WEBVTT Kind: captions Language: en 00:00:04.660 --> 00:00:06.720 align:start position:0% so<00:00:05.440> like<00:00:05.860> we<00:00:05.950> said<00:00:06.130> we're<00:00:06.280> gonna<00:00:06.340> talk<00:00:06.610> about 00:00:06.720 --> 00:00:06.730 align:start position:0% so like we said we're gonna talk about 00:00:06.730 --> 00:00:08.190 align:start position:0% so like we said we're gonna talk about why<00:00:07.060> all<00:00:07.330> your<00:00:07.450> smart<00:00:07.690> contracts<00:00:08.080> are 00:00:08.190 --> 00:00:08.200 align:start position:0% why all your smart contracts are 00:00:08.200 --> 00:00:09.570 align:start position:0% why all your smart contracts are vulnerable<00:00:08.530> to<00:00:08.650> bribery<00:00:08.800> and<00:00:09.160> what<00:00:09.340> to<00:00:09.460> do 00:00:09.570 --> 00:00:09.580 align:start position:0% vulnerable to bribery and what to do 00:00:09.580 --> 00:00:11.760 align:start position:0% vulnerable to bribery and what to do about<00:00:09.670> it<00:00:09.820> and<00:00:10.090> this<00:00:10.870> is<00:00:10.930> joint<00:00:11.350> work<00:00:11.440> with<00:00:11.740> a 00:00:11.760 --> 00:00:11.770 align:start position:0% about it and this is joint work with a 00:00:11.770 --> 00:00:13.740 align:start position:0% about it and this is joint work with a number<00:00:12.010> of<00:00:12.130> excellent<00:00:12.760> co-authors<00:00:13.240> like<00:00:13.540> all 00:00:13.740 --> 00:00:13.750 align:start position:0% number of excellent co-authors like all 00:00:13.750 --> 00:00:15.600 align:start position:0% number of excellent co-authors like all good<00:00:13.960> research<00:00:14.140> remember<00:00:14.590> no<00:00:15.070> research<00:00:15.430> is 00:00:15.600 --> 00:00:15.610 align:start position:0% good research remember no research is 00:00:15.610 --> 00:00:18.030 align:start position:0% good research remember no research is ever<00:00:15.790> an<00:00:15.970> island<00:00:16.360> so<00:00:17.260> let's<00:00:17.500> start<00:00:17.740> by<00:00:17.830> talking 00:00:18.030 --> 00:00:18.040 align:start position:0% ever an island so let's start by talking 00:00:18.040 --> 00:00:20.130 align:start position:0% ever an island so let's start by talking about<00:00:18.220> why<00:00:18.490> we're<00:00:18.700> all<00:00:18.849> here<00:00:18.880> and<00:00:19.330> actually 00:00:20.130 --> 00:00:20.140 align:start position:0% about why we're all here and actually 00:00:20.140 --> 00:00:21.810 align:start position:0% about why we're all here and actually one<00:00:20.320> of<00:00:20.349> the<00:00:20.560> interesting<00:00:21.130> reasons<00:00:21.520> we're<00:00:21.669> all 00:00:21.810 --> 00:00:21.820 align:start position:0% one of the interesting reasons we're all 00:00:21.820 --> 00:00:23.819 align:start position:0% one of the interesting reasons we're all here<00:00:22.150> is<00:00:22.329> because<00:00:22.599> of<00:00:22.689> a<00:00:22.779> Polish<00:00:23.200> economist 00:00:23.819 --> 00:00:23.829 align:start position:0% here is because of a Polish economist 00:00:23.829 --> 00:00:26.940 align:start position:0% here is because of a Polish economist from<00:00:24.009> the<00:00:24.130> 1970s<00:00:24.939> named<00:00:25.180> John<00:00:25.480> Harsanyi<00:00:25.950> who 00:00:26.940 --> 00:00:26.950 align:start position:0% from the 1970s named John Harsanyi who 00:00:26.950 --> 00:00:29.220 align:start position:0% from the 1970s named John Harsanyi who laid<00:00:27.279> the<00:00:27.520> groundwork<00:00:28.419> for<00:00:28.750> this<00:00:28.840> field<00:00:29.110> of 00:00:29.220 --> 00:00:29.230 align:start position:0% laid the groundwork for this field of 00:00:29.230 --> 00:00:32.100 align:start position:0% laid the groundwork for this field of study<00:00:29.290> we<00:00:29.770> call<00:00:29.980> mechanism<00:00:30.520> design<00:00:31.020> what<00:00:32.020> is 00:00:32.100 --> 00:00:32.110 align:start position:0% study we call mechanism design what is 00:00:32.110 --> 00:00:33.870 align:start position:0% study we call mechanism design what is mechanism<00:00:32.590> design<00:00:32.890> it's<00:00:33.310> a<00:00:33.430> field<00:00:33.700> of 00:00:33.870 --> 00:00:33.880 align:start position:0% mechanism design it's a field of 00:00:33.880 --> 00:00:36.000 align:start position:0% mechanism design it's a field of economics<00:00:34.540> and<00:00:34.720> game<00:00:34.899> theory<00:00:35.200> that<00:00:35.710> takes<00:00:35.920> an 00:00:36.000 --> 00:00:36.010 align:start position:0% economics and game theory that takes an 00:00:36.010 --> 00:00:38.250 align:start position:0% economics and game theory that takes an engineering<00:00:36.430> based<00:00:36.670> approach<00:00:37.060> to<00:00:37.360> trying<00:00:37.930> to 00:00:38.250 --> 00:00:38.260 align:start position:0% engineering based approach to trying to 00:00:38.260 --> 00:00:41.160 align:start position:0% engineering based approach to trying to get<00:00:38.440> users<00:00:38.890> to<00:00:38.920> behave<00:00:39.640> a<00:00:39.670> certain<00:00:40.030> way<00:00:40.180> using 00:00:41.160 --> 00:00:41.170 align:start position:0% get users to behave a certain way using 00:00:41.170 --> 00:00:43.740 align:start position:0% get users to behave a certain way using economic<00:00:41.740> incentives<00:00:42.340> assuming<00:00:43.330> the<00:00:43.510> players 00:00:43.740 --> 00:00:43.750 align:start position:0% economic incentives assuming the players 00:00:43.750 --> 00:00:45.660 align:start position:0% economic incentives assuming the players in<00:00:44.020> this<00:00:44.110> game<00:00:44.230> will<00:00:44.620> act<00:00:44.800> rationally<00:00:45.400> and<00:00:45.550> in 00:00:45.660 --> 00:00:45.670 align:start position:0% in this game will act rationally and in 00:00:45.670 --> 00:00:47.940 align:start position:0% in this game will act rationally and in their<00:00:45.790> own<00:00:45.910> self-interest<00:00:46.620> so<00:00:47.620> the<00:00:47.770> field 00:00:47.940 --> 00:00:47.950 align:start position:0% their own self-interest so the field 00:00:47.950 --> 00:00:50.790 align:start position:0% their own self-interest so the field started<00:00:48.310> in<00:00:48.400> the<00:00:48.460> 60s<00:00:48.790> and<00:00:48.910> 70s<00:00:49.060> and<00:00:49.800> consists 00:00:50.790 --> 00:00:50.800 align:start position:0% started in the 60s and 70s and consists 00:00:50.800 --> 00:00:53.190 align:start position:0% started in the 60s and 70s and consists of<00:00:50.860> several<00:00:51.130> basic<00:00:51.760> components<00:00:52.270> one<00:00:52.960> of<00:00:53.080> them 00:00:53.190 --> 00:00:53.200 align:start position:0% of several basic components one of them 00:00:53.200 --> 00:00:54.930 align:start position:0% of several basic components one of them is<00:00:53.380> a<00:00:53.410> mechanism<00:00:53.980> which<00:00:54.220> is<00:00:54.340> a<00:00:54.370> game<00:00:54.640> that<00:00:54.670> has 00:00:54.930 --> 00:00:54.940 align:start position:0% is a mechanism which is a game that has 00:00:54.940 --> 00:00:57.090 align:start position:0% is a mechanism which is a game that has rules<00:00:55.420> a<00:00:55.690> game<00:00:55.930> environment<00:00:56.500> and<00:00:56.710> that 00:00:57.090 --> 00:00:57.100 align:start position:0% rules a game environment and that 00:00:57.100 --> 00:00:59.700 align:start position:0% rules a game environment and that players<00:00:57.400> send<00:00:57.760> messages<00:00:58.150> to<00:00:58.260> that<00:00:59.260> game<00:00:59.470> has 00:00:59.700 --> 00:00:59.710 align:start position:0% players send messages to that game has 00:00:59.710 --> 00:01:01.770 align:start position:0% players send messages to that game has an<00:00:59.829> outcome<00:01:00.250> and<00:01:00.430> that<00:01:00.520> outcome<00:01:00.910> has<00:01:01.510> what's 00:01:01.770 --> 00:01:01.780 align:start position:0% an outcome and that outcome has what's 00:01:01.780 --> 00:01:03.479 align:start position:0% an outcome and that outcome has what's called<00:01:01.870> a<00:01:02.230> social<00:01:02.650> choice<00:01:02.860> function<00:01:03.340> or 00:01:03.479 --> 00:01:03.489 align:start position:0% called a social choice function or 00:01:03.489 --> 00:01:05.819 align:start position:0% called a social choice function or social<00:01:03.880> utility<00:01:04.150> function<00:01:04.689> that<00:01:05.290> says<00:01:05.619> how 00:01:05.819 --> 00:01:05.829 align:start position:0% social utility function that says how 00:01:05.829 --> 00:01:07.380 align:start position:0% social utility function that says how good<00:01:06.009> that<00:01:06.189> outcome<00:01:06.549> is<00:01:06.700> for<00:01:06.909> all<00:01:07.030> the<00:01:07.150> players 00:01:07.380 --> 00:01:07.390 align:start position:0% good that outcome is for all the players 00:01:07.390 --> 00:01:09.450 align:start position:0% good that outcome is for all the players in<00:01:07.600> the<00:01:07.659> game<00:01:07.689> and<00:01:08.140> therefore<00:01:08.799> for<00:01:08.920> society<00:01:09.369> at 00:01:09.450 --> 00:01:09.460 align:start position:0% in the game and therefore for society at 00:01:09.460 --> 00:01:10.980 align:start position:0% in the game and therefore for society at large<00:01:09.579> so<00:01:10.270> what<00:01:10.420> you<00:01:10.509> want<00:01:10.659> to<00:01:10.719> do<00:01:10.840> is 00:01:10.980 --> 00:01:10.990 align:start position:0% large so what you want to do is 00:01:10.990 --> 00:01:12.989 align:start position:0% large so what you want to do is implement<00:01:11.259> some<00:01:11.590> mechanism<00:01:12.130> that<00:01:12.520> implements 00:01:12.989 --> 00:01:12.999 align:start position:0% implement some mechanism that implements 00:01:12.999 --> 00:01:14.550 align:start position:0% implement some mechanism that implements some<00:01:13.149> social<00:01:13.539> choice<00:01:13.840> function<00:01:14.259> you<00:01:14.350> find 00:01:14.550 --> 00:01:14.560 align:start position:0% some social choice function you find 00:01:14.560 --> 00:01:16.649 align:start position:0% some social choice function you find desirable<00:01:14.859> and<00:01:15.310> the<00:01:15.789> hope<00:01:15.969> is<00:01:16.119> that<00:01:16.179> because 00:01:16.649 --> 00:01:16.659 align:start position:0% desirable and the hope is that because 00:01:16.659 --> 00:01:18.389 align:start position:0% desirable and the hope is that because people<00:01:17.020> act<00:01:17.170> rationally<00:01:17.740> they'll<00:01:17.890> sort<00:01:18.310> of 00:01:18.389 --> 00:01:18.399 align:start position:0% people act rationally they'll sort of 00:01:18.399 --> 00:01:19.919 align:start position:0% people act rationally they'll sort of converge<00:01:18.729> on<00:01:18.909> this<00:01:19.030> social<00:01:19.359> choice<00:01:19.539> function 00:01:19.919 --> 00:01:19.929 align:start position:0% converge on this social choice function 00:01:19.929 --> 00:01:21.989 align:start position:0% converge on this social choice function you've<00:01:20.049> chosen<00:01:20.369> so<00:01:21.369> what's<00:01:21.520> an<00:01:21.579> example<00:01:21.639> of 00:01:21.989 --> 00:01:21.999 align:start position:0% you've chosen so what's an example of 00:01:21.999 --> 00:01:23.969 align:start position:0% you've chosen so what's an example of this<00:01:22.149> well<00:01:22.600> before<00:01:22.960> Devcon<00:01:23.319> I<00:01:23.590> actually<00:01:23.740> found 00:01:23.969 --> 00:01:23.979 align:start position:0% this well before Devcon I actually found 00:01:23.979 --> 00:01:26.849 align:start position:0% this well before Devcon I actually found myself<00:01:24.219> pretty<00:01:24.729> hungry<00:01:25.299> and<00:01:25.569> I<00:01:26.439> wanted<00:01:26.710> some 00:01:26.849 --> 00:01:26.859 align:start position:0% myself pretty hungry and I wanted some 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image of Jesus on it like you may<00:01:33.579> have<00:01:33.609> seen<00:01:33.939> being<00:01:34.270> popular<00:01:34.719> on<00:01:34.840> on 00:01:35.039 --> 00:01:35.049 align:start position:0% may have seen being popular on on 00:01:35.049 --> 00:01:37.919 align:start position:0% may have seen being popular on on various<00:01:35.409> auction<00:01:35.770> sites<00:01:36.719> obviously<00:01:37.719> I<00:01:37.749> went 00:01:37.919 --> 00:01:37.929 align:start position:0% various auction sites obviously I went 00:01:37.929 --> 00:01:39.300 align:start position:0% various auction sites obviously I went with<00:01:38.109> the<00:01:38.200> Jesus<00:01:38.380> toast<00:01:38.770> because<00:01:39.009> who 00:01:39.300 --> 00:01:39.310 align:start position:0% with the Jesus toast because who 00:01:39.310 --> 00:01:39.690 align:start position:0% with the Jesus toast because who wouldn't 00:01:39.690 --> 00:01:39.700 align:start position:0% wouldn't 00:01:39.700 --> 00:01:41.789 align:start position:0% wouldn't and<00:01:39.850> so<00:01:40.479> I<00:01:40.509> headed<00:01:40.749> over<00:01:40.899> to<00:01:41.020> ebay<00:01:41.259> and<00:01:41.439> found 00:01:41.789 --> 00:01:41.799 align:start position:0% and so I headed over to ebay and found 00:01:41.799 --> 00:01:43.889 align:start position:0% and so I headed over to ebay and found some<00:01:41.979> auctions<00:01:42.399> on<00:01:42.639> this<00:01:42.819> sort<00:01:43.209> of<00:01:43.270> toast<00:01:43.569> and 00:01:43.889 --> 00:01:43.899 align:start position:0% some auctions on this sort of toast and 00:01:43.899 --> 00:01:45.719 align:start position:0% some auctions on this sort of toast and you<00:01:44.469> can<00:01:44.619> see<00:01:44.770> here<00:01:44.979> this<00:01:45.100> one<00:01:45.249> has<00:01:45.369> a<00:01:45.399> few<00:01:45.579> days 00:01:45.719 --> 00:01:45.729 align:start position:0% you can see here this one has a few days 