:00:35.820> identifier<00:00:36.600> that<00:00:36.899> represents 00:00:37.310 --> 00:00:37.320 align:start position:0% there's some identifier that represents 00:00:37.320 --> 00:00:39.290 align:start position:0% there's some identifier that represents them<00:00:37.500> that<00:00:38.100> prevents<00:00:38.520> them<00:00:38.700> from<00:00:38.880> claiming 00:00:39.290 --> 00:00:39.300 align:start position:0% them that prevents them from claiming 00:00:39.300 --> 00:00:41.450 align:start position:0% them that prevents them from claiming the<00:00:39.540> same<00:00:39.660> airdrop<00:00:40.140> twice<00:00:40.440> or<00:00:40.860> maybe<00:00:41.040> we<00:00:41.280> want 00:00:41.450 --> 00:00:41.460 align:start position:0% the same airdrop twice or maybe we want 00:00:41.460 --> 00:00:43.069 align:start position:0% the same airdrop twice or maybe we want to<00:00:41.579> do<00:00:41.640> an<00:00:41.760> anonymous<00:00:42.120> Message<00:00:42.360> Board<00:00:42.600> in 00:00:43.069 --> 00:00:43.079 align:start position:0% to do an anonymous Message Board in 00:00:43.079 --> 00:00:45.770 align:start position:0% to do an anonymous Message Board in which<00:00:43.200> we<00:00:43.440> know<00:00:44.120> that<00:00:45.120> each<00:00:45.420> of<00:00:45.540> the<00:00:45.660> people 00:00:45.770 --> 00:00:45.780 align:start position:0% which we know that each of the people 00:00:45.780 --> 00:00:47.510 align:start position:0% which we know that each of the people cannot<00:00:46.320> be<00:00:46.440> identified<00:00:46.739> but<00:00:47.040> we<00:00:47.160> know<00:00:47.280> for 00:00:47.510 --> 00:00:47.520 align:start position:0% cannot be identified but we know for 00:00:47.520 --> 00:00:49.369 align:start position:0% cannot be identified but we know for instance<00:00:47.760> that<00:00:48.120> maybe<00:00:48.420> the<00:00:48.660> first<00:00:48.780> poster<00:00:49.200> is 00:00:49.369 --> 00:00:49.379 align:start position:0% instance that maybe the first poster is 00:00:49.379 --> 00:00:51.410 align:start position:0% instance that maybe the first poster is the<00:00:49.500> same<00:00:49.620> as<00:00:49.800> the<00:00:49.920> third<00:00:49.980> poster<00:00:50.460> or<00:00:51.239> imagine 00:00:51.410 --> 00:00:51.420 align:start position:0% the same as the third poster or imagine 00:00:51.420 --> 00:00:53.630 align:start position:0% the same as the third poster or imagine we<00:00:51.719> want<00:00:51.899> to<00:00:51.960> do<00:00:52.079> Anonymous<00:00:52.559> voting<00:00:52.980> within<00:00:53.520> a 00:00:53.630 --> 00:00:53.640 align:start position:0% we want to do Anonymous voting within a 00:00:53.640 --> 00:00:55.549 align:start position:0% we want to do Anonymous voting within a large<00:00:53.760> anonymity<00:00:54.180> set<00:00:54.480> such<00:00:54.960> that<00:00:55.199> the<00:00:55.440> very 00:00:55.549 --> 00:00:55.559 align:start position:0% large anonymity set such that the very 00:00:55.559 --> 00:00:57.529 align:start position:0% large anonymity set such that the very first<00:00:55.680> person<00:00:55.920> to<00:00:56.160> vote<00:00:56.399> has<00:00:56.940> the<00:00:57.120> full<00:00:57.300> power 00:00:57.529 --> 00:00:57.539 align:start position:0% first person to vote has the full power 00:00:57.539 --> 00:00:59.029 align:start position:0% first person to vote has the full power of<00:00:57.840> every<00:00:58.020> single<00:00:58.260> person<00:00:58.440> in<00:00:58.680> this<00:00:58.800> anonymity 00:00:59.029 --> 00:00:59.039 align:start position:0% of every single person in this anonymity 00:00:59.039 --> 00:01:00.170 align:start position:0% of every single person in this anonymity set 00:01:00.170 --> 00:01:00.180 align:start position:0% set 00:01:00.180 --> 00:01:02.330 align:start position:0% set or<00:01:00.780> really<00:01:01.020> any<00:01:01.260> civil<00:01:01.559> resistant<00:01:01.980> Anonymous 00:01:02.330 --> 00:01:02.340 align:start position:0% or really any civil resistant Anonymous 00:01:02.340 --> 00:01:05.570 align:start position:0% or really any civil resistant Anonymous application<00:01:02.820> so<00:01:03.660> we<00:01:03.899> thought<00:01:04.019> about<00:01:04.220> what<00:01:05.220> we 00:01:05.570 --> 00:01:05.580 align:start position:0% application so we thought about what we 00:01:05.580 --> 00:01:09.170 align:start position:0% application so we thought about what we could<00:01:05.700> use<00:01:06.060> to<00:01:06.720> be<00:01:07.500> this<00:01:07.680> kind<00:01:07.860> of<00:01:07.979> tool<00:01:08.340> that 00:01:09.170 --> 00:01:09.180 align:start position:0% could use to be this kind of tool that 00:01:09.180 --> 00:01:10.609 align:start position:0% could use to be this kind of tool that stops<00:01:09.479> us<00:01:09.600> from<00:01:09.780> double<00:01:09.900> spending<00:01:10.320> and<00:01:10.439> it's 00:01:10.609 --> 00:01:10.619 align:start position:0% stops us from double spending and it's 00:01:10.619 --> 00:01:12.649 align:start position:0% stops us from double spending and it's kind<00:01:10.799> of<00:01:10.860> unique<00:01:11.159> identifier<00:01:11.700> of<00:01:12.240> someone<00:01:12.420> on 00:01:12.649 --> 00:01:12.659 align:start position:0% kind of unique identifier of someone on 00:01:12.659 --> 00:01:15.410 align:start position:0% kind of unique identifier of someone on chain<00:01:12.900> and<00:01:13.740> after<00:01:13.979> talking<00:01:14.280> a<00:01:14.520> bunch<00:01:14.640> on 00:01:15.410 --> 00:01:15.420 align:start position:0% chain and after talking a bunch on 00:01:15.420 --> 00:01:17.990 align:start position:0% chain and after talking a bunch on Discord<00:01:15.720> we<00:01:16.619> decided<00:01:16.979> to<00:01:17.220> create<00:01:17.340> a<00:01:17.580> new<00:01:17.640> Zeke 00:01:17.990 --> 00:01:18.000 align:start position:0% Discord we decided to create a new Zeke 00:01:18.000 --> 00:01:20.749 align:start position:0% Discord we decided to create a new Zeke nullifier<00:01:18.420> scheme<00:01:18.780> on<00:01:18.960> ecdsa<00:01:19.680> this<00:01:20.340> is<00:01:20.520> Joint 00:01:20.749 --> 00:01:20.759 align:start position:0% nullifier scheme on ecdsa this is Joint 00:01:20.759 --> 00:01:23.210 align:start position:0% nullifier scheme on ecdsa this is Joint work<00:01:20.939> with<00:01:21.540> Persona<00:01:22.080> Labs<00:01:22.320> geometry<00:01:22.799> research 00:01:23.210 --> 00:01:23.220 align:start position:0% work with Persona Labs geometry research 00:01:23.220 --> 00:01:25.429 align:start position:0% work with Persona Labs geometry research and<00:01:23.880> originally<00:01:24.360> done<00:01:24.600> at<00:01:24.780> Xerox<00:01:25.080> Park<00:01:25.320> and 00:01:25.429 --> 00:01:25.439 align:start position:0% and originally done at Xerox Park and 00:01:25.439 --> 00:01:28.609 align:start position:0% and originally done at Xerox Park and MIT<00:01:26.220> so<00:01:26.939> to<00:01:27.299> kind<00:01:27.479> of<00:01:27.600> clarify<00:01:28.020> what<00:01:28.320> exactly 00:01:28.609 --> 00:01:28.619 align:start position:0% MIT so to kind of clarify what exactly 00:01:28.619 --> 00:01:30.830 align:start position:0% MIT so to kind of clarify what exactly this<00:01:28.799> nullifier<00:01:29.280> is<00:01:29.580> let's<00:01:30.180> try<00:01:30.360> to<00:01:30.479> maybe<00:01:30.600> go 00:01:30.830 --> 00:01:30.840 align:start position:0% this nullifier is let's try to maybe go 00:01:30.840 --> 00:01:32.149 align:start position:0% this nullifier is let's try to maybe go through<00:01:30.960> some<00:01:31.140> properties 00:01:32.149 --> 00:01:32.159 align:start position:0% through some properties 00:01:32.159 --> 00:01:34.310 align:start position:0% through some properties so<00:01:32.580> if<00:01:32.700> you<00:01:32.820> want<00:01:32.939> to<00:01:33.060> avoid<00:01:33.360> people<00:01:33.720> from 00:01:34.310 --> 00:01:34.320 align:start position:0% so if you want to avoid people from 00:01:34.320 --> 00:01:35.929 align:start position:0% so if you want to avoid people from double<00:01:34.560> spending<00:01:35.100> and<00:01:35.340> we<00:01:35.460> want<00:01:35.640> each<00:01:35.820> person 00:01:35.929 --> 00:01:35.939 align:start position:0% double spending and we want each person 00:01:35.939 --> 00:01:38.569 align:start position:0% double spending and we want each person to<00:01:36.240> claim<00:01:36.479> only<00:01:36.900> once<00:01:37.320> then<00:01:38.040> we<00:01:38.220> need<00:01:38.400> this 00:01:38.569 --> 00:01:38.579 align:start position:0% to claim only once then we need this 00:01:38.579 --> 00:01:40.969 align:start position:0% to claim only once then we need this property<00:01:38.939> this<00:01:39.299> this<00:01:39.540> identifier<00:01:40.320> outputted 00:01:40.969 --> 00:01:40.979 align:start position:0% property this this identifier outputted 00:01:40.979 --> 00:01:42.710 align:start position:0% property this this identifier outputted by<00:01:41.040> this<00:01:41.159> account<00:01:41.280> to<00:01:41.579> be<00:01:41.700> unique<00:01:42.060> that<00:01:42.600> is 00:01:42.710 --> 00:01:42.720 align:start position:0% by this account to be unique that is 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ethereum public-private<00:01:48.720> key<00:01:48.780> pair<00:01:49.020> I<00:01:49.560> should<00:01:49.680> only<00:01:49.860> be 00:01:49.969 --> 00:01:49.979 align:start position:0% public-private key pair I should only be 00:01:49.979 --> 00:01:51.950 align:start position:0% public-private key pair I should only be able<00:01:50.159> to<00:01:50.280> generate<00:01:50.939> one<00:01:51.240> of<00:01:51.299> these<00:01:51.479> signals 00:01:51.950 --> 00:01:51.960 align:start position:0% able to generate one of these signals 00:01:51.960 --> 00:01:54.590 align:start position:0% able to generate one of these signals finally<00:01:52.680> the<00:01:52.920> signal<00:01:53.220> I<00:01:53.399> generate<00:01:53.939> should<00:01:54.479> be 00:01:54.590 --> 00:01:54.600 align:start position:0% finally the signal I generate should be 00:01:54.600 --> 00:01:56.149 align:start position:0% finally the signal I generate should be verifiable<00:01:55.079> without<00:01:55.380> access<00:01:55.619> to<00:01:55.860> my<00:01:55.979> secret 00:01:56.149 --> 00:01:56.159 align:start position:0% verifiable without access to my secret 00:01:56.159 --> 00:01:58.789 align:start position:0% verifiable without access to my secret key<00:01:56.460> this<00:01:57.119> is<00:01:57.240> because<00:01:57.420> in<00:01:58.020> a<00:01:58.200> ledger<00:01:58.439> wallet 00:01:58.789 --> 00:01:58.799 align:start position:0% key this is because in a ledger wallet 00:01:58.799 --> 00:02:00.770 align:start position:0% key this is because in a ledger wallet or<00:01:59.040> in<00:01:59.159> a<00:01:59.280> secure<00:01:59.460> Enclave<00:01:59.820> it's<00:02:00.299> not<00:02:00.479> possible 00:02:00.770 --> 00:02:00.780 align:start position:0% or in a secure Enclave it's not possible 00:02:00.780 --> 00:02:02.630 align:start position:0% or in a secure Enclave it's not possible to<00:02:00.960> even<00:02:01.140> read<00:02:01.320> the<00:02:01.500> secret<00:02:01.619> key<00:02:01.920> or<00:02:02.399> take<00:02:02.520> it 00:02:02.630 --> 00:02:02.640 align:start position:0% to even read the secret key or take it 00:02:02.640 --> 00:02:04.670 align:start position:0% to even read the secret key or take it out<00:02:02.759> of<00:02:02.880> the<00:02:02.939> secure<00:02:03.119> Enclave<00:02:03.479> we<00:02:04.259> also<00:02:04.500> don't 00:02:04.670 --> 00:02:04.680 align:start position:0% out of the secure Enclave we also don't 00:02:04.680 --> 00:02:06.649 align:start position:0% out of the secure Enclave we also don't want<00:02:04.920> users<00:02:05.460> copy<00:02:05.759> pasting<00:02:06.119> their<00:02:06.240> private 00:02:06.649 --> 00:02:06.659 align:start position:0% want users copy pasting their private 00:02:06.659 --> 00:02:08.930 align:start position:0% want users copy pasting their private Keys<00:02:07.020> all<00:02:07.560> over<00:02:07.680> the<00:02:07.920> place 00:02:08.930 --> 00:02:08.940 align:start position:0% Keys all over the place 00:02:08.940 --> 00:02:11.630 align:start position:0% Keys all over the place and<00:02:09.539> finally<00:02:09.780> we<00:02:10.200> want<00:02:10.380> this<00:02:10.800> number<00:02:11.280> this 00:02:11.630 --> 00:02:11.640 align:start position:0% and finally we want this number this 00:02:11.640 --> 00:02:13.309 align:start position:0% and finally we want this number this scheme<00:02:11.940> to<00:02:12.120> be<00:02:12.300> completely<00:02:12.540> non-interactive 00:02:13.309 --> 00:02:13.319 align:start position:0% scheme to be completely non-interactive 00:02:13.319 --> 00:02:15.110 align:start position:0% scheme to be completely non-interactive if<00:02:13.920> you've<00:02:14.099> heard<00:02:14.220> of<00:02:14.340> nullifiers<00:02:14.819> before<00:02:14.940> you 00:02:15.110 --> 00:02:15.120 align:start position:0% if you've heard of nullifiers before you 00:02:15.120 --> 00:02:15.890 align:start position:0% if you've heard of nullifiers before you might<00:02:15.300> have<00:02:15.360> heard<00:02:15.480> of<00:02:15.599> something<00:02:15.720> like 00:02:15.890 --> 00:02:15.900 align:start position:0% might have heard of something like 00:02:15.900 --> 00:02:17.869 align:start position:0% might have heard of something like tornado<00:02:16.200> cache<00:02:16.560> or<00:02:16.620> semaphore<00:02:17.099> and<00:02:17.580> the<00:02:17.760> way 00:02:17.869 --> 00:02:17.879 align:start position:0% tornado cache or semaphore and the way 00:02:17.879 --> 00:02:19.910 align:start position:0% tornado cache or semaphore and the way that<00:02:18.000> works<00:02:18.239> is<00:02:18.360> that<00:02:18.540> as<00:02:18.900> people<00:02:19.140> sign<00:02:19.379> up<00:02:19.560> the 00:02:19.910 --> 00:02:19.920 align:start position:0% that works is that as people sign up the 00:02:19.920 --> 00:02:21.410 align:start position:0% that works is that as people sign up the anonymity<00:02:20.220> set<00:02:20.580> grows<00:02:20.879> bigger<00:02:21.120> and<00:02:21.180> bigger 00:02:21.410 --> 00:02:21.420 align:start position:0% anonymity set grows bigger and bigger 00:02:21.420 --> 00:02:23.330 align:start position:0% anonymity set grows bigger and bigger and<00:02:21.540> bigger<00:02:21.840> however<00:02:22.379> the<00:02:22.739> first<00:02:22.860> person<00:02:23.040> to 00:02:23.330 --> 00:02:23.340 align:start position:0% and bigger however the first person to 00:02:23.340 --> 00:02:24.949 align:start position:0% and bigger however the first person to use<00:02:23.459> tornado<00:02:23.760> cash<00:02:23.940> or<00:02:24.180> the<00:02:24.300> first<00:02:24.420> person<00:02:24.599> to 00:02:24.949 --> 00:02:24.959 align:start position:0% use tornado cash or the first person to 00:02:24.959 --> 00:02:26.809 align:start position:0% use tornado cash or the first person to sign<00:02:25.140> up<00:02:25.200> for<00:02:25.319> a<00:02:25.440> semaphore<00:02:25.739> group<00:02:25.980> has<00:02:26.459> zero 00:02:26.809 --> 00:02:26.819 align:start position:0% sign up for a semaphore group has zero 00:02:26.819 --> 00:02:29.449 align:start position:0% sign up for a semaphore group has zero anonymity<00:02:27.239> until<00:02:27.840> more<00:02:28.140> people<00:02:28.319> join<00:02:28.739> but<00:02:29.280> if 00:02:29.449 --> 00:02:29.459 align:start position:0% anonymity until more people join but if 00:02:29.459 --> 00:02:31.070 align:start position:0% anonymity until more people join but if we<00:02:29.580> want<00:02:29.760> the<00:02:30.000> full<00:02:30.239> power<00:02:30.480> of<00:02:30.720> the<00:02:30.900> entire 00:02:31.070 --> 00:02:31.080 align:start position:0% we want the full power of the entire 00:02:31.080 --> 00:02:32.869 align:start position:0% we want the full power of the entire anonymity<00:02:31.560> set<00:02:31.860> for<00:02:32.099> the<00:02:32.280> very<00:02:32.400> first<00:02:32.580> person 00:02:32.869 --> 00:02:32.879 align:start position:0% anonymity set for the very first person 00:02:32.879 --> 00:02:34.970 align:start position:0% anonymity set for the very first person we<00:02:33.540> need<00:02:33.660> the<00:02:33.780> scheme<00:02:34.080> to<00:02:34.200> be<00:02:34.260> non-interactive 00:02:34.970 --> 00:02:34.980 align:start position:0% we need the scheme to be non-interactive 00:02:34.980 --> 00:02:36.470 align:start position:0% we need the scheme to be non-interactive that<00:02:35.400> is<00:02:35.520> there<00:02:35.700> shouldn't<00:02:35.940> be<00:02:36.060> two<00:02:36.180> phases 00:02:36.470 --> 00:02:36.480 align:start position:0% that is there shouldn't be two phases 00:02:36.480 --> 00:02:38.690 align:start position:0% that is there shouldn't be two phases like<00:02:36.660> a<00:02:36.840> sign<00:02:36.959> up<00:02:37.140> phase<00:02:37.440> and<00:02:37.860> a<00:02:38.040> utility<00:02:38.280> phase 00:02:38.690 --> 00:02:38.700 align:start position:0% like a sign up phase and a utility phase 00:02:38.700 --> 00:02:40.369 align:start position:0% like a sign up phase and a utility phase so<00:02:39.420> to<00:02:39.540> understand<00:02:39.660> these<00:02:39.959> properties<00:02:40.200> a 00:02:40.369 --> 00:02:40.379 align:start position:0% so to understand these properties a 00:02:40.379 --> 00:02:42.110 align:start position:0% so to understand these properties a little<00:02:40.440> bit<00:02:40.560> more<00:02:40.739> one<00:02:41.340> useful<00:02:41.640> exercise<00:02:41.879> is 00:02:42.110 --> 00:02:42.120 align:start position:0% little bit more one useful exercise is 00:02:42.120 --> 00:02:43.790 align:start position:0% little bit more one useful exercise is to<00:02:42.300> go<00:02:42.420> through<00:02:42.540> some<00:02:42.840> examples<00:02:43.200> of<00:02:43.379> schemes 00:02:43.790 --> 00:02:43.800 align:start position:0% to go through some examples of schemes 00:02:43.800 --> 00:02:46.190 align:start position:0% to go through some examples of schemes that<00:02:44.280> may<00:02:44.459> work<00:02:44.640> or<00:02:44.819> may<00:02:45.000> not<00:02:45.180> work<00:02:45.360> so<00:02:46.019> imagine 00:02:46.190 --> 00:02:46.200 align:start position:0% that may work or may not work so imagine 00:02:46.200 --> 00:02:49.009 align:start position:0% that may work or may not work so imagine when<00:02:47.040> we<00:02:47.160> wanted<00:02:47.280> someone<00:02:47.640> to<00:02:48.360> post<00:02:48.780> this 00:02:49.009 --> 00:02:49.019 align:start position:0% when we wanted someone to post this 00:02:49.019 --> 00:02:50.390 align:start position:0% when we wanted someone to post this deterministic<00:02:49.680> value<00:02:49.860> that<00:02:50.040> identified 00:02:50.390 --> 00:02:50.400 align:start position:0% deterministic value that identified 00:02:50.400 --> 00:02:51.589 align:start position:0% deterministic value that identified themselves<00:02:50.760> that<00:02:50.940> stop<00:02:51.180> them<00:02:51.360> from<00:02:51.480> double 00:02:51.589 --> 00:02:51.599 align:start position:0% themselves that stop them from double 00:02:51.599 --> 00:02:53.809 align:start position:0% themselves that stop them from double claiming<00:02:52.080> or<00:02:52.739> stop<00:02:52.980> them<00:02:53.160> from<00:02:53.280> double<00:02:53.400> voting 00:02:53.809 --> 00:02:53.819 align:start position:0% claiming or stop them from double voting 00:02:53.819 --> 00:02:55.910 align:start position:0% claiming or stop them from double voting but<00:02:54.300> they<00:02:54.480> use<00:02:54.660> the<00:02:54.900> hash<00:02:55.140> of<00:02:55.319> a<00:02:55.440> deterministic 00:02:55.910 --> 00:02:55.920 align:start position:0% but they use the hash of a deterministic 00:02:55.920 --> 00:02:57.770 align:start position:0% but they use the hash of a deterministic ecdsa<00:02:56.640> signature 00:02:57.770 --> 00:02:57.780 align:start position:0% ecdsa signature 00:02:57.780 --> 00:02:59.630 align:start position:0% ecdsa signature now<00:02:58.379> you<00:02:58.680> might<00:02:58.800> guess<00:02:58.980> that<00:02:59.160> this<00:02:59.340> has<00:02:59.459> all 00:02:59.630 --> 00:02:59.640 align:start position:0% now you might guess that this has all 00:02:59.640 --> 00:03:01.729 align:start position:0% now you might guess that this has all the<00:02:59.760> properties<00:02:59.940> we<00:03:00.120> want<00:03:00.300> it's<00:03:00.900> Unique<00:03:01.319> if 00:03:01.729 --> 00:03:01.739 align:start position:0% the properties we want it's Unique if 00:03:01.739 --> 00:03:04.009 align:start position:0% the properties we want it's Unique if you're<00:03:01.860> signing<00:03:02.220> a<00:03:02.340> message<00:03:02.519> a<00:03:03.480> deterministic 00:03:04.009 --> 00:03:04.019 align:start position:0% you're signing a message a deterministic 00:03:04.019 --> 00:03:06.050 align:start position:0% you're signing a message a deterministic signature<00:03:04.379> there<00:03:04.500> should<00:03:04.620> only<00:03:04.739> be<00:03:04.860> one 00:03:06.050 --> 00:03:06.060 align:start position:0% signature there should only be one 00:03:06.060 --> 00:03:08.390 align:start position:0% signature there should only be one um<00:03:06.180> it's<00:03:06.780> it's<00:03:07.080> uh<00:03:07.379> non-interactive<00:03:07.980> anyone 00:03:08.390 --> 00:03:08.400 align:start position:0% um it's it's uh non-interactive anyone 00:03:08.400 --> 00:03:09.770 align:start position:0% um it's it's uh non-interactive anyone could<00:03:08.519> generate<00:03:08.760> a<00:03:08.819> signature<00:03:09.180> and<00:03:09.599> blend 00:03:09.770 --> 00:03:09.780 align:start position:0% could generate a signature and blend 00:03:09.780 --> 00:03:11.990 align:start position:0% could generate a signature and blend into<00:03:09.900> the<00:03:10.080> anonymity<00:03:10.319> Set<00:03:10.620> uh<00:03:11.519> you<00:03:11.700> don't<00:03:11.879> need 00:03:11.990 --> 00:03:12.000 align:start position:0% into the anonymity Set uh you don't need 00:03:12.000 --> 00:03:13.610 align:start position:0% into the anonymity Set uh you don't need people<00:03:12.180> to<00:03:12.540> to<00:03:12.659> interact<00:03:13.019> and<00:03:13.200> sign<00:03:13.440> up<00:03:13.500> for 00:03:13.610 --> 00:03:13.620 align:start position:0% people to to interact and sign up for 00:03:13.620 --> 00:03:15.229 align:start position:0% people to to interact and sign up for the<00:03:13.739> scheme<00:03:14.040> first<00:03:14.159> however<00:03:14.700> the<00:03:14.940> issue<00:03:15.120> of 00:03:15.229 --> 00:03:15.239 align:start position:0% the scheme first however the issue of 00:03:15.239 --> 00:03:17.210 align:start position:0% the scheme first however the issue of determines<00:03:15.480> the<00:03:15.659> ecdsa<00:03:16.200> signatures<00:03:16.620> is<00:03:17.040> that 00:03:17.210 --> 00:03:17.220 align:start position:0% determines the ecdsa signatures is that 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access<00:03:23.819> to<00:03:24.120> the<00:03:24.239> private<00:03:24.540> key<00:03:24.720> that 00:03:25.490 --> 00:03:25.500 align:start position:0% you have access to the private key that 00:03:25.500 --> 00:03:27.530 align:start position:0% you have access to the private key that is<00:03:25.739> deterministic<00:03:26.580> EC<00:03:26.760> Dasa<00:03:27.060> signatures<00:03:27.420> are 00:03:27.530 --> 00:03:27.540 align:start position:0% is deterministic EC Dasa signatures are 00:03:27.540 --> 00:03:29.089 align:start position:0% is deterministic EC Dasa signatures are identical<00:03:27.780> to<00:03:27.959> non-deterministic<00:03:28.560> ecdsa 00:03:29.089 --> 00:03:29.099 align:start position:0% identical to non-deterministic ecdsa 00:03:29.099 --> 00:03:30.949 align:start position:0% identical to non-deterministic ecdsa signatures<00:03:29.519> because<00:03:29.879> the<00:03:30.239> randomness<00:03:30.659> is 00:03:30.949 --> 00:03:30.959 align:start position:0% signatures because the randomness is 00:03:30.959 --> 00:03:33.050 align:start position:0% signatures because the randomness is like<00:03:31.080> the<00:03:31.200> hash<00:03:31.379> of<00:03:31.560> the<00:03:31.680> private<00:03:31.980> key<00:03:32.099> and<00:03:32.879> so 00:03:33.050 --> 00:03:33.060 align:start position:0% like the hash of the private key and so 00:03:33.060 --> 00:03:34.729 align:start position:0% like the hash of the private key and so if<00:03:33.300> you're<00:03:33.360> trying<00:03:33.540> to<00:03:33.659> verify<00:03:33.959> this<00:03:34.200> on<00:03:34.560> chain 00:03:34.729 --> 00:03:34.739 align:start position:0% if you're trying to verify this on chain 00:03:34.739 --> 00:03:36.350 align:start position:0% if you're trying to verify this on chain or<00:03:34.980> in<00:03:35.099> a<00:03:35.220> ZK<00:03:35.400> snark<00:03:35.700> you<00:03:36.060> would<00:03:36.120> need<00:03:36.239> the 00:03:36.350 --> 00:03:36.360 align:start position:0% or in a ZK snark you would need the 00:03:36.360 --> 00:03:38.089 align:start position:0% or in a ZK snark you would need the private<00:03:36.659> key<00:03:36.780> so<00:03:37.080> it<00:03:37.200> doesn't<00:03:37.319> quite<00:03:37.739> achieve 00:03:38.089 --> 00:03:38.099 align:start position:0% private key so it doesn't quite achieve 00:03:38.099 --> 00:03:39.949 align:start position:0% private key so it doesn't quite achieve what<00:03:38.220> we<00:03:38.340> want<00:03:38.459> it<00:03:38.640> to<00:03:38.700> achieve<00:03:39.000> a<00:03:39.480> second<00:03:39.599> idea 00:03:39.949 --> 00:03:39.959 align:start position:0% what we want it to achieve a second idea 00:03:39.959 --> 00:03:41.449 align:start position:0% what we want it to achieve a second idea is<00:03:40.200> this<00:03:40.379> idea<00:03:40.620> called<00:03:40.799> a<00:03:40.980> verifiable 00:03:41.449 --> 00:03:41.459 align:start position:0% is this idea called a verifiable 00:03:41.459 --> 00:03:43.369 align:start position:0% is this idea called a verifiable unpredictable<00:03:42.000> function<00:03:42.420> or<00:03:43.019> a<00:03:43.140> unique 00:03:43.369 --> 00:03:43.379 align:start position:0% unpredictable function or a unique 00:03:43.379 --> 00:03:45.830 align:start position:0% unpredictable function or a unique signature<00:03:43.860> now<00:03:44.760> the<00:03:45.060> vast<00:03:45.239> majority<00:03:45.599> of<00:03:45.720> the 00:03:45.830 --> 00:03:45.840 align:start position:0% signature now the vast majority of the 00:03:45.840 --> 00:03:47.449 align:start position:0% signature now the vast majority of the schemes<00:03:46.200> for<00:03:46.379> these<00:03:46.620> are<00:03:46.980> on<00:03:47.159> pairing 00:03:47.449 --> 00:03:47.459 align:start position:0% schemes for these are on pairing 00:03:47.459 --> 00:03:49.789 align:start position:0% schemes for these are on pairing friendly<00:03:47.760> curves<00:03:48.060> and 00:03:49.789 --> 00:03:49.799 align:start position:0% friendly curves and 00:03:49.799 --> 00:03:52.729 align:start position:0% friendly curves and ethereum<00:03:50.580> which<00:03:50.819> is<00:03:50.879> on<00:03:51.000> ecgsa<00:03:51.599> on<00:03:51.780> SEC<00:03:52.019> B<00:03:52.260> 256 00:03:52.729 --> 00:03:52.739 align:start position:0% ethereum which is on ecgsa on SEC B 256 00:03:52.739 --> 00:03:55.250 align:start position:0% ethereum which is on ecgsa on SEC B 256 K1<00:03:53.159> is<00:03:53.700> not<00:03:53.879> a<00:03:54.000> pairing<00:03:54.299> friendly<00:03:54.540> curve<00:03:54.840> so 00:03:55.250 --> 00:03:55.260 align:start position:0% K1 is not a pairing friendly curve so 00:03:55.260 --> 00:03:56.690 align:start position:0% K1 is not a pairing friendly curve so the<00:03:55.440> vast<00:03:55.620> majority<00:03:55.920> of<00:03:55.980> this<00:03:56.099> literature<00:03:56.519> is 00:03:56.690 --> 00:03:56.700 align:start position:0% the vast majority of this literature is 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imagine this is unique every<00:04:03.000> account<00:04:03.239> every<00:04:03.540> public<00:04:03.780> key<00:04:03.959> has<00:04:04.200> a 00:04:04.309 --> 00:04:04.319 align:start position:0% every account every public key has a 00:04:04.319 --> 00:04:05.809 align:start position:0% every account every public key has a different<00:04:04.379> value<00:04:04.620> of<00:04:04.799> this<00:04:04.920> hash<00:04:05.159> it's 00:04:05.809 --> 00:04:05.819 align:start position:0% different value of this hash it's 00:04:05.819 --> 00:04:07.430 align:start position:0% different value of this hash it's deterministic<00:04:06.480> if<00:04:06.659> you<00:04:06.780> have<00:04:06.900> a<00:04:07.080> public<00:04:07.140> key 00:04:07.430 --> 00:04:07.440 align:start position:0% deterministic if you have a public key 00:04:07.440 --> 00:04:09.229 align:start position:0% deterministic if you have a public key and<00:04:07.920> there's<00:04:08.040> some<00:04:08.220> message<00:04:08.459> say<00:04:08.760> the<00:04:08.879> app<00:04:09.000> ID 00:04:09.229 --> 00:04:09.239 align:start position:0% and there's some message say the app ID 00:04:09.239 --> 00:04:11.690 align:start position:0% and there's some message say the app ID then<00:04:09.840> this<00:04:10.019> hash<00:04:10.200> is<00:04:10.439> deterministic 00:04:11.690 --> 00:04:11.700 align:start position:0% then this hash is deterministic 00:04:11.700 --> 00:04:13.369 align:start position:0% then this hash is deterministic it's<00:04:12.000> verifiable<00:04:12.540> without<00:04:12.780> your<00:04:13.019> private<00:04:13.260> key 00:04:13.369 --> 00:04:13.379 align:start position:0% it's verifiable without your private key 00:04:13.379 --> 00:04:15.589 align:start position:0% it's verifiable without your private key and<00:04:14.159> it's<00:04:14.280> not<00:04:14.459> interactive<00:04:14.939> you<00:04:15.239> can<00:04:15.299> give 00:04:15.589 --> 00:04:15.599 align:start position:0% and it's not interactive you can give 00:04:15.599 --> 00:04:16.990 align:start position:0% and it's not interactive you can give this<00:04:15.720> hash<00:04:15.900> without<00:04:16.139> signing<00:04:16.500> up<00:04:16.560> in<00:04:16.680> advance 00:04:16.990 --> 00:04:17.000 align:start position:0% this hash without signing up in advance 00:04:17.000 --> 00:04:20.390 align:start position:0% this hash without signing up in advance now<00:04:18.000> the<00:04:18.540> issue<00:04:18.720> with<00:04:18.959> this<00:04:19.199> is<00:04:19.680> that<00:04:19.919> it's<00:04:20.280> a 00:04:20.390 --> 00:04:20.400 align:start position:0% now the issue with this is that it's a 00:04:20.400 --> 00:04:21.409 align:start position:0% now the issue with this is that it's a little<00:04:20.459> bit<00:04:20.579> subtle<00:04:20.880> but<00:04:21.120> it's<00:04:21.239> actually 00:04:21.409 --> 00:04:21.419 align:start position:0% little bit subtle but it's actually 00:04:21.419 --> 00:04:23.510 align:start position:0% little bit subtle but it's actually possible<00:04:21.780> to<00:04:22.079> de-anonymize<00:04:22.680> people<00:04:22.919> who<00:04:23.400> are 00:04:23.510 --> 00:04:23.520 align:start position:0% possible to de-anonymize people who are 00:04:23.520 --> 00:04:25.070 align:start position:0% possible to de-anonymize people who are using<00:04:23.759> this<00:04:23.880> for<00:04:24.000> anonymity 00:04:25.070 --> 00:04:25.080 align:start position:0% using this for anonymity 00:04:25.080 --> 00:04:27.469 align:start position:0% using this for anonymity the<00:04:25.500> way<00:04:25.680> you<00:04:25.800> do<00:04:25.919> that<00:04:26.040> is<00:04:26.759> you<00:04:27.060> can<00:04:27.180> take<00:04:27.300> the 00:04:27.469 --> 00:04:27.479 align:start position:0% the way you do that is you can take the 00:04:27.479 --> 00:04:30.050 align:start position:0% the way you do that is you can take the list<00:04:27.600> of<00:04:27.900> all<00:04:28.320> 200<00:04:28.919> 400<00:04:29.220> million<00:04:29.520> private<00:04:29.820> keys 00:04:30.050 --> 00:04:30.060 align:start position:0% list of all 200 400 million private keys 00:04:30.060 --> 00:04:32.390 align:start position:0% list of all 200 400 million private keys on<00:04:30.180> ethereum<00:04:30.600> calculate<00:04:31.560> the<00:04:31.919> hash<00:04:32.040> values 00:04:32.390 --> 00:04:32.400 align:start position:0% on ethereum calculate the hash values 00:04:32.400 --> 00:04:34.310 align:start position:0% on ethereum calculate the hash values for<00:04:32.580> every<00:04:32.759> single<00:04:33.000> one<00:04:33.180> and<00:04:33.840> match<00:04:33.960> it<00:04:34.199> up 00:04:34.310 --> 00:04:34.320 align:start position:0% for every single one and match it up 00:04:34.320 --> 00:04:36.469 align:start position:0% for every single one and match it up with<00:04:34.620> this<00:04:34.800> nullifier<00:04:35.220> value<00:04:35.460> on<00:04:35.699> chain<00:04:35.880> and 00:04:36.469 --> 00:04:36.479 align:start position:0% with this nullifier value on chain and 00:04:36.479 --> 00:04:37.850 align:start position:0% with this nullifier value on chain and boom<00:04:36.720> you've<00:04:36.840> de-anonymized<00:04:37.440> a<00:04:37.500> person<00:04:37.620> who 00:04:37.850 --> 00:04:37.860 align:start position:0% boom you've de-anonymized a person who 00:04:37.860 --> 00:04:38.810 align:start position:0% boom you've de-anonymized a person who tried<00:04:38.040> to<00:04:38.100> use<00:04:38.220> this<00:04:38.340> as<00:04:38.520> their<00:04:38.639> unique 00:04:38.810 --> 00:04:38.820 align:start position:0% tried to use this as their unique 00:04:38.820 --> 00:04:40.010 align:start position:0% tried to use this as their unique identifier 00:04:40.010 --> 00:04:40.020 align:start position:0% identifier 00:04:40.020 --> 00:04:41.689 align:start position:0% identifier maybe<00:04:40.440> kind<00:04:40.800> of<00:04:40.860> getting<00:04:41.040> inspired<00:04:41.460> by<00:04:41.580> this 00:04:41.689 --> 00:04:41.699 align:start position:0% maybe kind of getting inspired by this 00:04:41.699 --> 00:04:43.010 align:start position:0% maybe kind of getting inspired by this we<00:04:41.880> can<00:04:42.000> try<00:04:42.180> something<00:04:42.360> like<00:04:42.600> hash<00:04:42.780> of 00:04:43.010 --> 00:04:43.020 align:start position:0% we can try something like hash of 00:04:43.020 --> 00:04:44.930 align:start position:0% we can try something like hash of message<00:04:43.199> comma<00:04:43.680> secret<00:04:43.800> key 00:04:44.930 --> 00:04:44.940 align:start position:0% message comma secret key 00:04:44.940 --> 00:04:46.909 align:start position:0% message comma secret key you'd<00:04:45.360> imagine<00:04:45.540> this<00:04:45.840> is<00:04:46.020> similar<00:04:46.320> to<00:04:46.440> the<00:04:46.680> the 00:04:46.909 --> 00:04:46.919 align:start position:0% you'd imagine this is similar to the the 00:04:46.919 --> 00:04:49.010 align:start position:0% you'd imagine this is similar to the the public<00:04:47.160> key<00:04:47.400> case<00:04:47.699> except 00:04:49.010 --> 00:04:49.020 align:start position:0% public key case except 00:04:49.020 --> 00:04:50.689 align:start position:0% public key case except you<00:04:49.500> can't<00:04:49.560> take<00:04:49.860> everyone's<00:04:50.160> secret<00:04:50.280> key<00:04:50.520> on 00:04:50.689 --> 00:04:50.699 align:start position:0% you can't take everyone's secret key on 00:04:50.699 --> 00:04:51.710 align:start position:0% you can't take everyone's secret key on chain<00:04:50.820> because<00:04:51.060> you<00:04:51.180> don't<00:04:51.300> know<00:04:51.419> everyone's 00:04:51.710 --> 00:04:51.720 align:start position:0% chain because you don't know everyone's 00:04:51.720 --> 00:04:52.909 align:start position:0% chain because you don't know everyone's secret<00:04:51.900> key<00:04:52.139> so<00:04:52.320> it's<00:04:52.440> not<00:04:52.560> possible<00:04:52.800> to 00:04:52.909 --> 00:04:52.919 align:start position:0% secret key so it's not possible to 00:04:52.919 --> 00:04:54.650 align:start position:0% secret key so it's not possible to anonymize<00:04:53.400> people<00:04:53.520> in<00:04:53.699> the<00:04:53.820> same<00:04:53.940> way 00:04:54.650 --> 00:04:54.660 align:start position:0% anonymize people in the same way 00:04:54.660 --> 00:04:56.330 align:start position:0% anonymize people in the same way but<00:04:55.139> the<00:04:55.259> issue<00:04:55.440> is<00:04:55.560> to<00:04:55.800> verify<00:04:56.100> something 00:04:56.330 --> 00:04:56.340 align:start position:0% but the issue is to verify something 00:04:56.340 --> 00:04:57.950 align:start position:0% but the issue is to verify something that's<00:04:56.580> behind<00:04:56.880> a<00:04:57.060> hash<00:04:57.240> you<00:04:57.780> have<00:04:57.900> to 00:04:57.950 --> 00:04:57.960 align:start position:0% that's behind a hash you have to 00:04:57.960 --> 00:04:59.270 align:start position:0% that's behind a hash you have to calculate<00:04:58.320> the<00:04:58.500> entire<00:04:58.680> hash<00:04:58.979> function 00:04:59.270 --> 00:04:59.280 align:start position:0% calculate the entire hash function 00:04:59.280 --> 00:05:01.010 align:start position:0% calculate the entire hash function inside<00:04:59.880> the<00:05:00.120> xero<00:05:00.479> knowledge<00:05:00.660> proof<00:05:00.900> or 00:05:01.010 --> 00:05:01.020 align:start position:0% inside the xero knowledge proof or 00:05:01.020 --> 00:05:02.689 align:start position:0% inside the xero knowledge proof or inside<00:05:01.199> whatever<00:05:01.560> identity<00:05:02.460> primitive 00:05:02.689 --> 00:05:02.699 align:start position:0% inside whatever identity primitive 00:05:02.699 --> 00:05:04.790 align:start position:0% inside whatever identity primitive you're<00:05:02.880> using<00:05:03.240> and<00:05:03.840> we<00:05:04.020> don't<00:05:04.139> want<00:05:04.259> to<00:05:04.380> use 00:05:04.790 --> 00:05:04.800 align:start position:0% you're using and we don't want to use 00:05:04.800 --> 00:05:06.890 align:start position:0% you're using and we don't want to use this<00:05:04.979> copy<00:05:05.280> around<00:05:05.400> the<00:05:05.699> secret<00:05:05.880> key<00:05:06.240> and<00:05:06.720> so 00:05:06.890 --> 00:05:06.900 align:start position:0% this copy around the secret key and so 00:05:06.900 --> 00:05:08.930 align:start position:0% this copy around the secret key and so this<00:05:07.199> scheme<00:05:07.680> isn't<00:05:07.979> quite<00:05:08.220> it 00:05:08.930 --> 00:05:08.940 align:start position:0% this scheme isn't quite it 00:05:08.940 --> 00:05:12.050 align:start position:0% this scheme isn't quite it so<00:05:09.360> finally<00:05:09.680> we<00:05:10.680> resolved<00:05:11.280> on<00:05:11.460> this<00:05:11.580> scheme<00:05:11.880> we 00:05:12.050 --> 00:05:12.060 align:start position:0% so finally we resolved on this scheme we 00:05:12.060 --> 00:05:13.850 align:start position:0% so finally we resolved on this scheme we use<00:05:12.240> a<00:05:12.419> hash<00:05:12.600> of<00:05:12.780> message<00:05:12.960> from<00:05:13.320> a<00:05:13.440> public<00:05:13.620> key 00:05:13.850 --> 00:05:13.860 align:start position:0% use a hash of message from a public key 00:05:13.860 --> 00:05:16.370 align:start position:0% use a hash of message from a public key to<00:05:14.340> the<00:05:14.460> power<00:05:14.580> of<00:05:14.820> secret<00:05:14.940> key<00:05:15.720> it's<00:05:16.139> kind<00:05:16.320> of 00:05:16.370 --> 00:05:16.380 align:start position:0% to the power of secret key it's kind of 00:05:16.380 --> 00:05:17.810 align:start position:0% to the power of secret key it's kind of similar<00:05:16.680> to<00:05:16.800> the<00:05:16.979> other<00:05:17.100> schemes<00:05:17.520> but<00:05:17.699> it 00:05:17.810 --> 00:05:17.820 align:start position:0% similar to the other schemes but it 00:05:17.820 --> 00:05:19.670 align:start position:0% similar to the other schemes but it turns<00:05:18.120> out<00:05:18.180> it<00:05:18.660> has<00:05:18.840> this<00:05:19.020> nice<00:05:19.199> property<00:05:19.500> that 00:05:19.670 --> 00:05:19.680 align:start position:0% turns out it has this nice property that 00:05:19.680 --> 00:05:21.950 align:start position:0% turns out it has this nice property that is<00:05:19.800> a<00:05:19.919> ddh<00:05:20.280> vrf<00:05:20.820> or<00:05:21.419> a<00:05:21.600> decisional 00:05:21.950 --> 00:05:21.960 align:start position:0% is a ddh vrf or a decisional 00:05:21.960 --> 00:05:23.450 align:start position:0% is a ddh vrf or a decisional diffie-hellman<00:05:22.620> verifiable<00:05:23.039> random 00:05:23.450 --> 00:05:23.460 align:start position:0% diffie-hellman verifiable random 00:05:23.460 --> 00:05:25.670 align:start position:0% diffie-hellman verifiable random function<00:05:23.780> and<00:05:24.780> specifically<00:05:25.259> what<00:05:25.500> this 00:05:25.670 --> 00:05:25.680 align:start position:0% function and specifically what this 00:05:25.680 --> 00:05:27.590 align:start position:0% function and specifically what this means<00:05:25.979> is<00:05:26.160> that<00:05:26.340> we<00:05:26.520> can<00:05:26.639> verify<00:05:27.060> that<00:05:27.300> this<00:05:27.419> is 00:05:27.590 --> 00:05:27.600 align:start position:0% means is that we can verify that this is 00:05:27.600 --> 00:05:29.150 align:start position:0% means is that we can verify that this is actually<00:05:27.780> calculated<00:05:28.199> correctly<00:05:28.680> without 00:05:29.150 --> 00:05:29.160 align:start position:0% actually calculated correctly without 00:05:29.160 --> 00:05:31.610 align:start position:0% actually calculated correctly without access<00:05:29.520> to<00:05:29.820> the<00:05:29.940> secret<00:05:30.060> key<00:05:30.360> so<00:05:31.199> to<00:05:31.500> maybe 00:05:31.610 --> 00:05:31.620 align:start position:0% access to the secret key so to maybe 00:05:31.620 --> 00:05:33.170 align:start position:0% access to the secret key so to maybe summarize<00:05:32.100> like<00:05:32.340> what<00:05:32.580> exactly<00:05:32.940> the 00:05:33.170 --> 00:05:33.180 align:start position:0% summarize like what exactly the 00:05:33.180 --> 00:05:36.110 align:start position:0% summarize like what exactly the properties<00:05:33.479> we<00:05:33.720> are<00:05:33.900> that<00:05:34.740> we<00:05:34.919> want<00:05:35.100> so<00:05:35.340> far<00:05:35.580> is 00:05:36.110 --> 00:05:36.120 align:start position:0% properties we are that we want so far is 00:05:36.120 --> 00:05:37.610 align:start position:0% properties we are that we want so far is that<00:05:36.300> we<00:05:36.419> want<00:05:36.600> this<00:05:36.720> deterministic<00:05:37.320> function 00:05:37.610 --> 00:05:37.620 align:start position:0% that we want this deterministic function 00:05:37.620 --> 00:05:39.830 align:start position:0% that we want this deterministic function of<00:05:37.860> a<00:05:38.039> user's<00:05:38.400> secret<00:05:38.520> key<00:05:38.880> that<00:05:39.539> can<00:05:39.720> be 00:05:39.830 --> 00:05:39.840 align:start position:0% of a user's secret key that can be 00:05:39.840 --> 00:05:41.810 align:start position:0% of a user's secret key that can be verified<00:05:40.080> with<00:05:40.380> only<00:05:40.560> their<00:05:40.800> public<00:05:40.979> key<00:05:41.280> and 00:05:41.810 --> 00:05:41.820 align:start position:0% verified with only their public key and 00:05:41.820 --> 00:05:43.370 align:start position:0% verified with only their public key and keeps<00:05:42.060> them<00:05:42.180> anonymous 00:05:43.370 --> 00:05:43.380 align:start position:0% keeps them anonymous 00:05:43.380 --> 00:05:45.950 align:start position:0% keeps them anonymous and<00:05:43.800> the<00:05:43.979> way<00:05:44.039> we<00:05:44.160> do<00:05:44.280> this<00:05:44.460> is<00:05:44.759> we<00:05:44.940> Define<00:05:45.120> a 00:05:45.950 --> 00:05:45.960 align:start position:0% and the way we do this is we Define a 00:05:45.960 --> 00:05:47.870 align:start position:0% and the way we do this is we Define a new<00:05:46.080> deterministic<00:05:46.740> signature<00:05:47.100> scheme<00:05:47.460> on 00:05:47.870 --> 00:05:47.880 align:start position:0% new deterministic signature scheme on 00:05:47.880 --> 00:05:49.670 align:start position:0% new deterministic signature scheme on ethereum<00:05:48.419> so<00:05:48.960> I'm<00:05:49.080> going<00:05:49.199> to<00:05:49.259> try<00:05:49.380> to<00:05:49.500> go 00:05:49.670 --> 00:05:49.680 align:start position:0% ethereum so I'm going to try to go 00:05:49.680 --> 00:05:51.050 align:start position:0% ethereum so I'm going to try to go through<00:05:49.860> what<00:05:50.280> exactly<00:05:50.580> the<00:05:50.699> signature 00:05:51.050 --> 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color code the numbers that are 00:05:56.699 --> 00:05:58.610 align:start position:0% slightly color code the numbers that are the<00:05:56.820> same<00:05:56.940> so<00:05:57.419> you<00:05:57.660> can<00:05:57.780> kind<00:05:57.960> of<00:05:58.080> correlate 00:05:58.610 --> 00:05:58.620 align:start position:0% the same so you can kind of correlate 00:05:58.620 --> 00:06:00.050 align:start position:0% the same so you can kind of correlate them<00:05:58.740> across 00:06:00.050 --> 00:06:00.060 align:start position:0% them across 00:06:00.060 --> 00:06:01.249 align:start position:0% them across um<00:06:00.120> and<00:06:00.300> although<00:06:00.539> the<00:06:00.720> math<00:06:00.840> is<00:06:01.020> a<00:06:01.080> little<00:06:01.139> bit 00:06:01.249 --> 00:06:01.259 align:start position:0% um and although the math is a little bit 00:06:01.259 --> 00:06:02.570 align:start position:0% um and although the math is a little bit difficult<00:06:01.440> to<00:06:01.560> understand<00:06:01.680> on<00:06:01.979> first<00:06:02.220> glance 00:06:02.570 --> 00:06:02.580 align:start position:0% difficult to understand on first glance 00:06:02.580 --> 00:06:04.249 align:start position:0% difficult to understand on first glance I'll<00:06:02.940> try<00:06:03.120> to<00:06:03.240> give<00:06:03.300> you<00:06:03.419> an<00:06:03.479> intuition<00:06:03.900> for 00:06:04.249 --> 00:06:04.259 align:start position:0% I'll try to give you an intuition for 00:06:04.259 --> 00:06:06.170 align:start position:0% I'll try to give you an intuition for why<00:06:04.680> it<00:06:05.160> achieves<00:06:05.520> the<00:06:05.639> properties<00:06:05.880> that<00:06:06.060> we 00:06:06.170 --> 00:06:06.180 align:start position:0% why it achieves the properties that we 00:06:06.180 --> 00:06:07.490 align:start position:0% why it achieves the properties that we wanted<00:06:06.300> to<00:06:06.539> achieve 00:06:07.490 --> 00:06:07.500 align:start position:0% wanted to achieve 00:06:07.500 --> 00:06:09.650 align:start position:0% wanted to achieve so<00:06:07.740> remember<00:06:07.979> our<00:06:08.280> nullifier<00:06:08.820> was<00:06:09.240> the<00:06:09.479> hash 00:06:09.650 --> 00:06:09.660 align:start position:0% so remember our nullifier was the hash 00:06:09.660 --> 00:06:10.969 align:start position:0% so remember our nullifier was the hash of<00:06:09.840> message<00:06:10.020> from<00:06:10.259> a<00:06:10.380> public<00:06:10.500> key<00:06:10.740> to<00:06:10.860> the 00:06:10.969 --> 00:06:10.979 align:start position:0% of message from a public key to the 00:06:10.979 --> 00:06:12.290 align:start position:0% of message from a public key to the power<00:06:11.039> of<00:06:11.220> secret<00:06:11.340> key 00:06:12.290 --> 00:06:12.300 align:start position:0% power of secret key 00:06:12.300 --> 00:06:14.450 align:start position:0% power of secret key and<00:06:12.660> so<00:06:12.840> this<00:06:13.020> value<00:06:13.139> will<00:06:13.440> be<00:06:13.620> public<00:06:13.800> it<00:06:14.400> will 00:06:14.450 --> 00:06:14.460 align:start position:0% and so this value will be public it will 00:06:14.460 --> 00:06:15.770 align:start position:0% and so this value will be public it will be<00:06:14.580> calculated<00:06:14.820> inside<00:06:15.000> the<00:06:15.240> user's<00:06:15.539> wallet 00:06:15.770 --> 00:06:15.780 align:start position:0% be calculated inside the user's wallet 00:06:15.780 --> 00:06:17.210 align:start position:0% be calculated inside the user's wallet whether<00:06:16.199> it's<00:06:16.320> our<00:06:16.440> metamask<00:06:16.860> or<00:06:17.039> their 00:06:17.210 --> 00:06:17.220 align:start position:0% whether it's our metamask or their 00:06:17.220 --> 00:06:19.129 align:start position:0% whether it's our metamask or their Ledger<00:06:17.520> or<00:06:17.639> anything<00:06:17.759> else<00:06:18.060> and<00:06:18.720> this<00:06:18.960> value 00:06:19.129 --> 00:06:19.139 align:start position:0% Ledger or anything else and this value 00:06:19.139 --> 00:06:20.870 align:start position:0% Ledger or anything else and this value will<00:06:19.440> stay<00:06:19.620> public<00:06:19.800> the<00:06:20.039> entire<00:06:20.280> time<00:06:20.460> it<00:06:20.820> will 00:06:20.870 --> 00:06:20.880 align:start position:0% will stay public the entire time it will 00:06:20.880 --> 00:06:22.010 align:start position:0% will stay public the entire time it will be<00:06:21.000> posted<00:06:21.240> on<00:06:21.360> chain<00:06:21.479> eventually<00:06:21.840> for 00:06:22.010 --> 00:06:22.020 align:start