00:01:45.729 --> 00:01:46.980 align:start position:0% you can see here this one has a few days left<00:01:45.939> in<00:01:46.090> the<00:01:46.149> auction<00:01:46.299> and<00:01:46.659> it's<00:01:46.810> currently 00:01:46.980 --> 00:01:46.990 align:start position:0% left in the auction and it's currently 00:01:46.990 --> 00:01:49.199 align:start position:0% left in the auction and it's currently bidding<00:01:47.409> at<00:01:47.499> 1<00:01:47.649> cent<00:01:47.920> so<00:01:48.670> I<00:01:48.729> was<00:01:48.850> like<00:01:48.969> this<00:01:49.060> is 00:01:49.199 --> 00:01:49.209 align:start position:0% bidding at 1 cent so I was like this is 00:01:49.209 --> 00:01:51.029 align:start position:0% bidding at 1 cent so I was like this is great<00:01:49.329> I<00:01:49.569> put<00:01:49.779> in<00:01:49.869> my<00:01:49.990> bid<00:01:50.170> for<00:01:50.200> 2<00:01:50.499> cents<00:01:50.740> and 00:01:51.029 --> 00:01:51.039 align:start position:0% great I put in my bid for 2 cents and 00:01:51.039 --> 00:01:52.410 align:start position:0% great I put in my bid for 2 cents and I'm<00:01:51.130> gonna<00:01:51.249> win<00:01:51.429> this<00:01:51.549> Jesus<00:01:51.850> toast<00:01:52.060> and<00:01:52.270> sort 00:01:52.410 --> 00:01:52.420 align:start position:0% I'm gonna win this Jesus toast and sort 00:01:52.420 --> 00:01:55.080 align:start position:0% I'm gonna win this Jesus toast and sort of<00:01:52.479> fill<00:01:52.719> my<00:01:52.840> hunger<00:01:53.490> the<00:01:54.490> Pens<00:01:54.670> sort<00:01:54.939> of<00:01:54.999> at 00:01:55.080 --> 00:01:55.090 align:start position:0% of fill my hunger the Pens sort of at 00:01:55.090 --> 00:01:56.879 align:start position:0% of fill my hunger the Pens sort of at the<00:01:55.119> last<00:01:55.359> second<00:01:55.779> someone<00:01:56.170> comes<00:01:56.439> in<00:01:56.619> and 00:01:56.879 --> 00:01:56.889 align:start position:0% the last second someone comes in and 00:01:56.889 --> 00:01:58.980 align:start position:0% the last second someone comes in and puts<00:01:57.100> a<00:01:57.219> bid<00:01:57.369> for<00:01:57.549> over<00:01:57.759> $9,000<00:01:58.659> because<00:01:58.869> they 00:01:58.980 --> 00:01:58.990 align:start position:0% puts a bid for over $9,000 because they 00:01:58.990 --> 00:02:00.569 align:start position:0% puts a bid for over $9,000 because they really<00:01:59.350> wanted<00:01:59.590> that<00:01:59.649> piece<00:01:59.859> of<00:02:00.009> toast<00:02:00.249> and 00:02:00.569 --> 00:02:00.579 align:start position:0% really wanted that piece of toast and 00:02:00.579 --> 00:02:02.639 align:start position:0% really wanted that piece of toast and I'm<00:02:01.119> sort<00:02:01.299> of<00:02:01.420> left<00:02:01.599> hungry<00:02:01.990> and<00:02:02.170> not<00:02:02.289> knowing 00:02:02.639 --> 00:02:02.649 align:start position:0% I'm sort of left hungry and not knowing 00:02:02.649 --> 00:02:04.499 align:start position:0% I'm sort of left hungry and not knowing what's<00:02:02.799> going<00:02:02.979> on<00:02:03.159> so<00:02:04.119> this<00:02:04.270> sort<00:02:04.450> of 00:02:04.499 --> 00:02:04.509 align:start position:0% what's going on so this sort of 00:02:04.509 --> 00:02:05.760 align:start position:0% what's going on so this sort of highlights<00:02:04.899> a<00:02:04.990> general<00:02:05.289> problem<00:02:05.499> with 00:02:05.760 --> 00:02:05.770 align:start position:0% highlights a general problem with 00:02:05.770 --> 00:02:07.349 align:start position:0% highlights a general problem with auctions<00:02:05.979> which<00:02:06.369> is<00:02:06.490> that<00:02:06.609> in<00:02:06.759> auctions<00:02:07.240> you 00:02:07.349 --> 00:02:07.359 align:start position:0% auctions which is that in auctions you 00:02:07.359 --> 00:02:09.029 align:start position:0% auctions which is that in auctions you need<00:02:07.479> to<00:02:07.569> play<00:02:07.719> strategically<00:02:08.380> you<00:02:08.830> need<00:02:08.979> to 00:02:09.029 --> 00:02:09.039 align:start position:0% need to play strategically you need to 00:02:09.039 --> 00:02:10.469 align:start position:0% need to play strategically you need to consider<00:02:09.340> how<00:02:09.520> other<00:02:09.759> people<00:02:10.060> are<00:02:10.119> going<00:02:10.300> to 00:02:10.469 --> 00:02:10.479 align:start position:0% consider how other people are going to 00:02:10.479 --> 00:02:12.330 align:start position:0% consider how other people are going to act<00:02:10.630> when<00:02:11.380> you<00:02:11.470> choose<00:02:11.709> how<00:02:11.890> you're<00:02:12.069> going<00:02:12.250> to 00:02:12.330 --> 00:02:12.340 align:start position:0% act when you choose how you're going to 00:02:12.340 --> 00:02:15.240 align:start position:0% act when you choose how you're going to act<00:02:12.580> yourself<00:02:13.000> and<00:02:13.990> the<00:02:14.410> games<00:02:14.620> you<00:02:14.890> sort<00:02:15.190> of 00:02:15.240 --> 00:02:15.250 align:start position:0% act yourself and the games you sort of 00:02:15.250 --> 00:02:16.620 align:start position:0% act yourself and the games you sort of play<00:02:15.400> with<00:02:15.550> them<00:02:15.700> like<00:02:15.850> people<00:02:16.150> play<00:02:16.270> on<00:02:16.300> eBay 00:02:16.620 --> 00:02:16.630 align:start position:0% play with them like people play on eBay 00:02:16.630 --> 00:02:17.940 align:start position:0% play with them like people play on eBay become<00:02:16.960> very<00:02:17.170> complex 00:02:17.940 --> 00:02:17.950 align:start position:0% become very complex 00:02:17.950 --> 00:02:20.550 align:start position:0% become very complex so<00:02:18.849> one<00:02:18.970> of<00:02:19.000> the<00:02:19.150> early<00:02:19.420> things<00:02:19.660> the<00:02:19.959> field<00:02:20.349> of 00:02:20.550 --> 00:02:20.560 align:start position:0% so one of the early things the field of 00:02:20.560 --> 00:02:22.110 align:start position:0% so one of the early things the field of mechanism<00:02:21.099> design<00:02:21.400> has<00:02:21.670> looked<00:02:21.940> at 00:02:22.110 --> 00:02:22.120 align:start position:0% mechanism design has looked at 00:02:22.120 --> 00:02:24.150 align:start position:0% mechanism design has looked at traditionally<00:02:22.840> is<00:02:23.020> can<00:02:23.380> we<00:02:23.500> improve<00:02:23.800> things 00:02:24.150 --> 00:02:24.160 align:start position:0% traditionally is can we improve things 00:02:24.160 --> 00:02:27.390 align:start position:0% traditionally is can we improve things like<00:02:24.459> auctions<00:02:25.230> and<00:02:26.230> in<00:02:26.680> terms<00:02:26.890> of<00:02:26.980> the<00:02:27.099> social 00:02:27.390 --> 00:02:27.400 align:start position:0% like auctions and in terms of the social 00:02:27.400 --> 00:02:28.559 align:start position:0% like auctions and in terms of the social choice<00:02:27.580> function<00:02:28.060> what<00:02:28.300> our<00:02:28.420> high-level 00:02:28.559 --> 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--> 00:02:35.970 align:start position:0% profit from selling the item of course and<00:02:34.000> for<00:02:34.720> the<00:02:34.810> buyers<00:02:35.050> they<00:02:35.530> don't<00:02:35.739> want<00:02:35.890> to 00:02:35.970 --> 00:02:35.980 align:start position:0% and for the buyers they don't want to 00:02:35.980 --> 00:02:38.040 align:start position:0% and for the buyers they don't want to overpay<00:02:36.459> over<00:02:36.880> what<00:02:37.060> they<00:02:37.209> think<00:02:37.480> the<00:02:37.630> item<00:02:37.930> is 00:02:38.040 --> 00:02:38.050 align:start position:0% overpay over what they think the item is 00:02:38.050 --> 00:02:39.330 align:start position:0% overpay over what they think the item is worth<00:02:38.170> or<00:02:38.470> the<00:02:38.650> minimum<00:02:38.890> they<00:02:39.069> could<00:02:39.220> be 00:02:39.330 --> 00:02:39.340 align:start position:0% worth or the minimum they could be 00:02:39.340 --> 00:02:41.040 align:start position:0% worth or the minimum they could be paying<00:02:39.550> they<00:02:40.450> don't<00:02:40.660> want<00:02:40.780> to<00:02:40.840> have<00:02:40.930> to<00:02:41.020> think 00:02:41.040 --> 00:02:41.050 align:start position:0% paying they don't want to have to think 00:02:41.050 --> 00:02:42.840 align:start position:0% paying they don't want to have to think about<00:02:41.290> complex<00:02:41.920> strategies<00:02:42.400> like<00:02:42.610> when 00:02:42.840 --> 00:02:42.850 align:start position:0% about complex strategies like when 00:02:42.850 --> 00:02:44.640 align:start position:0% about complex strategies like when should<00:02:43.060> I<00:02:43.120> place<00:02:43.360> my<00:02:43.569> bid<00:02:43.780> do<00:02:44.230> I<00:02:44.290> have<00:02:44.440> to<00:02:44.560> wait 00:02:44.640 --> 00:02:44.650 align:start position:0% should I place my bid do I have to wait 00:02:44.650 --> 00:02:45.930 align:start position:0% should I place my bid do I have to wait until<00:02:44.950> the<00:02:45.010> last<00:02:45.130> second<00:02:45.580> what<00:02:45.730> are<00:02:45.760> other 00:02:45.930 --> 00:02:45.940 align:start position:0% until the last second what are other 00:02:45.940 --> 00:02:47.790 align:start position:0% until the last second what are other people<00:02:46.300> gonna<00:02:46.420> do<00:02:46.600> in<00:02:46.720> this<00:02:46.840> auction<00:02:47.050> and<00:02:47.349> how 00:02:47.790 --> 00:02:47.800 align:start position:0% people gonna do in this auction and how 00:02:47.800 --> 00:02:50.160 align:start position:0% people gonna do in this auction and how can<00:02:47.860> I<00:02:48.040> get<00:02:48.099> this<00:02:48.280> item<00:02:48.550> more<00:02:48.849> cheaply<00:02:49.180> and<00:02:49.390> the 00:02:50.160 --> 00:02:50.170 align:start position:0% can I get this item more cheaply and the 00:02:50.170 --> 00:02:52.050 align:start position:0% can I get this item more cheaply and the buyers<00:02:50.350> also<00:02:50.650> want<00:02:50.920> to<00:02:51.010> win<00:02:51.190> the<00:02:51.370> item<00:02:51.670> if<00:02:51.880> they 00:02:52.050 --> 00:02:52.060 align:start position:0% buyers also want to win the item if they 00:02:52.060 --> 00:02:53.699 align:start position:0% buyers also want to win the item if they value<00:02:52.390> it<00:02:52.420> more<00:02:52.720> than<00:02:52.900> any<00:02:53.050> other<00:02:53.230> buyer<00:02:53.470> in 00:02:53.699 --> 00:02:53.709 align:start position:0% value it more than any other buyer in 00:02:53.709 --> 00:02:57.570 align:start position:0% value it more than any other buyer in the<00:02:53.800> system<00:02:55.440> we<00:02:56.440> also<00:02:56.590> assume<00:02:56.950> the<00:02:57.100> existence 00:02:57.570 --> 00:02:57.580 align:start position:0% the system we also assume the existence 00:02:57.580 --> 00:02:58.920 align:start position:0% the system we also assume the existence of<00:02:57.670> some<00:02:57.880> auctioneer<00:02:58.360> who's<00:02:58.540> this<00:02:58.690> sort<00:02:58.870> of 00:02:58.920 --> 00:02:58.930 align:start position:0% of some auctioneer who's this sort of 00:02:58.930 --> 00:03:01.140 align:start position:0% of some auctioneer who's this sort of trustworthy<00:02:59.590> third<00:02:59.799> party<00:03:00.220> that<00:03:00.549> runs<00:03:00.940> the 00:03:01.140 --> 00:03:01.150 align:start position:0% trustworthy third party that runs the 00:03:01.150 --> 00:03:02.670 align:start position:0% trustworthy third party that runs the mechanism<00:03:01.630> which<00:03:02.140> is<00:03:02.260> sort<00:03:02.440> of<00:03:02.470> a<00:03:02.560> classic 00:03:02.670 --> 00:03:02.680 align:start position:0% mechanism which is sort of a classic 00:03:02.680 --> 00:03:04.710 align:start position:0% mechanism which is sort of a classic assumption<00:03:03.340> in<00:03:03.489> mechanism<00:03:04.180> design<00:03:04.450> that<00:03:04.630> you 00:03:04.710 --> 00:03:04.720 align:start position:0% assumption in mechanism design that you 00:03:04.720 --> 00:03:06.900 align:start position:0% assumption in mechanism design that you have<00:03:04.750> this<00:03:05.140> third<00:03:05.739> party<00:03:06.220> that<00:03:06.370> everyone<00:03:06.670> who 00:03:06.900 --> 00:03:06.910 align:start position:0% have this third party that everyone who 00:03:06.910 --> 00:03:08.789 align:start position:0% have this third party that everyone who trusts<00:03:07.420> that's<00:03:07.690> actually<00:03:08.049> running<00:03:08.319> this<00:03:08.560> game 00:03:08.789 --> 00:03:08.799 align:start position:0% trusts that's actually running this game 00:03:08.799 --> 00:03:12.870 align:start position:0% trusts that's actually running this game that<00:03:09.130> we<00:03:09.220> talked<00:03:09.430> about<00:03:10.590> so<00:03:11.590> can<00:03:12.489> we<00:03:12.610> improve 00:03:12.870 --> 00:03:12.880 align:start position:0% that we talked about so can we improve 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or<00:03:20.019> Vickery<00:03:20.440> Clarke's<00:03:20.739> Groves 00:03:21.360 --> 00:03:21.370 align:start position:0% auction or Vickery Clarke's Groves 00:03:21.370 --> 00:03:23.759 align:start position:0% auction or Vickery Clarke's Groves auction<00:03:21.970> and<00:03:22.180> the<00:03:22.810> way<00:03:22.900> this<00:03:23.049> works<00:03:23.320> is<00:03:23.590> that 00:03:23.759 --> 00:03:23.769 align:start position:0% auction and the way this works is that 00:03:23.769 --> 00:03:26.220 align:start position:0% auction and the way this works is that all<00:03:24.220> the<00:03:24.549> buyers<00:03:24.760> send<00:03:25.239> a<00:03:25.420> bid<00:03:25.630> in<00:03:25.810> a<00:03:25.989> sealed 00:03:26.220 --> 00:03:26.230 align:start position:0% all the buyers send a bid in a sealed 00:03:26.230 --> 00:03:28.380 align:start position:0% all