position:0% be posted on chain eventually for 00:06:22.020 --> 00:06:23.270 align:start position:0% be posted on chain eventually for everyone<00:06:22.139> to<00:06:22.380> see 00:06:23.270 --> 00:06:23.280 align:start position:0% everyone to see 00:06:23.280 --> 00:06:25.550 align:start position:0% everyone to see these<00:06:23.940> private<00:06:24.180> outputs<00:06:24.600> will<00:06:24.900> be<00:06:25.080> created<00:06:25.319> by 00:06:25.550 --> 00:06:25.560 align:start position:0% these private outputs will be created by 00:06:25.560 --> 00:06:28.550 align:start position:0% these private outputs will be created by the<00:06:25.740> wallet<00:06:26.039> and<00:06:26.520> given<00:06:26.759> to<00:06:26.880> the<00:06:27.060> user<00:06:27.720> these 00:06:28.550 --> 00:06:28.560 align:start position:0% the wallet and given to the user these 00:06:28.560 --> 00:06:30.050 align:start position:0% the wallet and given to the user these outputs<00:06:29.160> if<00:06:29.340> they<00:06:29.460> were<00:06:29.580> seen<00:06:29.759> by<00:06:29.940> the 00:06:30.050 --> 00:06:30.060 align:start position:0% outputs if they were seen by the 00:06:30.060 --> 00:06:32.090 align:start position:0% outputs if they were seen by the external<00:06:30.360> world<00:06:30.539> could<00:06:31.020> de-anonymize<00:06:31.680> a<00:06:31.800> user 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idea<00:06:38.160> is<00:06:38.280> that<00:06:38.400> these<00:06:38.639> signals 00:06:38.990 --> 00:06:39.000 align:start position:0% and so the idea is that these signals 00:06:39.000 --> 00:06:41.090 align:start position:0% and so the idea is that these signals are<00:06:39.120> kept<00:06:39.479> to<00:06:39.780> the<00:06:39.960> user<00:06:40.259> and<00:06:40.560> the<00:06:40.740> user<00:06:40.979> can 00:06:41.090 --> 00:06:41.100 align:start position:0% are kept to the user and the user can 00:06:41.100 --> 00:06:43.909 align:start position:0% are kept to the user and the user can use<00:06:41.280> them<00:06:41.520> to<00:06:41.940> generate<00:06:42.240> a<00:06:42.360> ZK<00:06:42.660> snark<00:06:43.440> so<00:06:43.800> what 00:06:43.909 --> 00:06:43.919 align:start position:0% use them to generate a ZK snark so what 00:06:43.919 --> 00:06:45.350 align:start position:0% use them to generate a ZK snark so what the<00:06:44.100> user<00:06:44.400> does<00:06:44.520> is<00:06:44.699> once<00:06:44.940> they<00:06:45.060> have<00:06:45.180> these 00:06:45.350 --> 00:06:45.360 align:start position:0% the user does is once they have these 00:06:45.360 --> 00:06:46.850 align:start position:0% the user does is once they have these signals<00:06:45.720> you<00:06:45.900> can<00:06:46.020> think<00:06:46.080> of<00:06:46.259> this<00:06:46.500> as 00:06:46.850 --> 00:06:46.860 align:start position:0% signals you can think of this as 00:06:46.860 --> 00:06:49.010 align:start position:0% signals you can think of this as splitting<00:06:47.639> the<00:06:47.940> signature<00:06:48.300> scheme<00:06:48.600> into<00:06:48.780> a 00:06:49.010 --> 00:06:49.020 align:start position:0% splitting the signature scheme into a 00:06:49.020 --> 00:06:50.930 align:start position:0% splitting the signature scheme into a deterministic<00:06:49.500> part<00:06:49.680> the<00:06:49.919> nullifier<00:06:50.400> and<00:06:50.819> the 00:06:50.930 --> 00:06:50.940 align:start position:0% deterministic part the nullifier and the 00:06:50.940 --> 00:06:52.430 align:start position:0% deterministic part the nullifier and the non-deterministic<00:06:51.600> part<00:06:51.780> the<00:06:51.960> private<00:06:52.319> part 00:06:52.430 --> 00:06:52.440 align:start position:0% non-deterministic part the private part 00:06:52.440 --> 00:06:54.710 align:start position:0% non-deterministic part the private part the<00:06:53.160> verifier<00:06:53.580> simply<00:06:53.940> checks<00:06:54.240> these<00:06:54.479> values 00:06:54.710 --> 00:06:54.720 align:start position:0% the verifier simply checks these values 00:06:54.720 --> 00:06:56.330 align:start position:0% the verifier simply checks these values are<00:06:54.840> calculated<00:06:55.199> correctly 00:06:56.330 --> 00:06:56.340 align:start position:0% are calculated correctly 00:06:56.340 --> 00:06:59.510 align:start position:0% are calculated correctly now<00:06:57.319> it's<00:06:58.319> a<00:06:58.440> little<00:06:58.500> bit<00:06:58.620> hard<00:06:58.800> to<00:06:59.039> drive 00:06:59.510 --> 00:06:59.520 align:start position:0% now it's a little bit hard to drive 00:06:59.520 --> 00:07:00.529 align:start position:0% now it's a little bit hard to drive through<00:06:59.699> all<00:06:59.819> this<00:06:59.940> math<00:07:00.060> so<00:07:00.300> I'm<00:07:00.419> going<00:07:00.539> to 00:07:00.529 --> 00:07:00.539 align:start position:0% through all this math so I'm going to 00:07:00.539 --> 00:07:02.029 align:start position:0% through all this math so I'm going to try<00:07:00.660> to<00:07:00.780> give<00:07:00.900> like<00:07:01.139> a<00:07:01.319> high<00:07:01.440> level<00:07:01.560> overview 00:07:02.029 --> 00:07:02.039 align:start position:0% try to give like a high level overview 00:07:02.039 --> 00:07:04.309 align:start position:0% try to give like a high level overview of<00:07:02.220> why<00:07:02.759> we<00:07:02.940> have<00:07:03.120> this<00:07:03.419> kind<00:07:03.780> of<00:07:03.840> C<00:07:04.020> value 00:07:04.309 --> 00:07:04.319 align:start position:0% of why we have this kind of C value 00:07:04.319 --> 00:07:06.650 align:start position:0% of why we have this kind of C value floating<00:07:04.740> around<00:07:05.000> now<00:07:06.000> the<00:07:06.180> reason<00:07:06.300> we<00:07:06.539> have 00:07:06.650 --> 00:07:06.660 align:start position:0% floating around now the reason we have 00:07:06.660 --> 00:07:08.210 align:start position:0% floating around now the reason we have this<00:07:06.780> like<00:07:06.960> C<00:07:07.080> value<00:07:07.319> floating<00:07:07.680> around<00:07:07.860> is 00:07:08.210 --> 00:07:08.220 align:start position:0% this like C value floating around is 00:07:08.220 --> 00:07:10.730 align:start position:0% this like C value floating around is that<00:07:08.520> when<00:07:09.180> you're<00:07:09.300> taking<00:07:09.539> a<00:07:09.720> hash<00:07:09.960> it's 00:07:10.730 --> 00:07:10.740 align:start position:0% that when you're taking a hash it's 00:07:10.740 --> 00:07:12.230 align:start position:0% that when you're taking a hash it's impossible<00:07:11.039> to<00:07:11.220> Brute<00:07:11.460> Force<00:07:11.699> the<00:07:11.819> output<00:07:12.060> of 00:07:12.230 --> 00:07:12.240 align:start position:0% impossible to Brute Force the output of 00:07:12.240 --> 00:07:14.450 align:start position:0% impossible to Brute Force the output of the<00:07:12.300> hash<00:07:12.479> so<00:07:13.199> you<00:07:13.380> must<00:07:13.500> know<00:07:13.680> all<00:07:13.979> the<00:07:14.100> inputs 00:07:14.450 --> 00:07:14.460 align:start position:0% the hash so you must know all the inputs 00:07:14.460 --> 00:07:16.430 align:start position:0% the hash so you must know all the inputs that<00:07:14.639> went<00:07:14.819> into<00:07:15.000> the<00:07:15.180> hash<00:07:15.419> this<00:07:16.080> means<00:07:16.319> that 00:07:16.430 --> 00:07:16.440 align:start position:0% that went into the hash this means that 00:07:16.440 --> 00:07:18.350 align:start position:0% that went into the hash this means that the<00:07:16.680> person<00:07:16.860> you<00:07:17.639> can<00:07:17.699> kind<00:07:17.819> of<00:07:17.940> think<00:07:18.060> of<00:07:18.180> this 00:07:18.350 --> 00:07:18.360 align:start position:0% the person you can kind of think of this 00:07:18.360 --> 00:07:21.170 align:start position:0% the person you can kind of think of this C<00:07:18.479> commitment<00:07:18.960> as<00:07:19.500> a<00:07:19.740> hash<00:07:19.919> commitment<00:07:20.699> to 00:07:21.170 --> 00:07:21.180 align:start position:0% C commitment as a hash commitment to 00:07:21.180 --> 00:07:23.270 align:start position:0% C commitment as a hash commitment to these<00:07:21.539> values<00:07:21.780> of<00:07:21.960> G<00:07:22.139> to<00:07:22.259> the<00:07:22.440> r<00:07:22.620> to<00:07:23.039> another 00:07:23.270 --> 00:07:23.280 align:start position:0% these values of G to the r to another 00:07:23.280 --> 00:07:25.790 align:start position:0% these values of G to the r to another fire<00:07:23.639> to<00:07:23.880> our<00:07:24.060> public<00:07:24.240> key<00:07:24.479> then<00:07:25.259> we<00:07:25.500> calculate 00:07:25.790 --> 00:07:25.800 align:start position:0% fire to our public key then we calculate 00:07:25.800 --> 00:07:27.650 align:start position:0% fire to our public key then we calculate this<00:07:25.979> value<00:07:26.160> which<00:07:26.400> is<00:07:26.520> s<00:07:26.759> which<00:07:27.180> is<00:07:27.240> based<00:07:27.539> on 00:07:27.650 --> 00:07:27.660 align:start position:0% this value which is s which is based on 00:07:27.660 --> 00:07:29.930 align:start position:0% this value which is s which is based on the<00:07:27.780> C<00:07:27.960> value<00:07:28.199> which<00:07:28.800> we<00:07:28.979> know<00:07:29.220> must<00:07:29.699> have<00:07:29.819> been 00:07:29.930 --> 00:07:29.940 align:start position:0% the C value which we know must have been 00:07:29.940 --> 00:07:31.670 align:start position:0% the C value which we know must have been calculated<00:07:30.300> after<00:07:30.660> c 00:07:31.670 --> 00:07:31.680 align:start position:0% calculated after c 00:07:31.680 --> 00:07:33.950 align:start position:0% calculated after c and<00:07:32.340> notice<00:07:32.699> that<00:07:32.940> this<00:07:33.240> s<00:07:33.360> value<00:07:33.539> does<00:07:33.840> not 00:07:33.950 --> 00:07:33.960 align:start position:0% and notice that this s value does not 00:07:33.960 --> 00:07:35.809 align:start position:0% and notice that this s value does not reveal<00:07:34.199> the<00:07:34.319> user's<00:07:34.620> secret<00:07:34.740> key<00:07:35.039> although<00:07:35.699> it 00:07:35.809 --> 00:07:35.819 align:start position:0% reveal the user's secret key although it 00:07:35.819 --> 00:07:37.850 align:start position:0% reveal the user's secret key although it has<00:07:35.940> secret<00:07:36.120> key<00:07:36.419> in<00:07:36.599> it<00:07:36.660> it's<00:07:36.900> blinded<00:07:37.500> by<00:07:37.740> a 00:07:37.850 --> 00:07:37.860 align:start position:0% has secret key in it it's blinded by a 00:07:37.860 --> 00:07:39.589 align:start position:0% has secret key in it it's blinded by a completely<00:07:38.099> random<00:07:38.460> number<00:07:38.639> the<00:07:39.240> check<00:07:39.419> in 00:07:39.589 --> 00:07:39.599 align:start position:0% completely random number the check in 00:07:39.599 --> 00:07:41.450 align:start position:0% completely random number the check in the<00:07:39.720> snark<00:07:39.960> you'll<00:07:40.560> also<00:07:40.800> notice<00:07:41.039> has<00:07:41.220> no 00:07:41.450 --> 00:07:41.460 align:start position:0% the snark you'll also notice has no 00:07:41.460 --> 00:07:43.550 align:start position:0% the snark you'll also notice has no secret<00:07:41.639> keys<00:07:42.060> in<00:07:42.180> it<00:07:42.300> we<00:07:42.599> only<00:07:42.780> pass<00:07:43.080> in<00:07:43.259> these 00:07:43.550 --> 00:07:43.560 align:start position:0% secret keys in it we only pass in these 00:07:43.560 --> 00:07:45.110 align:start position:0% secret keys in it we only pass in these signals<00:07:43.919> none<00:07:44.340> of<00:07:44.460> which<00:07:44.580> you<00:07:44.699> can<00:07:44.880> use<00:07:44.940> to 00:07:45.110 --> 00:07:45.120 align:start position:0% signals none of which you can use to 00:07:45.120 --> 00:07:46.550 align:start position:0% signals none of which you can use to derive<00:07:45.419> the<00:07:45.539> user's<00:07:45.840> original<00:07:45.960> secret<00:07:46.259> key 00:07:46.550 --> 00:07:46.560 align:start position:0% derive the user's original secret key 00:07:46.560 --> 00:07:48.650 align:start position:0% derive the user's original secret key and<00:07:46.979> the<00:07:47.099> check<00:07:47.220> that<00:07:47.460> we<00:07:47.580> do<00:07:47.699> is<00:07:48.240> effectively 00:07:48.650 --> 00:07:48.660 align:start position:0% and the check that we do is effectively 00:07:48.660 --> 00:07:50.629 align:start position:0% and the check that we do is effectively did<00:07:49.139> the<00:07:49.319> user<00:07:49.620> calculate<00:07:49.919> C<00:07:50.099> in<00:07:50.280> the<00:07:50.400> correct 00:07:50.629 --> 00:07:50.639 align:start position:0% did the user calculate C in the correct 00:07:50.639 --> 00:07:52.550 align:start position:0% did the user calculate C in the correct order<00:07:50.759> did<00:07:51.360> they<00:07:51.539> commit<00:07:51.840> to<00:07:52.199> their<00:07:52.440> secret 00:07:52.550 --> 00:07:52.560 align:start position:0% order did they commit to their secret 00:07:52.560 --> 00:07:54.409 align:start position:0% order did they commit to their secret key<00:07:52.800> their<00:07:53.039> public<00:07:53.280> key<00:07:53.400> and<00:07:53.639> calculate<00:07:54.060> the 00:07:54.409 --> 00:07:54.419 align:start position:0% key their public key and calculate the 00:07:54.419 --> 00:07:55.969 align:start position:0% key their public key and calculate the signature<00:07:54.900> in<00:07:55.380> a<00:07:55.500> way<00:07:55.620> that<00:07:55.740> would<00:07:55.919> have 00:07:55.969 --> 00:07:55.979 align:start position:0% signature in a way that would have 00:07:55.979 --> 00:07:57.110 align:start position:0% signature in a way that would have actually<00:07:56.160> proved<00:07:56.520> that<00:07:56.639> they<00:07:56.759> owned<00:07:57.060> that 00:07:57.110 --> 00:07:57.120 align:start position:0% actually proved that they owned that 00:07:57.120 --> 00:07:59.689 align:start position:0% actually proved that they owned that secret<00:07:57.300> key<00:07:57.660> and<00:07:58.319> finally<00:07:58.620> the<00:07:59.099> ZK<00:07:59.340> snark 00:07:59.689 --> 00:07:59.699 align:start position:0% secret key and finally the ZK snark 00:07:59.699 --> 00:08:00.830 align:start position:0% secret key and finally the ZK snark apart<00:07:59.940> from<00:08:00.060> checking<00:08:00.360> that<00:08:00.419> the<00:08:00.539> nullifier 00:08:00.830 --> 00:08:00.840 align:start position:0% apart from checking that the nullifier 00:08:00.840 --> 00:08:02.029 align:start position:0% apart from checking that the nullifier was<00:08:01.020> calculated<00:08:01.259> correctly<00:08:01.560> in<00:08:01.740> a<00:08:01.919> German 00:08:02.029 --> 00:08:02.039 align:start position:0% was calculated correctly in a German 00:08:02.039 --> 00:08:03.589 align:start position:0% was calculated correctly in a German succession 00:08:03.589 --> 00:08:03.599 align:start position:0% succession 00:08:03.599 --> 00:08:05.689 align:start position:0% succession um on<00:08:04.080> the<00:08:04.199> correct<00:08:04.380> curve<00:08:04.740> we<00:08:05.340> also<00:08:05.520> check 00:08:05.689 --> 00:08:05.699 align:start position:0% um on the correct curve we also check 00:08:05.699 --> 00:08:07.309 align:start position:0% um on the correct curve we also check whatever<00:08:06.060> public<00:08:06.419> key<00:08:06.599> check<00:08:06.780> we<00:08:06.960> want<00:08:07.080> to<00:08:07.199> do 00:08:07.309 --> 00:08:07.319 align:start position:0% whatever public key check we want to do 00:08:07.319 --> 00:08:08.930 align:start position:0% whatever public key check we want to do this<00:08:07.800> allows<00:08:08.039> us<00:08:08.160> to<00:08:08.280> verify<00:08:08.580> that<00:08:08.699> the<00:08:08.819> public 00:08:08.930 --> 00:08:08.940 align:start position:0% this allows us to verify that the public 00:08:08.940 --> 00:08:10.909 align:start position:0% this allows us to verify that the public key<00:08:09.120> is<00:08:09.300> in<00:08:09.479> fact<00:08:09.599> acting<00:08:10.020> correctly<00:08:10.319> and<00:08:10.740> has 00:08:10.909 --> 00:08:10.919 align:start position:0% key is in fact acting correctly and has 00:08:10.919 --> 00:08:12.710 align:start position:0% key is in fact acting correctly and has some<00:08:11.039> unique<00:08:11.340> identifier<00:08:11.880> but<00:08:12.240> now<00:08:12.419> I<00:08:12.539> have<00:08:12.599> to 00:08:12.710 --> 00:08:12.720 align:start position:0% some unique identifier but now I have to 00:08:12.720 --> 00:08:14.210 align:start position:0% some unique identifier but now I have to verify<00:08:12.960> that<00:08:13.080> the<00:08:13.259> public<00:08:13.380> key<00:08:13.560> is<00:08:13.800> in<00:08:14.099> fact 00:08:14.210 --> 00:08:14.220 align:start position:0% verify that the public key is in fact 00:08:14.220 --> 00:08:15.290 align:start position:0% verify that the public key is in fact allowed<00:08:14.520> to<00:08:14.639> interact<00:08:14.880> with<00:08:15.000> this<00:08:15.120> protocol 00:08:15.290 --> 00:08:15.300 align:start position:0% allowed to interact with this protocol 00:08:15.300 --> 00:08:16.790 align:start position:0% allowed to interact with this protocol maybe<00:08:15.539> they're<00:08:15.720> a<00:08:15.900> numerical<00:08:16.080> proof<00:08:16.500> maybe 00:08:16.790 --> 00:08:16.800 align:start position:0% maybe they're a numerical proof maybe 00:08:16.800 --> 00:08:19.129 align:start position:0% maybe they're a numerical proof maybe they<00:08:17.099> submit<00:08:17.400> a<00:08:17.699> Merkel<00:08:18.060> try<00:08:18.240> Patricia<00:08:18.780> proof 00:08:19.129 --> 00:08:19.139 align:start position:0% they submit a Merkel try Patricia proof 00:08:19.139 --> 00:08:20.930 align:start position:0% they submit a Merkel try Patricia proof that<00:08:19.560> they<00:08:19.860> are<00:08:20.039> they<00:08:20.460> satisfy<00:08:20.759> some 00:08:20.930 --> 00:08:20.940 align:start position:0% that they are they satisfy some 00:08:20.940 --> 00:08:22.909 align:start position:0% that they are they satisfy some condition<00:08:21.060> on<00:08:21.419> chain<00:08:21.660> and<00:08:22.319> the<00:08:22.500> idea<00:08:22.620> that<00:08:22.800> we 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00:08:30.050 align:start position:0% summarize the wallet generates these signals<00:08:28.199> the<00:08:28.620> user<00:08:28.979> plugs<00:08:29.460> them<00:08:29.580> into<00:08:29.639> a<00:08:29.819> ZK 00:08:30.050 --> 00:08:30.060 align:start position:0% signals the user plugs them into a ZK 00:08:30.060 --> 00:08:32.089 align:start position:0% signals the user plugs them into a ZK snark<00:08:30.360> and<00:08:30.780> posts<00:08:31.020> the<00:08:31.080> ZK<00:08:31.319> snark<00:08:31.500> when<00:08:31.620> with<00:08:31.979> a 00:08:32.089 --> 00:08:32.099 align:start position:0% snark and posts the ZK snark when with a 00:08:32.099 --> 00:08:34.190 align:start position:0% snark and posts the ZK snark when with a public<00:08:32.219> nullifier<00:08:32.760> output<00:08:33.120> on<00:08:33.479> chain<00:08:33.719> proving 00:08:34.190 --> 00:08:34.200 align:start position:0% public nullifier output on chain proving 00:08:34.200 --> 00:08:35.570 align:start position:0% public nullifier output on chain proving that<00:08:34.320> they<00:08:34.500> are<00:08:34.680> allowed<00:08:35.099> to<00:08:35.159> interact<00:08:35.399> with 00:08:35.570 --> 00:08:35.580 align:start position:0% that they are allowed to interact with 00:08:35.580 --> 00:08:37.430 align:start position:0% that they are allowed to interact with this<00:08:35.700> protocol<00:08:35.940> and<00:08:36.419> a<00:08:36.599> unique<00:08:36.839> user<00:08:37.140> who<00:08:37.320> is 00:08:37.430 --> 00:08:37.440 align:start position:0% this protocol and a unique user who is 00:08:37.440 --> 00:08:39.409 align:start position:0% this protocol and a unique user who is still<00:08:37.620> going<00:08:37.800> to<00:08:37.919> be<00:08:37.979> kept<00:08:38.219> Anonymous<00:08:38.580> now 00:08:39.409 --> 00:08:39.419 align:start position:0% still going to be kept Anonymous now 00:08:39.419 --> 00:08:41.329 align:start position:0% still going to be kept Anonymous now interestingly<00:08:40.140> when<00:08:40.860> we<00:08:40.979> were<00:08:41.039> doing<00:08:41.219> this 00:08:41.329 --> 00:08:41.339 align:start position:0% interestingly when we were doing this 00:08:41.339 --> 00:08:42.949 align:start position:0% interestingly when we were doing this work<00:08:41.459> we<00:08:41.700> discovered<00:08:42.000> this<00:08:42.180> Quantum<00:08:42.539> secrecy 00:08:42.949 --> 00:08:42.959 align:start position:0% work we discovered this Quantum secrecy 00:08:42.959 --> 00:08:44.930 align:start position:0% work we discovered this Quantum secrecy interactivity<00:08:43.620> trade-off<00:08:43.979> now<00:08:44.339> it<00:08:44.580> turns<00:08:44.820> out 00:08:44.930 --> 00:08:44.940 align:start position:0% interactivity trade-off now it turns out 00:08:44.940 --> 00:08:47.449 align:start position:0% interactivity trade-off now it turns out that<00:08:45.360> semaphore<00:08:46.080> is<00:08:46.440> extremely<00:08:46.920> Quantum 00:08:47.449 --> 00:08:47.459 align:start position:0% that semaphore is extremely Quantum 00:08:47.459 --> 00:08:49.610 align:start position:0% that semaphore is extremely Quantum secure<00:08:47.760> because<00:08:47.940> it<00:08:48.120> uses<00:08:48.360> hashes<00:08:48.779> but<00:08:49.440> it's 00:08:49.610 --> 00:08:49.620 align:start position:0% secure because it uses hashes but it's 00:08:49.620 --> 00:08:51.829 align:start position:0% secure because it uses hashes but it's not<00:08:49.800> it<00:08:50.160> is<00:08:50.339> interactive<00:08:50.880> meaning<00:08:51.240> that<00:08:51.600> you 00:08:51.829 --> 00:08:51.839 align:start position:0% not it is interactive meaning that you 00:08:51.839 --> 00:08:53.210 align:start position:0% not it is interactive meaning that you have<00:08:52.019> two<00:08:52.140> phases<00:08:52.500> and<00:08:52.800> the<00:08:52.920> first<00:08:53.040> people 00:08:53.210 --> 00:08:53.220 align:start position:0% have two phases and the first people 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person<00:09:00.480> to 00:09:00.710 --> 00:09:00.720 align:start position:0% non-interactive the very first person to 00:09:00.720 --> 00:09:01.790 align:start position:0% non-interactive the very first person to use<00:09:00.839> another<00:09:00.959> fire<00:09:01.320> will<00:09:01.500> have<00:09:01.620> the<00:09:01.740> full 00:09:01.790 --> 00:09:01.800 align:start position:0% use another fire will have the full 00:09:01.800 --> 00:09:03.230 align:start position:0% use another fire will have the full anonymity<00:09:02.160> of<00:09:02.339> the<00:09:02.399> entire<00:09:02.580> anonymity<00:09:03.000> set 00:09:03.230 --> 00:09:03.240 align:start position:0% anonymity of the entire anonymity set 00:09:03.240 --> 00:09:06.110 align:start position:0% anonymity of the entire anonymity set however<00:09:03.959> it<00:09:04.380> is<00:09:04.560> not<00:09:04.680> Quantum<00:09:05.040> secure 00:09:06.110 --> 00:09:06.120 align:start position:0% however it is not Quantum secure 00:09:06.120 --> 00:09:07.910 align:start position:0% however it is not Quantum secure and<00:09:06.839> the<00:09:07.140> way<00:09:07.260> that<00:09:07.380> you<00:09:07.500> can<00:09:07.560> kind<00:09:07.680> of<00:09:07.800> think 00:09:07.910 --> 00:09:07.920 align:start position:0% and the way that you can kind of think 00:09:07.920 --> 00:09:09.410 align:start position:0% and the way that you can kind of think about<00:09:08.040> Quantum<00:09:08.700> adversaries<00:09:09.180> in<00:09:09.300> the 00:09:09.410 --> 00:09:09.420 align:start position:0% about Quantum adversaries in the 00:09:09.420 --> 00:09:11.930 align:start position:0% about Quantum adversaries in the situation<00:09:09.779> is<00:09:10.500> that<00:09:10.800> a<00:09:11.220> Quantum<00:09:11.459> adversary 00:09:11.930 --> 00:09:11.940 align:start position:0% situation is that a Quantum adversary 00:09:11.940 --> 00:09:13.430 align:start position:0% situation is that a Quantum adversary can<00:09:12.180> effectively<00:09:12.480> take<00:09:12.720> discrete<00:09:13.080> log<00:09:13.200> and 00:09:13.430 --> 00:09:13.440 align:start position:0% can effectively take discrete log and 00:09:13.440 --> 00:09:15.530 align:start position:0% can effectively take discrete log and prime<00:09:13.620> factorizations<00:09:14.220> but<00:09:14.820> it<00:09:14.940> can't<00:09:15.120> undo 00:09:15.530 --> 00:09:15.540 align:start position:0% prime factorizations but it can't undo 00:09:15.540 --> 00:09:16.490 align:start position:0% prime factorizations but it can't undo hashes 00:09:16.490 --> 00:09:16.500 align:start position:0% hashes 00:09:16.500 --> 00:09:18.170 align:start position:0% hashes you<00:09:16.860> can<00:09:17.040> imagine<00:09:17.220> that<00:09:17.760> when<00:09:17.880> we<00:09:18.000> have<00:09:18.120> a 00:09:18.170 --> 00:09:18.180 align:start position:0% you can imagine that when we have a 00:09:18.180 --> 00:09:20.090 align:start position:0% you can imagine that when we have a quantum<00:09:18.420> computer<00:09:18.600> with<00:09:18.899> 2000<00:09:19.320> signal<00:09:19.620> qubits 00:09:20.090 --> 00:09:20.100 align:start position:0% quantum computer with 2000 signal qubits 00:09:20.100 --> 00:09:23.690 align:start position:0% quantum computer with 2000 signal qubits that<00:09:20.459> can<00:09:20.640> break<00:09:20.820> all<00:09:21.540> of<00:09:22.100> ethereum's<00:09:23.100> uh 00:09:23.690 --> 00:09:23.700 align:start position:0% that can break all of ethereum's uh 00:09:23.700 --> 00:09:25.130 align:start position:0% that can break all of ethereum's uh public<00:09:23.880> keys<00:09:24.300> and<00:09:24.420> derive<00:09:24.660> their<00:09:24.839> private 00:09:25.130 --> 00:09:25.140 align:start position:0% public keys and derive their private 00:09:25.140 --> 00:09:26.030 align:start position:0% public keys and derive their private keys 00:09:26.030 --> 00:09:26.040 align:start position:0% keys 00:09:26.040 --> 00:09:27.889 align:start position:0% keys in<00:09:26.519> the<00:09:26.640> actual<00:09:26.940> situation<00:09:27.420> of<00:09:27.660> the<00:09:27.779> chain 00:09:27.889 --> 00:09:27.899 align:start position:0% in the actual situation of the chain 00:09:27.899 --> 00:09:30.050 align:start position:0% in the actual situation of the chain continuing<00:09:28.440> this<00:09:28.860> is<00:09:28.980> completely<00:09:29.279> fine<00:09:29.459> users 00:09:30.050 --> 00:09:30.060 align:start position:0% continuing this is completely fine users 00:09:30.060 --> 00:09:32.690 align:start position:0% continuing this is completely fine users can<00:09:30.240> sign<00:09:30.480> their<00:09:31.320> new<00:09:31.560> key<00:09:31.800> with<00:09:32.399> their<00:09:32.580> old 00:09:32.690 --> 00:09:32.700 align:start position:0% can sign their new key with their old 00:09:32.700 --> 00:09:35.269 align:start position:0% can sign their new key with their old key<00:09:32.940> before<00:09:33.540> Quantum<00:09:34.140> Supremacy<00:09:34.620> occurs<00:09:34.920> and 00:09:35.269 --> 00:09:35.279 align:start position:0% key before Quantum Supremacy occurs and 00:09:35.279 --> 00:09:37.009 align:start position:0% key before Quantum Supremacy occurs and the<00:09:35.399> entire<00:09:35.580> chain<00:09:35.760> can<00:09:36.060> move<00:09:36.180> seamlessly<00:09:36.600> to 00:09:37.009 --> 00:09:37.019 align:start position:0% the entire chain can move seamlessly to 00:09:37.019 --> 00:09:38.870 align:start position:0% the entire chain can move seamlessly to a<00:09:37.200> new<00:09:37.320> Quantum<00:09:37.620> resistance<00:09:38.040> system 00:09:38.870 --> 00:09:38.880 align:start position:0% a new Quantum resistance system 00:09:38.880 --> 00:09:41.030 align:start position:0% a new Quantum resistance system however<00:09:39.540> if<00:09:40.080> you<00:09:40.140> can<00:09:40.260> derive<00:09:40.560> all<00:09:40.680> the<00:09:40.800> user 00:09:41.030 --> 00:09:41.040 align:start position:0% however if you can derive all the user 00:09:41.040 --> 00:09:43.490 align:start position:0% however if you can derive all the user secret<00:09:41.220> Keys<00:09:41.700> then<00:09:42.420> if<00:09:43.080> you<00:09:43.140> remember<00:09:43.260> the 00:09:43.490 --> 00:09:43.500 align:start position:0% secret Keys then if you remember the 00:09:43.500 --> 00:09:44.870 align:start position:0% secret Keys then if you remember the trick<00:09:43.680> we<00:09:43.800> did<00:09:43.920> in<00:09:43.980> the<00:09:44.100> very<00:09:44.220> beginning<00:09:44.399> where 00:09:44.870 --> 00:09:44.880 align:start position:0% trick we did in the very beginning where 00:09:44.880 --> 00:09:46.610 align:start position:0% trick we did in the very beginning where we<00:09:45.060> calculate<00:09:45.480> the<00:09:45.720> half<00:09:45.839> of<00:09:46.019> meshes<00:09:46.260> come<00:09:46.440> a 00:09:46.610 --> 00:09:46.620 align:start position:0% we calculate the half of meshes come a 00:09:46.620 --> 00:09:47.449 align:start position:0% we calculate the half of meshes come a public<00:09:46.680> key<00:09:46.860> for<00:09:47.040> all<00:09:47.100> the<00:09:47.220> users<00:09:47.399> and 00:09:47.449 --> 00:09:47.459 align:start position:0% public key for all the users and 00:09:47.459 --> 00:09:49.310 align:start position:0% public key for all the users and de-anonymize<00:09:48.060> people<00:09:48.240> we<00:09:48.720> can<00:09:48.839> do<00:09:48.959> the<00:09:49.140> exact 00:09:49.310 --> 00:09:49.320 align:start position:0% de-anonymize people we can do the exact 00:09:49.320 --> 00:09:50.810 align:start position:0% de-anonymize people we can do the exact same<00:09:49.440> thing<00:09:49.680> with<00:09:49.980> this<00:09:50.160> Quantum<00:09:50.399> adversary 00:09:50.810 --> 00:09:50.820 align:start position:0% same thing with this Quantum adversary 00:09:50.820 --> 00:09:52.790 align:start position:0% same thing with this Quantum adversary calculated<00:09:51.120> secret<00:09:51.360> key<00:09:51.720> Quantum<00:09:52.440> adversary 00:09:52.790 --> 00:09:52.800 align:start position:0% calculated secret key Quantum adversary 00:09:52.800 --> 00:09:54.410 align:start position:0% calculated secret key Quantum adversary simply<00:09:53.100> calculates<00:09:53.459> every<00:09:53.820> secret<00:09:54.000> key<00:09:54.240> for 00:09:54.410 --> 00:09:54.420 align:start position:0% simply calculates every secret key for 00:09:54.420 --> 00:09:55.850 align:start position:0% simply calculates every secret key for every<00:09:54.540> private<00:09:54.899> for<00:09:55.260> every<00:09:55.320> public<00:09:55.560> key<00:09:55.680> in 00:09:55.850 --> 00:09:55.860 align:start position:0% every private for every public key in 00:09:55.860 --> 00:09:57.650 align:start position:0% every private for every public key in ethereum<00:09:56.160> calculates<00:09:56.880> another<00:09:57.060> Fires<00:09:57.540> for 00:09:57.650 --> 00:09:57.660 align:start position:0% ethereum calculates another Fires for 00:09:57.660 --> 00:09:58.970 align:start position:0% ethereum calculates another Fires for every<00:09:57.779> single<00:09:57.959> one<00:09:58.080> of<00:09:58.260> these<00:09:58.380> keys<00:09:58.620> and 00:09:58.970 --> 00:09:58.980 align:start position:0% every single one of these keys and 00:09:58.980 --> 00:10:00.290 align:start position:0% every single one of these keys and matches<00:09:59.339> them<00:09:59.459> up<00:09:59.640> with<00:09:59.880> the<00:09:59.940> anonymous 00:10:00.290 --> 00:10:00.300 align:start position:0% matches them up with the anonymous 00:10:00.300 --> 00:10:02.990 align:start position:0% matches them up with the anonymous signal<00:10:00.600> and<00:10:00.779> so<00:10:01.019> interestingly<00:10:01.980> any<00:10:02.820> future 00:10:02.990 --> 00:10:03.000 align:start position:0% signal and so interestingly any future 00:10:03.000 --> 00:10:04.550 align:start position:0% signal and so interestingly any future Quantum<00:10:03.420> adversary<00:10:03.839> can<00:10:04.140> break<00:10:04.260> past 00:10:04.550 --> 00:10:04.560 align:start position:0% Quantum adversary can break past 00:10:04.560 --> 00:10:06.170 align:start position:0% Quantum adversary can break past anonymity 00:10:06.170 --> 00:10:06.180 align:start position:0% anonymity 00:10:06.180 --> 00:10:06.769 align:start position:0% anonymity um 00:10:06.769 --> 00:10:06.779 align:start position:0% um 00:10:06.779 --> 00:10:09.410 align:start position:0% um and<00:10:07.740> the<00:10:08.279> issue<00:10:08.459> is<00:10:08.580> that<00:10:08.880> actually<00:10:09.120> any 00:10:09.410 --> 00:10:09.420 align:start position:0% and the issue is that actually any 00:10:09.420 --> 00:10:10.910 align:start position:0% and the issue is that actually any deterministic<00:10:09.959> nullifier<00:10:10.380> scheme<00:10:10.740> that<00:10:10.800> has 00:10:10.910 --> 00:10:10.920 align:start position:0% deterministic nullifier scheme that has 00:10:10.920 --> 00:10:12.110 align:start position:0% deterministic nullifier scheme that has the<00:10:11.100> properties<00:10:11.339> that<00:10:11.580> I<00:10:11.640> defined<00:10:11.880> in<00:10:12.000> the 00:10:12.110 --> 00:10:12.120 align:start position:0% the properties that I defined in the 00:10:12.120 --> 00:10:14.329 align:start position:0% the properties that I defined in the beginning<00:10:12.240> has<00:10:12.839> its<00:10:13.140> vulnerability<00:10:13.620> because 00:10:14.329 --> 00:10:14.339 align:start position:0% beginning has its vulnerability because 00:10:14.339 --> 00:10:16.310 align:start position:0% beginning has its vulnerability because if<00:10:14.880> you<00:10:15.000> Source<00:10:15.360> Randomness<00:10:15.720> from<00:10:15.959> only<00:10:16.140> the 00:10:16.310 --> 00:10:16.320 align:start position:0% if you Source Randomness from only the 00:10:16.320 --> 00:10:17.509 align:start position:0% if you Source Randomness from only the secret<00:10:16.440> key<00:10:16.680> that<00:10:16.920> means<00:10:17.100> the<00:10:17.220> quantum 00:10:17.509 --> 00:10:17.519 align:start position:0% secret key that means the quantum 00:10:17.519 --> 00:10:19.850 align:start position:0% secret key that means the quantum adversary<00:10:17.880> can<00:10:18.120> derive<00:10:18.360> it<00:10:18.480> as<00:10:18.600> well<00:10:19.260> and<00:10:19.740> so 00:10:19.850 --> 00:10:19.860 align:start position:0% adversary can derive it as well and so 00:10:19.860 --> 00:10:21.050 align:start position:0% adversary can derive it as well and so you<00:10:20.040> have<00:10:20.160> to<00:10:20.220> Source<00:10:20.399> Randomness<00:10:20.760> beyond<00:10:20.940> the 00:10:21.050 --> 00:10:21.060 align:start position:0% you have to Source Randomness beyond the 00:10:21.060 --> 00:10:22.550 align:start position:0% you have to Source Randomness beyond the secret<00:10:21.120> key<00:10:21.480> which<00:10:21.839> requires<00:10:22.200> the<00:10:22.260> user<00:10:22.500> to 00:10:22.550 --> 00:10:22.560 align:start position:0% secret key which requires the user to 00:10:22.560 --> 00:10:23.690 align:start position:0% secret key which requires the user to remember<00:10:22.680> that<00:10:22.920> value<00:10:23.100> which<00:10:23.279> means<00:10:23.459> you<00:10:23.580> need 00:10:23.690 --> 00:10:23.700 align:start position:0% remember that value which means you need 00:10:23.700 --> 00:10:25.730 align:start position:0% remember that value which means you need to<00:10:23.760> have<00:10:23.880> a<00:10:24.000> password<00:10:24.120> so<00:10:24.899> to<00:10:25.140> kind<00:10:25.380> of<00:10:25.500> get<00:10:25.620> a 00:10:25.730 --> 00:10:25.740 align:start position:0% to have a password so to kind of get a 00:10:25.740 --> 00:10:27.050 align:start position:0% to have a password so to kind of get a better<00:10:25.860> intuition<00:10:26.220> for<00:10:26.459> like<00:10:26.580> whether<00:10:26.880> this 00:10:27.050 --> 00:10:27.060 align:start position:0% better intuition for like whether this 00:10:27.060 --> 00:10:28.550 align:start position:0% better intuition for like whether this actually<00:10:27.240> matters<00:10:27.660> or<00:10:27.839> not 00:10:28.550 --> 00:10:28.560 align:start position:0% actually matters or not 00:10:28.560 --> 00:10:31.190 align:start position:0% actually matters or not there's<00:10:29.519> the<00:10:29.820> the<00:10:30.000> predictions<00:10:30.600> of<00:10:30.839> quantum 00:10:31.190 --> 00:10:31.200 align:start position:0% there's the the predictions of quantum 00:10:31.200 --> 00:10:33.769 align:start position:0% there's the the predictions of quantum researchers<00:10:31.740> very<00:10:32.220> extremely<00:10:32.760> widely<00:10:33.180> some 00:10:33.769 --> 00:10:33.779 align:start position:0% researchers very extremely widely some 00:10:33.779 --> 00:10:35.030 align:start position:0% researchers very extremely widely some researchers<00:10:34.200> have<00:10:34.320> mentioned<00:10:34.680> they<00:10:34.920> think 00:10:35.030 --> 00:10:35.040 align:start position:0% researchers have mentioned they think 00:10:35.040 --> 00:10:36.470 align:start position:0% researchers have mentioned they think it's<00:10:35.160> going<00:10:35.339> to<00:10:35.399> come<00:10:35.519> as<00:10:35.760> soon<00:10:36.000> as<00:10:36.120> 30<00:10:36.300> years 00:10:36.470 --> 00:10:36.480 align:start position:0% it's going to come as soon as 30 years 00:10:36.480 --> 00:10:38.810 align:start position:0% it's going to come as soon as 30 years signal<00:10:37.019> qubits<00:10:37.440> that<00:10:37.500> can<00:10:37.620> break<00:10:37.680> ecdsa<00:10:38.339> some 00:10:38.810 --> 00:10:38.820 align:start position:0% signal qubits that can break ecdsa some 00:10:38.820 --> 00:10:40.610 align:start position:0% signal qubits that can break ecdsa some researchers<00:10:39.360> think<00:10:39.660> somewhere<00:10:40.320> around<00:10:40.440> 100 00:10:40.610 --> 00:10:40.620 align:start position:0% researchers think somewhere around 100 00:10:40.620 --> 00:10:42.590 align:start position:0% researchers think somewhere around 100 years<00:10:40.920> and<00:10:41.399> some<00:10:41.580> think<00:10:41.820> that<00:10:42.060> because<00:10:42.300> of<00:10:42.480> the 00:10:42.590 --> 00:10:42.600 align:start position:0% years and some think that because of the 00:10:42.600 --> 00:10:43.670 align:start position:0% years and some think that because of the noise<00:10:42.720> problem<00:10:42.959> it's<00:10:43.260> theoretically 00:10:43.670 --> 00:10:43.680 align:start position:0% noise problem it's theoretically 00:10:43.680 --> 00:10:46.250 align:start position:0% noise problem it's theoretically impossible<00:10:44.040> and<00:10:44.160> it<00:10:44.279> will<00:10:44.399> never<00:10:44.519> happen 00:10:46.250 --> 00:10:46.260 align:start position:0% impossible and it will never happen 00:10:46.260 --> 00:10:47.269 align:start position:0% impossible and it will never happen um 00:10:47.269 --> 00:10:47.279 align:start position:0% um 00:10:47.279 --> 00:10:49.910 align:start position:0% um it's<00:10:47.940> a<00:10:48.120> little<00:10:48.180> unclear<00:10:48.720> uh<00:10:49.380> as<00:10:49.500> of<00:10:49.620> right<00:10:49.800> now 00:10:49.910 --> 00:10:49.920 align:start position:0% it's a little unclear uh as of right now 00:10:49.920 --> 00:10:51.650 align:start position:0% it's a little unclear uh as of right now we<00:10:50.160> have<00:10:50.279> about<00:10:50.399> 20<00:10:50.579> signal<00:10:50.940> qubits<00:10:51.360> and<00:10:51.480> we 00:10:51.650 --> 00:10:51.660 align:start position:0% we have about 20 signal qubits and we 00:10:51.660 --> 00:10:54.350 align:start position:0% we have about 20 signal qubits and we need<00:10:51.779> over<00:10:52.019> 2000<00:10:52.560> to<00:10:52.860> break<00:10:52.980> ecdsa 00:10:54.350 --> 00:10:54.360 align:start position:0% need over 2000 to break ecdsa 00:10:54.360 --> 00:10:56.210 align:start position:0% need over 2000 to break ecdsa so<00:10:54.899> I've<00:10:55.140> written<00:10:55.560> a<00:10:55.680> short<00:10:55.800> mental<00:10:56.100> model 00:10:56.210 --> 00:10:56.220 align:start position:0% so I've written a short mental model 00:10:56.220 --> 00:10:57.710 align:start position:0% so I've written a short mental model that<00:10:56.459> you<00:10:56.579> can<00:10:56.700> read<00:10:56.880> once<00:10:57.300> you<00:10:57.360> look<00:10:57.540> at<00:10:57.660> the 00:10:57.710 --> 00:10:57.720 align:start position:0% that you can read once you look at the 00:10:57.720 --> 00:10:59.269 align:start position:0% that you can read once you look at the link<00:10:57.839> on<00:10:57.959> the<00:10:58.079> slides<00:10:58.380> which<00:10:58.680> describes<00:10:59.100> kind 00:10:59.269 --> 00:10:59.279 align:start position:0% link on the slides which describes kind 00:10:59.279 --> 00:11:01.250 align:start position:0% link on the slides which describes kind of<00:10:59.399> how<00:10:59.519> I<00:10:59.579> think<00:10:59.760> about<00:10:59.880> this<00:11:00.360> Quantum<00:11:00.779> mental 00:11:01.250 --> 00:11:01.260 align:start position:0% of how I think about this Quantum mental 00:11:01.260 --> 00:11:02.930 align:start position:0% of how I think about this Quantum mental model<00:11:01.380> of<00:11:01.620> how<00:11:02.040> these<00:11:02.339> systems<00:11:02.579> are<00:11:02.700> going<00:11:02.820> to 00:11:02.930 --> 00:11:02.940 align:start position:0% model of how these systems are going to 00:11:02.940 --> 00:11:04.370 align:start position:0% model of how these systems are going to evolve<00:11:03.300> and<00:11:03.660> whether<00:11:03.779> or<00:11:03.899> not<00:11:03.899> we<00:11:04.140> should<00:11:04.260> be 00:11:04.370 --> 00:11:04.380 align:start position:0% evolve and whether or not we should be 00:11:04.380 --> 00:11:06.650 align:start position:0% evolve and whether or not we should be worried<00:11:04.560> about<00:11:04.680> it<00:11:04.860> but<00:11:05.579> I<00:11:05.880> think<00:11:05.940> for<00:11:06.180> now<00:11:06.360> the 00:11:06.650 --> 00:11:06.660 align:start position:0% worried about it but I think for now the 00:11:06.660 --> 00:11:08.389 align:start position:0% worried about it but I think for now the decision<00:11:06.899> that<00:11:07.079> we<00:11:07.200> made<00:11:07.320> is<00:11:07.560> that 00:11:08.389 --> 00:11:08.399 align:start position:0% decision that we made is that 00:11:08.399 --> 00:11:09.949 align:start position:0% decision that we made is that it<00:11:08.700> makes<00:11:08.880> more<00:11:09.060> sense<00:11:09.240> to<00:11:09.420> not<00:11:09.540> be<00:11:09.720> worried 00:11:09.949 --> 00:11:09.959 align:start position:0% it makes more sense to not be worried 00:11:09.959 --> 00:11:11.990 align:start position:0% it makes more sense to not be worried about<00:11:10.079> Quantum<00:11:10.440> oracles<00:11:10.800> because<00:11:11.339> as<00:11:11.700> long<00:11:11.820> as 00:11:11.990 --> 00:11:12.000 align:start position:0% about Quantum oracles because as long as 00:11:12.000 --> 00:11:14.269 align:start position:0% about Quantum oracles because as long as the<00:11:12.899> protocols<00:11:13.500> are<00:11:13.560> transparent<00:11:13.980> that<00:11:14.160> you 00:11:14.269 --> 00:11:14.279 align:start position:0% the protocols are transparent that you 00:11:14.279 --> 00:11:16.130 align:start position:0% the protocols are transparent that you will<00:11:14.399> be<00:11:14.519> genomized<00:11:15.300> in<00:11:15.600> something<00:11:15.899> between 00:11:16.130 --> 00:11:16.140 align:start position:0% will be genomized in something between 00:11:16.140 --> 00:11:18.290 align:start position:0% will be genomized in something between 30<00:11:16.380> and<00:11:16.560> 100<00:11:16.740> years<00:11:16.980> the<00:11:17.820> idea<00:11:17.940> is<00:11:18.060> that<00:11:18.180> most 00:11:18.290 --> 00:11:18.300 align:start position:0% 30 and 100 years the idea is that most 00:11:18.300 --> 00:11:20.210 align:start position:0% 30 and 100 years the idea is that most people<00:11:18.420> probably<00:11:18.720> won't<00:11:18.959> care<00:11:19.140> because<00:11:19.500> by 00:11:20.210 --> 00:11:20.220 align:start position:0% people probably won't care because by 00:11:20.220 --> 00:11:22.090 align:start position:0% people probably won't care because by that<00:11:20.339> time<00:11:20.579> for<00:11:20.880> instance<00:11:21.060> even<00:11:21.300> governments 00:11:22.090 --> 00:11:22.100 align:start position:0% that time for instance even governments 00:11:22.100 --> 00:11:24.410 align:start position:0% that time for instance even governments declassify<00:11:23.100> their<00:11:23.220> secret<00:11:23.399> documents<00:11:23.940> in 00:11:24.410 --> 00:11:24.420 align:start position:0% declassify their secret documents in 00:11:24.420 --> 00:11:25.790 align:start position:0% declassify their secret documents in this<00:11:24.600> kind<00:11:24.720> of<00:11:24.839> time<00:11:24.959> frame 00:11:25.790 --> 00:11:25.800 align:start position:0% this kind of time frame 00:11:25.800 --> 00:11:27.769 align:start position:0% this kind of time frame so<00:11:26.339> to<00:11:26.579> understand<00:11:26.700> more<00:11:27.240> how<00:11:27.480> this<00:11:27.600> another 00:11:27.769 --> 00:11:27.779 align:start position:0% so to understand more how this another 00:11:27.779 --> 00:11:29.150 align:start position:0% so to understand more how this another fire<00:11:28.019> scheme<00:11:28.320> is<00:11:28.320> going<00:11:28.500> and<00:11:28.680> if<00:11:28.800> you<00:11:28.920> can<00:11:28.980> use 00:11:29.150 --> 00:11:29.160 align:start position:0% fire scheme is going and if you can use 00:11:29.160 --> 00:11:31.670 align:start position:0% fire scheme is going and if you can use it<00:11:29.279> yourself<00:11:29.660> we<00:11:30.660> have<00:11:30.959> a<00:11:31.079> paper<00:11:31.200> in<00:11:31.500> which<00:11:31.620> we 00:11:31.670 --> 00:11:31.680 align:start position:0% it yourself we have a paper in which we 00:11:31.680 --> 00:11:33.170 align:start position:0% it yourself we have a paper in which we approved<00:11:31.920> all<00:11:32.100> the<00:11:32.220> security<00:11:32.279> properties<00:11:32.760> of 00:11:33.170 --> 00:11:33.180 align:start position:0% approved all the security properties of 00:11:33.180 --> 00:11:34.970 align:start position:0% approved all the security properties of this<00:11:33.300> nullifier<00:11:33.720> scheme 00:11:34.970 --> 00:11:34.980 align:start position:0% this nullifier scheme 00:11:34.980 --> 00:11:36.350 align:start position:0% this nullifier scheme um<00:11:35.100> we<00:11:35.399> have<00:11:35.459> a<00:11:35.579> blog<00:11:35.820> post<00:11:35.880> that's<00:11:36.120> going<00:11:36.240> to 00:11:36.350 --> 00:11:36.360 align:start position:0% um we have a blog post that's going to 00:11:36.360 --> 00:11:37.670 align:start position:0% um we have a blog post that's going to be<00:11:36.420> coming<00:11:36.480> up<00:11:36.660> on<00:11:36.779> the<00:11:36.839> Persona<00:11:37.200> Labs<00:11:37.500> blog 00:11:37.670 --> 00:11:37.680 align:start position:0% be coming up on the Persona Labs blog 00:11:37.680 --> 00:11:39.650 align:start position:0% be coming up on the Persona Labs blog soon<00:11:37.860> and<00:11:38.579> we<00:11:38.700> also<00:11:38.880> have<00:11:38.940> a<00:11:39.060> proof<00:11:39.240> of<00:11:39.360> concept 00:11:39.650 --> 00:11:39.660 align:start position:0% soon and we also have a proof of concept 00:11:39.660 --> 00:11:41.870 align:start position:0% soon and we also have a proof of concept uh<00:11:40.500> in<00:11:40.620> Rust<00:11:40.860> and<00:11:41.100> in<00:11:41.220> a<00:11:41.339> metamask<00:11:41.640> snap 00:11:41.870 --> 00:11:41.880 align:start position:0% uh in Rust and in a metamask snap 00:11:41.880 --> 00:11:43.310 align:start position:0% uh in Rust and in a metamask snap finished 00:11:43.310 --> 00:11:43.320 align:start position:0% finished 00:11:43.320 --> 00:11:45.710 align:start position:0% finished um<00:11:43.860> the<00:11:44.279> next<00:11:44.399> step<00:11:44.519> is<00:11:44.700> to<00:11:44.880> put<00:11:45.000> it<00:11:45.120> into<00:11:45.240> a<00:11:45.600> ton 00:11:45.710 --> 00:11:45.720 align:start position:0% um the next step is to put it into a ton 00:11:45.720 --> 00:11:48.889 align:start position:0% um the next step is to put it into a ton of<00:11:45.839> other<00:11:45.959> wallets<00:11:46.320> into<00:11:47.120> Ledger<00:11:48.120> into<00:11:48.420> burner 00:11:48.889 --> 00:11:48.899 align:start position:0% of other wallets into Ledger into burner 00:11:48.899 --> 00:11:50.990 align:start position:0% of other wallets into Ledger into burner wallets<00:11:49.140> into<00:11:49.260> metamask<00:11:49.740> core<00:11:49.980> create<00:11:50.459> an<00:11:50.700> ERC 00:11:50.990 --> 00:11:51.000 align:start position:0% wallets into metamask core create an ERC 00:11:51.000 --> 00:11:52.490 align:start position:0% wallets into metamask core create an ERC standard<00:11:51.300> for<00:11:51.480> people<00:11:51.600> to<00:11:51.779> use<00:11:51.959> this<00:11:52.140> scheme 00:11:52.490 --> 00:11:52.500 