the buyers send a bid in a sealed envelope<00:03:26.380> to<00:03:26.859> the<00:03:26.980> auctioneer<00:03:27.400> and<00:03:27.579> at<00:03:28.269> the 00:03:28.380 --> 00:03:28.390 align:start position:0% envelope to the auctioneer and at the 00:03:28.390 --> 00:03:29.819 align:start position:0% envelope to the auctioneer and at the end<00:03:28.540> of<00:03:28.630> the<00:03:28.750> auction<00:03:28.870> the<00:03:29.140> auctioneer<00:03:29.440> opens 00:03:29.819 --> 00:03:29.829 align:start position:0% end of the auction the auctioneer opens 00:03:29.829 --> 00:03:32.160 align:start position:0% end of the auction the auctioneer opens it<00:03:29.980> and<00:03:30.070> the<00:03:30.670> the<00:03:30.910> winner<00:03:31.090> of<00:03:31.329> the<00:03:31.480> item<00:03:31.750> is<00:03:31.930> the 00:03:32.160 --> 00:03:32.170 align:start position:0% it and the the winner of the item is the 00:03:32.170 --> 00:03:34.289 align:start position:0% it and the the winner of the item is the highest<00:03:32.470> bidder<00:03:32.650> but<00:03:33.400> he<00:03:33.579> pays<00:03:33.790> the<00:03:33.970> second 00:03:34.289 --> 00:03:34.299 align:start position:0% highest bidder but he pays the second 00:03:34.299 --> 00:03:37.020 align:start position:0% highest bidder but he pays the second highest<00:03:34.600> price<00:03:34.750> for<00:03:35.049> the<00:03:35.140> item<00:03:35.400> this<00:03:36.400> model<00:03:36.940> is 00:03:37.020 --> 00:03:37.030 align:start position:0% highest price for the item this model is 00:03:37.030 --> 00:03:38.430 align:start position:0% highest price for the item this model is used<00:03:37.239> very<00:03:37.420> commonly<00:03:37.570> in<00:03:37.930> things<00:03:38.109> like<00:03:38.170> ad 00:03:38.430 --> 00:03:38.440 align:start position:0% used very commonly in things like ad 00:03:38.440 --> 00:03:41.250 align:start position:0% used very commonly in things like ad sales<00:03:39.390> and<00:03:40.390> you<00:03:40.989> can<00:03:41.140> actually 00:03:41.250 --> 00:03:41.260 align:start position:0% sales and you can actually 00:03:41.260 --> 00:03:43.770 align:start position:0% sales and you can actually mathematically<00:03:41.590> prove<00:03:42.310> that<00:03:43.030> given<00:03:43.450> a<00:03:43.630> bunch 00:03:43.770 --> 00:03:43.780 align:start position:0% mathematically prove that given a bunch 00:03:43.780 --> 00:03:46.110 align:start position:0% mathematically prove that given a bunch of<00:03:43.930> private<00:03:44.200> valuations<00:03:44.920> on<00:03:45.070> the<00:03:45.190> buyer<00:03:45.400> the 00:03:46.110 --> 00:03:46.120 align:start position:0% of private valuations on the buyer the 00:03:46.120 --> 00:03:48.240 align:start position:0% of private valuations on the buyer the best<00:03:46.329> strategy<00:03:46.840> for<00:03:46.870> any<00:03:47.170> buyer<00:03:47.470> in<00:03:47.799> this<00:03:48.010> game 00:03:48.240 --> 00:03:48.250 align:start position:0% best strategy for any buyer in this game 00:03:48.250 --> 00:03:50.190 align:start position:0% best strategy for any buyer in this game is<00:03:48.579> to<00:03:48.820> bid<00:03:49.030> what<00:03:49.299> the<00:03:49.420> item<00:03:49.660> is<00:03:49.810> really<00:03:50.049> worth 00:03:50.190 --> 00:03:50.200 align:start position:0% is to bid what the item is really worth 00:03:50.200 --> 00:03:52.949 align:start position:0% is to bid what the item is really worth for<00:03:50.440> them<00:03:50.560> if<00:03:50.920> they<00:03:51.400> over<00:03:51.790> bid<00:03:52.000> in<00:03:52.209> many<00:03:52.570> cases 00:03:52.949 --> 00:03:52.959 align:start position:0% for them if they over bid in many cases 00:03:52.959 --> 00:03:54.870 align:start position:0% for them if they over bid in many cases they<00:03:53.079> will<00:03:53.200> lose<00:03:53.440> money<00:03:53.709> over<00:03:54.250> bidding<00:03:54.760> their 00:03:54.870 --> 00:03:54.880 align:start position:0% they will lose money over bidding their 00:03:54.880 --> 00:03:56.819 align:start position:0% they will lose money over bidding their real<00:03:55.060> valuation<00:03:55.600> and<00:03:55.780> similarly<00:03:56.530> if<00:03:56.709> they 00:03:56.819 --> 00:03:56.829 align:start position:0% real valuation and similarly if they 00:03:56.829 --> 00:03:58.740 align:start position:0% real valuation and similarly if they under<00:03:57.100> bid<00:03:57.250> they'll<00:03:57.430> lose<00:03:57.609> money<00:03:57.820> so<00:03:58.600> that's 00:03:58.740 --> 00:03:58.750 align:start position:0% under bid they'll lose money so that's 00:03:58.750 --> 00:04:00.180 align:start position:0% under bid they'll lose money so that's great<00:03:58.959> right<00:03:59.230> that's<00:03:59.739> what's<00:03:59.920> called<00:04:00.070> a 00:04:00.180 --> 00:04:00.190 align:start position:0% great right that's what's called a 00:04:00.190 --> 00:04:02.009 align:start position:0% great right that's what's called a dominant<00:04:00.609> strategy<00:04:00.760> truthful<00:04:01.450> mechanism<00:04:01.900> in 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always to tell the truth and 00:04:08.459 --> 00:04:10.289 align:start position:0% strategy is always to tell the truth and traditionally<00:04:09.459> we've<00:04:09.609> wanted<00:04:09.910> to<00:04:10.150> build 00:04:10.289 --> 00:04:10.299 align:start position:0% traditionally we've wanted to build 00:04:10.299 --> 00:04:12.720 align:start position:0% traditionally we've wanted to build mechanisms<00:04:10.930> that<00:04:11.049> rdst<00:04:11.680> because<00:04:12.519> they 00:04:12.720 --> 00:04:12.730 align:start position:0% mechanisms that rdst because they 00:04:12.730 --> 00:04:15.120 align:start position:0% mechanisms that rdst because they minimize<00:04:13.030> cognitive<00:04:13.750> load<00:04:13.959> and<00:04:14.170> overhead<00:04:14.590> for 00:04:15.120 --> 00:04:15.130 align:start position:0% minimize cognitive load and overhead for 00:04:15.130 --> 00:04:16.680 align:start position:0% minimize cognitive load and overhead for sort<00:04:15.370> of<00:04:15.459> the<00:04:15.579> players<00:04:15.790> in<00:04:16.000> your<00:04:16.090> system<00:04:16.450> and 00:04:16.680 --> 00:04:16.690 align:start position:0% sort of the players in your system and 00:04:16.690 --> 00:04:18.360 align:start position:0% sort of the players in your system and just<00:04:17.169> make<00:04:17.320> things<00:04:17.530> simpler<00:04:17.829> to<00:04:18.039> think<00:04:18.070> about 00:04:18.360 --> 00:04:18.370 align:start position:0% just make things simpler to think about 00:04:18.370 --> 00:04:21.479 align:start position:0% just make things simpler to think about in<00:04:18.519> reason<00:04:18.760> about<00:04:18.940> and<00:04:19.919> cryptocurrency<00:04:20.919> has 00:04:21.479 --> 00:04:21.489 align:start position:0% in reason about and cryptocurrency has 00:04:21.489 --> 00:04:23.070 align:start position:0% in reason about and cryptocurrency has sort<00:04:21.669> of<00:04:21.700> continued<00:04:22.180> this<00:04:22.389> broad<00:04:22.660> tradition 00:04:23.070 --> 00:04:23.080 align:start position:0% sort of continued this broad tradition 00:04:23.080 --> 00:04:26.040 align:start position:0% sort of continued this broad tradition of<00:04:23.169> mechanism<00:04:23.620> design<00:04:23.919> again<00:04:24.669> by<00:04:25.300> some<00:04:25.690> party 00:04:26.040 --> 00:04:26.050 align:start position:0% of mechanism design again by some party 00:04:26.050 --> 00:04:27.690 align:start position:0% of mechanism design again by some party or<00:04:26.080> principle<00:04:26.620> using<00:04:26.830> incentives<00:04:27.430> to<00:04:27.490> drive 00:04:27.690 --> 00:04:27.700 align:start position:0% or principle using incentives to drive 00:04:27.700 --> 00:04:29.850 align:start position:0% or principle using incentives to drive outcomes<00:04:28.120> so<00:04:28.870> this<00:04:29.020> is<00:04:29.110> an<00:04:29.229> example<00:04:29.470> from<00:04:29.710> the 00:04:29.850 --> 00:04:29.860 align:start position:0% outcomes so this is an example from the 00:04:29.860 --> 00:04:31.220 align:start position:0% outcomes so this is an example from the Bitcoin<00:04:30.039> white<00:04:30.400> paper 00:04:31.220 --> 00:04:31.230 align:start position:0% Bitcoin white paper 00:04:31.230 --> 00:04:33.380 align:start position:0% Bitcoin white paper satoshi<00:04:31.650> nakamoto<00:04:31.770> who<00:04:32.670> talks<00:04:32.910> about<00:04:33.150> how<00:04:33.330> the 00:04:33.380 --> 00:04:33.390 align:start position:0% satoshi nakamoto who talks about how the 00:04:33.390 --> 00:04:35.360 align:start position:0% satoshi nakamoto who talks about how the incentives<00:04:33.960> in<00:04:34.020> Bitcoin<00:04:34.380> may<00:04:34.590> help<00:04:34.830> nodes<00:04:35.130> to 00:04:35.360 --> 00:04:35.370 align:start position:0% incentives in Bitcoin may help nodes to 00:04:35.370 --> 00:04:39.230 align:start position:0% incentives in Bitcoin may help nodes to behave<00:04:35.640> honestly<00:04:35.940> in<00:04:36.390> the<00:04:36.510> system<00:04:37.940> and<00:04:38.940> smart 00:04:39.230 --> 00:04:39.240 align:start position:0% behave honestly in the system and smart 00:04:39.240 --> 00:04:41.060 align:start position:0% behave honestly in the system and smart contracts<00:04:39.690> have<00:04:39.930> similar<00:04:40.290> overlaps<00:04:40.860> and 00:04:41.060 --> 00:04:41.070 align:start position:0% contracts have similar overlaps and 00:04:41.070 --> 00:04:42.320 align:start position:0% contracts have similar overlaps and continuations<00:04:41.670> of<00:04:41.820> this<00:04:41.940> field<00:04:42.180> of<00:04:42.270> study 00:04:42.320 --> 00:04:42.330 align:start position:0% continuations of this field of study 00:04:42.330 --> 00:04:44.720 align:start position:0% continuations of this field of study that's<00:04:42.660> been<00:04:42.840> going<00:04:43.080> on<00:04:43.200> since<00:04:43.350> the<00:04:43.470> 70s 00:04:44.720 --> 00:04:44.730 align:start position:0% that's been going on since the 70s 00:04:44.730 --> 00:04:46.640 align:start position:0% that's been going on since the 70s for<00:04:45.060> example<00:04:45.480> there's<00:04:45.900> this<00:04:46.050> idea<00:04:46.380> that<00:04:46.530> you 00:04:46.640 --> 00:04:46.650 align:start position:0% for example there's this idea that you 00:04:46.650 --> 00:04:48.170 align:start position:0% for example there's this idea that you can<00:04:46.770> take<00:04:46.980> any<00:04:47.190> mechanism<00:04:47.760> that<00:04:47.850> we've<00:04:48.000> been 00:04:48.170 --> 00:04:48.180 align:start position:0% can take any mechanism that we've been 00:04:48.180 --> 00:04:50.180 align:start position:0% can take any mechanism that we've been studying<00:04:48.570> for<00:04:48.780> decades<00:04:49.200> and<00:04:49.410> just<00:04:49.890> make<00:04:50.010> it<00:04:50.130> a 00:04:50.180 --> 00:04:50.190 align:start position:0% studying for decades and just make it a 00:04:50.190 --> 00:04:51.860 align:start position:0% studying for decades and just make it a smart<00:04:50.370> contract<00:04:50.580> get<00:04:51.120> rid<00:04:51.270> of<00:04:51.300> your<00:04:51.480> trusted 00:04:51.860 --> 00:04:51.870 align:start position:0% smart contract get rid of your trusted 00:04:51.870 --> 00:04:53.960 align:start position:0% smart contract get rid of your trusted third<00:04:52.050> party<00:04:52.410> get<00:04:52.920> rid<00:04:53.100> of<00:04:53.130> your<00:04:53.310> auctioneer 00:04:53.960 --> 00:04:53.970 align:start position:0% third party get rid of your auctioneer 00:04:53.970 --> 00:04:55.760 align:start position:0% third party get rid of your auctioneer put<00:04:54.390> it<00:04:54.480> on<00:04:54.570> chain<00:04:54.840> and<00:04:55.110> then<00:04:55.320> we<00:04:55.440> don't<00:04:55.590> have 00:04:55.760 --> 00:04:55.770 align:start position:0% put it on chain and then we don't have 00:04:55.770 --> 00:04:57.680 align:start position:0% put it on chain and then we don't have to<00:04:55.890> choose<00:04:56.160> who<00:04:56.730> to<00:04:56.760> trust<00:04:57.060> to<00:04:57.210> play<00:04:57.510> that<00:04:57.630> role 00:04:57.680 --> 00:04:57.690 align:start position:0% to choose who to trust to play that role 00:04:57.690 --> 00:04:59.450 align:start position:0% to choose who to trust to play that role we<00:04:58.020> can<00:04:58.050> just<00:04:58.350> sort<00:04:58.470> of<00:04:58.590> converge<00:04:59.010> on<00:04:59.310> this 00:04:59.450 --> 00:04:59.460 align:start position:0% we can just sort of converge on this 00:04:59.460 --> 00:05:02.330 align:start position:0% we can just sort of converge on this code<00:04:59.730> instead<00:05:00.650> otherwise<00:05:01.650> if<00:05:02.040> you<00:05:02.130> want<00:05:02.280> to 00:05:02.330 --> 00:05:02.340 align:start position:0% code instead otherwise if you want to 00:05:02.340 --> 00:05:03.440 align:start position:0% code instead otherwise if you want to build<00:05:02.460> something<00:05:02.670> that<00:05:02.790> no<00:05:02.970> one's<00:05:03.120> ever<00:05:03.180> built 00:05:03.440 --> 00:05:03.450 align:start position:0% build something that no one's ever built 00:05:03.450 --> 00:05:05.120 align:start position:0% build something that no one's ever built before<00:05:03.570> you<00:05:03.990> can<00:05:04.140> use<00:05:04.260> these<00:05:04.470> same<00:05:04.680> techniques 00:05:05.120 --> 00:05:05.130 align:start position:0% before you can use these same techniques 00:05:05.130 --> 00:05:06.380 align:start position:0% before you can use these same techniques that<00:05:05.400> people<00:05:05.490> have<00:05:05.700> been<00:05:05.820> using<00:05:05.970> for<00:05:06.210> decades 00:05:06.380 --> 00:05:06.390 align:start position:0% that