align:start position:0% standard for people to use this scheme 00:11:52.500 --> 00:11:54.590 align:start position:0% standard for people to use this scheme so<00:11:52.800> we<00:11:53.040> can<00:11:53.100> have<00:11:53.220> unique<00:11:53.519> anonymity<00:11:53.940> across 00:11:54.590 --> 00:11:54.600 align:start position:0% so we can have unique anonymity across 00:11:54.600 --> 00:11:57.590 align:start position:0% so we can have unique anonymity across the<00:11:54.720> board<00:11:54.899> and<00:11:55.860> to<00:11:56.220> potentially<00:11:56.579> write<00:11:57.480> an 00:11:57.590 --> 00:11:57.600 align:start position:0% the board and to potentially write an 00:11:57.600 --> 00:12:00.170 align:start position:0% the board and to potentially write an appendix<00:11:57.959> to<00:11:58.079> an<00:11:58.200> ietf<00:11:58.560> RFC<00:11:58.980> to<00:11:59.220> make<00:11:59.339> it<00:11:59.579> a 00:12:00.170 --> 00:12:00.180 align:start position:0% appendix to an ietf RFC to make it a 00:12:00.180 --> 00:12:01.670 align:start position:0% appendix to an ietf RFC to make it a complete<00:12:00.899> standard<00:12:01.140> across<00:12:01.440> all<00:12:01.560> of 00:12:01.670 --> 00:12:01.680 align:start position:0% complete standard across all of 00:12:01.680 --> 00:12:03.350 align:start position:0% complete standard across all of cryptography<00:12:02.220> if<00:12:02.880> you're<00:12:03.000> interested<00:12:03.240> in 00:12:03.350 --> 00:12:03.360 align:start position:0% cryptography if you're interested in 00:12:03.360 --> 00:12:05.509 align:start position:0% cryptography if you're interested in seeing<00:12:03.600> more<00:12:03.720> about<00:12:03.899> the<00:12:04.140> code<00:12:04.339> this<00:12:05.339> link 00:12:05.509 --> 00:12:05.519 align:start position:0% seeing more about the code this link 00:12:05.519 --> 00:12:06.949 align:start position:0% seeing more about the code this link will<00:12:05.760> link<00:12:05.880> you<00:12:06.000> to<00:12:06.120> our<00:12:06.240> GitHub<00:12:06.480> repo<00:12:06.839> where 00:12:06.949 --> 00:12:06.959 align:start position:0% will link you to our GitHub repo where 00:12:06.959 --> 00:12:08.389 align:start position:0% will link you to our GitHub repo where we<00:12:07.079> have<00:12:07.200> all<00:12:07.260> the<00:12:07.380> open<00:12:07.500> source<00:12:07.860> code<00:12:07.980> we'll 00:12:08.389 --> 00:12:08.399 align:start position:0% we have all the open source code we'll 00:12:08.399 --> 00:12:10.430 align:start position:0% we have all the open source code we'll be<00:12:08.579> linking<00:12:08.940> to<00:12:09.240> all<00:12:09.720> the<00:12:09.839> slides<00:12:10.200> here<00:12:10.320> as 00:12:10.430 --> 00:12:10.440 align:start position:0% be linking to all the slides here as 00:12:10.440 --> 00:12:12.949 align:start position:0% be linking to all the slides here as well<00:12:10.620> along<00:12:10.860> with<00:12:11.040> the<00:12:11.220> quantum<00:12:11.519> mental<00:12:11.760> model 00:12:12.949 --> 00:12:12.959 align:start position:0% well along with the quantum mental model 00:12:12.959 --> 00:12:14.449 align:start position:0% well along with the quantum mental model um<00:12:13.019> and<00:12:13.500> our<00:12:13.680> Twitter<00:12:13.800> if<00:12:14.040> you<00:12:14.160> want<00:12:14.279> to<00:12:14.339> learn 00:12:14.449 --> 00:12:14.459 align:start position:0% um and our Twitter if you want to learn 00:12:14.459 --> 00:12:16.430 align:start position:0% um and our Twitter if you want to learn more 00:12:16.430 --> 00:12:16.440 align:start position:0% more 00:12:16.440 --> 00:12:18.829 align:start position:0% more um<00:12:16.500> you<00:12:16.860> guys<00:12:16.980> are<00:12:17.100> interested<00:12:17.459> in<00:12:17.579> this<00:12:18.540> uh 00:12:18.829 --> 00:12:18.839 align:start position:0% um you guys are interested in this uh 00:12:18.839 --> 00:12:20.509 align:start position:0% um you guys are interested in this uh want<00:12:19.079> to<00:12:19.200> use<00:12:19.260> a<00:12:19.440> scheme<00:12:19.740> or<00:12:20.100> are<00:12:20.279> curious 00:12:20.509 --> 00:12:20.519 align:start position:0% want to use a scheme or are curious 00:12:20.519 --> 00:12:23.690 align:start position:0% want to use a scheme or are curious about<00:12:20.839> uh<00:12:21.839> student<00:12:22.100> I'd<00:12:23.100> be<00:12:23.220> happy<00:12:23.339> to<00:12:23.579> talk 00:12:23.690 --> 00:12:23.700 align:start position:0% about uh student I'd be happy to talk 00:12:23.700 --> 00:12:24.949 align:start position:0% about uh student I'd be happy to talk and<00:12:23.820> it<00:12:24.000> would<00:12:24.060> be<00:12:24.180> really<00:12:24.300> fun<00:12:24.540> to<00:12:24.660> see<00:12:24.779> where 00:12:24.949 --> 00:12:24.959 align:start position:0% and it would be really fun to see where 00:12:24.959 --> 00:12:26.810 align:start position:0% and it would be really fun to see where the<00:12:25.140> scheme<00:12:25.380> can<00:12:25.500> go<00:12:25.620> if<00:12:26.279> anyone<00:12:26.519> has<00:12:26.700> any 00:12:26.810 --> 00:12:26.820 align:start position:0% the scheme can go if anyone has any 00:12:26.820 --> 00:12:28.670 align:start position:0% the scheme can go if anyone has any questions<00:12:27.000> about<00:12:27.360> understanding<00:12:28.200> the<00:12:28.320> scheme 00:12:28.670 --> 00:12:28.680 align:start position:0% questions about understanding the scheme 00:12:28.680 --> 00:12:31.730 align:start position:0% questions about understanding the scheme or<00:12:29.519> thoughts<00:12:30.300> on<00:12:30.660> where<00:12:31.019> it<00:12:31.140> can<00:12:31.260> or<00:12:31.440> can't<00:12:31.620> be 00:12:31.730 --> 00:12:31.740 align:start position:0% or thoughts on where it can or can't be 00:12:31.740 --> 00:12:33.050 align:start position:0% or thoughts on where it can or can't be used<00:12:31.860> I'd<00:12:32.220> be<00:12:32.399> happy<00:12:32.519> to<00:12:32.640> take<00:12:32.760> any<00:12:32.880> questions 00:12:33.050 --> 00:12:33.060 align:start position:0% used I'd be happy to take any questions 00:12:33.060 --> 00:12:35.329 align:start position:0% used I'd be happy to take any questions for<00:12:33.420> the<00:12:33.540> next<00:12:33.660> five<00:12:33.899> or<00:12:34.079> ten<00:12:34.260> minutes 00:12:35.329 --> 00:12:35.339 align:start position:0% for the next five or ten minutes 00:12:35.339 --> 00:12:38.269 align:start position:0% for the next five or ten minutes test<00:12:35.820> okay<00:12:36.240> how<00:12:36.600> is<00:12:36.720> this<00:12:36.839> scheme<00:12:37.140> called 00:12:38.269 --> 00:12:38.279 align:start position:0% test okay how is this scheme called 00:12:38.279 --> 00:12:40.130 align:start position:0% test okay how is this scheme called so<00:12:38.760> right<00:12:39.000> now<00:12:39.120> the<00:12:39.300> scheme<00:12:39.600> is<00:12:39.660> called<00:12:39.779> just<00:12:40.019> a 00:12:40.130 --> 00:12:40.140 align:start position:0% so right now the scheme is called just a 00:12:40.140 --> 00:12:41.870 align:start position:0% so right now the scheme is called just a ZK<00:12:40.380> nullifier<00:12:40.860> because<00:12:41.160> we<00:12:41.459> think<00:12:41.579> this<00:12:41.760> is 00:12:41.870 --> 00:12:41.880 align:start position:0% ZK nullifier because we think this is 00:12:41.880 --> 00:12:44.150 align:start position:0% ZK nullifier because we think this is the<00:12:42.720> kind<00:12:43.139> of<00:12:43.260> most<00:12:43.380> straightforward<00:12:43.740> way<00:12:43.920> to 00:12:44.150 --> 00:12:44.160 align:start position:0% the kind of most straightforward way to 00:12:44.160 --> 00:12:46.129 align:start position:0% the kind of most straightforward way to describe<00:12:44.399> what<00:12:44.579> is<00:12:44.700> going<00:12:44.820> on<00:12:45.000> but<00:12:45.779> I'm<00:12:45.899> open 00:12:46.129 --> 00:12:46.139 align:start position:0% describe what is going on but I'm open 00:12:46.139 --> 00:12:47.870 align:start position:0% describe what is going on but I'm open to<00:12:46.320> any<00:12:46.440> other<00:12:46.620> name<00:12:46.800> suggestions 00:12:47.870 --> 00:12:47.880 align:start position:0% to any other name suggestions 00:12:47.880 --> 00:12:50.449 align:start position:0% to any other name suggestions I<00:12:48.300> think<00:12:48.480> there's<00:12:48.839> a<00:12:48.959> question<00:12:49.139> in<00:12:49.260> the<00:12:49.380> front 00:12:50.449 --> 00:12:50.459 align:start position:0% I think there's a question in the front 00:12:50.459 --> 00:12:53.389 align:start position:0% I think there's a question in the front can<00:12:51.120> you<00:12:51.300> like<00:12:51.600> explain<00:12:52.079> uh<00:12:52.860> probably<00:12:53.100> maybe 00:12:53.389 --> 00:12:53.399 align:start position:0% can you like explain uh probably maybe 00:12:53.399 --> 00:12:56.710 align:start position:0% can you like explain uh probably maybe using<00:12:53.880> an<00:12:54.000> example<00:12:54.420> how<00:12:55.019> uh<00:12:55.620> like<00:12:55.980> this 00:12:56.710 --> 00:12:56.720 align:start position:0% using an example how uh like this 00:12:56.720 --> 00:13:00.650 align:start position:0% using an example how uh like this non-interactive<00:12:57.720> uh<00:12:58.200> is<00:12:58.980> like<00:12:59.339> is<00:13:00.000> like<00:13:00.300> seen 00:13:00.650 --> 00:13:00.660 align:start position:0% non-interactive uh is like is like seen 00:13:00.660 --> 00:13:03.530 align:start position:0% non-interactive uh is like is like seen in<00:13:00.779> practice<00:13:01.019> like<00:13:01.500> in<00:13:01.860> terms<00:13:02.639> of<00:13:02.820> like<00:13:03.120> uh 00:13:03.530 --> 00:13:03.540 align:start position:0% in practice like in terms of like uh 00:13:03.540 --> 00:13:05.329 align:start position:0% in practice like in terms of like uh using<00:13:03.959> the<00:13:04.139> scheme 00:13:05.329 --> 00:13:05.339 align:start position:0% using the scheme 00:13:05.339 --> 00:13:07.850 align:start position:0% using the scheme like<00:13:05.820> maybe<00:13:06.000> like<00:13:06.300> an<00:13:06.540> airdrop<00:13:07.260> like<00:13:07.500> can<00:13:07.680> you 00:13:07.850 --> 00:13:07.860 align:start position:0% like maybe like an airdrop like can you 00:13:07.860 --> 00:13:09.470 align:start position:0% like maybe like an airdrop like can you explain<00:13:07.980> like<00:13:08.279> how<00:13:08.519> that<00:13:08.700> system<00:13:09.000> would<00:13:09.300> work 00:13:09.470 --> 00:13:09.480 align:start position:0% explain like how that system would work 00:13:09.480 --> 00:13:11.569 align:start position:0% explain like how that system would work how<00:13:09.899> like<00:13:10.139> user<00:13:10.500> would<00:13:10.680> interact<00:13:11.100> and<00:13:11.279> like 00:13:11.569 --> 00:13:11.579 align:start position:0% how like user would interact and like 00:13:11.579 --> 00:13:14.509 align:start position:0% how like user would interact and like kind<00:13:11.820> of<00:13:12.139> maintain<00:13:13.139> that<00:13:13.380> property<00:13:13.980> yeah 00:13:14.509 --> 00:13:14.519 align:start position:0% kind of maintain that property yeah 00:13:14.519 --> 00:13:16.430 align:start position:0% kind of maintain that property yeah that's<00:13:14.820> a<00:13:14.940> great<00:13:15.060> question<00:13:15.300> I<00:13:15.540> can<00:13:15.660> maybe<00:13:15.839> go 00:13:16.430 --> 00:13:16.440 align:start position:0% that's a great question I can maybe go 00:13:16.440 --> 00:13:17.930 align:start position:0% that's a great question I can maybe go through<00:13:16.620> the<00:13:16.800> kind<00:13:17.040> of<00:13:17.100> the<00:13:17.339> whole<00:13:17.579> airdrop 00:13:17.930 --> 00:13:17.940 align:start position:0% through the kind of the whole airdrop 00:13:17.940 --> 00:13:20.030 align:start position:0% through the kind of the whole airdrop scheme<00:13:18.240> and<00:13:18.300> try<00:13:18.420> to<00:13:18.540> describe<00:13:18.959> why<00:13:19.740> it 00:13:20.030 --> 00:13:20.040 align:start position:0% scheme and try to describe why it 00:13:20.040 --> 00:13:20.990 align:start position:0% scheme and try to describe why it wouldn't<00:13:20.100> be<00:13:20.339> practical<00:13:20.519> or<00:13:20.700> something<00:13:20.820> like 00:13:20.990 --> 00:13:21.000 align:start position:0% wouldn't be practical or something like 00:13:21.000 --> 00:13:22.069 align:start position:0% wouldn't be practical or something like that<00:13:21.120> before<00:13:21.300> but<00:13:21.540> why<00:13:21.660> it<00:13:21.839> could<00:13:21.959> be 00:13:22.069 --> 00:13:22.079 align:start position:0% that before but why it could be 00:13:22.079 --> 00:13:22.790 align:start position:0% that before but why it could be practical<00:13:22.320> with<00:13:22.500> something<00:13:22.620> like<00:13:22.740> the 00:13:22.790 --> 00:13:22.800 align:start position:0% practical with something like the 00:13:22.800 --> 00:13:24.530 align:start position:0% practical with something like the nullifier<00:13:23.700> so<00:13:24.060> if<00:13:24.180> you<00:13:24.240> imagine<00:13:24.360> the 00:13:24.530 --> 00:13:24.540 align:start position:0% nullifier so if you imagine the 00:13:24.540 --> 00:13:26.389 align:start position:0% nullifier so if you imagine the semaphore<00:13:24.959> scheme<00:13:25.260> for<00:13:25.320> the<00:13:25.440> airdrop<00:13:25.860> the<00:13:26.279> way 00:13:26.389 --> 00:13:26.399 align:start position:0% semaphore scheme for the airdrop the way 00:13:26.399 --> 00:13:27.829 align:start position:0% semaphore scheme for the airdrop the way it<00:13:26.519> would<00:13:26.639> look<00:13:26.820> is<00:13:27.000> that<00:13:27.180> people<00:13:27.360> would<00:13:27.720> first 00:13:27.829 --> 00:13:27.839 align:start position:0% it would look is that people would first 00:13:27.839 --> 00:13:29.530 align:start position:0% it would look is that people would first have<00:13:28.019> to<00:13:28.139> sign<00:13:28.260> up<00:13:28.440> to<00:13:28.680> receive<00:13:28.920> the<00:13:29.040> airdrop 00:13:29.530 --> 00:13:29.540 align:start position:0% have to sign up to receive the airdrop 00:13:29.540 --> 00:13:31.970 align:start position:0% have to sign up to receive the airdrop and<00:13:30.540> this<00:13:30.720> is<00:13:30.899> so<00:13:31.260> people<00:13:31.440> have<00:13:31.680> to<00:13:31.800> submit 00:13:31.970 --> 00:13:31.980 align:start position:0% and this is so people have to submit 00:13:31.980 --> 00:13:34.550 align:start position:0% and this is so people have to submit their<00:13:32.100> semaphore<00:13:32.459> commitment<00:13:32.820> to<00:13:33.000> some<00:13:33.600> uh 00:13:34.550 --> 00:13:34.560 align:start position:0% their semaphore commitment to some uh 00:13:34.560 --> 00:13:37.250 align:start position:0% their semaphore commitment to some uh either<00:13:34.740> like<00:13:35.100> an<00:13:35.279> on-chain<00:13:35.820> directory<00:13:36.540> or<00:13:37.139> an 00:13:37.250 --> 00:13:37.260 align:start position:0% either like an on-chain directory or an 00:13:37.260 --> 00:13:39.290 align:start position:0% either like an on-chain directory or an off<00:13:37.440> chain<00:13:37.680> list<00:13:37.920> and<00:13:38.459> the<00:13:38.820> issue<00:13:39.120> with<00:13:39.180> this 00:13:39.290 --> 00:13:39.300 align:start position:0% off chain list and the issue with this 00:13:39.300 --> 00:13:40.670 align:start position:0% off chain list and the issue with this is<00:13:39.420> that<00:13:39.600> people<00:13:39.779> can<00:13:40.019> then<00:13:40.139> stable<00:13:40.440> attack 00:13:40.670 --> 00:13:40.680 align:start position:0% is that people can then stable attack 00:13:40.680 --> 00:13:42.470 align:start position:0% is that people can then stable attack this<00:13:41.459> airdrop<00:13:41.820> very<00:13:41.940> easily<00:13:42.120> because<00:13:42.300> they 00:13:42.470 --> 00:13:42.480 align:start position:0% this airdrop very easily because they 00:13:42.480 --> 00:13:43.490 align:start position:0% this airdrop very easily because they know<00:13:42.540> that<00:13:42.720> an<00:13:42.839> interrupt<00:13:43.200> is<00:13:43.260> going<00:13:43.380> to<00:13:43.440> be 00:13:43.490 --> 00:13:43.500 align:start position:0% know that an interrupt is going to be 00:13:43.500 --> 00:13:44.870 align:start position:0% know that an interrupt is going to be coming<00:13:43.680> and<00:13:44.160> this<00:13:44.279> is<00:13:44.399> a<00:13:44.519> way<00:13:44.579> to<00:13:44.700> gain 00:13:44.870 --> 00:13:44.880 align:start position:0% coming and this is a way to gain 00:13:44.880 --> 00:13:47.210 align:start position:0% coming and this is a way to gain eligibility<00:13:45.300> for<00:13:45.660> it<00:13:45.779> and<00:13:46.380> so<00:13:46.620> because<00:13:46.980> they 00:13:47.210 --> 00:13:47.220 align:start position:0% eligibility for it and so because they 00:13:47.220 --> 00:13:49.310 align:start position:0% eligibility for it and so because they have<00:13:47.399> this<00:13:47.639> two-step<00:13:48.120> process<00:13:48.420> people<00:13:48.899> can 00:13:49.310 --> 00:13:49.320 align:start position:0% have this two-step process people can 00:13:49.320 --> 00:13:51.290 align:start position:0% have this two-step process people can spam<00:13:49.620> whatever<00:13:49.920> mechanism<00:13:50.760> it<00:13:51.060> is<00:13:51.180> that 00:13:51.290 --> 00:13:51.300 align:start position:0% spam whatever mechanism it is that 00:13:51.300 --> 00:13:52.730 align:start position:0% spam whatever mechanism it is that they're<00:13:51.420> using<00:13:51.660> to<00:13:51.779> determine<00:13:52.139> who<00:13:52.620> is 00:13:52.730 --> 00:13:52.740 align:start position:0% they're using to determine who is 00:13:52.740 --> 00:13:54.590 align:start position:0% they're using to determine who is legible<00:13:53.040> and<00:13:53.160> who<00:13:53.279> is<00:13:53.459> not<00:13:53.579> resulting<00:13:54.480> as 00:13:54.590 --> 00:13:54.600 align:start position:0% legible and who is not resulting as 00:13:54.600 --> 00:13:56.030 align:start position:0% legible and who is not resulting as being<00:13:54.779> of<00:13:54.959> somewhat<00:13:55.260> impractical<00:13:55.620> solution 00:13:56.030 --> 00:13:56.040 align:start position:0% being of somewhat impractical solution 00:13:56.040 --> 00:13:59.030 align:start position:0% being of somewhat impractical solution you<00:13:56.940> can<00:13:57.060> also<00:13:57.240> imagine<00:13:57.420> that<00:13:58.260> if<00:13:58.800> you<00:13:58.860> didn't 00:13:59.030 --> 00:13:59.040 align:start position:0% you can also imagine that if you didn't 00:13:59.040 --> 00:14:00.769 align:start position:0% you can also imagine that if you didn't have<00:13:59.220> a<00:13:59.399> two-phase<00:13:59.760> process<00:14:00.060> where<00:14:00.480> instead 00:14:00.769 --> 00:14:00.779 align:start position:0% have a two-phase process where instead 00:14:00.779 --> 00:14:01.910 align:start position:0% have a two-phase process where instead people<00:14:00.959> could<00:14:01.079> sign<00:14:01.260> up<00:14:01.380> for<00:14:01.500> the<00:14:01.560> summer<00:14:01.680> for 00:14:01.910 --> 00:14:01.920 align:start position:0% people could sign up for the summer for 00:14:01.920 --> 00:14:04.069 align:start position:0% people could sign up for the summer for Keys<00:14:02.160> whenever<00:14:02.399> and<00:14:02.760> claim<00:14:03.060> whenever<00:14:03.360> and<00:14:03.899> the 00:14:04.069 --> 00:14:04.079 align:start position:0% Keys whenever and claim whenever and the 00:14:04.079 --> 00:14:05.329 align:start position:0% Keys whenever and claim whenever and the very<00:14:04.139> first<00:14:04.260> person<00:14:04.440> to<00:14:04.620> claimed<00:14:04.860> the<00:14:04.980> airdrop 00:14:05.329 --> 00:14:05.339 align:start position:0% very first person to claimed the airdrop 00:14:05.339 --> 00:14:07.190 align:start position:0% very first person to claimed the airdrop was<00:14:05.579> sign<00:14:05.760> up<00:14:05.880> for<00:14:05.940> this<00:14:06.060> timer<00:14:06.240> for<00:14:06.480> key<00:14:06.660> you 00:14:07.190 --> 00:14:07.200 align:start position:0% was sign up for this timer for key you 00:14:07.200 --> 00:14:09.710 align:start position:0% was sign up for this timer for key you would<00:14:07.320> see<00:14:07.440> only<00:14:07.740> one<00:14:07.920> semaphore<00:14:08.399> key<00:14:08.639> in<00:14:09.540> the 00:14:09.710 --> 00:14:09.720 align:start position:0% would see only one semaphore key in the 00:14:09.720 --> 00:14:11.509 align:start position:0% would see only one semaphore key in the list<00:14:09.839> of<00:14:09.959> all<00:14:10.079> summer<00:14:10.260> Four<00:14:10.560> Keys<00:14:10.860> and<00:14:11.399> then 00:14:11.509 --> 00:14:11.519 align:start position:0% list of all summer Four Keys and then 00:14:11.519 --> 00:14:12.710 align:start position:0% list of all summer Four Keys and then that<00:14:11.639> person<00:14:11.760> would<00:14:12.060> clean<00:14:12.180> their<00:14:12.360> airdrop 00:14:12.710 --> 00:14:12.720 align:start position:0% that person would clean their airdrop 00:14:12.720 --> 00:14:14.329 align:start position:0% that person would clean their airdrop and<00:14:13.019> so<00:14:13.139> you<00:14:13.260> would<00:14:13.440> know<00:14:13.620> that<00:14:14.040> the<00:14:14.220> person 00:14:14.329 --> 00:14:14.339 align:start position:0% and so you would know that the person 00:14:14.339 --> 00:14:15.889 align:start position:0% and so you would know that the person who<00:14:14.519> posted<00:14:14.820> that<00:14:14.940> proof<00:14:15.240> must<00:14:15.540> have<00:14:15.660> been<00:14:15.779> the 00:14:15.889 --> 00:14:15.899 align:start position:0% who posted that proof must have been the 00:14:15.899 --> 00:14:18.350 align:start position:0% who posted that proof must have been the person<00:14:16.079> who<00:14:16.380> claimed<00:14:16.620> the<00:14:16.680> airdrop<00:14:17.579> and<00:14:18.120> so 00:14:18.350 --> 00:14:18.360 align:start position:0% person who claimed the airdrop and so 00:14:18.360 --> 00:14:20.750 align:start position:0% person who claimed the airdrop and so there's<00:14:18.779> all<00:14:19.019> the<00:14:19.139> small<00:14:19.260> anonymity<00:14:19.680> set<00:14:19.920> is 00:14:20.750 --> 00:14:20.760 align:start position:0% there's all the small anonymity set is 00:14:20.760 --> 00:14:22.370 align:start position:0% there's all the small anonymity set is is<00:14:21.180> not<00:14:21.480> ideal<00:14:21.779> if<00:14:21.959> you're<00:14:22.079> trying<00:14:22.260> to 00:14:22.370 --> 00:14:22.380 align:start position:0% is not ideal if you're trying to 00:14:22.380 --> 00:14:23.629 align:start position:0% is not ideal if you're trying to maintain<00:14:22.620> perfect<00:14:22.800> anonymity<00:14:23.339> for<00:14:23.519> everyone 00:14:23.629 --> 00:14:23.639 align:start position:0% maintain perfect anonymity for everyone 00:14:23.639 --> 00:14:25.610 align:start position:0% maintain perfect anonymity for everyone in<00:14:23.880> the<00:14:24.000> set<00:14:24.120> with<00:14:24.839> another<00:14:24.959> fire<00:14:25.260> scheme 00:14:25.610 --> 00:14:25.620 align:start position:0% in the set with another fire scheme 00:14:25.620 --> 00:14:26.870 align:start position:0% in the set with another fire scheme would<00:14:25.680> work<00:14:25.860> is<00:14:26.160> that<00:14:26.279> when<00:14:26.459> you<00:14:26.519> claim<00:14:26.760> the 00:14:26.870 --> 00:14:26.880 align:start position:0% would work is that when you claim the 00:14:26.880 --> 00:14:29.210 align:start position:0% would work is that when you claim the airdrop<00:14:27.300> you<00:14:27.839> prove<00:14:28.200> that<00:14:28.320> you<00:14:28.560> have<00:14:28.740> another 00:14:29.210 --> 00:14:29.220 align:start position:0% airdrop you prove that you have another 00:14:29.220 --> 00:14:31.190 align:start position:0% airdrop you prove that you have another fire<00:14:29.519> for<00:14:29.760> a<00:14:29.940> message<00:14:30.120> like<00:14:30.480> I<00:14:30.720> am<00:14:30.839> claiming 00:14:31.190 --> 00:14:31.200 align:start position:0% fire for a message like I am claiming 00:14:31.200 --> 00:14:34.190 align:start position:0% fire for a message like I am claiming the<00:14:31.380> ZK<00:14:31.680> airdrop<00:14:32.160> and<00:14:33.060> the<00:14:33.600> verifier<00:14:34.019> would 00:14:34.190 --> 00:14:34.200 align:start position:0% the ZK airdrop and the verifier would 00:14:34.200 --> 00:14:35.449 align:start position:0% the ZK airdrop and the verifier would prove<00:14:34.440> that<00:14:34.620> you<00:14:34.740> in<00:14:34.860> fact<00:14:34.980> signed<00:14:35.339> that 