people have been using for decades 00:05:06.390 --> 00:05:08.630 align:start position:0% that people have been using for decades to<00:05:07.050> sort<00:05:07.230> of<00:05:07.290> analyze<00:05:07.530> your<00:05:07.950> mechanism<00:05:08.280> and 00:05:08.630 --> 00:05:08.640 align:start position:0% to sort of analyze your mechanism and 00:05:08.640 --> 00:05:11.170 align:start position:0% to sort of analyze your mechanism and give<00:05:08.850> users<00:05:09.060> the<00:05:09.210> properties<00:05:09.690> they<00:05:09.810> want 00:05:11.170 --> 00:05:11.180 align:start position:0% give users the properties they want 00:05:11.180 --> 00:05:13.190 align:start position:0% give users the properties they want unfortunately<00:05:12.180> there's<00:05:12.450> some<00:05:12.690> challenges<00:05:13.170> in 00:05:13.190 --> 00:05:13.200 align:start position:0% unfortunately there's some challenges in 00:05:13.200 --> 00:05:14.810 align:start position:0% unfortunately there's some challenges in doing<00:05:13.380> this<00:05:13.650> that<00:05:13.860> make<00:05:14.190> smart<00:05:14.460> contracts 00:05:14.810 --> 00:05:14.820 align:start position:0% doing this that make smart contracts 00:05:14.820 --> 00:05:15.920 align:start position:0% doing this that make smart contracts very<00:05:15.060> different<00:05:15.420> from<00:05:15.480> traditional 00:05:15.920 --> 00:05:15.930 align:start position:0% very different from traditional 00:05:15.930 --> 00:05:17.840 align:start position:0% very different from traditional mechanisms<00:05:16.160> so<00:05:17.160> again<00:05:17.370> in<00:05:17.490> traditional 00:05:17.840 --> 00:05:17.850 align:start position:0% mechanisms so again in traditional 00:05:17.850 --> 00:05:19.040 align:start position:0% mechanisms so again in traditional mechanisms<00:05:18.000> you<00:05:18.330> have<00:05:18.450> this<00:05:18.570> trusted<00:05:18.930> third 00:05:19.040 --> 00:05:19.050 align:start position:0% mechanisms you have this trusted third 00:05:19.050 --> 00:05:20.840 align:start position:0% mechanisms you have this trusted third party<00:05:19.440> where<00:05:19.920> as<00:05:20.040> in<00:05:20.160> block<00:05:20.400> chains<00:05:20.670> you're 00:05:20.840 --> 00:05:20.850 align:start position:0% party where as in block chains you're 00:05:20.850 --> 00:05:21.980 align:start position:0% party where as in block chains you're replacing<00:05:21.270> it<00:05:21.360> with<00:05:21.450> the<00:05:21.510> blockchain<00:05:21.750> which 00:05:21.980 --> 00:05:21.990 align:start position:0% replacing it with the blockchain which 00:05:21.990 --> 00:05:23.810 align:start position:0% replacing it with the blockchain which has<00:05:22.320> its<00:05:22.470> own<00:05:22.650> sort<00:05:22.980> of<00:05:23.100> set<00:05:23.280> of<00:05:23.370> gotchas 00:05:23.810 --> 00:05:23.820 align:start position:0% has its own sort of set of gotchas 00:05:23.820 --> 00:05:25.100 align:start position:0% has its own sort of set of gotchas including<00:05:24.450> things<00:05:24.720> like<00:05:24.810> how<00:05:25.050> the 00:05:25.100 --> 00:05:25.110 align:start position:0% including things like how the 00:05:25.110 --> 00:05:27.290 align:start position:0% including things like how the peer-to-peer<00:05:25.440> network<00:05:25.950> works<00:05:26.160> or<00:05:26.700> how<00:05:26.760> miners 00:05:27.290 --> 00:05:27.300 align:start position:0% peer-to-peer network works or how miners 00:05:27.300 --> 00:05:28.670 align:start position:0% peer-to-peer network works or how miners choose<00:05:27.540> transactions<00:05:28.200> or<00:05:28.350> sensor 00:05:28.670 --> 00:05:28.680 align:start position:0% choose transactions or sensor 00:05:28.680 --> 00:05:31.370 align:start position:0% choose transactions or sensor transactions<00:05:29.870> also<00:05:30.870> in<00:05:30.990> traditional 00:05:31.370 --> 00:05:31.380 align:start position:0% transactions also in traditional 00:05:31.380 --> 00:05:32.960 align:start position:0% transactions also in traditional mechanisms<00:05:31.530> you<00:05:31.920> often<00:05:32.220> assume<00:05:32.490> a<00:05:32.580> permission 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eBay knows all of the accounts 00:05:38.790 --> 00:05:40.070 align:start position:0% example eBay knows all of the accounts that<00:05:38.820> are<00:05:38.940> eligible<00:05:39.360> to<00:05:39.420> participate<00:05:39.660> in<00:05:39.930> a 00:05:40.070 --> 00:05:40.080 align:start position:0% that are eligible to participate in a 00:05:40.080 --> 00:05:42.260 align:start position:0% that are eligible to participate in a given<00:05:40.320> action<00:05:40.920> and<00:05:41.340> they<00:05:41.700> have<00:05:41.820> permission 00:05:42.260 --> 00:05:42.270 align:start position:0% given action and they have permission 00:05:42.270 --> 00:05:43.970 align:start position:0% given action and they have permission control<00:05:42.570> over<00:05:42.780> this<00:05:42.870> set<00:05:43.110> so<00:05:43.680> does<00:05:43.830> Google 00:05:43.970 --> 00:05:43.980 align:start position:0% control over this set so does Google 00:05:43.980 --> 00:05:46.100 align:start position:0% control over this set so does Google when<00:05:44.250> they're<00:05:44.370> auctioning<00:05:44.760> off<00:05:44.850> ads<00:05:45.150> and 00:05:46.100 --> 00:05:46.110 align:start position:0% when they're auctioning off ads and 00:05:46.110 --> 00:05:47.270 align:start position:0% when they're auctioning off ads and because<00:05:46.380> of<00:05:46.410> that<00:05:46.500> you<00:05:46.740> can<00:05:46.890> do<00:05:47.010> things<00:05:47.160> like 00:05:47.270 --> 00:05:47.280 align:start position:0% because of that you can do things like 00:05:47.280 --> 00:05:49.640 align:start position:0% because of that you can do things like leveraging<00:05:47.820> identity<00:05:48.270> and<00:05:49.200> there<00:05:49.350> is<00:05:49.440> some 00:05:49.640 --> 00:05:49.650 align:start position:0% leveraging identity and there is some 00:05:49.650 --> 00:05:51.650 align:start position:0% leveraging identity and there is some trust<00:05:49.860> involved<00:05:50.130> there<00:05:50.460> unlike<00:05:51.240> in<00:05:51.390> smart 00:05:51.650 --> 00:05:51.660 align:start position:0% trust involved there unlike in smart 00:05:51.660 --> 00:05:53.120 align:start position:0% trust involved there unlike in smart contracts<00:05:52.110> and<00:05:52.260> cryptographic<00:05:52.500> systems 00:05:53.120 --> 00:05:53.130 align:start position:0% contracts and cryptographic systems 00:05:53.130 --> 00:05:54.920 align:start position:0% contracts and cryptographic systems where<00:05:53.700> all<00:05:53.880> you<00:05:54.060> might<00:05:54.240> see<00:05:54.510> is<00:05:54.660> someone's 00:05:54.920 --> 00:05:54.930 align:start position:0% where all you might see is someone's 00:05:54.930 --> 00:05:56.690 align:start position:0% where all you might see is someone's private<00:05:55.320> key<00:05:55.500> and<00:05:55.620> signatures<00:05:56.100> and<00:05:56.340> you<00:05:56.520> might 00:05:56.690 --> 00:05:56.700 align:start position:0% private key and signatures and you might 00:05:56.700 --> 00:05:58.100 align:start position:0% private key and signatures and you might not<00:05:56.850> be<00:05:57.030> able<00:05:57.120> to<00:05:57.240> leverage<00:05:57.660> this<00:05:57.840> shared 00:05:58.100 --> 00:05:58.110 align:start position:0% not be able to leverage this shared 00:05:58.110 --> 00:06:01.400 align:start position:0% not be able to leverage this shared trust<00:05:58.940> so<00:05:59.940> smart<00:06:00.360> contract<00:06:00.780> mechanism<00:06:00.900> design 00:06:01.400 --> 00:06:01.410 align:start position:0% trust so smart contract mechanism design 00:06:01.410 --> 00:06:03.920 align:start position:0% trust so smart contract mechanism design poses<00:06:01.770> new<00:06:01.950> challenges<00:06:01.980> and<00:06:02.850> chief<00:06:03.810> among 00:06:03.920 --> 00:06:03.930 align:start position:0% poses new challenges and chief among 00:06:03.930 --> 00:06:05.060 align:start position:0% poses new challenges and chief among these<00:06:04.170> challenges<00:06:04.620> and<00:06:04.710> what<00:06:04.800> we're<00:06:04.890> going<00:06:04.980> to 00:06:05.060 --> 00:06:05.070 align:start position:0% these challenges and what we're going to 00:06:05.070 --> 00:06:06.080 align:start position:0% these challenges and what we're going to talk<00:06:05.220> about<00:06:05.250> today<00:06:05.610> is<00:06:05.820> the<00:06:05.940> ease<00:06:06.060> of 00:06:06.080 --> 00:06:06.090 align:start position:0% talk about today is the ease of 00:06:06.090 --> 00:06:08.810 align:start position:0% talk about today is the ease of coordinating<00:06:06.780> bribery<00:06:07.140> so<00:06:08.070> last<00:06:08.580> year<00:06:08.760> I 00:06:08.810 --> 00:06:08.820 align:start position:0% coordinating bribery so last year I 00:06:08.820 --> 00:06:10.250 align:start position:0% coordinating bribery so last year I wrote<00:06:09.000> a<00:06:09.060> blog<00:06:09.240> post<00:06:09.360> called<00:06:09.810> the<00:06:09.900> dart<00:06:10.080> Dow 00:06:10.250 --> 00:06:10.260 align:start position:0% wrote a blog post called the dart Dow 00:06:10.260 --> 00:06:11.510 align:start position:0% wrote a blog post called the dart Dow which<00:06:10.530> if<00:06:10.680> you<00:06:10.800> have<00:06:10.980> in<00:06:11.100> read<00:06:11.250> I<00:06:11.280> highly 00:06:11.510 --> 00:06:11.520 align:start position:0% which if you have in read I highly 00:06:11.520 --> 00:06:13.310 align:start position:0% which if you have in read I highly encourage<00:06:11.730> you<00:06:12.030> to<00:06:12.150> check<00:06:12.270> out<00:06:12.420> and<00:06:12.720> it 00:06:13.310 --> 00:06:13.320 align:start position:0% encourage you to check out and it 00:06:13.320 --> 00:06:14.960 align:start position:0% encourage you to check out and it described<00:06:13.740> a<00:06:13.860> sort<00:06:14.040> of<00:06:14.100> nightmare<00:06:14.520> scenario 00:06:14.960 --> 00:06:14.970 align:start position:0% described a sort of nightmare scenario 00:06:14.970 --> 00:06:17.120 align:start position:0% described a sort of nightmare scenario where<00:06:15.450> people<00:06:15.990> can<00:06:16.170> build<00:06:16.290> bribery<00:06:16.740> systems 00:06:17.120 --> 00:06:17.130 align:start position:0% where people can build bribery systems 00:06:17.130 --> 00:06:18.980 align:start position:0% where people can build bribery systems for<00:06:17.280> smart<00:06:17.520> contracts<00:06:18.000> that<00:06:18.540> operate 00:06:18.980 --> 00:06:18.990 align:start position:0% for smart contracts that operate 00:06:18.990 --> 00:06:21.080 align:start position:0% for smart contracts that operate completely<00:06:19.290> in<00:06:19.620> the<00:06:19.740> dark<00:06:19.950> so<00:06:20.640> no<00:06:20.790> one<00:06:20.940> can 00:06:21.080 --> 00:06:21.090 align:start position:0% completely in the dark so no one can 00:06:21.090 --> 00:06:22.640 align:start position:0% completely in the dark so no one can tell<00:06:21.150> exactly<00:06:21.480> what<00:06:22.050> players<00:06:22.290> are<00:06:22.530> being 00:06:22.640 --> 00:06:22.650 align:start position:0% tell exactly what players are being 00:06:22.650 --> 00:06:24.770 align:start position:0% tell exactly what players are being bribed<00:06:22.950> to<00:06:23.100> do<00:06:23.280> how<00:06:23.910> many<00:06:24.090> players<00:06:24.330> are<00:06:24.570> being 00:06:24.770 --> 00:06:24.780 align:start position:0% bribed to do how many players are being 00:06:24.780 --> 00:06:28.100 align:start position:0% bribed to do how many players are being bribed<00:06:25.040> or<00:06:26.040> or<00:06:26.610> or<00:06:27.030> if<00:06:27.270> the<00:06:27.450> attack<00:06:27.720> is<00:06:27.870> even 00:06:28.100 --> 00:06:28.110 align:start position:0% bribed or or or if the attack is even 00:06:28.110 --> 00:06:30.260 align:start position:0% bribed or or or if the attack is even succeeding<00:06:28.530> at<00:06:28.650> all<00:06:28.770> not<00:06:29.760> only<00:06:29.790> that<00:06:30.090> but 00:06:30.260 --> 00:06:30.270 align:start position:0% succeeding at all not only that but 00:06:30.270 --> 00:06:31.880 align:start position:0% succeeding at all not only that but users<00:06:30.420> are<00:06:30.660> guaranteed<00:06:31.080> that<00:06:31.410> the<00:06:31.620> person 00:06:31.880 --> 00:06:31.890 align:start position:0% users are guaranteed that the person 00:06:31.890 --> 00:06:33.050 align:start position:0% users are guaranteed that the person that's<00:06:31.980> bribing<00:06:32.370> them<00:06:32.460> is<00:06:32.610> not<00:06:32.730> going<00:06:32.790> to<00:06:33.000> get 00:06:33.050 --> 00:06:33.060 align:start position:0% that's bribing them is not going to get 00:06:33.060 --> 00:06:34.430 align:start position:0% that's bribing them is not going to get control<00:06:33.390> of<00:06:33.420> their<00:06:33.600> money<00:06:33.780> so<00:06:34.020> the<00:06:34.140> entire 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other 00:06:40.710 --> 00:06:42.719 align:start position:0% actually a mechanism for bribing other mechanism<00:06:41.250> just 00:06:42.719 --> 00:06:42.729 align:start position:0% mechanism just 00:06:42.729 --> 00:06:44.039 align:start position:0% mechanism just and<00:06:42.939> what<00:06:43.179> I'm<00:06:43.269> gonna<00:06:43.389> do<00:06:43.539> today<00:06:43.719> is<00:06:43.809> introduce 00:06:44.039 --> 00:06:44.049 align:start position:0% and what I'm gonna do today is introduce 00:06:44.049 --> 00:06:45.689 align:start position:0% and what I'm gonna do today is introduce this<00:06:44.349> new<00:06:44.529> term<00:06:44.709> for<00:06:44.949> you<00:06:45.009> guys<00:06:45.189> that<00:06:45.429> we<00:06:45.519> call 00:06:45.689 --> 00:06:45.699 align:start position:0% this new term for you guys that we call 00:06:45.699 --> 00:06:48.239 align:start position:0% this new term for you guys that we call anti<00:06:46.059> mechanisms<00:06:46.599> which<00:06:47.289> are<00:06:47.469> all<00:06:47.619> mechanisms 00:06:48.239 --> 00:06:48.249 align:start position:0% anti mechanisms which are all mechanisms 00:06:48.249 --> 00:06:50.219 align:start position:0% anti mechanisms which are all mechanisms that<00:06:48.399> are<00:06:48.459> intended<00:06:48.849> to<00:06:49.029> disrupt<00:06:49.749> other 00:06:50.219 --> 00:06:50.229 align:start position:0% that are intended to disrupt other 00:06:50.229 --> 00:06:52.319 align:start position:0% that are intended to disrupt other mechanisms<00:06:50.859> so<00:06:51.669> the<00:06:51.759> dark<00:06:51.939> Dao<00:06:52.089> is<00:06:52.119> a 00:06:52.319 --> 00:06:52.329 align:start position:0% mechanisms so the dark Dao is a 00:06:52.329 --> 00:06:54.119 align:start position:0% mechanisms so the dark Dao is a particular<00:06:52.689> type<00:06:52.719> of<00:06:53.049> anti<00:06:53.259> mechanism<00:06:53.739> it's 00:06:54.119 --> 00:06:54.129 align:start position:0% particular type of anti mechanism it's 00:06:54.129 --> 00:06:55.739 align:start position:0% particular type of anti mechanism it's called<00:06:54.369> the<00:06:54.459> dark<00:06:54.639> Dao<00:06:54.819> because<00:06:55.119> it's<00:06:55.269> dark<00:06:55.509> or 00:06:55.739 --> 00:06:55.749 align:start position:0% called the dark Dao because it's dark or 00:06:55.749 --> 00:06:58.019 align:start position:0% called the dark Dao because it's dark or invisible<00:06:56.319> no<00:06:56.979> one<00:06:57.129> can<00:06:57.279> tell<00:06:57.429> exactly<00:06:57.729> what's 00:06:58.019 --> 00:06:58.029 align:start position:0% invisible no one can tell exactly what's 00:06:58.029 --> 00:06:59.639 align:start position:0% invisible no one can tell exactly what's going<00:06:58.239> on<00:06:58.359> inside<00:06:58.689> it<00:06:58.869> but<00:06:59.289> you<00:06:59.379> could<00:06:59.499> also 00:06:59.639 --> 00:06:59.649 align:start position:0% going on inside it but you could also 00:06:59.649 --> 00:07:01.379 align:start position:0% going on inside it but you could also have<00:06:59.829> a<00:06:59.889> public<00:07:00.099> bribery<00:07:00.609> contract<00:07:01.089> or<00:07:01.239> other 00:07:01.379 --> 00:07:01.389 align:start position:0% have a public bribery contract or other 00:07:01.389 --> 00:07:03.869 align:start position:0% have a public bribery contract or other form<00:07:01.689> of<00:07:01.779> anti<00:07:02.049> mechanism<00:07:02.529> and<00:07:02.739> what<00:07:03.579> anti 00:07:03.869 --> 00:07:03.879 align:start position:0% form of anti mechanism and what anti 00:07:03.879 --> 00:07:05.339 align:start position:0% form of anti mechanism and what anti mechanisms<00:07:04.329> look<00:07:04.479> like<00:07:04.629> is<00:07:04.749> basically<00:07:05.109> this 00:07:05.339 --> 00:07:05.349 align:start position:0% mechanisms look like is basically this 00:07:05.349 --> 00:07:07.679 align:start position:0% mechanisms look like is basically this so<00:07:05.979> on<00:07:06.129> the<00:07:06.249> left<00:07:06.459> you<00:07:06.639> have<00:07:06.669> what<00:07:07.149> what<00:07:07.599> it 00:07:07.679 --> 00:07:07.689 align:start position:0% so on the left you have what what it 00:07:07.689 --> 00:07:08.789 align:start position:0% so on the left you have what what it looks<00:07:07.839> like<00:07:07.929> when<00:07:08.109> users<00:07:08.349> are<00:07:08.409> playing<00:07:08.709> a 00:07:08.789 --> 00:07:08.799 align:start position:0% looks like when users are playing a 00:07:08.799 --> 00:07:10.349 align:start position:0% looks like when users are playing a regular<00:07:08.949> mechanism<00:07:09.639> they're<00:07:10.089> sending 00:07:10.349 --> 00:07:10.359 align:start position:0% regular mechanism they're sending 00:07:10.359 --> 00:07:11.759 align:start position:0% regular mechanism they're sending messages<00:07:10.809> to<00:07:10.869> this<00:07:11.019> mechanism<00:07:11.349> and<00:07:11.679> the 00:07:11.759 --> 00:07:11.769 align:start position:0% messages to this mechanism and the 00:07:11.769 --> 00:07:13.409 align:start position:0% messages to this mechanism and the mechanism<00:07:12.219> is<00:07:12.339> coming<00:07:12.609> up<00:07:12.699> with<00:07:12.849> some<00:07:12.999> outputs 00:07:13.409 --> 00:07:13.419 align:start position:0% mechanism is coming up with some outputs 00:07:13.419 --> 00:07:15.329 align:start position:0% mechanism is coming up with some outputs of<00:07:13.629> the<00:07:13.749> game<00:07:13.929> you<00:07:14.679> can<00:07:14.829> see<00:07:14.979> this<00:07:15.069> mechanism 00:07:15.329 --> 00:07:15.339 align:start position:0% of the game you can see this mechanism 00:07:15.339 --> 00:07:17.489 align:start position:0% of the game you can see this mechanism as<00:07:15.579> a<00:07:15.609> smart<00:07:15.879> contract<00:07:16.029> on<00:07:16.359> etherium<00:07:16.779> private 00:07:17.489 --> 00:07:17.499 align:start position:0% as a smart contract on etherium private 00:07:17.499 --> 00:07:18.869 align:start position:0% as a smart contract on etherium private keys<00:07:17.679> there<00:07:17.949> on<00:07:18.069> the<00:07:18.159> left<00:07:18.369> sending 00:07:18.869 --> 00:07:18.879 align:start position:0% keys there on the left sending 00:07:18.879 --> 00:07:20.849 align:start position:0% keys there on the left sending transactions<00:07:19.509> to<00:07:19.599> the<00:07:19.689> mechanism<00:07:20.109> and<00:07:20.319> some 00:07:20.849 --> 00:07:20.859 align:start position:0% transactions to the mechanism and some 00:07:20.859 --> 00:07:22.649 align:start position:0% transactions to the mechanism and some outputs<00:07:21.279> occurring<00:07:21.969> in<00:07:22.119> the<00:07:22.209> state<00:07:22.449> of<00:07:22.569> the 00:07:22.649 --> 00:07:22.659 align:start position:0% outputs occurring in the state of the 00:07:22.659 --> 00:07:25.559 align:start position:0% outputs occurring in the state of the system<00:07:23.189> an<00:07:24.189> anti<00:07:24.579> mechanism<00:07:25.059> happens<00:07:25.449> when 00:07:25.559 --> 00:07:25.569 align:start position:0% system an anti mechanism happens when 00:07:25.569 --> 00:07:27.209 align:start position:0% system an anti mechanism happens when you<00:07:25.629> have<00:07:25.779> another<00:07:26.109> mechanism<00:07:26.409> that<00:07:26.859> users 00:07:27.209 --> 00:07:27.219 align:start position:0% you have another mechanism that users 00:07:27.219 --> 00:07:29.339 align:start position:0% you have another mechanism that users can<00:07:27.429> play<00:07:27.579> through<00:07:27.909> instead<00:07:28.209> potentially<00:07:29.169> one 00:07:29.339 --> 00:07:29.349 align:start position:0% can play through instead potentially one 00:07:29.349 --> 00:07:30.659 align:start position:0% can play through instead potentially one that<00:07:29.499> can<00:07:29.649> interact<00:07:29.889> with<00:07:30.159> the<00:07:30.339> original 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anti mechanism and two users in this 00:07:36.669 --> 00:07:41.039 align:start position:0% anti mechanism and two users in this case<00:07:36.909> are<00:07:37.359> playing<00:07:37.719> em<00:07:37.959> through<00:07:38.469> em<00:07:38.679> Prime<00:07:40.049> so 00:07:41.039 --> 00:07:41.049 align:start position:0% case are playing em through em Prime so 00:07:41.049 --> 00:07:42.989 align:start position:0% case are playing em through em Prime so why<00:07:41.169> does<00:07:41.319> that<00:07:41.349> matter<00:07:41.499> it<00:07:42.129> matters<00:07:42.609> because 00:07:42.989 --> 00:07:42.999 align:start position:0% why does that matter it matters because 00:07:42.999 --> 00:07:44.819 align:start position:0% why does that matter it matters because the<00:07:43.149> existence<00:07:43.629> of<00:07:43.749> these<00:07:43.929> anti<00:07:44.289> mechanisms 00:07:44.819 --> 00:07:44.829 align:start position:0% the existence of these anti mechanisms 00:07:44.829 --> 00:07:47.789 align:start position:0% the existence of these anti mechanisms erode<00:07:45.639> a<00:07:45.999> mechanisms<00:07:46.689> ability<00:07:47.079> to<00:07:47.289> faithfully 00:07:47.789 --> 00:07:47.799 align:start position:0% erode a mechanisms ability to faithfully 00:07:47.799 --> 00:07:49.829 align:start position:0% erode a mechanisms ability to faithfully implement<00:07:48.189> it's<00:07:48.309> social<00:07:48.610> choice<00:07:48.789> function<00:07:49.239> so 00:07:49.829 --> 00:07:49.839 align:start position:0% implement it's social choice function so 00:07:49.839 --> 00:07:51.419 align:start position:0% implement it's social choice function so in<00:07:49.959> terms<00:07:50.139> of<00:07:50.289> optimizing<00:07:50.739> for<00:07:51.039> those<00:07:51.189> goals 00:07:51.419 --> 00:07:51.429 align:start position:0% in terms of optimizing for those goals 00:07:51.429 --> 00:07:52.919 align:start position:0% in terms of optimizing for those goals that<00:07:51.699> we<00:07:51.819> talked<00:07:52.059> about<00:07:52.149> earlier<00:07:52.659> that 00:07:52.919 --> 00:07:52.929 align:start position:0% that we talked about earlier that 00:07:52.929 --> 00:07:54.679 align:start position:0% that we talked about earlier that mechanism<00:07:53.619> design<00:07:53.829> loves<00:07:54.099> to<00:07:54.219> optimize<00:07:54.610> for 00:07:54.679 --> 00:07:54.689 align:start position:0% mechanism design loves to optimize for 00:07:54.689 --> 00:07:56.759 align:start position:0% mechanism design loves to optimize for those<00:07:55.689> goals<00:07:55.989> are<00:07:56.110> highly<00:07:56.379> harmed<00:07:56.619> by<00:07:56.709> the 00:07:56.759 --> 00:07:56.769 align:start position:0% those goals are highly harmed by the 00:07:56.769 --> 00:08:00.179 align:start position:0% those goals are highly harmed by the existence<00:07:57.189> of<00:07:57.309> these<00:07:57.939> anti<00:07:58.269> mechanisms<00:07:59.189> not 00:08:00.179 --> 00:08:00.189 align:start position:0% existence of these anti mechanisms not 00:08:00.189 --> 00:08:01.619 align:start position:0% existence of these anti mechanisms not only<00:08:00.369> that<00:08:00.519> but<00:08:00.669> we<00:08:00.789> can<00:08:00.969> actually<00:08:01.119> quantify 00:08:01.619 --> 00:08:01.629 align:start position:0% only that but we can actually quantify 00:08:01.629 --> 00:08:03.779 align:start position:0% only that but we can actually quantify the<00:08:02.019> security<00:08:02.469> of<00:08:02.559> a<00:08:02.619> given<00:08:02.829> mechanism<00:08:03.309> as<00:08:03.489> the 00:08:03.779 --> 00:08:03.789 align:start position:0% the security of a given mechanism as the 00:08:03.789 --> 00:08:05.549 align:start position:0% the security of a given mechanism as the smallest<00:08:04.119> budget<00:08:04.449> anti<00:08:04.869> mechanism<00:08:05.349> that 00:08:05.549 --> 00:08:05.559 align:start position:0% smallest budget anti mechanism that 00:08:05.559 --> 00:08:07.199 align:start position:0% smallest budget anti mechanism that disrupts<00:08:06.009> the<00:08:06.099> properties<00:08:06.519> we<00:08:06.729> design<00:08:07.029> the 00:08:07.199 --> 00:08:07.209 align:start position:0% disrupts the properties we design the 00:08:07.209 --> 00:08:10.469 align:start position:0% disrupts the properties we design the original<00:08:07.539> mechanism<00:08:07.749> for<00:08:08.819> so<00:08:09.819> I<00:08:09.849> would 00:08:10.469 --> 00:08:10.479 align:start position:0% original mechanism for so I would 00:08:10.479 --> 00:08:11.789 align:start position:0% original mechanism for so I would encourage<00:08:10.779> you<00:08:10.989> guys<00:08:11.019> to<00:08:11.169> stop<00:08:11.529> thinking 00:08:11.789 --> 00:08:11.799 align:start position:0% encourage you guys to stop thinking 00:08:11.799 --> 00:08:13.739 align:start position:0% encourage you guys to stop thinking about<00:08:11.889> anti<00:08:12.309> mechanisms<00:08:12.789> or<00:08:13.119> sorry<00:08:13.479> stop 00:08:13.739 --> 00:08:13.749 align:start position:0% about anti mechanisms or sorry stop 00:08:13.749 --> 00:08:15.419 align:start position:0% about anti mechanisms or sorry stop thinking<00:08:14.049> only<00:08:14.199> about<00:08:14.589> mechanisms<00:08:14.799> when<00:08:15.339> you 00:08:15.419 --> 00:08:15.429 align:start position:0% thinking only about mechanisms when you 00:08:15.429 --> 00:08:16.799 align:start position:0% thinking only about mechanisms when you design<00:08:15.729> your<00:08:15.909> smart<00:08:16.119> contracts<00:08:16.569> and<00:08:16.719> your 00:08:16.799 --> 00:08:16.809 align:start position:0% design your smart contracts and your 00:08:16.809 --> 00:08:18.599 align:start position:0% design your smart contracts and your protocols<00:08:17.259> and<00:08:17.559> started<00:08:18.279> thinking<00:08:18.519> about 00:08:18.599 --> 00:08:18.609 align:start position:0% protocols and started thinking about 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of disruption is as a result so<00:08:25.389> for<00:08:25.599> the<00:08:25.659> VCG<00:08:25.959> auction<00:08:26.529> the<00:08:26.649> second<00:08:27.009> price 00:08:27.179 --> 00:08:27.189 align:start position:0% so for the VCG auction the second price 00:08:27.189 --> 00:08:28.679 align:start position:0% so for the VCG auction the second price auction<00:08:27.549> we<00:08:27.639> mentioned<00:08:27.939> earlier<00:08:28.209> here's<00:08:28.629> a 00:08:28.679 --> 00:08:28.689 align:start position:0% auction we mentioned earlier here's a 00:08:28.689 --> 00:08:30.719 align:start position:0% auction we mentioned earlier