00:14:35.449 --> 00:14:35.459 align:start position:0% prove that you in fact signed that 00:14:35.459 --> 00:14:36.650 align:start position:0% prove that you in fact signed that message<00:14:35.639> that<00:14:36.180> you<00:14:36.300> created<00:14:36.480> your 00:14:36.650 --> 00:14:36.660 align:start position:0% message that you created your 00:14:36.660 --> 00:14:38.629 align:start position:0% message that you created your deterministic<00:14:37.079> nullifier<00:14:37.440> correctly<00:14:37.860> and 00:14:38.629 --> 00:14:38.639 align:start position:0% deterministic nullifier correctly and 00:14:38.639 --> 00:14:40.189 align:start position:0% deterministic nullifier correctly and would<00:14:39.060> allow<00:14:39.300> you<00:14:39.360> to<00:14:39.480> clean<00:14:39.600> the<00:14:39.720> airdrop<00:14:40.019> and 00:14:40.189 --> 00:14:40.199 align:start position:0% would allow you to clean the airdrop and 00:14:40.199 --> 00:14:41.629 align:start position:0% would allow you to clean the airdrop and then<00:14:40.320> add<00:14:40.440> that<00:14:40.620> nullifier<00:14:41.100> to<00:14:41.279> a<00:14:41.339> block<00:14:41.459> list 00:14:41.629 --> 00:14:41.639 align:start position:0% then add that nullifier to a block list 00:14:41.639 --> 00:14:43.550 align:start position:0% then add that nullifier to a block list from<00:14:41.880> ever<00:14:42.060> claiming<00:14:42.480> again<00:14:42.600> and<00:14:43.320> so<00:14:43.440> what 00:14:43.550 --> 00:14:43.560 align:start position:0% from ever claiming again and so what 00:14:43.560 --> 00:14:44.870 align:start position:0% from ever claiming again and so what would<00:14:43.680> happen<00:14:43.860> is<00:14:44.040> the<00:14:44.160> very<00:14:44.339> first<00:14:44.459> person<00:14:44.639> to 00:14:44.870 --> 00:14:44.880 align:start position:0% would happen is the very first person to 00:14:44.880 --> 00:14:46.490 align:start position:0% would happen is the very first person to claim<00:14:45.180> no<00:14:45.600> one<00:14:45.720> would<00:14:45.839> know<00:14:45.959> who<00:14:46.139> they<00:14:46.260> are<00:14:46.380> out 00:14:46.490 --> 00:14:46.500 align:start position:0% claim no one would know who they are out 00:14:46.500 --> 00:14:48.110 align:start position:0% claim no one would know who they are out of<00:14:46.620> the<00:14:46.740> entire<00:14:46.920> set<00:14:47.160> of<00:14:47.399> all<00:14:47.639> the<00:14:47.820> keys<00:14:48.060> that 00:14:48.110 --> 00:14:48.120 align:start position:0% of the entire set of all the keys that 00:14:48.120 --> 00:14:49.850 align:start position:0% of the entire set of all the keys that are<00:14:48.240> eligible<00:14:48.480> for<00:14:48.660> the<00:14:48.720> airdrop 00:14:49.850 --> 00:14:49.860 align:start position:0% are eligible for the airdrop 00:14:49.860 --> 00:14:52.550 align:start position:0% are eligible for the airdrop where<00:14:50.519> does<00:14:50.820> the<00:14:51.060> like<00:14:51.420> nft<00:14:51.720> eventually<00:14:52.320> end 00:14:52.550 --> 00:14:52.560 align:start position:0% where does the like nft eventually end 00:14:52.560 --> 00:14:56.090 align:start position:0% where does the like nft eventually end like<00:14:52.860> it's<00:14:53.040> an<00:14:53.339> ethereum<00:14:53.940> address<00:14:54.320> versus<00:14:55.320> uh 00:14:56.090 --> 00:14:56.100 align:start position:0% like it's an ethereum address versus uh 00:14:56.100 --> 00:14:57.949 align:start position:0% like it's an ethereum address versus uh like<00:14:56.339> is<00:14:56.699> it<00:14:56.820> like<00:14:57.000> the<00:14:57.240> things<00:14:57.420> are<00:14:57.660> happening 00:14:57.949 --> 00:14:57.959 align:start position:0% like is it like the things are happening 00:14:57.959 --> 00:14:59.810 align:start position:0% like is it like the things are happening on<00:14:58.199> chain<00:14:58.380> or<00:14:58.620> is<00:14:58.800> like<00:14:58.980> an<00:14:59.040> off<00:14:59.160> chain<00:14:59.399> process 00:14:59.810 --> 00:14:59.820 align:start position:0% on chain or is like an off chain process 00:14:59.820 --> 00:15:02.210 align:start position:0% on chain or is like an off chain process or<00:15:00.180> like<00:15:00.420> uh<00:15:00.899> just<00:15:01.260> trying<00:15:01.560> to<00:15:01.680> understand 00:15:02.210 --> 00:15:02.220 align:start position:0% or like uh just trying to understand 00:15:02.220 --> 00:15:04.550 align:start position:0% or like uh just trying to understand that<00:15:02.519> yeah<00:15:03.060> that's<00:15:03.240> a<00:15:03.420> great<00:15:03.540> question<00:15:03.720> uh<00:15:04.380> for 00:15:04.550 --> 00:15:04.560 align:start position:0% that yeah that's a great question uh for 00:15:04.560 --> 00:15:05.750 align:start position:0% that yeah that's a great question uh for those<00:15:04.680> who<00:15:04.860> don't<00:15:04.980> hear<00:15:05.100> the<00:15:05.220> beginning<00:15:05.399> the 00:15:05.750 --> 00:15:05.760 align:start position:0% those who don't hear the beginning the 00:15:05.760 --> 00:15:07.550 align:start position:0% those who don't hear the beginning the question<00:15:05.940> was<00:15:06.180> basically<00:15:06.600> how<00:15:07.019> does<00:15:07.199> ZK 00:15:07.550 --> 00:15:07.560 align:start position:0% question was basically how does ZK 00:15:07.560 --> 00:15:09.410 align:start position:0% question was basically how does ZK airdrop<00:15:07.980> actually<00:15:08.100> implemented<00:15:08.639> and<00:15:09.240> the 00:15:09.410 --> 00:15:09.420 align:start position:0% airdrop actually implemented and the 00:15:09.420 --> 00:15:11.030 align:start position:0% airdrop actually implemented and the idea<00:15:09.600> is<00:15:09.839> that<00:15:10.079> what<00:15:10.380> you<00:15:10.560> would<00:15:10.680> do<00:15:10.800> is<00:15:10.920> you 00:15:11.030 --> 00:15:11.040 align:start position:0% idea is that what you would do is you 00:15:11.040 --> 00:15:13.129 align:start position:0% idea is that what you would do is you would<00:15:11.220> prove<00:15:11.579> that<00:15:11.940> you<00:15:12.120> own<00:15:12.240> an<00:15:12.420> account<00:15:12.600> that 00:15:13.129 --> 00:15:13.139 align:start position:0% would prove that you own an account that 00:15:13.139 --> 00:15:14.389 align:start position:0% would prove that you own an account that is<00:15:13.199> in<00:15:13.380> the<00:15:13.440> Merkle<00:15:13.740> tree<00:15:13.860> of<00:15:14.040> eligible 00:15:14.389 --> 00:15:14.399 align:start position:0% is in the Merkle tree of eligible 00:15:14.399 --> 00:15:16.730 align:start position:0% is in the Merkle tree of eligible addresses<00:15:14.760> for<00:15:15.000> the<00:15:15.120> SDK<00:15:15.540> airdrop<00:15:15.959> you<00:15:16.560> would 00:15:16.730 --> 00:15:16.740 align:start position:0% addresses for the SDK airdrop you would 00:15:16.740 --> 00:15:19.009 align:start position:0% addresses for the SDK airdrop you would generate<00:15:17.519> a<00:15:17.639> summer<00:15:17.820> for<00:15:18.000> another<00:15:18.120> fire<00:15:18.480> for 00:15:19.009 --> 00:15:19.019 align:start position:0% generate a summer for another fire for 00:15:19.019 --> 00:15:21.590 align:start position:0% generate a summer for another fire for that<00:15:19.260> scheme<00:15:19.620> uh<00:15:20.279> in<00:15:20.519> the<00:15:20.639> original<00:15:20.820> case<00:15:21.180> and 00:15:21.590 --> 00:15:21.600 align:start position:0% that scheme uh in the original case and 00:15:21.600 --> 00:15:23.329 align:start position:0% that scheme uh in the original case and then<00:15:21.779> you<00:15:22.320> would<00:15:22.440> claim<00:15:22.740> it<00:15:22.860> to<00:15:22.980> a<00:15:23.100> completely 00:15:23.329 --> 00:15:23.339 align:start position:0% then you would claim it to a completely 00:15:23.339 --> 00:15:25.069 align:start position:0% then you would claim it to a completely unlinked<00:15:23.880> unused<00:15:24.420> account<00:15:24.540> that<00:15:24.839> has<00:15:24.959> never 00:15:25.069 --> 00:15:25.079 align:start position:0% unlinked unused account that has never 00:15:25.079 --> 00:15:27.769 align:start position:0% unlinked unused account that has never had<00:15:25.260> any<00:15:25.380> transaction<00:15:25.980> on<00:15:26.160> ethereum 00:15:27.769 --> 00:15:27.779 align:start position:0% had any transaction on ethereum 00:15:27.779 --> 00:15:28.310 align:start position:0% had any transaction on ethereum um 00:15:28.310 --> 00:15:28.320 align:start position:0% um 00:15:28.320 --> 00:15:29.689 align:start position:0% um and<00:15:28.680> then<00:15:28.800> all<00:15:28.920> the<00:15:29.040> fire<00:15:29.100> scheme<00:15:29.399> you<00:15:29.459> do<00:15:29.579> a 00:15:29.689 --> 00:15:29.699 align:start position:0% and then all the fire scheme you do a 00:15:29.699 --> 00:15:31.430 align:start position:0% and then all the fire scheme you do a similar<00:15:29.880> thing<00:15:30.060> you<00:15:30.360> would<00:15:30.600> prove<00:15:30.839> you<00:15:31.019> have 00:15:31.430 --> 00:15:31.440 align:start position:0% similar thing you would prove you have 00:15:31.440 --> 00:15:32.870 align:start position:0% similar thing you would prove you have an<00:15:31.620> account<00:15:31.800> in<00:15:32.040> this<00:15:32.160> Merkel<00:15:32.459> tree<00:15:32.639> you<00:15:32.820> would 00:15:32.870 --> 00:15:32.880 align:start position:0% an account in this Merkel tree you would 00:15:32.880 --> 00:15:34.189 align:start position:0% an account in this Merkel tree you would prove<00:15:33.060> ownership<00:15:33.300> of<00:15:33.480> that<00:15:33.600> account<00:15:33.779> you 00:15:34.189 --> 00:15:34.199 align:start position:0% prove ownership of that account you 00:15:34.199 --> 00:15:35.389 align:start position:0% prove ownership of that account you would<00:15:34.320> prove<00:15:34.500> the<00:15:34.620> nullifier<00:15:34.980> Via<00:15:35.220> this<00:15:35.339> is 00:15:35.389 --> 00:15:35.399 align:start position:0% would prove the nullifier Via this is 00:15:35.399 --> 00:15:37.009 align:start position:0% would prove the nullifier Via this is another<00:15:35.699> fire<00:15:36.000> scheme<00:15:36.300> and<00:15:36.480> similarly<00:15:36.899> the 00:15:37.009 --> 00:15:37.019 align:start position:0% another fire scheme and similarly the 00:15:37.019 --> 00:15:38.509 align:start position:0% another fire scheme and similarly the tokens<00:15:37.320> would<00:15:37.560> go<00:15:37.680> to<00:15:37.920> a<00:15:38.100> completely<00:15:38.339> new 00:15:38.509 --> 00:15:38.519 align:start position:0% tokens would go to a completely new 00:15:38.519 --> 00:15:40.069 align:start position:0% tokens would go to a completely new fresh<00:15:38.820> ethereum<00:15:39.300> account<00:15:39.420> and<00:15:39.779> there's<00:15:39.959> no 00:15:40.069 --> 00:15:40.079 align:start position:0% fresh ethereum account and there's no 00:15:40.079 --> 00:15:41.030 align:start position:0% fresh ethereum account and there's no history<00:15:40.199> on<00:15:40.440> it<00:15:40.500> and<00:15:40.620> it's<00:15:40.740> effectively 00:15:41.030 --> 00:15:41.040 align:start position:0% history on it and it's effectively 00:15:41.040 --> 00:15:42.769 align:start position:0% history on it and it's effectively anonymous 00:15:42.769 --> 00:15:42.779 align:start position:0% anonymous 00:15:42.779 --> 00:15:46.370 align:start position:0% anonymous that's<00:15:43.500> a<00:15:43.680> great<00:15:43.800> question<00:15:43.980> though 00:15:46.370 --> 00:15:46.380 align:start position:0% 00:15:46.380 --> 00:15:49.129 align:start position:0% yeah<00:15:46.440> uh<00:15:47.399> so<00:15:48.120> just<00:15:48.360> to<00:15:48.480> expand<00:15:48.779> on<00:15:48.959> the 00:15:49.129 --> 00:15:49.139 align:start position:0% yeah uh so just to expand on the 00:15:49.139 --> 00:15:50.689 align:start position:0% yeah uh so just to expand on the previous<00:15:49.440> question<00:15:49.800> like<00:15:50.160> a<00:15:50.279> concrete 00:15:50.689 --> 00:15:50.699 align:start position:0% previous question like a concrete 00:15:50.699 --> 00:15:52.970 align:start position:0% previous question like a concrete example<00:15:51.000> so<00:15:51.240> you<00:15:51.420> wanted<00:15:51.540> to<00:15:51.779> like<00:15:51.959> airdrop<00:15:52.740> an 00:15:52.970 --> 00:15:52.980 align:start position:0% example so you wanted to like airdrop an 00:15:52.980 --> 00:15:57.050 align:start position:0% example so you wanted to like airdrop an NF<00:15:53.339> an<00:15:53.760> nft<00:15:54.000> to<00:15:55.100> anyone<00:15:56.100> who<00:15:56.399> has<00:15:56.579> a<00:15:56.760> crypto 00:15:57.050 --> 00:15:57.060 align:start position:0% NF an nft to anyone who has a crypto 00:15:57.060 --> 00:15:59.090 align:start position:0% NF an nft to anyone who has a crypto Punk<00:15:57.660> and<00:15:58.079> but<00:15:58.260> you<00:15:58.380> want<00:15:58.560> people<00:15:58.680> to<00:15:58.860> be<00:15:58.980> able 00:15:59.090 --> 00:15:59.100 align:start position:0% Punk and but you want people to be able 00:15:59.100 --> 00:16:00.590 align:start position:0% Punk and but you want people to be able to<00:15:59.220> claim<00:15:59.459> it<00:15:59.579> without<00:15:59.699> revealing<00:16:00.180> which<00:16:00.360> Punk 00:16:00.590 --> 00:16:00.600 align:start position:0% to claim it without revealing which Punk 00:16:00.600 --> 00:16:01.850 align:start position:0% to claim it without revealing which Punk they<00:16:00.839> are 00:16:01.850 --> 00:16:01.860 align:start position:0% they are 00:16:01.860 --> 00:16:03.949 align:start position:0% they are um<00:16:01.920> within<00:16:02.339> semaphore<00:16:02.940> or<00:16:03.540> anything<00:16:03.720> that's 00:16:03.949 --> 00:16:03.959 align:start position:0% um within semaphore or anything that's 00:16:03.959 --> 00:16:06.230 align:start position:0% um within semaphore or anything that's like<00:16:04.199> a<00:16:04.320> two-step<00:16:04.740> your<00:16:05.399> anonymity<00:16:05.820> set<00:16:06.060> is 00:16:06.230 --> 00:16:06.240 align:start position:0% like a two-step your anonymity set is 00:16:06.240 --> 00:16:07.370 align:start position:0% like a two-step your anonymity set is only<00:16:06.420> going<00:16:06.540> to<00:16:06.600> be<00:16:06.720> the<00:16:06.899> amount<00:16:07.139> of<00:16:07.260> people 00:16:07.370 --> 00:16:07.380 align:start position:0% only going to be the amount of people 00:16:07.380 --> 00:16:09.590 align:start position:0% only going to be the amount of people who<00:16:07.680> like<00:16:07.800> sign<00:16:07.980> up<00:16:08.160> for<00:16:08.279> this<00:16:08.399> mm4 00:16:09.590 --> 00:16:09.600 align:start position:0% who like sign up for this mm4 00:16:09.600 --> 00:16:11.930 align:start position:0% who like sign up for this mm4 and<00:16:10.019> with<00:16:10.260> this<00:16:10.500> the<00:16:10.980> anonymity<00:16:11.279> even<00:16:11.639> if<00:16:11.820> it's 00:16:11.930 --> 00:16:11.940 align:start position:0% and with this the anonymity even if it's 00:16:11.940 --> 00:16:13.189 align:start position:0% and with this the anonymity even if it's just<00:16:12.120> two<00:16:12.300> people<00:16:12.480> that<00:16:12.660> end<00:16:12.779> up<00:16:12.899> claiming 00:16:13.189 --> 00:16:13.199 align:start position:0% just two people that end up claiming 00:16:13.199 --> 00:16:15.350 align:start position:0% just two people that end up claiming this<00:16:13.320> nft<00:16:13.920> they<00:16:14.279> have<00:16:14.459> the<00:16:14.639> full<00:16:14.820> anonymity 00:16:15.350 --> 00:16:15.360 align:start position:0% this nft they have the full anonymity 00:16:15.360 --> 00:16:18.230 align:start position:0% this nft they have the full anonymity set<00:16:15.600> of<00:16:15.779> like<00:16:15.899> all<00:16:16.139> all<00:16:17.100> Punk<00:16:17.399> holders<00:16:17.820> if<00:16:18.060> that 00:16:18.230 --> 00:16:18.240 align:start position:0% set of like all all Punk holders if that 00:16:18.240 --> 00:16:20.090 align:start position:0% set of like all all Punk holders if that makes<00:16:18.360> sense<00:16:18.540> and<00:16:18.959> it's<00:16:19.260> going<00:16:19.440> to<00:16:19.620> like<00:16:19.800> a<00:16:19.920> new 00:16:20.090 --> 00:16:20.100 align:start position:0% makes sense and it's going to like a new 00:16:20.100 --> 00:16:22.970 align:start position:0% makes sense and it's going to like a new address<00:16:20.279> not<00:16:20.639> to<00:16:20.820> the<00:16:20.940> one<00:16:21.060> that<00:16:21.240> has<00:16:21.360> the<00:16:21.540> punk 00:16:22.970 --> 00:16:22.980 align:start position:0% address not to the one that has the punk 00:16:22.980 --> 00:16:26.210 align:start position:0% address not to the one that has the punk hello<00:16:23.639> all<00:16:24.060> right<00:16:24.180> uh<00:16:24.839> so<00:16:25.139> I'm<00:16:25.380> wondering<00:16:25.740> uh 00:16:26.210 --> 00:16:26.220 align:start position:0% hello all right uh so I'm wondering uh 00:16:26.220 --> 00:16:27.350 align:start position:0% hello all right uh so I'm wondering uh can<00:16:26.459> you 00:16:27.350 --> 00:16:27.360 align:start position:0% can you 00:16:27.360 --> 00:16:31.069 align:start position:0% can you um<00:16:27.420> expand<00:16:28.139> a<00:16:28.260> bit<00:16:28.440> upon<00:16:28.980> if<00:16:29.639> you<00:16:30.120> uh<00:16:30.660> if<00:16:30.959> you 00:16:31.069 --> 00:16:31.079 align:start position:0% um expand a bit upon if you uh if you 00:16:31.079 --> 00:16:35.230 align:start position:0% um expand a bit upon if you uh if you use<00:16:31.260> this<00:16:31.620> scheme<00:16:32.040> for<00:16:32.579> a<00:16:33.120> uh<00:16:33.839> sort<00:16:34.560> of<00:16:34.740> a 00:16:35.230 --> 00:16:35.240 align:start position:0% use this scheme for a uh sort of a 00:16:35.240 --> 00:16:37.490 align:start position:0% use this scheme for a uh sort of a multi-step<00:16:36.240> protocol<00:16:36.600> where<00:16:36.899> it's<00:16:37.079> not<00:16:37.320> just 00:16:37.490 --> 00:16:37.500 align:start position:0% multi-step protocol where it's not just 00:16:37.500 --> 00:16:39.650 align:start position:0% multi-step protocol where it's not just maybe<00:16:37.800> a<00:16:38.279> tornado<00:16:38.759> cache<00:16:39.120> deposit<00:16:39.540> and 00:16:39.650 --> 00:16:39.660 align:start position:0% maybe a tornado cache deposit and 00:16:39.660 --> 00:16:41.749 align:start position:0% maybe a tornado cache deposit and withdrawal<00:16:40.139> or<00:16:40.440> a<00:16:40.620> claim<00:16:40.860> scheme<00:16:41.220> but<00:16:41.459> you 00:16:41.749 --> 00:16:41.759 align:start position:0% withdrawal or a claim scheme but you 00:16:41.759 --> 00:16:43.910 align:start position:0% withdrawal or a claim scheme but you continue<00:16:42.240> where<00:16:42.779> you<00:16:43.019> maybe<00:16:43.139> have<00:16:43.380> some<00:16:43.680> sort 00:16:43.910 --> 00:16:43.920 align:start position:0% continue where you maybe have some sort 00:16:43.920 --> 00:16:47.210 align:start position:0% continue where you maybe have some sort of<00:16:44.579> um<00:16:44.720> transfer<00:16:45.720> of<00:16:45.959> private<00:16:46.320> assets<00:16:46.620> within 00:16:47.210 --> 00:16:47.220 align:start position:0% of um transfer of private assets within 00:16:47.220 --> 00:16:49.790 align:start position:0% of um transfer of private assets within the<00:16:47.459> anonymity<00:16:47.880> Set<00:16:48.180> uh<00:16:49.079> do<00:16:49.320> you<00:16:49.440> keep<00:16:49.560> that 00:16:49.790 --> 00:16:49.800 align:start position:0% the anonymity Set uh do you keep that 00:16:49.800 --> 00:16:52.790 align:start position:0% the anonymity Set uh do you keep that anonymity<00:16:50.279> and<00:16:50.820> and<00:16:51.000> how<00:16:51.300> does<00:16:51.420> that<00:16:51.540> work 00:16:52.790 --> 00:16:52.800 align:start position:0% anonymity and and how does that work 00:16:52.800 --> 00:16:55.670 align:start position:0% anonymity and and how does that work yeah<00:16:53.459> so<00:16:53.699> the<00:16:54.000> the<00:16:54.540> way<00:16:54.779> dark<00:16:55.019> pool<00:16:55.199> transfers 00:16:55.670 --> 00:16:55.680 align:start position:0% yeah so the the way dark pool transfers 00:16:55.680 --> 00:16:56.749 align:start position:0% yeah so the the way dark pool transfers would<00:16:55.860> kind<00:16:56.040> of<00:16:56.100> work<00:16:56.160> with<00:16:56.279> its<00:16:56.459> anonymity 00:16:56.749 --> 00:16:56.759 align:start position:0% would kind of work with its anonymity 00:16:56.759 --> 00:16:58.970 align:start position:0% would kind of work with its anonymity with<00:16:57.000> this<00:16:57.120> nullifier<00:16:57.600> is<00:16:58.259> that 00:16:58.970 --> 00:16:58.980 align:start position:0% with this nullifier is that 00:16:58.980 --> 00:17:00.650 align:start position:0% with this nullifier is that the<00:16:59.459> way<00:16:59.579> most<00:16:59.759> people<00:16:59.880> enter<00:17:00.060> a<00:17:00.300> dark<00:17:00.360> pose 00:17:00.650 --> 00:17:00.660 align:start position:0% the way most people enter a dark pose 00:17:00.660 --> 00:17:01.850 align:start position:0% the way most people enter a dark pose they<00:17:00.839> send<00:17:00.959> their<00:17:01.139> assets<00:17:01.380> to<00:17:01.560> like<00:17:01.740> a 00:17:01.850 --> 00:17:01.860 align:start position:0% they send their assets to like a 00:17:01.860 --> 00:17:03.530 align:start position:0% they send their assets to like a specific<00:17:02.100> smart<00:17:02.339> contract<00:17:02.759> and<00:17:03.240> so<00:17:03.360> you 00:17:03.530 --> 00:17:03.540 align:start position:0% specific smart contract and so you 00:17:03.540 --> 00:17:05.870 align:start position:0% specific smart contract and so you already<00:17:03.660> know<00:17:04.020> that<00:17:04.860> the<00:17:05.220> engine<00:17:05.339> reset<00:17:05.819> is 00:17:05.870 --> 00:17:05.880 align:start position:0% already know that the engine reset is 00:17:05.880 --> 00:17:06.770 align:start position:0% already know that the engine reset is limited<00:17:06.120> to<00:17:06.179> everyone<00:17:06.299> who<00:17:06.540> has<00:17:06.660> ever 00:17:06.770 --> 00:17:06.780 align:start position:0% limited to everyone who has ever 00:17:06.780 --> 00:17:08.809 align:start position:0% limited to everyone who has ever interacted<00:17:07.140> with<00:17:07.199> a<00:17:07.319> smart<00:17:07.439> contract<00:17:07.860> and<00:17:08.640> one 00:17:08.809 --> 00:17:08.819 align:start position:0% interacted with a smart contract and one 00:17:08.819 --> 00:17:09.710 align:start position:0% interacted with a smart contract and one thing<00:17:08.939> you<00:17:09.059> could<00:17:09.120> do<00:17:09.240> is<00:17:09.360> you<00:17:09.480> could<00:17:09.600> use 00:17:09.710 --> 00:17:09.720 align:start position:0% thing you could do is you could use 00:17:09.720 --> 00:17:11.630 align:start position:0% thing you could do is you could use something<00:17:09.900> like<00:17:10.079> semaphore<00:17:10.620> and<00:17:11.280> if<00:17:11.579> you 00:17:11.630 --> 00:17:11.640 align:start position:0% something like semaphore and if you 00:17:11.640 --> 00:17:13.490 align:start position:0% something like semaphore and if you interact<00:17:11.939> with<00:17:12.059> smart<00:17:12.299> contract<00:17:12.600> the 00:17:13.490 --> 00:17:13.500 align:start position:0% interact with smart contract the 00:17:13.500 --> 00:17:15.110 align:start position:0% interact with smart contract the guarantee<00:17:14.160> that<00:17:14.339> you<00:17:14.459> have<00:17:14.579> to<00:17:14.699> sign<00:17:14.819> up<00:17:14.939> for<00:17:15.059> a 00:17:15.110 --> 00:17:15.120 align:start position:0% guarantee that you have to sign up for a 00:17:15.120 --> 00:17:17.090 align:start position:0% guarantee that you have to sign up for a semaphore<00:17:15.540> key<00:17:15.720> so<00:17:16.260> because<00:17:16.439> the<00:17:16.620> anime<00:17:16.860> set 00:17:17.090 --> 00:17:17.100 align:start position:0% semaphore key so because the anime set 00:17:17.100 --> 00:17:18.590 align:start position:0% semaphore key so because the anime set is<00:17:17.280> already<00:17:17.400> limited<00:17:17.760> by<00:17:18.000> something<00:17:18.179> like<00:17:18.480> an 00:17:18.590 --> 00:17:18.600 align:start position:0% is already limited by something like an 00:17:18.600 --> 00:17:20.510 align:start position:0% is already limited by something like an on-chain<00:17:18.959> interaction<00:17:19.380> the<00:17:19.980> nullifier 00:17:20.510 --> 00:17:20.520 align:start position:0% on-chain interaction the nullifier 00:17:20.520 --> 00:17:22.309 align:start position:0% on-chain interaction the nullifier