here's a very<00:08:28.899> simple<00:08:28.959> anti<00:08:29.469> mechanism<00:08:29.949> M<00:08:30.099> Prime 00:08:30.719 --> 00:08:30.729 align:start position:0% very simple anti mechanism M Prime 00:08:30.729 --> 00:08:32.969 align:start position:0% very simple anti mechanism M Prime all<00:08:31.389> M<00:08:31.719> prime<00:08:31.959> does<00:08:32.169> is<00:08:32.349> it<00:08:32.469> collects<00:08:32.740> bids 00:08:32.969 --> 00:08:32.979 align:start position:0% all M prime does is it collects bids 00:08:32.979 --> 00:08:34.799 align:start position:0% all M prime does is it collects bids from<00:08:33.189> its<00:08:33.309> users<00:08:33.490> and<00:08:33.879> it<00:08:34.059> forwards<00:08:34.389> only<00:08:34.569> the 00:08:34.799 --> 00:08:34.809 align:start position:0% from its users and it forwards only the 00:08:34.809 --> 00:08:37.980 align:start position:0% from its users and it forwards only the top<00:08:34.990> bid<00:08:35.289> to<00:08:35.529> the<00:08:35.620> original<00:08:35.949> mechanism<00:08:36.219> M<00:08:36.990> so 00:08:37.980 --> 00:08:37.990 align:start position:0% top bid to the original mechanism M so 00:08:37.990 --> 00:08:40.139 align:start position:0% top bid to the original mechanism M so why<00:08:38.199> is<00:08:38.259> is<00:08:38.829> playing<00:08:39.159> through<00:08:39.339> M<00:08:39.519> prime<00:08:39.759> always 00:08:40.139 --> 00:08:40.149 align:start position:0% why is is playing through M prime always 00:08:40.149 --> 00:08:42.329 align:start position:0% why is is playing through M prime always better<00:08:40.360> than<00:08:40.539> playing<00:08:40.749> through<00:08:40.990> M<00:08:41.129> well<00:08:42.129> if 00:08:42.329 --> 00:08:42.339 align:start position:0% better than playing through M well if 00:08:42.339 --> 00:08:43.999 align:start position:0% better than playing through M well if the<00:08:42.459> highest<00:08:42.639> bidder<00:08:42.939> plays<00:08:43.209> through<00:08:43.419> M 00:08:43.999 --> 00:08:44.009 align:start position:0% the highest bidder plays through M 00:08:44.009 --> 00:08:46.290 align:start position:0% the highest bidder plays through M doesn't<00:08:45.009> matter<00:08:45.160> the<00:08:45.490> outcome<00:08:45.639> is<00:08:45.939> the<00:08:46.059> exact 00:08:46.290 --> 00:08:46.300 align:start position:0% doesn't matter the outcome is the exact 00:08:46.300 --> 00:08:48.119 align:start position:0% doesn't matter the outcome is the exact same<00:08:46.480> as<00:08:46.629> before<00:08:46.809> so<00:08:46.959> no<00:08:47.290> one's<00:08:47.470> worse<00:08:47.620> off<00:08:47.829> on 00:08:48.119 --> 00:08:48.129 align:start position:0% same as before so no one's worse off on 00:08:48.129 --> 00:08:49.799 align:start position:0% same as before so no one's worse off on the<00:08:48.759> other<00:08:48.879> hand<00:08:49.149> if<00:08:49.269> the<00:08:49.389> highest<00:08:49.660> bidder 00:08:49.799 --> 00:08:49.809 align:start position:0% the other hand if the highest bidder 00:08:49.809 --> 00:08:52.139 align:start position:0% the other hand if the highest bidder happens<00:08:50.170> to<00:08:50.259> play<00:08:50.410> through<00:08:50.559> M<00:08:50.679> prime<00:08:51.149> then 00:08:52.139 --> 00:08:52.149 align:start position:0% happens to play through M prime then 00:08:52.149 --> 00:08:53.819 align:start position:0% happens to play through M prime then either<00:08:52.540> the<00:08:52.750> second<00:08:53.110> bidder<00:08:53.259> plays<00:08:53.529> to<00:08:53.709> R<00:08:53.740> M 00:08:53.819 --> 00:08:53.829 align:start position:0% either the second bidder plays to R M 00:08:53.829 --> 00:08:54.590 align:start position:0% either the second bidder plays to R M Prime 00:08:54.590 --> 00:08:54.600 align:start position:0% Prime 00:08:54.600 --> 00:08:56.180 align:start position:0% Prime which<00:08:54.690> case<00:08:54.930> their<00:08:55.170> bid<00:08:55.350> is<00:08:55.440> never<00:08:55.649> forwarded 00:08:56.180 --> 00:08:56.190 align:start position:0% which case their bid is never forwarded 00:08:56.190 --> 00:08:57.710 align:start position:0% which case their bid is never forwarded and<00:08:56.339> the<00:08:56.610> highest<00:08:56.910> bidder<00:08:56.970> ends<00:08:57.420> up<00:08:57.509> paying 00:08:57.710 --> 00:08:57.720 align:start position:0% and the highest bidder ends up paying 00:08:57.720 --> 00:09:01.009 align:start position:0% and the highest bidder ends up paying less<00:08:57.920> or<00:08:58.920> the<00:08:59.610> second<00:08:59.940> bidder<00:09:00.509> plays<00:09:00.779> through 00:09:01.009 --> 00:09:01.019 align:start position:0% less or the second bidder plays through 00:09:01.019 --> 00:09:02.600 align:start position:0% less or the second bidder plays through em<00:09:01.170> and<00:09:01.440> you<00:09:01.649> get<00:09:01.800> sort<00:09:02.009> of<00:09:02.040> the<00:09:02.130> same<00:09:02.160> outcome 00:09:02.600 --> 00:09:02.610 align:start position:0% em and you get sort of the same outcome 00:09:02.610 --> 00:09:05.090 align:start position:0% em and you get sort of the same outcome again<00:09:02.839> so<00:09:03.839> what<00:09:03.959> we<00:09:04.050> say<00:09:04.259> is<00:09:04.290> that<00:09:04.440> M<00:09:04.769> Prime 00:09:05.090 --> 00:09:05.100 align:start position:0% again so what we say is that M Prime 00:09:05.100 --> 00:09:07.249 align:start position:0% again so what we say is that M Prime composed<00:09:05.610> with<00:09:05.790> M<00:09:06.000> or<00:09:06.269> playing<00:09:06.600> M<00:09:06.839> through<00:09:07.110> m 00:09:07.249 --> 00:09:07.259 align:start position:0% composed with M or playing M through m 00:09:07.259 --> 00:09:09.710 align:start position:0% composed with M or playing M through m Prime<00:09:07.500> in<00:09:07.709> this<00:09:07.829> case<00:09:08.009> dominates<00:09:08.970> in<00:09:09.569> this 00:09:09.710 --> 00:09:09.720 align:start position:0% Prime in this case dominates in this 00:09:09.720 --> 00:09:12.230 align:start position:0% Prime in this case dominates in this case<00:09:09.899> weakly<00:09:10.199> dominates<00:09:10.620> playing<00:09:11.459> M<00:09:11.670> directly 00:09:12.230 --> 00:09:12.240 align:start position:0% case weakly dominates playing M directly 00:09:12.240 --> 00:09:14.030 align:start position:0% case weakly dominates playing M directly it's<00:09:12.449> always<00:09:12.839> better<00:09:13.079> for<00:09:13.199> players<00:09:13.589> to<00:09:13.709> play 00:09:14.030 --> 00:09:14.040 align:start position:0% it's always better for players to play 00:09:14.040 --> 00:09:16.370 align:start position:0% it's always better for players to play through<00:09:14.220> M<00:09:14.310> Prime<00:09:14.579> and<00:09:14.880> it<00:09:15.569> disrupts<00:09:16.110> what<00:09:16.290> we 00:09:16.370 --> 00:09:16.380 align:start position:0% through M Prime and it disrupts what we 00:09:16.380 --> 00:09:17.780 align:start position:0% through M Prime and it disrupts what we talked<00:09:16.829> about<00:09:16.920> earlier<00:09:17.069> which<00:09:17.579> is<00:09:17.610> the 00:09:17.780 --> 00:09:17.790 align:start position:0% talked about earlier which is the 00:09:17.790 --> 00:09:20.090 align:start position:0% talked about earlier which is the dominant<00:09:18.209> strategy<00:09:18.329> truthful<00:09:19.079> nature<00:09:19.410> of<00:09:19.649> BCG 00:09:20.090 --> 00:09:20.100 align:start position:0% dominant strategy truthful nature of BCG 00:09:20.100 --> 00:09:22.189 align:start position:0% dominant strategy truthful nature of BCG auctions<00:09:21.060> because<00:09:21.420> the<00:09:21.540> auction<00:09:21.930> is<00:09:22.050> no 00:09:22.189 --> 00:09:22.199 align:start position:0% auctions because the auction is no 00:09:22.199 --> 00:09:24.230 align:start position:0% auctions because the auction is no longer<00:09:22.560> receiving<00:09:22.949> the<00:09:23.490> true<00:09:23.699> valuations 00:09:24.230 --> 00:09:24.240 align:start position:0% longer receiving the true valuations 00:09:24.240 --> 00:09:27.350 align:start position:0% longer receiving the true valuations from<00:09:24.420> the<00:09:24.509> buyers<00:09:25.009> so<00:09:26.009> in<00:09:26.310> this<00:09:26.430> case<00:09:26.699> VCG<00:09:27.240> in 00:09:27.350 --> 00:09:27.360 align:start position:0% from the buyers so in this case VCG in 00:09:27.360 --> 00:09:28.370 align:start position:0% from the buyers so in this case VCG in terms<00:09:27.600> of<00:09:27.750> a<00:09:27.899> dominant<00:09:28.230> strategy 00:09:28.370 --> 00:09:28.380 align:start position:0% terms of a dominant strategy 00:09:28.380 --> 00:09:31.220 align:start position:0% terms of a dominant strategy truthfulness<00:09:29.009> has<00:09:29.579> zero<00:09:30.180> security<00:09:30.630> against 00:09:31.220 --> 00:09:31.230 align:start position:0% truthfulness has zero security against 00:09:31.230 --> 00:09:34.999 align:start position:0% truthfulness has zero security against bribery<00:09:32.569> and<00:09:33.569> bribery<00:09:33.810> is<00:09:34.110> a<00:09:34.139> huge<00:09:34.500> deal<00:09:34.709> in 00:09:34.999 --> 00:09:35.009 align:start position:0% bribery and bribery is a huge deal in 00:09:35.009 --> 00:09:36.530 align:start position:0% bribery and bribery is a huge deal in all<00:09:35.190> these<00:09:35.339> systems<00:09:35.550> we're<00:09:35.819> building<00:09:36.120> a<00:09:36.269> huge 00:09:36.530 --> 00:09:36.540 align:start position:0% all these systems we're building a huge 00:09:36.540 --> 00:09:38.480 align:start position:0% all these systems we're building a huge deal<00:09:36.750> in<00:09:36.930> smart<00:09:37.170> contracts<00:09:37.589> so<00:09:38.250> if<00:09:38.370> you're 00:09:38.480 --> 00:09:38.490 align:start position:0% deal in smart contracts so if you're 00:09:38.490 --> 00:09:40.280 align:start position:0% deal in smart contracts so if you're building<00:09:38.610> an<00:09:38.790> Oracle<00:09:39.240> you<00:09:39.630> can<00:09:39.810> bribe<00:09:40.019> people 00:09:40.280 --> 00:09:40.290 align:start position:0% building an Oracle you can bribe people 00:09:40.290 --> 00:09:42.139 align:start position:0% building an Oracle you can bribe people to<00:09:40.560> provide<00:09:40.920> certain<00:09:41.220> responses<00:09:41.790> you<00:09:42.000> can 00:09:42.139 --> 00:09:42.149 align:start position:0% to provide certain responses you can 00:09:42.149 --> 00:09:44.269 align:start position:0% to provide certain responses you can bribe<00:09:42.329> them<00:09:42.540> to<00:09:42.660> go<00:09:42.779> offline<00:09:43.019> you<00:09:43.889> can<00:09:43.920> bribe 00:09:44.269 --> 00:09:44.279 align:start position:0% bribe them to go offline you can bribe 00:09:44.279 --> 00:09:46.069 align:start position:0% bribe them to go offline you can bribe them<00:09:44.519> to<00:09:44.730> choose<00:09:44.970> which<00:09:45.300> point<00:09:45.630> in<00:09:45.810> a 00:09:46.069 --> 00:09:46.079 align:start position:0% them to choose which point in a 00:09:46.079 --> 00:09:47.629 align:start position:0% them to choose which point in a continuous<00:09:46.560> time<00:09:46.800> series<00:09:47.130> of<00:09:47.160> data<00:09:47.399> they 00:09:47.629 --> 00:09:47.639 align:start position:0% continuous time series of data they 00:09:47.639 --> 00:09:49.610 align:start position:0% continuous time series of data they sample<00:09:48.060> and<00:09:48.240> send<00:09:48.449> into<00:09:48.660> the<00:09:48.690> blockchain<00:09:48.930> if 00:09:49.610 --> 00:09:49.620 align:start position:0% sample and send into the blockchain if 00:09:49.620 --> 00:09:51.199 align:start position:0% sample and send into the blockchain if you're<00:09:50.190> running<00:09:50.339> a<00:09:50.490> voter<00:09:50.699> a<00:09:50.819> governance 00:09:51.199 --> 00:09:51.209 align:start position:0% you're running a voter a governance 00:09:51.209 --> 00:09:53.720 align:start position:0% you're running a voter a governance system<00:09:51.569> you<00:09:51.750> can<00:09:51.899> buy<00:09:52.290> people's<00:09:52.680> votes<00:09:52.920> you 00:09:53.720 --> 00:09:53.730 align:start position:0% system you can buy people's votes you 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an<00:10:00.180> ting<00:10:00.329> mechanisms<00:10:00.779> that<00:10:01.110> lease 00:10:01.400 --> 00:10:01.410 align:start position:0% build an ting mechanisms that lease 00:10:01.410 --> 00:10:03.350 align:start position:0% build an ting mechanisms that lease people's<00:10:01.829> identities<00:10:02.370> or<00:10:02.610> partition<00:10:03.240> out 00:10:03.350 --> 00:10:03.360 align:start position:0% people's identities or partition out 00:10:03.360 --> 00:10:04.970 align:start position:0% people's identities or partition out certain<00:10:03.660> capabilities<00:10:04.290> of<00:10:04.439> the<00:10:04.529> identities 00:10:04.970 --> 00:10:04.980 align:start position:0% certain capabilities of the identities 00:10:04.980 --> 00:10:08.240 align:start position:0% certain capabilities of the identities as<00:10:05.939> separate<00:10:06.509> from<00:10:06.689> others<00:10:06.930> and<00:10:07.230> for<00:10:08.100> all 00:10:08.240 --> 00:10:08.250 align:start position:0% as separate from others and for all 00:10:08.250 --> 00:10:09.920 align:start position:0% as separate from others and for all mechanisms<00:10:08.819> you<00:10:08.939> can<00:10:09.000> bribe<00:10:09.300> players<00:10:09.600> to<00:10:09.810> take 00:10:09.920 --> 00:10:09.930 align:start position:0% mechanisms you can bribe players to take 00:10:09.930 --> 00:10:11.629 align:start position:0% mechanisms you can bribe players to take certain<00:10:10.230> strategies<00:10:10.649> and<00:10:10.889> even<00:10:11.069> to<00:10:11.430> collude 00:10:11.629 --> 00:10:11.639 align:start position:0% certain strategies and even to collude 00:10:11.639 --> 00:10:14.720 align:start position:0% certain strategies and even to collude with<00:10:11.819> each<00:10:11.910> other<00:10:12.089> or<00:10:12.269> not<00:10:12.300> participate<00:10:13.730> so 00:10:14.720 --> 00:10:14.730 align:start position:0% with each other or not participate so 00:10:14.730 --> 00:10:17.749 align:start position:0% with each other or not participate so the<00:10:15.149> conclusion<00:10:15.600> is<00:10:15.689> basically<00:10:16.050> this<00:10:16.759> at 00:10:17.749 --> 00:10:17.759 align:start position:0% the conclusion is basically this at 00:10:17.759 --> 00:10:20.629 align:start position:0% the conclusion is basically this at least<00:10:17.939> for<00:10:18.149> now<00:10:19.100> so<00:10:20.100> what<00:10:20.220> are<00:10:20.279> we<00:10:20.339> gonna<00:10:20.459> do 00:10:20.629 --> 00:10:20.639 align:start position:0% least for now so what are we gonna do 00:10:20.639 --> 00:10:22.550 align:start position:0% least for now so what are we gonna do about<00:10:20.670> it<00:10:21.029> well<00:10:21.540> first<00:10:21.839> let's<00:10:22.079> talk<00:10:22.199> about<00:10:22.259> the 00:10:22.550 --> 00:10:22.560 align:start position:0% about it well first let's talk about the 00:10:22.560 --> 00:10:24.410 align:start position:0% about it well first let's talk about the core<00:10:22.740> problem<00:10:23.130> here<00:10:23.370> which<00:10:23.910> is<00:10:24.089> that<00:10:24.209> this 00:10:24.410 --> 00:10:24.420 align:start position:0% core problem here which is that this 00:10:24.420 --> 00:10:26.449 align:start position:0% core problem here which is that this Dark<00:10:24.720> Tower<00:10:24.959> these<00:10:25.410> private<00:10:25.800> smart<00:10:26.009> contracts 00:10:26.449 --> 00:10:26.459 align:start position:0% Dark Tower these private smart contracts 00:10:26.459 --> 00:10:28.519 align:start position:0% Dark Tower these private smart contracts that<00:10:26.610> we're<00:10:26.759> talking<00:10:27.060> about<00:10:27.149> remove<00:10:28.019> a<00:10:28.199> user's 00:10:28.519 --> 00:10:28.529 align:start position:0% that we're talking about remove a user's 00:10:28.529 --> 00:10:30.889 align:start position:0% that we're talking about remove a user's free<00:10:28.860> will<00:10:29.040> in<00:10:29.250> the<00:10:29.279> system<00:10:29.670> they<00:10:30.389> do<00:10:30.449> that<00:10:30.720> by 00:10:30.889 --> 00:10:30.899 align:start position:0% free will in the system they do that by 00:10:30.899 --> 00:10:32.660 align:start position:0% free will in the system they do that by restraining<00:10:31.410> the<00:10:31.680> actions<00:10:32.009> a<00:10:32.100> user<00:10:32.279> can<00:10:32.490> take 00:10:32.660 --> 00:10:32.670 align:start position:0% restraining the actions a user can take 00:10:32.670 --> 00:10:34.100 align:start position:0% restraining the actions a user can take in<00:10:32.880> this<00:10:32.939> cryptographic<00:10:33.269> system<00:10:33.870> and 00:10:34.100 --> 00:10:34.110 align:start position:0% in this cryptographic system and 00:10:34.110 --> 00:10:36.050 align:start position:0% in this cryptographic system and basically<00:10:34.589> shackling<00:10:35.279> them<00:10:35.459> to<00:10:35.670> a<00:10:35.699> certain 00:10:36.050 --> 00:10:36.060 align:start position:0% basically shackling them to a certain 00:10:36.060 --> 00:10:38.240 align:start position:0% basically shackling them to a certain set<00:10:36.209> of<00:10:36.240> strategies<00:10:36.569> or<00:10:37.470> shackling<00:10:37.920> them<00:10:38.069> to<00:10:38.220> a 00:10:38.240 --> 00:10:38.250 align:start position:0% set of strategies or shackling them to a 00:10:38.250 --> 00:10:41.420 align:start position:0% set of strategies or shackling them to a certain<00:10:38.459> collusive<00:10:38.939> set<00:10:39.620> and<00:10:40.620> we<00:10:41.100> want<00:10:41.279> to<00:10:41.370> get 00:10:41.420 --> 00:10:41.430 align:start position:0% certain collusive set and we want to get 00:10:41.430 --> 00:10:42.920 align:start position:0% certain collusive set and we want to get back<00:10:41.610> to<00:10:41.790> sort<00:10:41.970> of<00:10:42.000> a<00:10:42.089> state<00:10:42.300> where<00:10:42.449> users<00:10:42.720> have 00:10:42.920 --> 00:10:42.930 align:start position:0% back to sort of a state where users have 00:10:42.930 --> 00:10:44.389 align:start position:0% back to sort of a state where users have free<00:10:43.199> will<00:10:43.319> where<00:10:43.589> we<00:10:43.740> know<00:10:43.949> that<00:10:44.160> if<00:10:44.250> they're 00:10:44.389 --> 00:10:44.399 align:start position:0% free will where we know that if they're 00:10:44.399 --> 00:10:46.040 align:start position:0% free will where we know that if they're signing<00:10:44.610> a<00:10:44.759> message<00:10:45.120> they<00:10:45.630> could<00:10:45.810> have<00:10:45.899> signed 00:10:46.040 --> 00:10:46.050 align:start position:0% signing a message they could have signed 00:10:46.050 --> 00:10:47.600 align:start position:0% signing a message they could have signed any<00:10:46.350> other<00:10:46.529> message<00:10:46.860> in<00:10:46.949> the<00:10:47.040> system<00:10:47.339> as<00:10:47.459> well 00:10:47.600 --> 00:10:47.610 align:start position:0% any other message in the system as well 00:10:47.610 --> 00:10:49.460 align:start position:0% any other message in the system as well and<00:10:47.910> they're<00:10:48.060> not<00:10:48.089> artificially<00:10:48.839> shackled<00:10:49.319> by 00:10:49.460 --> 00:10:49.470 align:start position:0% and they're not artificially shackled by 00:10:49.470 --> 00:10:51.439 align:start position:0% and they're not artificially shackled by some<00:10:49.769> other<00:10:49.949> piece<00:10:50.189> of<00:10:50.310> technology<00:10:50.819> or<00:10:51.000> some 00:10:51.439 --> 00:10:51.449 align:start position:0% some other piece of technology or some 00:10:51.449 --> 00:10:54.650 align:start position:0% some other piece of technology or some anti<00:10:51.750> mechanism<00:10:52.610> so<00:10:53.610> here<00:10:54.029> we<00:10:54.120> define<00:10:54.269> free 00:10:54.650 --> 00:10:54.660 align:start position:0% anti mechanism so here we define free 00:10:54.660 --> 00:10:56.269 align:start position:0% anti mechanism so here we define free will<00:10:54.810> as<00:10:54.990> the<00:10:55.110> ability<00:10:55.290> for<00:10:55.500> a<00:10:55.680> user<00:10:55.889> to<00:10:55.980> use 00:10:56.269 --> 00:10:56.279 align:start position:0% will as the ability for a user to use 00:10:56.279 --> 00:10:57.860 align:start position:0% will as the ability for a user to use their<00:10:56.519> information<00:10:56.880> in<00:10:57.209> this<00:10:57.389> case<00:10:57.449> their 00:10:57.860 --> 00:10:57.870 align:start position:0% their information in this case their 00:10:57.870 --> 00:11:00.019 align:start position:0% their information in this case their keys<00:10:58.079> in<00:10:58.110> aetherium<00:10:58.589> without<00:10:59.399> any<00:10:59.610> external 00:11:00.019 --> 00:11:00.029 align:start position:0% keys in aetherium without any external 00:11:00.029 --> 00:11:02.300 align:start position:0% keys in aetherium without any external restrictions<00:11:00.720> and<00:11:01.649> in<00:11:01.800> this<00:11:01.920> case<00:11:02.100> we're 00:11:02.300 --> 00:11:02.310 align:start position:0% restrictions and in this case we're 00:11:02.310 --> 00:11:03.650 align:start position:0% restrictions and in this case we're specifically<00:11:02.699> talking<00:11:02.790> about<00:11:03.149> remote 00:11:03.650 --> 00:11:03.660 align:start position:0% specifically talking about remote 00:11:03.660 --> 00:11:05.870 align:start position:0% specifically talking about remote parties<00:11:04.100> people<00:11:05.100> who<00:11:05.189> are<00:11:05.309> trying<00:11:05.550> to<00:11:05.670> bribe 00:11:05.870 --> 00:11:05.880 align:start position:0% parties people who are trying to bribe 00:11:05.880 --> 00:11:07.879 align:start position:0% parties people who are trying to bribe or<00:11:06.209> otherwise<00:11:06.540> influence<00:11:06.930> users<00:11:07.470> over<00:11:07.860> a 00:11:07.879 --> 00:11:07.889 align:start position:0% or otherwise influence users over a 00:11:07.889 --> 00:11:08.850 align:start position:0% or otherwise influence users over a network 00:11:08.850 --> 00:11:08.860 align:start position:0% network 00:11:08.860 --> 00:11:10.079 align:start position:0% network because<00:11:09.160> that's<00:11:09.399> most<00:11:09.639> of<00:11:09.759> what<00:11:09.850> we're<00:11:09.970> trying 00:11:10.079 --> 00:11:10.089 align:start position:0% because that's most of what we're trying 00:11:10.089 --> 00:11:13.350 align:start position:0% because that's most of what we're trying to<00:11:10.329> secure<00:11:10.600> against<00:11:11.490> so<00:11:12.490> this<00:11:13.000> problem 00:11:13.350 --> 00:11:13.360 align:start position:0% to secure against so this problem 00:11:13.360 --> 00:11:14.850 align:start position:0% to secure against so this problem actually<00:11:13.600> goes<00:11:13.720> beyond<00:11:14.050> crypto<00:11:14.410> currencies 00:11:14.850 --> 00:11:14.860 align:start position:0% actually goes beyond crypto currencies 00:11:14.860 --> 00:11:16.290 align:start position:0% actually goes beyond crypto currencies this<00:11:14.980> is<00:11:15.129> not<00:11:15.279> only<00:11:15.490> a<00:11:15.610> crypto<00:11:15.910> currency 00:11:16.290 --> 00:11:16.300 align:start position:0% this is not only a crypto currency 00:11:16.300 --> 00:11:18.689 align:start position:0% this is not only a crypto currency problem<00:11:16.690> these<00:11:17.560> two<00:11:17.769> papers<00:11:17.980> have<00:11:18.370> pointed 00:11:18.689 --> 00:11:18.699 align:start position:0% problem these two papers have pointed 00:11:18.699 --> 00:11:20.879 align:start position:0% problem these two papers have pointed out<00:11:18.759> similar<00:11:19.149> problems<00:11:19.629> in<00:11:19.889> traditional 00:11:20.879 --> 00:11:20.889 align:start position:0% out similar problems in traditional 00:11:20.889 --> 00:11:23.220 align:start position:0% out similar problems in traditional cryptographic<00:11:21.190> systems<00:11:21.819> so<00:11:22.810> one<00:11:22.959> thing<00:11:23.139> you 00:11:23.220 --> 00:11:23.230 align:start position:0% cryptographic systems so one thing you 00:11:23.230 --> 00:11:25.170 align:start position:0% cryptographic systems so one thing you can<00:11:23.379> do<00:11:23.470> is<00:11:23.620> you<00:11:23.709> can<00:11:23.860> use<00:11:23.949> s<00:11:24.129> jacks<00:11:24.430> or<00:11:24.579> MPC<00:11:24.939> to 00:11:25.170 --> 00:11:25.180 align:start position:0% can do is you can use s jacks or MPC to 00:11:25.180 --> 00:11:26.939 align:start position:0% can do is you can use s jacks or MPC to take<00:11:25.360> a<00:11:25.389> deniable<00:11:25.779> communication<00:11:26.529> protocol 00:11:26.939 --> 00:11:26.949 align:start position:0% take a deniable communication protocol 00:11:26.949 --> 00:11:28.980 align:start position:0% take a deniable communication protocol where<00:11:27.759> the<00:11:27.939> property<00:11:28.360> is<00:11:28.449> that<00:11:28.629> I<00:11:28.660> can't 00:11:28.980 --> 00:11:28.990 align:start position:0% where the property is that I can't 00:11:28.990 --> 00:11:31.040 align:start position:0% where the property is that I can't generate<00:11:29.410> a<00:11:29.439> transcript<00:11:30.069> of<00:11:30.189> the<00:11:30.279> protocol 00:11:31.040 --> 00:11:31.050 align:start position:0% generate a transcript of the protocol 00:11:31.050 --> 00:11:33.420 align:start position:0% generate a transcript of the protocol and<00:11:32.050> you<00:11:32.620> can<00:11:32.769> actually<00:11:32.889> generate<00:11:33.189> a 00:11:33.420 --> 00:11:33.430 align:start position:0% and you can actually generate a 00:11:33.430 --> 00:11:35.699 align:start position:0% and you can actually generate a transcript<00:11:34.000> that's<00:11:34.209> provable<00:11:34.779> right<00:11:35.230> so<00:11:35.680> I 00:11:35.699 --> 00:11:35.709 align:start position:0% transcript that's provable right so I 00:11:35.709 --> 00:11:37.679 align:start position:0% transcript that's provable right so I lose<00:11:36.040> all<00:11:36.250> my<00:11:36.279> deniability<00:11:36.819> I<00:11:37.000> can't<00:11:37.329> tell<00:11:37.509> you 00:11:37.679 --> 00:11:37.689 align:start position:0% lose all my deniability I can't tell you 00:11:37.689 --> 00:11:39.809 align:start position:0% lose all my deniability I can't tell you that<00:11:38.230> no<00:11:38.470> I<00:11:38.500> didn't<00:11:38.860> say<00:11:39.009> this<00:11:39.189> because<00:11:39.639> now 00:11:39.809 --> 00:11:39.819 align:start position:0% that no I didn't say this because now 00:11:39.819 --> 00:11:42.660 align:start position:0% that no I didn't say this because now the<00:11:39.879> MPC<00:11:40.720> or<00:11:40.750> SGX<00:11:41.199> process<00:11:41.680> is<00:11:41.860> gonna<00:11:42.370> stamp 00:11:42.660 --> 00:11:42.670 align:start position:0% the MPC or SGX process is gonna stamp 00:11:42.670 --> 00:11:44.369 align:start position:0% the MPC or SGX process is gonna stamp for<00:11:42.910> me<00:11:42.970> that<00:11:43.149> yes<00:11:43.360> I<00:11:43.569> actually<00:11:43.720> did<00:11:44.019> say<00:11:44.199> this 00:11:44.369 --> 00:11:44.379 align:start position:0% for me that yes I actually did say this 00:11:44.379 --> 00:11:46.499 align:start position:0% for me that yes I actually did say this or<00:11:44.980> you<00:11:45.009> can<00:11:45.819> use<00:11:45.939> it<00:11:45.970> to<00:11:46.120> do<00:11:46.209> things<00:11:46.449> like 00:11:46.499 --> 00:11:46.509 align:start position:0% or you can use it to