wouldn't<00:17:21.240> add<00:17:21.540> additional<00:17:21.900> anonymity 00:17:22.309 --> 00:17:22.319 align:start position:0% wouldn't add additional anonymity 00:17:22.319 --> 00:17:23.809 align:start position:0% wouldn't add additional anonymity because<00:17:22.620> it's<00:17:22.799> already<00:17:22.919> limited<00:17:23.339> by<00:17:23.520> the 00:17:23.809 --> 00:17:23.819 align:start position:0% because it's already limited by the 00:17:23.819 --> 00:17:26.150 align:start position:0% because it's already limited by the chain<00:17:24.179> interactions<00:17:24.900> however<00:17:25.559> what<00:17:25.919> it<00:17:26.040> could 00:17:26.150 --> 00:17:26.160 align:start position:0% chain interactions however what it could 00:17:26.160 --> 00:17:27.710 align:start position:0% chain interactions however what it could do<00:17:26.280> is<00:17:26.640> prevent<00:17:27.120> you<00:17:27.240> from<00:17:27.419> having<00:17:27.540> to 00:17:27.710 --> 00:17:27.720 align:start position:0% do is prevent you from having to 00:17:27.720 --> 00:17:29.390 align:start position:0% do is prevent you from having to memorize<00:17:28.020> secret<00:17:28.260> notes<00:17:28.679> so<00:17:29.100> for<00:17:29.280> instance 00:17:29.390 --> 00:17:29.400 align:start position:0% memorize secret notes so for instance 00:17:29.400 --> 00:17:30.470 align:start position:0% memorize secret notes so for instance with<00:17:29.580> tornado<00:17:29.820> cache<00:17:30.120> you<00:17:30.179> have<00:17:30.299> to<00:17:30.419> download 00:17:30.470 --> 00:17:30.480 align:start position:0% with tornado cache you have to download 00:17:30.480 --> 00:17:32.930 align:start position:0% with tornado cache you have to download a<00:17:30.780> string<00:17:31.020> and<00:17:31.380> remember<00:17:31.500> it<00:17:31.799> forever 00:17:32.930 --> 00:17:32.940 align:start position:0% a string and remember it forever 00:17:32.940 --> 00:17:34.130 align:start position:0% a string and remember it forever um<00:17:33.000> and<00:17:33.120> if<00:17:33.240> you<00:17:33.360> lose<00:17:33.480> that<00:17:33.660> string<00:17:33.900> then<00:17:34.020> you 00:17:34.130 --> 00:17:34.140 align:start position:0% um and if you lose that string then you 00:17:34.140 --> 00:17:36.110 align:start position:0% um and if you lose that string then you lose<00:17:34.260> your<00:17:34.380> money<00:17:34.559> but 00:17:36.110 --> 00:17:36.120 align:start position:0% lose your money but 00:17:36.120 --> 00:17:37.730 align:start position:0% lose your money but what<00:17:36.480> you<00:17:36.660> can<00:17:36.780> do<00:17:36.840> with<00:17:36.960> this<00:17:37.080> scheme<00:17:37.380> is<00:17:37.620> that 00:17:37.730 --> 00:17:37.740 align:start position:0% what you can do with this scheme is that 00:17:37.740 --> 00:17:38.750 align:start position:0% what you can do with this scheme is that instead<00:17:37.919> of<00:17:37.980> having<00:17:38.039> to<00:17:38.220> memorize<00:17:38.460> a<00:17:38.640> Toyota 00:17:38.750 --> 00:17:38.760 align:start position:0% instead of having to memorize a Toyota 00:17:38.760 --> 00:17:40.430 align:start position:0% instead of having to memorize a Toyota cache<00:17:39.120> note<00:17:39.240> you<00:17:39.660> just<00:17:39.780> remember<00:17:40.020> the<00:17:40.260> amount 00:17:40.430 --> 00:17:40.440 align:start position:0% cache note you just remember the amount 00:17:40.440 --> 00:17:42.650 align:start position:0% cache note you just remember the amount of<00:17:40.559> money<00:17:40.679> you<00:17:40.860> got<00:17:41.039> and<00:17:41.700> then<00:17:41.880> you<00:17:42.419> could<00:17:42.480> say 00:17:42.650 --> 00:17:42.660 align:start position:0% of money you got and then you could say 00:17:42.660 --> 00:17:44.029 align:start position:0% of money you got and then you could say okay<00:17:42.780> I<00:17:43.080> got<00:17:43.200> one<00:17:43.380> eighth<00:17:43.679> so<00:17:43.799> I'm<00:17:43.860> going<00:17:43.980> to 00:17:44.029 --> 00:17:44.039 align:start position:0% okay I got one eighth so I'm going to 00:17:44.039 --> 00:17:45.289 align:start position:0% okay I got one eighth so I'm going to sign<00:17:44.160> a<00:17:44.280> message<00:17:44.400> saying<00:17:44.700> here<00:17:44.820> to<00:17:45.000> cash<00:17:45.120> one 00:17:45.289 --> 00:17:45.299 align:start position:0% sign a message saying here to cash one 00:17:45.299 --> 00:17:46.970 align:start position:0% sign a message saying here to cash one eth<00:17:45.660> and<00:17:45.960> I<00:17:46.020> know<00:17:46.140> that<00:17:46.260> the<00:17:46.320> nullify<00:17:46.679> that<00:17:46.860> it 00:17:46.970 --> 00:17:46.980 align:start position:0% eth and I know that the nullify that it 00:17:46.980 --> 00:17:48.590 align:start position:0% eth and I know that the nullify that it creates<00:17:47.160> will<00:17:47.340> be<00:17:47.460> a<00:17:47.580> valid<00:17:47.820> note<00:17:48.000> for<00:17:48.419> my 00:17:48.590 --> 00:17:48.600 align:start position:0% creates will be a valid note for my 00:17:48.600 --> 00:17:50.150 align:start position:0% creates will be a valid note for my deposit<00:17:49.020> and<00:17:49.440> the<00:17:49.559> contract<00:17:49.799> can<00:17:49.919> simply 00:17:50.150 --> 00:17:50.160 align:start position:0% deposit and the contract can simply 00:17:50.160 --> 00:17:52.730 align:start position:0% deposit and the contract can simply validate<00:17:50.520> that<00:17:50.640> and<00:17:50.820> so<00:17:51.059> it<00:17:51.539> can<00:17:51.720> help<00:17:52.020> uh 00:17:52.730 --> 00:17:52.740 align:start position:0% validate that and so it can help uh 00:17:52.740 --> 00:17:56.210 align:start position:0% validate that and so it can help uh saving<00:17:53.360> memory<00:17:54.360> or<00:17:54.660> losing<00:17:55.200> strings<00:17:56.039> for 00:17:56.210 --> 00:17:56.220 align:start position:0% saving memory or losing strings for 00:17:56.220 --> 00:17:57.890 align:start position:0% saving memory or losing strings for anonymous<00:17:56.580> money<00:17:56.760> but<00:17:57.240> it<00:17:57.419> wouldn't<00:17:57.539> add 00:17:57.890 --> 00:17:57.900 align:start position:0% anonymous money but it wouldn't add 00:17:57.900 --> 00:17:59.450 align:start position:0% anonymous money but it wouldn't add significantly<00:17:58.500> additional<00:17:58.799> anonymity<00:17:59.100> if 00:17:59.450 --> 00:17:59.460 align:start position:0% significantly additional anonymity if 00:17:59.460 --> 00:18:01.909 align:start position:0% significantly additional anonymity if the<00:17:59.700> original<00:17:59.880> scheme<00:18:00.419> was<00:18:00.480> implemented<00:18:01.020> uh 00:18:01.909 --> 00:18:01.919 align:start position:0% the original scheme was implemented uh 00:18:01.919 --> 00:18:03.289 align:start position:0% the original scheme was implemented uh with<00:18:02.160> the<00:18:02.280> dark<00:18:02.400> pool<00:18:02.580> correctly<00:18:02.940> ascending 00:18:03.289 --> 00:18:03.299 align:start position:0% with the dark pool correctly ascending 00:18:03.299 --> 00:18:05.029 align:start position:0% with the dark pool correctly ascending to<00:18:03.360> the<00:18:03.480> contract<00:18:03.780> yeah<00:18:04.559> that's<00:18:04.740> a<00:18:04.919> great 00:18:05.029 --> 00:18:05.039 align:start position:0% to the contract yeah that's a great 00:18:05.039 --> 00:18:07.669 align:start position:0% to the contract yeah that's a great question<00:18:05.220> though 00:18:07.669 --> 00:18:07.679 align:start position:0% 00:18:07.679 --> 00:18:12.289 align:start position:0% hey<00:18:08.160> hi<00:18:08.520> uh<00:18:09.299> okay<00:18:10.020> uh<00:18:10.740> I'm<00:18:11.580> pretty<00:18:11.820> sure<00:18:12.000> like 00:18:12.289 --> 00:18:12.299 align:start position:0% hey hi uh okay uh I'm pretty sure like 00:18:12.299 --> 00:18:14.029 align:start position:0% hey hi uh okay uh I'm pretty sure like many<00:18:12.539> of<00:18:12.780> us<00:18:12.900> would<00:18:13.320> have<00:18:13.500> read<00:18:13.860> about 00:18:14.029 --> 00:18:14.039 align:start position:0% many of us would have read about 00:18:14.039 --> 00:18:16.070 align:start position:0% many of us would have read about nullifies<00:18:14.760> for<00:18:15.059> the<00:18:15.179> first<00:18:15.360> time<00:18:15.600> in 00:18:16.070 --> 00:18:16.080 align:start position:0% nullifies for the first time in 00:18:16.080 --> 00:18:18.350 align:start position:0% nullifies for the first time in vitalik's<00:18:16.740> article<00:18:17.039> the<00:18:17.700> one<00:18:17.880> with<00:18:18.120> like 00:18:18.350 --> 00:18:18.360 align:start position:0% vitalik's article the one with like 00:18:18.360 --> 00:18:22.549 align:start position:0% vitalik's article the one with like privacy<00:18:18.960> applications<00:18:19.460> now<00:18:20.660> and<00:18:21.660> like<00:18:22.140> I<00:18:22.440> did 00:18:22.549 --> 00:18:22.559 align:start position:0% privacy applications now and like I did 00:18:22.559 --> 00:18:24.710 align:start position:0% privacy applications now and like I did not<00:18:22.740> understand<00:18:22.980> it<00:18:23.400> completely<00:18:23.880> but<00:18:24.360> I 00:18:24.710 --> 00:18:24.720 align:start position:0% not understand it completely but I 00:18:24.720 --> 00:18:26.990 align:start position:0% not understand it completely but I thought<00:18:24.840> it<00:18:25.200> was<00:18:25.260> vitalik<00:18:25.799> who<00:18:26.039> wrote<00:18:26.640> it<00:18:26.820> so 00:18:26.990 --> 00:18:27.000 align:start position:0% thought it was vitalik who wrote it so 00:18:27.000 --> 00:18:30.250 align:start position:0% thought it was vitalik who wrote it so it<00:18:27.179> must<00:18:27.360> be<00:18:27.480> true<00:18:27.720> so 00:18:30.250 --> 00:18:30.260 align:start position:0% it must be true so 00:18:30.260 --> 00:18:33.409 align:start position:0% it must be true so so<00:18:31.260> can<00:18:31.559> you<00:18:31.740> like<00:18:31.980> just<00:18:32.280> uh<00:18:32.640> give<00:18:32.820> a<00:18:33.000> brief 00:18:33.409 --> 00:18:33.419 align:start position:0% so can you like just uh give a brief 00:18:33.419 --> 00:18:36.350 align:start position:0% so can you like just uh give a brief difference<00:18:33.960> between<00:18:34.640> that<00:18:35.640> nullifier 00:18:36.350 --> 00:18:36.360 align:start position:0% difference between that nullifier 00:18:36.360 --> 00:18:39.230 align:start position:0% difference between that nullifier technique<00:18:36.840> and<00:18:37.260> your<00:18:37.500> nullify<00:18:38.100> technique<00:18:38.880> for 00:18:39.230 --> 00:18:39.240 align:start position:0% technique and your nullify technique for 00:18:39.240 --> 00:18:41.510 align:start position:0% technique and your nullify technique for us<00:18:39.480> to<00:18:39.600> compare<00:18:39.960> right<00:18:40.380> uh<00:18:40.860> so<00:18:41.039> the<00:18:41.100> nullifier 00:18:41.510 --> 00:18:41.520 align:start position:0% us to compare right uh so the nullifier 00:18:41.520 --> 00:18:43.070 align:start position:0% us to compare right uh so the nullifier technique<00:18:41.880> that<00:18:42.179> is<00:18:42.299> classically<00:18:42.720> referred 00:18:43.070 --> 00:18:43.080 align:start position:0% technique that is classically referred 00:18:43.080 --> 00:18:45.049 align:start position:0% technique that is classically referred to<00:18:43.140> in<00:18:43.320> mostly<00:18:43.559> ZK<00:18:43.799> snark<00:18:44.100> posts 00:18:45.049 --> 00:18:45.059 align:start position:0% to in mostly ZK snark posts 00:18:45.059 --> 00:18:46.490 align:start position:0% to in mostly ZK snark posts um<00:18:45.179> is<00:18:45.299> another<00:18:45.480> fire<00:18:45.780> technique<00:18:46.020> that<00:18:46.140> exists 00:18:46.490 --> 00:18:46.500 align:start position:0% um is another fire technique that exists 00:18:46.500 --> 00:18:48.890 align:start position:0% um is another fire technique that exists which<00:18:46.980> is<00:18:47.160> uh<00:18:47.460> kind<00:18:47.580> of<00:18:47.700> why<00:18:47.820> Halo<00:18:48.120> 2<00:18:48.240> defined<00:18:48.660> a 00:18:48.890 --> 00:18:48.900 align:start position:0% which is uh kind of why Halo 2 defined a 00:18:48.900 --> 00:18:51.230 align:start position:0% which is uh kind of why Halo 2 defined a number<00:18:49.140> of<00:18:49.260> years<00:18:49.440> ago<00:18:49.740> and<00:18:50.580> it's<00:18:50.880> kind<00:18:51.179> of 00:18:51.230 --> 00:18:51.240 align:start position:0% number of years ago and it's kind of 00:18:51.240 --> 00:18:53.150 align:start position:0% number of years ago and it's kind of evolved<00:18:51.660> into<00:18:51.780> being<00:18:52.080> this<00:18:52.440> semaphore<00:18:52.980> type 00:18:53.150 --> 00:18:53.160 align:start position:0% evolved into being this semaphore type 00:18:53.160 --> 00:18:54.770 align:start position:0% evolved into being this semaphore type scheme<00:18:53.580> in<00:18:53.940> which<00:18:54.059> another<00:18:54.179> fire<00:18:54.539> just 00:18:54.770 --> 00:18:54.780 align:start position:0% scheme in which another fire just 00:18:54.780 --> 00:18:56.810 align:start position:0% scheme in which another fire just represents<00:18:55.260> that<00:18:55.799> you<00:18:56.039> can't<00:18:56.160> double<00:18:56.400> claim 00:18:56.810 --> 00:18:56.820 align:start position:0% represents that you can't double claim 00:18:56.820 --> 00:18:57.950 align:start position:0% represents that you can't double claim or<00:18:56.940> double<00:18:57.059> interact<00:18:57.480> with<00:18:57.600> a<00:18:57.780> specific 00:18:57.950 --> 00:18:57.960 align:start position:0% or double interact with a specific 00:18:57.960 --> 00:19:00.110 align:start position:0% or double interact with a specific protocol<00:18:58.320> because<00:18:58.799> I<00:18:59.100> know<00:18:59.220> the<00:18:59.340> fire<00:18:59.460> nullify 00:19:00.110 --> 00:19:00.120 align:start position:0% protocol because I know the fire nullify 00:19:00.120 --> 00:19:02.210 align:start position:0% protocol because I know the fire nullify is<00:19:00.299> their<00:19:00.419> ability<00:19:00.660> to<00:19:01.140> do<00:19:01.320> so 00:19:02.210 --> 00:19:02.220 align:start position:0% is their ability to do so 00:19:02.220 --> 00:19:03.770 align:start position:0% is their ability to do so um that<00:19:02.400> is<00:19:02.580> an<00:19:02.880> added<00:19:03.059> to<00:19:03.120> a<00:19:03.240> Smart<00:19:03.360> contract 00:19:03.770 --> 00:19:03.780 align:start position:0% um that is an added to a Smart contract 00:19:03.780 --> 00:19:05.990 align:start position:0% um that is an added to a Smart contract or<00:19:04.200> something<00:19:04.380> and<00:19:04.740> then<00:19:04.919> when<00:19:05.580> you<00:19:05.700> interact 00:19:05.990 --> 00:19:06.000 align:start position:0% or something and then when you interact 00:19:06.000 --> 00:19:07.370 align:start position:0% or something and then when you interact with<00:19:06.120> that<00:19:06.240> in<00:19:06.360> the<00:19:06.480> future<00:19:06.539> it<00:19:07.020> would<00:19:07.140> notice 00:19:07.370 --> 00:19:07.380 align:start position:0% with that in the future it would notice 00:19:07.380 --> 00:19:08.330 align:start position:0% with that in the future it would notice that<00:19:07.500> you've<00:19:07.679> already<00:19:07.740> interact<00:19:08.039> with<00:19:08.220> it 00:19:08.330 --> 00:19:08.340 align:start position:0% that you've already interact with it 00:19:08.340 --> 00:19:09.830 align:start position:0% that you've already interact with it before<00:19:08.460> and<00:19:09.059> then<00:19:09.179> stop<00:19:09.360> that<00:19:09.600> transaction 00:19:09.830 --> 00:19:09.840 align:start position:0% before and then stop that transaction 00:19:09.840 --> 00:19:11.930 align:start position:0% before and then stop that transaction from<00:19:10.080> going<00:19:10.260> through 00:19:11.930 --> 00:19:11.940 align:start position:0% from going through 00:19:11.940 --> 00:19:13.789 align:start position:0% from going through um so<00:19:12.419> the<00:19:12.539> scheme<00:19:12.900> that<00:19:13.080> likely<00:19:13.559> is<00:19:13.679> being 00:19:13.789 --> 00:19:13.799 align:start position:0% um so the scheme that likely is being 00:19:13.799 --> 00:19:15.230 align:start position:0% um so the scheme that likely is being referred<00:19:14.039> to<00:19:14.100> that<00:19:14.220> in<00:19:14.400> that<00:19:14.520> post<00:19:14.700> is<00:19:15.000> likely 00:19:15.230 --> 00:19:15.240 align:start position:0% referred to that in that post is likely 00:19:15.240 --> 00:19:17.390 align:start position:0% referred to that in that post is likely a<00:19:15.360> semaphore<00:19:15.720> type<00:19:15.900> scheme<00:19:16.260> or<00:19:16.440> a<00:19:16.679> sign<00:19:17.280> up 00:19:17.390 --> 00:19:17.400 align:start position:0% a semaphore type scheme or a sign up 00:19:17.400 --> 00:19:18.890 align:start position:0% a semaphore type scheme or a sign up type<00:19:17.520> scheme<00:19:17.820> in<00:19:17.880> which<00:19:18.000> this<00:19:18.179> nullifier<00:19:18.720> is 00:19:18.890 --> 00:19:18.900 align:start position:0% type scheme in which this nullifier is 00:19:18.900 --> 00:19:20.990 align:start position:0% type scheme in which this nullifier is like<00:19:19.080> a<00:19:19.440> hash<00:19:19.620> or<00:19:19.799> some<00:19:19.919> string 00:19:20.990 --> 00:19:21.000 align:start position:0% like a hash or some string 00:19:21.000 --> 00:19:21.950 align:start position:0% like a hash or some string um<00:19:21.059> which<00:19:21.299> again<00:19:21.419> would<00:19:21.660> have<00:19:21.840> to<00:19:21.900> be 00:19:21.950 --> 00:19:21.960 align:start position:0% um which again would have to be 00:19:21.960 --> 00:19:23.450 align:start position:0% um which again would have to be interactively<00:19:22.500> generated 00:19:23.450 --> 00:19:23.460 align:start position:0% interactively generated 00:19:23.460 --> 00:19:24.590 align:start position:0% interactively generated um and<00:19:23.580> so<00:19:23.700> when<00:19:23.820> I<00:19:23.940> when<00:19:24.059> I<00:19:24.179> say<00:19:24.240> this<00:19:24.419> kind<00:19:24.539> of 00:19:24.590 --> 00:19:24.600 align:start position:0% um and so when I when I say this kind of 00:19:24.600 --> 00:19:26.029 align:start position:0% um and so when I when I say this kind of semaphore<00:19:24.960> side<00:19:25.200> or<00:19:25.320> this<00:19:25.440> like<00:19:25.620> interactive 00:19:26.029 --> 00:19:26.039 align:start position:0% semaphore side or this like interactive 00:19:26.039 --> 00:19:27.830 align:start position:0% semaphore side or this like interactive side<00:19:26.160> that's<00:19:26.760> larger<00:19:27.120> than<00:19:27.240> the<00:19:27.480> classical 00:19:27.830 --> 00:19:27.840 align:start position:0% side that's larger than the classical 00:19:27.840 --> 00:19:30.590 align:start position:0% side that's larger than the classical nullifier<00:19:28.380> that<00:19:28.559> I'm<00:19:28.679> referring<00:19:28.980> to<00:19:29.580> yeah<00:19:29.640> uh 00:19:30.590 --> 00:19:30.600 align:start position:0% nullifier that I'm referring to yeah uh 00:19:30.600 --> 00:19:32.270 align:start position:0% nullifier that I'm referring to yeah uh thank<00:19:30.720> you<00:19:30.840> for<00:19:30.960> the<00:19:31.140> talk<00:19:31.620> um<00:19:31.620> I<00:19:31.799> had<00:19:32.039> a 00:19:32.270 --> 00:19:32.280 align:start position:0% thank you for the talk um I had a 00:19:32.280 --> 00:19:33.409 align:start position:0% thank you for the talk um I had a general<00:19:32.460> question 00:19:33.409 --> 00:19:33.419 align:start position:0% general question 00:19:33.419 --> 00:19:34.850 align:start position:0% general question um kind<00:19:33.720> of<00:19:33.840> about<00:19:33.960> coming<00:19:34.380> back<00:19:34.559> to<00:19:34.679> the 00:19:34.850 --> 00:19:34.860 align:start position:0% um kind of about coming back to the 00:19:34.860 --> 00:19:37.490 align:start position:0% um kind of about coming back to the example<00:19:35.100> of<00:19:35.280> the<00:19:35.340> token<00:19:35.640> get<00:19:35.760> a<00:19:35.940> job<00:19:36.240> so<00:19:36.960> if<00:19:37.320> you 00:19:37.490 --> 00:19:37.500 align:start position:0% example of the token get a job so if you 00:19:37.500 --> 00:19:38.990 align:start position:0% example of the token get a job so if you either<00:19:37.679> use<00:19:37.919> like<00:19:38.039> the<00:19:38.220> zika<00:19:38.460> nullifa<00:19:38.880> or 00:19:38.990 --> 00:19:39.000 align:start position:0% either use like the zika nullifa or 00:19:39.000 --> 00:19:41.690 align:start position:0% either use like the zika nullifa or summer<00:19:39.179> for<00:19:39.480> to<00:19:39.960> generate<00:19:40.380> a<00:19:40.620> proof<00:19:41.340> um<00:19:41.460> that 00:19:41.690 --> 00:19:41.700 align:start position:0% summer for to generate a proof um that 00:19:41.700 --> 00:19:43.310 align:start position:0% summer for to generate a proof um that an<00:19:42.000> address<00:19:42.120> is<00:19:42.360> eligible<00:19:42.780> for<00:19:42.960> an<00:19:43.080> outro 00:19:43.310 --> 00:19:43.320 align:start position:0% an address is eligible for an outro 00:19:43.320 --> 00:19:44.450 align:start position:0% an address is eligible for an outro based<00:19:43.740> on 00:19:44.450 --> 00:19:44.460 align:start position:0% based on 00:19:44.460 --> 00:19:46.130 align:start position:0% based on um owning<00:19:44.820> an<00:19:44.940> nft<00:19:45.179> in<00:19:45.419> a<00:19:45.539> set<00:19:45.660> for<00:19:45.960> example 00:19:46.130 --> 00:19:46.140 align:start position:0% um owning an nft in a set for example 00:19:46.140 --> 00:19:48.350 align:start position:0% um owning an nft in a set for example how<00:19:46.740> does<00:19:46.860> that<00:19:47.039> respond<00:19:47.460> to<00:19:47.640> updates<00:19:48.120> for 00:19:48.350 --> 00:19:48.360 align:start position:0% how does that respond to updates for 00:19:48.360 --> 00:19:49.430 align:start position:0% how does that respond to updates for example<00:19:48.539> when<00:19:48.720> you<00:19:48.840> transfer<00:19:49.140> the<00:19:49.200> nft 00:19:49.430 --> 00:19:49.440 align:start position:0% example when you transfer the nft 00:19:49.440 --> 00:19:51.230 align:start position:0% example when you transfer the nft afterwards<00:19:50.039> since<00:19:50.340> the<00:19:50.580> nullifier<00:19:51.000> is<00:19:51.120> only 00:19:51.230 --> 00:19:51.240 align:start position:0% afterwards since the nullifier is only 00:19:51.240 --> 00:19:53.090 align:start position:0% afterwards since the nullifier is only tied<00:19:51.600> to<00:19:51.780> the<00:19:51.900> address<00:19:52.020> could<00:19:52.679> you<00:19:52.860> then 00:19:53.090 --> 00:19:53.100 align:start position:0% tied to the address could you then 00:19:53.100 --> 00:19:54.770 align:start position:0% tied to the address could you then transfer<00:19:53.640> that<00:19:53.760> nft<00:19:54.000> to<00:19:54.240> different<00:19:54.480> address 00:19:54.770 --> 00:19:54.780 align:start position:0% transfer that nft to different address 00:19:54.780 --> 00:19:56.630 align:start position:0% transfer that nft to different address and<00:19:55.020> create<00:19:55.200> another<00:19:55.380> another<00:19:55.919> file<00:19:56.460> and 00:19:56.630 --> 00:19:56.640 align:start position:0% and create another another file and 00:19:56.640 --> 00:19:58.789 align:start position:0% and create another another file and again<00:19:56.760> qualify<00:19:57.240> for<00:19:57.360> their<00:19:57.539> job 00:19:58.789 --> 00:19:58.799 align:start position:0% again qualify for their job 00:19:58.799 --> 00:20:01.850 align:start position:0% again qualify for their job yes<00:19:59.280> that's<00:19:59.460> a<00:19:59.700> great<00:19:59.820> question<00:20:00.000> so<00:20:00.960> the<00:20:01.740> way 00:20:01.850 --> 00:20:01.860 align:start position:0% yes that's a great question so the way 00:20:01.860 --> 00:20:02.990 align:start position:0% yes that's a great question so the way that<00:20:02.039> you<00:20:02.160> would<00:20:02.280> solve<00:20:02.580> this<00:20:02.700> kind<00:20:02.940> of 00:20:02.990 --> 00:20:03.000 align:start position:0% that you would solve this kind of 00:20:03.000 --> 00:20:04.549 align:start position:0% that you would solve this kind of multiple<00:20:03.360> qualifying<00:20:03.960> for<00:20:04.080> the<00:20:04.140> airdrop 00:20:04.549 --> 00:20:04.559 align:start position:0% multiple qualifying for the airdrop 00:20:04.559 --> 00:20:07.010 align:start position:0% multiple qualifying for the airdrop problem<00:20:04.679> is<00:20:04.980> that<00:20:05.220> when<00:20:05.640> you<00:20:05.820> define<00:20:06.120> when<00:20:06.900> you 00:20:07.010 --> 00:20:07.020 align:start position:0% problem is that when you define when you 00:20:07.020 --> 00:20:08.990 align:start position:0% problem is that when you define when you release<00:20:07.260> this<00:20:07.559> airdrop<00:20:08.039> you<00:20:08.340> define<00:20:08.520> like<00:20:08.820> a 00:20:08.990 --> 00:20:09.000 align:start position:0% release this airdrop you define like a 00:20:09.000 --> 00:20:10.490 align:start position:0% release this airdrop you define like a strict<00:20:09.240> set<00:20:09.419> of<00:20:09.539> keys<00:20:09.780> that<00:20:09.900> are<00:20:10.020> eligible<00:20:10.320> for 00:20:10.490 --> 00:20:10.500 align:start position:0% strict set of keys that are eligible for 00:20:10.500 --> 00:20:12.470 align:start position:0% strict set of keys that are eligible for this<00:20:10.559> airdrop<00:20:11.039> it<00:20:11.400> can<00:20:11.520> be<00:20:11.640> say<00:20:11.940> like<00:20:12.179> people 00:20:12.470 --> 00:20:12.480 align:start position:0% this airdrop it can be say like people 00:20:12.480 --> 00:20:14.029 align:start position:0% this airdrop it can be say like people who<00:20:12.660> owned<00:20:13.020> a<00:20:13.080> certain<00:20:13.200> nft<00:20:13.500> at<00:20:13.799> a<00:20:13.919> certain 00:20:14.029 --> 00:20:14.039 align:start position:0% who owned a certain nft at a certain 00:20:14.039 --> 00:20:15.950 align:start position:0% who owned a certain nft at a certain Block<00:20:14.280> in<00:20:14.940> which<00:20:15.059> case<00:20:15.240> there's<00:20:15.480> a<00:20:15.600> finite 00:20:15.950 --> 00:20:15.960 align:start position:0% Block in which case there's a finite 00:20:15.960 --> 00:20:17.330 align:start position:0% Block in which case there's a finite number<00:20:16.080> of<00:20:16.260> addresses<00:20:16.620> that<00:20:16.799> can<00:20:16.919> claim<00:20:17.160> that 00:20:17.330 --> 00:20:17.340 align:start position:0% number of addresses that can claim that 00:20:17.340 --> 00:20:19.850 align:start position:0% number of addresses that can claim that or<00:20:17.940> it<00:20:18.179> can<00:20:18.299> be<00:20:18.480> so<00:20:19.020> anything<00:20:19.260> you<00:20:19.500> could<00:20:19.620> prove 00:20:19.850 --> 00:20:19.860 align:start position:0% or it can be so anything you could prove 00:20:19.860 --> 00:20:22.070 align:start position:0% or it can be so anything you could prove in<00:20:19.980> the<00:20:20.100> ethereum<00:20:20.460> storage<00:20:20.700> Market<00:20:21.660> potential 00:20:22.070 --> 00:20:22.080 align:start position:0% in the ethereum storage Market potential 00:20:22.080 --> 00:20:24.230 align:start position:0% in the ethereum storage Market potential try<00:20:22.320> or<00:20:22.860> it<00:20:22.980> could<00:20:23.100> be<00:20:23.220> like<00:20:23.460> just<00:20:23.940> a<00:20:24.000> list<00:20:24.120> of 00:20:24.230 --> 00:20:24.240 align:start position:0% try or it could be like just a list of 00:20:24.240 --> 00:20:25.430 align:start position:0% try or it could be like just a list of addresses<00:20:24.539> in<00:20:24.660> a<00:20:24.780> Merkel<00:20:25.020> tree<00:20:25.140> like<00:20:25.320> a 00:20:25.430 --> 00:20:25.440 align:start position:0% addresses in a Merkel tree like a 00:20:25.440 --> 00:20:27.710 align:start position:0% addresses in a Merkel tree like a standard<00:20:25.679> airdrop<00:20:26.100> is<00:20:26.220> done<00:20:26.400> so<00:20:27.360> the<00:20:27.419> idea<00:20:27.600> is 00:20:27.710 --> 00:20:27.720 align:start position:0% standard airdrop is done so the idea is 00:20:27.720 --> 00:20:29.870 align:start position:0% standard airdrop is done so the idea is that<00:20:27.900> even<00:20:28.140> the<00:20:28.679> the<00:20:28.860> reason<00:20:29.100> that<00:20:29.280> nullifiers 00:20:29.870 --> 00:20:29.880 align:start position:0% that even the the reason that nullifiers 00:20:29.880 --> 00:20:31.789 align:start position:0% that even the the reason that nullifiers uses<00:20:30.120> it<00:20:30.299> would<00:20:30.539> only<00:20:31.080> suffice<00:20:31.500> for<00:20:31.679> this 00:20:31.789 --> 00:20:31.799 align:start position:0% uses it would only suffice for this 00:20:31.799 --> 00:20:33.049 align:start position:0% uses it would only suffice for this claiming<00:20:32.160> step<00:20:32.340> because<00:20:32.580> once<00:20:32.940> you've 00:20:33.049 --> 00:20:33.059 align:start position:0% claiming step because once you've 00:20:33.059 --> 00:20:35.450 align:start position:0% claiming step because once you've claimed<00:20:33.419> the<00:20:33.480> nullifier<00:20:33.900> to<00:20:34.140> an<00:20:34.320> account<00:20:34.460> and 00:20:35.450 --> 00:20:35.460 align:start position:0% claimed the nullifier to an account and 00:20:35.460 --> 00:20:37.130 align:start position:0% claimed the nullifier to an account and you've<00:20:35.640> claimed<00:20:35.940> this<00:20:36.000> nft<00:20:36.299> or<00:20:36.600> airdrop<00:20:37.020> or 00:20:37.130 --> 00:20:37.140 align:start position:0% you've claimed this nft or airdrop or 00:20:37.140 --> 00:20:38.630 align:start position:0% you've claimed this nft or airdrop or whatever<00:20:37.260> to<00:20:37.559> this<00:20:37.740> account<00:20:37.919> that<00:20:38.520> account 00:20:38.630 --> 00:20:38.640 align:start position:0% whatever to this account that account 00:20:38.640 --> 00:20:39.890 align:start position:0% whatever to this account that account can<00:20:38.880> do<00:20:39.000> whatever<00:20:39.059> it<00:20:39.299> wants<00:20:39.539> with<00:20:39.720> that 00:20:39.890 --> 00:20:39.900 align:start position:0% can do whatever it wants with that 00:20:39.900 --> 00:20:41.930 align:start position:0% can do whatever it wants with that information<00:20:40.140> now<00:20:40.980> it's<00:20:41.160> it's<00:20:41.340> come<00:20:41.640> from<00:20:41.760> a 00:20:41.930 --> 00:20:41.940 align:start position:0% information now it's it's come from a 00:20:41.940 --> 00:20:43.430 align:start position:0% information now it's it's come from a completely<00:20:42.179> anonymous<00:20:42.539> source<00:20:42.900> and<00:20:43.200> so<00:20:43.320> it 00:20:43.430 --> 00:20:43.440 align:start position:0% completely anonymous source and so it 00:20:43.440 --> 00:20:45.409 align:start position:0% completely anonymous source and so it can<00:20:43.620> it<00:20:43.980> can<00:20:44.160> go<00:20:44.280> wherever<00:20:44.640> and<00:20:44.940> it'll 00:20:45.409 --> 00:20:45.419 align:start position:0% can it can go wherever and it'll 00:20:45.419 --> 00:20:47.270 align:start position:0% can it can go wherever and it'll continue<00:20:45.660> to<00:20:45.900> maintain<00:20:46.140> that<00:20:46.260> anonymity<00:20:46.620> so 00:20:47.270 --> 00:20:47.280 align:start position:0% continue to maintain that anonymity so 00:20:47.280 --> 00:20:49.190 align:start position:0% continue to maintain that anonymity so the<00:20:47.520> you<00:20:47.940> can<00:20:48.000> continue<00:20:48.120> to<00:20:48.419> transact<00:20:49.080> that 00:20:49.190 --> 00:20:49.200 align:start position:0% the you can continue to transact that 00:20:49.200 --> 00:20:51.169 align:start position:0% the you can continue to transact that nft<00:20:49.440> or<00:20:49.559> your<00:20:49.740> C20<00:20:50.100> but<00:20:50.580> you<00:20:50.760> just<00:20:50.880> wouldn't<00:20:51.000> be 00:20:51.169 --> 00:20:51.179 align:start position:0% nft or your C20 but you just wouldn't be 00:20:51.179 --> 00:20:52.370 align:start position:0% nft or your C20 but you just wouldn't be interacting<00:20:51.600> with<00:20:51.720> the<00:20:51.780> original<00:20:51.900> airdrop 00:20:52.370 --> 00:20:52.380 align:start position:0% interacting with the original airdrop 00:20:52.380 --> 00:20:53.870 align:start position:0% interacting with the original airdrop contract<00:20:52.679> ever<00:20:52.860> again<00:20:53.039> so<00:20:53.220> you<00:20:53.400> wouldn't<00:20:53.520> need 00:20:53.870 --> 00:20:53.880 align:start position:0% contract ever again so you wouldn't need 00:20:53.880 --> 00:20:55.610 align:start position:0% contract ever again so you wouldn't need another<00:20:54.059> fire<00:20:54.360> in<00:20:54.539> the<00:20:54.660> future 00:20:55.610 --> 00:20:55.620 align:start position:0% another fire in the future 00:20:55.620 --> 00:20:58.909 align:start position:0% another fire in the future yeah<00:20:56.220> okay<00:20:56.640> good<00:20:56.940> so<00:20:57.900> this<00:20:58.320> is<00:20:58.500> probably<00:20:58.679> a 00:20:58.909 --> 00:20:58.919 align:start position:0% yeah okay good so this is probably a 00:20:58.919 --> 00:21:01.610 align:start position:0% yeah okay good so this is probably a silly<00:20:59.280> question<00:20:59.780> when<00:21:00.780> people<00:21:00.960> redeem<00:21:01.440> it 00:21:01.610 --> 00:21:01.620 align:start position:0% silly question when people redeem it 00:21:01.620 --> 00:21:05.090 align:start position:0% silly question when people redeem it right<00:21:01.919> they<00:21:02.220> have<00:21:02.520> to<00:21:02.720> provide<00:21:03.720> some<00:21:03.960> gas<00:21:04.140> so 00:21:05.090 --> 00:21:05.100 align:start position:0% right they have to provide some gas so 00:21:05.100 --> 00:21:06.770 align:start position:0% right they have to provide some gas so the<00:21:05.340> guests<00:21:05.760> must<00:21:05.880> be<00:21:06.059> coming<00:21:06.179> from<00:21:06.480> some 00:21:06.770 --> 00:21:06.780 align:start position:0% the guests must be coming from some 00:21:06.780 --> 00:21:09.409 align:start position:0% the guests must be coming from some account<00:21:07.020> so<00:21:07.799> even<00:21:08.039> even<00:21:08.460> though<00:21:08.820> we<00:21:09.000> have<00:21:09.179> all 00:21:09.409 --> 00:21:09.419 align:start position:0% account so even even though we have all 00:21:09.419 --> 00:21:13.610 align:start position:0% account so even even though we have all these<00:21:09.720> anonymity<00:21:10.260> is<00:21:10.559> uh<00:21:11.400> probably<00:21:11.700> hide<00:21:12.620> the 00:21:13.610 --> 00:21:13.620 align:start position:0% these anonymity is uh probably hide the 00:21:13.620 --> 00:21:15.470 align:start position:0% these anonymity is uh probably hide the the<00:21:13.860> edges<00:21:14.220> that's<00:21:14.400> going<00:21:14.640> to<00:21:14.760> receiving<00:21:15.179> it 00:21:15.470 --> 00:21:15.480 align:start position:0% the edges that's going to receiving it 00:21:15.480 --> 00:21:19.190 align:start position:0% the edges that's going to receiving it but<00:21:15.840> when<00:21:16.679> people<00:21:16.860> provide<00:21:17.280> the<00:21:17.460> gas 00:21:19.190 --> 00:21:19.200 align:start position:0% but when people provide the gas 00:21:19.200 --> 00:21:21.950 align:start position:0% but when people provide the gas this<00:21:19.799> transaction<00:21:20.160> actually<00:21:20.640> links<00:21:21.240> the 00:21:21.950 --> 00:21:21.960 align:start position:0% this transaction actually links the 00:21:21.960 --> 00:21:25.070 align:start position:0% this transaction actually links the account<00:21:22.260> that's<00:21:22.559> receiving<00:21:22.980> nnp<00:21:23.820> versus<00:21:24.179> the 00:21:25.070 --> 00:21:25.080 align:start position:0% account that's receiving nnp versus the 00:21:25.080 --> 00:21:28.010 align:start position:0% account that's receiving nnp versus the account<00:21:25.260> having<00:21:25.559> the<00:21:25.860> gas<00:21:26.299> so<00:21:27.299> it's<00:21:27.840> still 00:21:28.010 --> 00:21:28.020 align:start position:0% account having the gas so it's still 00:21:28.020 --> 00:21:30.590 align:start position:0% account having the gas so it's still revealing<00:21:28.620> like<00:21:29.159> some<00:21:29.520> information<00:21:29.760> yeah 00:21:30.590 --> 00:21:30.600 align:start position:0% revealing like some information yeah 00:21:30.600 --> 00:21:32.029 align:start position:0% revealing like some information yeah that's<00:21:30.780> a<00:21:30.960> great<00:21:31.080> question<00:21:31.260> the<00:21:31.500> question<00:21:31.679> was 00:21:32.029 --> 00:21:32.039 align:start position:0% that's a great question the question was 00:21:32.039 --> 00:21:33.310 align:start position:0% that's a great question the question was basically<00:21:32.340> how<00:21:32.520> do<00:21:32.640> you<00:21:32.700> pay<00:21:32.820> for<00:21:32.940> the<00:21:33.120> gas 00:21:33.310 --> 00:21:33.320 align:start position:0% basically how do you pay for the gas 00:21:33.320 --> 00:21:35.870 align:start position:0% basically how do you pay for the gas without<00:21:34.320> the<00:21:34.620> anonymizing<00:21:35.159> yourself<00:21:35.280> and 00:21:35.870 --> 00:21:35.880 align:start position:0% without the anonymizing yourself and 00:21:35.880 --> 00:21:37.250 align:start position:0% without the anonymizing yourself and there's<00:21:36.120> kind<00:21:36.299> of<00:21:36.360> two<00:21:36.480> main<00:21:36.659> ways<00:21:36.900> to<00:21:37.020> do<00:21:37.140> this 00:21:37.250 --> 00:21:37.260 align:start position:0% there's kind of two main ways to do this 00:21:37.260 --> 00:21:40.490 align:start position:0% there's kind of two main ways to do this one<00:21:38.100> is<00:21:38.340> uh<00:21:38.880> the<00:21:39.480> airdrop<00:21:39.900> contract<00:21:40.200> itself 00:21:40.490 --> 00:21:40.500 align:start position:0% one is uh the airdrop contract itself 00:21:40.500 --> 00:21:42.230 align:start position:0% one is uh the airdrop contract itself will<00:21:40.919> pay<00:21:41.100> for<00:21:41.280> the<00:21:41.400> gas<00:21:41.520> the<00:21:41.880> way<00:21:42.000> this<00:21:42.059> would 00:21:42.230 --> 00:21:42.240 align:start position:0% will pay for the gas the way this would 00:21:42.240 --> 00:21:44.210 align:start position:0% will pay for the gas the way this would work<00:21:42.360> is<00:21:42.539> when<00:21:42.659> you<00:21:42.780> claim<00:21:43.140> uh<00:21:43.740> the<00:21:43.919> airdrop 00:21:44.210 --> 00:21:44.220 align:start position:0% work is when you claim uh the airdrop 00:21:44.220 --> 00:21:45.649 align:start position:0% work is when you claim uh the airdrop contract<00:21:44.460> would<00:21:44.640> record<00:21:44.820> the<00:21:45.179> amount<00:21:45.419> of<00:21:45.539> gas 00:21:45.649 --> 00:21:45.659 align:start position:0% contract would record the amount of gas 00:21:45.659 --> 00:21:47.210 align:start position:0% contract would record the amount of gas being<00:21:45.900> used<00:21:46.020> in<00:21:46.200> the<00:21:46.260> transaction<00:21:46.620> there 00:21:47.210 --> 00:21:47.220 align:start position:0% being used in the transaction there 00:21:47.220 --> 00:21:48.409 align:start position:0% being used in the transaction there would<00:21:47.340> be<00:21:47.460> a<00:21:47.520> certain<00:21:47.640> Bank<00:21:47.880> inside<00:21:48.179> the 00:21:48.409 --> 00:21:48.419 align:start position:0% would be a certain Bank inside the 00:21:48.419 --> 00:21:51.289 align:start position:0% would be a certain Bank inside the contract<00:21:48.780> to<00:21:49.380> pay<00:21:49.620> for<00:21:49.799> that<00:21:49.919> gas<00:21:50.159> plus<00:21:51.120> a 00:21:51.289 --> 00:21:51.299 align:start position:0% contract to pay for that gas plus a 00:21:51.299 --> 00:21:53.270 align:start position:0% contract to pay for that gas plus a little<00:21:51.419> bit<00:21:51.600> extra<00:21:51.780> and<00:21:52.440> so<00:21:52.559> the<00:21:52.679> idea<00:21:52.860> is<00:21:52.980> that 00:21:53.270 --> 00:21:53.280 align:start position:0% little bit extra and so the idea is that 00:21:53.280 --> 00:21:55.070 align:start position:0% little bit extra and so the idea is that you<00:21:53.520> could<00:21:53.640> send<00:21:53.880> your<00:21:54.120> claim<00:21:54.480> transaction<00:21:54.780> on 00:21:55.070 --> 00:21:55.080 align:start position:0% you could send your claim transaction on 00:21:55.080 --> 00:21:58.970 align:start position:0% you could send your claim transaction on chain<00:21:55.400> uh<00:21:56.400> or<00:21:56.760> uh<00:21:57.480> to<00:21:57.720> a<00:21:57.900> private<00:21:58.140> mempool<00:21:58.500> an 00:21:58.970 --> 00:21:58.980 align:start position:0% chain uh or uh to a private mempool an 00:21:58.980 --> 00:22:00.230 align:start position:0% chain uh or uh to a private mempool an Mev<00:21:59.400> Searcher<00:21:59.760> would<00:21:59.940> actually<00:22:00.059> be 00:22:00.230 --> 00:22:00.240 align:start position:0% Mev Searcher would actually be 00:22:00.240 --> 00:22:01.970 align:start position:0% Mev Searcher would actually be incentivized<00:22:00.900> to<00:22:01.200> claim<00:22:01.500> this<00:22:01.620> transaction 00:22:01.970 --> 00:22:01.980 align:start position:0% incentivized to claim this transaction 00:22:01.980 --> 00:22:04.130 align:start position:0% incentivized to claim this transaction act<00:22:02.340> as<00:22:02.580> your<00:22:02.700> relayer<00:22:03.240> in<00:22:03.480> a<00:22:03.659> decentralized 00:22:04.130 --> 00:22:04.140 align:start position:0% act as your relayer in a decentralized 00:22:04.140 --> 00:22:05.270 align:start position:0% act as your relayer in a decentralized manner<00:22:04.440> because<00:22:04.799> they're<00:22:05.039> getting 00:22:05.270 --> 00:22:05.280 align:start position:0% manner because they're getting 00:22:05.280 --> 00:22:07.789 align:start position:0% manner because they're getting compensated<00:22:05.700> for<00:22:05.940> it<00:22:06.120> uh<00:22:06.840> because<00:22:07.140> it 00:22:07.789 --> 00:22:07.799 align:start position:0% compensated for it uh because it 00:22:07.799 --> 00:22:10.010 align:start position:0% compensated for it uh because it contract<00:22:08.520> is<00:22:08.700> calculating<00:22:09.059> and<00:22:09.539> reimbursing 00:22:10.010 --> 00:22:10.020 align:start position:0% contract is calculating and reimbursing 00:22:10.020 --> 00:22:10.970 align:start position:0% contract is calculating and reimbursing them<00:22:10.140> more<00:22:10.320> than<00:22:10.380> they<00:22:10.500> would<00:22:10.620> have<00:22:10.679> paid<00:22:10.799> for 00:22:10.970 --> 00:22:10.980 align:start position:0% them more than they would have paid for 00:22:10.980 --> 00:22:12.830 align:start position:0% them more than they would have paid for the<00:22:11.100> gas<00:22:11.220> that's<00:22:11.760> one<00:22:11.940> way<00:22:12.120> to<00:22:12.240> do<00:22:12.360> it<00:22:12.419> second 00:22:12.830 --> 00:22:12.840 align:start position:0% the gas that's one way to do it second 00:22:12.840 --> 00:22:13.850 align:start position:0% the gas that's one way to do it second way<00:22:13.020> to<00:22:13.140> do<00:22:13.200> it<00:22:13.260> with<00:22:13.380> something<00:22:13.559> like<00:22:13.679> account 00:22:13.850 --> 00:22:13.860 align:start position:0% way to do it with something like account 00:22:13.860 --> 00:22:16.669 align:start position:0% way to do it with something like account abstraction<00:22:14.400> where<00:22:15.059> you<00:22:15.360> can<00:22:15.480> again<00:22:15.720> have<00:22:16.380> a 00:22:16.669 --> 00:22:16.679 align:start position:0% abstraction where you can again have a 00:22:16.679 --> 00:22:18.110 align:start position:0% abstraction where you can again have a third<00:22:16.799> party<00:22:16.980> pay<00:22:17.220> for<00:22:17.340> the<00:22:17.460> gas<00:22:17.580> usually<00:22:18.000> out 00:22:18.110 --> 00:22:18.120 align:start position:0% third party pay for the gas usually out 00:22:18.120 --> 00:22:19.850 align:start position:0% third party pay for the gas usually out of<00:22:18.240> the<00:22:18.360> contract<00:22:18.600> this<00:22:19.020> can<00:22:19.200> happen<00:22:19.380> with<00:22:19.679> say 00:22:19.850 --> 00:22:19.860 align:start position:0% of the contract this can happen with say 00:22:19.860 --> 00:22:21.649 align:start position:0% of the contract this can happen with say the<00:22:19.980> contract<00:22:20.220> doing<00:22:20.400> an<00:22:20.520> atomic<00:22:20.880> swap<00:22:21.179> with 00:22:21.649 --> 00:22:21.659 align:start position:0% the contract doing an atomic swap with 00:22:21.659 --> 00:22:23.450 align:start position:0% the contract doing an atomic swap with say<00:22:21.900> the<00:22:22.080> token<00:22:22.380> that<00:22:22.440> it's<00:22:22.559> giving<00:22:22.740> you<00:22:22.919> and 00:22:23.450 --> 00:22:23.460 align:start position:0% say the token that it's giving you and 00:22:23.460 --> 00:22:25.370 align:start position:0% say the token that it's giving you and each<00:22:23.640> to<00:22:23.940> pay<00:22:24.000> for<00:22:24.179> the<00:22:24.299> gas 00:22:25.370 --> 00:22:25.380 align:start position:0% each to pay for the gas 00:22:25.380 --> 00:22:25.909 align:start position:0% each to pay for the gas um 00:22:25.909 --> 00:22:25.919 align:start position:0% um 00:22:25.919 --> 00:22:27.830 align:start position:0% um similarly<00:22:26.520> reimbursing<00:22:27.120> the<00:22:27.360> the<00:22:27.659> front 00:22:27.830 --> 00:22:27.840 align:start position:0% similarly reimbursing the the front 00:22:27.840 --> 00:22:30.350 align:start position:0% similarly reimbursing the the front running<00:22:28.220> relayer<00:22:29.220> effectively 00:22:30.350 --> 00:22:30.360 align:start position:0% running relayer effectively 00:22:30.360 --> 00:22:33.470 align:start position:0% running relayer effectively um<00:22:30.419> or<00:22:31.020> you<00:22:31.200> could<00:22:31.320> send<00:22:31.500> it<00:22:31.620> to<00:22:31.799> like<00:22:32.100> uh<00:22:32.820> uh 00:22:33.470 --> 00:22:33.480 align:start position:0% um or you could send it to like uh uh 00:22:33.480 --> 00:22:35.029 align:start position:0% um or you could send it to like uh uh something<00:22:33.720> like<00:22:33.960> keeper<00:22:34.500> Network<00:22:34.679> which 00:22:35.029 --> 00:22:35.039 align:start position:0% something like keeper Network which 00:22:35.039 --> 00:22:36.649 align:start position:0% something like keeper Network which would<00:22:35.159> incentivize<00:22:35.640> which<00:22:36.240> is<00:22:36.299> basically<00:22:36.539> a 00:22:36.649 --> 00:22:36.659 align:start position:0% would incentivize which is basically a 00:22:36.659 --> 00:22:39.529 align:start position:0% would incentivize which is basically a place<00:22:36.780> where<00:22:36.900> Mev<00:22:37.260> Searchers<00:22:37.799> can<00:22:38.159> post<00:22:39.000> or 00:22:39.529 --> 00:22:39.539 align:start position:0% place where Mev Searchers can post or 00:22:39.539 --> 00:22:40.970 align:start position:0% place where Mev Searchers can post or people<00:22:39.720> can<00:22:39.960> post<00:22:40.080> maybe<00:22:40.260> ideas<00:22:40.559> and<00:22:40.860> maybe 00:22:40.970 --> 00:22:40.980 align:start position:0% people can post maybe ideas and maybe 00:22:40.980 --> 00:22:42.710 align:start position:0% people can post maybe ideas and maybe Searchers<00:22:41.460> can<00:22:41.580> take<00:22:41.700> them<00:22:41.880> you<00:22:42.360> could<00:22:42.480> use<00:22:42.600> a 00:22:42.710 --> 00:22:42.720 align:start position:0% Searchers can take them you could use a 00:22:42.720 --> 00:22:44.210 align:start position:0% Searchers can take them you could use a mempool<00:22:43.020> or<00:22:43.140> you<00:22:43.260> could<00:22:43.380> use<00:22:43.500> a<00:22:43.799> kind<00:22:43.919> of<00:22:44.039> a 00:22:44.210 --> 00:22:44.220 align:start position:0% mempool or you could use a kind of a 00:22:44.220 --> 00:22:46.250 align:start position:0% mempool or you could use a kind of a private<00:22:44.600> centralized<00:22:45.600> or<00:22:45.720> decentralized 00:22:46.250 --> 00:22:46.260 align:start position:0% private centralized or decentralized 00:22:46.260 --> 00:22:47.810 align:start position:0% private centralized or decentralized method<00:22:46.740> to<00:22:46.860> do<00:22:46.980> that 00:22:47.810 --> 00:22:47.820 align:start position:0% method to do that 00:22:47.820 --> 00:22:49.370 align:start position:0% method to do that yeah<00:22:48.299> that's<00:22:48.480> a<00:22:48.659> good<00:22:48.720> transaction<00:22:49.020> that's<00:22:49.200> a 00:22:49.370 --> 00:22:49.380 align:start position:0% yeah that's a good transaction that's a 00:22:49.380 --> 00:22:51.289 align:start position:0% yeah that's a good transaction that's a great<00:22:49.500> question<00:22:49.740> though 00:22:51.289 --> 00:22:51.299 align:start position:0% great question though 00:22:51.299 --> 00:22:55.880 align:start position:0% great question though thank<00:22:51.840> you<00:22:51.900> so<00:22:52.020> much<00:22:52.400> bigger<00:22:53.400> Plus