do things like 00:11:46.509 --> 00:11:47.910 align:start position:0% or you can use it to do things like bribe<00:11:46.839> people<00:11:47.050> to<00:11:47.290> act<00:11:47.439> a<00:11:47.560> certain<00:11:47.589> way<00:11:47.889> on 00:11:47.910 --> 00:11:47.920 align:start position:0% bribe people to act a certain way on 00:11:47.920 --> 00:11:50.790 align:start position:0% bribe people to act a certain way on Facebook<00:11:48.490> or<00:11:48.670> buy<00:11:48.819> their<00:11:49.000> votes<00:11:49.209> in<00:11:49.870> like<00:11:50.560> sort 00:11:50.790 --> 00:11:50.800 align:start position:0% Facebook or buy their votes in like sort 00:11:50.800 --> 00:11:52.949 align:start position:0% Facebook or buy their votes in like sort of<00:11:51.000> traditional<00:11:52.000> and<00:11:52.120> voting<00:11:52.389> systems<00:11:52.750> and 00:11:52.949 --> 00:11:52.959 align:start position:0% of traditional and voting systems and 00:11:52.959 --> 00:11:54.269 align:start position:0% of traditional and voting systems and things<00:11:53.110> like<00:11:53.230> that<00:11:53.439> which<00:11:53.740> is<00:11:53.769> what<00:11:54.129> that 00:11:54.269 --> 00:11:54.279 align:start position:0% things like that which is what that 00:11:54.279 --> 00:11:57.240 align:start position:0% things like that which is what that paper<00:11:54.459> on<00:11:54.670> the<00:11:54.759> Left<00:11:54.939> deals<00:11:55.180> with<00:11:56.069> so<00:11:57.069> how<00:11:57.189> do 00:11:57.240 --> 00:11:57.250 align:start position:0% paper on the Left deals with so how do 00:11:57.250 --> 00:11:59.280 align:start position:0% paper on the Left deals with so how do we<00:11:57.310> get<00:11:57.459> back<00:11:57.639> to<00:11:57.819> free<00:11:58.000> will<00:11:58.180> well<00:11:58.930> our<00:11:59.079> core 00:11:59.280 --> 00:11:59.290 align:start position:0% we get back to free will well our core 00:11:59.290 --> 00:12:00.990 align:start position:0% we get back to free will well our core task<00:11:59.529> is<00:11:59.829> ensuring<00:12:00.279> that<00:12:00.310> a<00:12:00.459> user<00:12:00.699> has 00:12:00.990 --> 00:12:01.000 align:start position:0% task is ensuring that a user has 00:12:01.000 --> 00:12:03.150 align:start position:0% task is ensuring that a user has unlimited<00:12:01.360> knowledge<00:12:01.930> or<00:12:02.139> access<00:12:02.709> to<00:12:03.009> their 00:12:03.150 --> 00:12:03.160 align:start position:0% unlimited knowledge or access to their 00:12:03.160 --> 00:12:04.590 align:start position:0% unlimited knowledge or access to their private<00:12:03.490> information<00:12:03.610> such<00:12:04.149> as<00:12:04.180> their<00:12:04.360> keys 00:12:04.590 --> 00:12:04.600 align:start position:0% private information such as their keys 00:12:04.600 --> 00:12:07.410 align:start position:0% private information such as their keys and<00:12:04.959> that<00:12:05.589> those<00:12:06.100> private<00:12:06.579> information<00:12:07.149> or 00:12:07.410 --> 00:12:07.420 align:start position:0% and that those private information or 00:12:07.420 --> 00:12:09.360 align:start position:0% and that those private information or that<00:12:08.019> private<00:12:08.290> information<00:12:08.410> can't<00:12:09.040> be<00:12:09.160> stored 00:12:09.360 --> 00:12:09.370 align:start position:0% that private information can't be stored 00:12:09.370 --> 00:12:11.340 align:start position:0% that private information can't be stored in<00:12:09.639> a<00:12:09.790> secured<00:12:10.389> environment<00:12:10.540> that's<00:12:11.110> somehow 00:12:11.340 --> 00:12:11.350 align:start position:0% in a secured environment that's somehow 00:12:11.350 --> 00:12:14.249 align:start position:0% in a secured environment that's somehow shackling<00:12:11.980> the<00:12:12.129> user<00:12:12.630> and<00:12:13.630> our<00:12:13.720> second<00:12:14.050> task 00:12:14.249 --> 00:12:14.259 align:start position:0% shackling the user and our second task 00:12:14.259 --> 00:12:15.509 align:start position:0% shackling the user and our second task is<00:12:14.500> that<00:12:14.529> we<00:12:14.769> want<00:12:14.980> to<00:12:15.009> use<00:12:15.130> this<00:12:15.220> to<00:12:15.370> make<00:12:15.399> a 00:12:15.509 --> 00:12:15.519 align:start position:0% is that we want to use this to make a 00:12:15.519 --> 00:12:17.009 align:start position:0% is that we want to use this to make a signature<00:12:15.910> scheme<00:12:16.149> that's<00:12:16.360> usable<00:12:16.660> in<00:12:16.839> things 00:12:17.009 --> 00:12:17.019 align:start position:0% signature scheme that's usable in things 00:12:17.019 --> 00:12:18.480 align:start position:0% signature scheme that's usable in things like<00:12:17.079> smart<00:12:17.410> contracts<00:12:17.829> so<00:12:18.069> we<00:12:18.160> know<00:12:18.310> that 00:12:18.480 --> 00:12:18.490 align:start position:0% like smart contracts so we know that 00:12:18.490 --> 00:12:20.309 align:start position:0% like smart contracts so we know that when<00:12:18.579> a<00:12:18.610> user<00:12:18.759> signs<00:12:19.180> the<00:12:19.360> message<00:12:19.689> they 00:12:20.309 --> 00:12:20.319 align:start position:0% when a user signs the message they 00:12:20.319 --> 00:12:24.870 align:start position:0% when a user signs the message they actually<00:12:20.740> control<00:12:21.009> their<00:12:21.189> key<00:12:22.709> so<00:12:23.709> we<00:12:24.399> more 00:12:24.870 --> 00:12:24.880 align:start position:0% actually control their key so we more 00:12:24.880 --> 00:12:26.220 align:start position:0% actually control their key so we more generally<00:12:25.300> defined<00:12:25.600> free<00:12:25.810> will<00:12:25.959> as<00:12:26.079> the 00:12:26.220 --> 00:12:26.230 align:start position:0% generally defined free will as the 00:12:26.230 --> 00:12:27.569 align:start position:0% generally defined free will as the ability<00:12:26.560> of<00:12:26.649> a<00:12:26.709> user<00:12:26.889> to<00:12:27.130> learn<00:12:27.250> their<00:12:27.459> own 00:12:27.569 --> 00:12:27.579 align:start position:0% ability of a user to learn their own 00:12:27.579 --> 00:12:29.999 align:start position:0% ability of a user to learn their own secrets<00:12:28.029> and<00:12:28.300> we<00:12:28.959> achieve<00:12:29.259> free<00:12:29.560> will<00:12:29.709> by 00:12:29.999 --> 00:12:30.009 align:start position:0% secrets and we achieve free will by 00:12:30.009 --> 00:12:32.819 align:start position:0% secrets and we achieve free will by requiring<00:12:30.430> that<00:12:31.000> whenever<00:12:31.630> a<00:12:31.689> user<00:12:31.899> sends<00:12:32.560> a 00:12:32.819 --> 00:12:32.829 align:start position:0% requiring that whenever a user sends a 00:12:32.829 --> 00:12:35.189 align:start position:0% requiring that whenever a user sends a message<00:12:33.459> that<00:12:33.490> involves<00:12:34.269> secret<00:12:34.630> data<00:12:34.779> for 00:12:35.189 --> 00:12:35.199 align:start position:0% message that involves secret data for 00:12:35.199 --> 00:12:36.769 align:start position:0% message that involves secret data for example<00:12:35.290> a<00:12:35.680> private<00:12:36.069> key 00:12:36.769 --> 00:12:36.779 align:start position:0% example a private key 00:12:36.779 --> 00:12:39.090 align:start position:0% example a private key someone<00:12:37.779> can<00:12:38.110> eavesdrop<00:12:38.319> on<00:12:38.740> that<00:12:38.920> message 00:12:39.090 --> 00:12:39.100 align:start position:0% someone can eavesdrop on that message 00:12:39.100 --> 00:12:41.730 align:start position:0% someone can eavesdrop on that message and<00:12:39.630> because<00:12:40.630> the<00:12:40.750> user<00:12:40.930> won't<00:12:41.290> let<00:12:41.470> anyone 00:12:41.730 --> 00:12:41.740 align:start position:0% and because the user won't let anyone 00:12:41.740 --> 00:12:43.319 align:start position:0% and because the user won't let anyone else<00:12:41.860> eavesdrop<00:12:42.490> on<00:12:42.610> their<00:12:42.759> message<00:12:43.060> that 00:12:43.319 --> 00:12:43.329 align:start position:0% else eavesdrop on their message that 00:12:43.329 --> 00:12:44.900 align:start position:0% else eavesdrop on their message that would<00:12:43.449> for<00:12:43.630> example<00:12:43.660> compromise<00:12:44.470> their<00:12:44.620> funds 00:12:44.900 --> 00:12:44.910 align:start position:0% would for example compromise their funds 00:12:44.910 --> 00:12:47.309 align:start position:0% would for example compromise their funds that<00:12:45.910> means<00:12:46.149> that<00:12:46.329> essentially<00:12:46.630> the<00:12:46.810> user<00:12:47.019> is 00:12:47.309 --> 00:12:47.319 align:start position:0% that means that essentially the user is 00:12:47.319 --> 00:12:50.999 align:start position:0% that means that essentially the user is able<00:12:47.620> to<00:12:47.740> eavesdrop<00:12:47.889> on<00:12:48.250> their<00:12:48.399> own<00:12:48.550> data<00:12:50.009> so 00:12:50.999 --> 00:12:51.009 align:start position:0% able to eavesdrop on their own data so 00:12:51.009 --> 00:12:53.059 align:start position:0% able to eavesdrop on their own data so what<00:12:51.189> we're<00:12:51.279> gonna<00:12:51.339> be<00:12:51.759> doing<00:12:52.089> is<00:12:52.269> sort<00:12:52.720> of 00:12:53.059 --> 00:12:53.069 align:start position:0% what we're gonna be doing is sort of 00:12:53.069 --> 00:12:55.139 align:start position:0% what we're gonna be doing is sort of designing<00:12:54.069> a<00:12:54.130> scheme<00:12:54.399> we<00:12:54.579> call<00:12:54.790> complete 00:12:55.139 --> 00:12:55.149 align:start position:0% designing a scheme we call complete 00:12:55.149 --> 00:12:57.449 align:start position:0% designing a scheme we call complete knowledge<00:12:55.500> and<00:12:56.500> users<00:12:56.860> are<00:12:56.980> gonna<00:12:57.100> provide 00:12:57.449 --> 00:12:57.459 align:start position:0% knowledge and users are gonna provide 00:12:57.459 --> 00:12:59.519 align:start position:0% knowledge and users are gonna provide these<00:12:57.610> complete<00:12:58.029> knowledge<00:12:58.209> proofs<00:12:58.720> to<00:12:59.410> the 00:12:59.519 --> 00:12:59.529 align:start position:0% these complete knowledge proofs to the 00:12:59.529 --> 00:13:01.350 align:start position:0% these complete knowledge proofs to the system<00:12:59.889> to<00:13:00.339> prove<00:13:00.579> that<00:13:00.759> they<00:13:00.880> actually<00:13:01.029> know 00:13:01.350 --> 00:13:01.360 align:start position:0% system to prove that they actually know 00:13:01.360 --> 00:13:02.999 align:start position:0% system to prove that they actually know their<00:13:01.569> own<00:13:01.689> secrets<00:13:02.110> and<00:13:02.319> that<00:13:02.439> some<00:13:02.649> human 00:13:02.999 --> 00:13:03.009 align:start position:0% their own secrets and that some human 00:13:03.009 --> 00:13:04.290 align:start position:0% their own secrets and that some human knows<00:13:03.160> this<00:13:03.339> secret<00:13:03.699> and<00:13:03.850> it's<00:13:03.939> not<00:13:04.089> somehow 00:13:04.290 --> 00:13:04.300 align:start position:0% knows this secret and it's not somehow 00:13:04.300 --> 00:13:06.420 align:start position:0% knows this secret and it's not somehow shared<00:13:04.720> across<00:13:05.350> multiple<00:13:05.439> parties<00:13:06.220> or 00:13:06.420 --> 00:13:06.430 align:start position:0% shared across multiple parties or 00:13:06.430 --> 00:13:10.350 align:start position:0% shared across multiple parties or otherwise<00:13:07.059> constrained<00:13:08.550> so<00:13:09.550> I'm<00:13:09.850> gonna<00:13:10.000> flash 00:13:10.350 --> 00:13:10.360 align:start position:0% otherwise constrained so I'm gonna flash 00:13:10.360 --> 00:13:12.119 align:start position:0% otherwise constrained so I'm gonna flash a<00:13:10.389> bunch<00:13:10.689> of<00:13:10.779> cryptography<00:13:11.110> at<00:13:11.439> you<00:13:11.589> these 00:13:12.119 --> 00:13:12.129 align:start position:0% a bunch of cryptography at you these 00:13:12.129 --> 00:13:13.379 align:start position:0% a bunch of cryptography at you these slides<00:13:12.430> are<00:13:12.550> gonna<00:13:12.610> be<00:13:12.759> on<00:13:12.850> my<00:13:12.939> Twitter<00:13:13.180> if<00:13:13.329> you 00:13:13.379 --> 00:13:13.389 align:start position:0% slides are gonna be on my Twitter if you 00:13:13.389 --> 00:13:15.960 align:start position:0% slides are gonna be on my Twitter if you want<00:13:13.449> to<00:13:13.629> read<00:13:13.750> this<00:13:13.839> in<00:13:13.990> more<00:13:14.110> depth<00:13:14.350> but<00:13:15.160> the 00:13:15.960 --> 00:13:15.970 align:start position:0% want to read this in more depth but the 00:13:15.970 --> 00:13:17.309 align:start position:0% want to read this in more depth but the only<00:13:16.209> important<00:13:16.630> thing<00:13:16.720> on<00:13:16.870> this<00:13:16.990> slide<00:13:17.199> is 00:13:17.309 --> 00:13:17.319 align:start position:0% only important thing on this slide is 00:13:17.319 --> 00:13:18.569 align:start position:0% only important thing on this slide is sort<00:13:17.470> of<00:13:17.500> these<00:13:17.620> last<00:13:17.829> two<00:13:18.009> bullet<00:13:18.279> points 00:13:18.569 --> 00:13:18.579 align:start position:0% sort of these last two bullet points 00:13:18.579 --> 00:13:21.329 align:start position:0% sort of these last two bullet points which<00:13:19.540> is<00:13:19.569> that<00:13:19.839> we<00:13:19.930> consider<00:13:20.110> to<00:13:20.500> computation 00:13:21.329 --> 00:13:21.339 align:start position:0% which is that we consider to computation 00:13:21.339 --> 00:13:22.480 align:start position:0% which is that we consider to computation environments 00:13:22.480 --> 00:13:22.490 align:start position:0% environments 00:13:22.490 --> 00:13:24.400 align:start position:0% environments one<00:13:22.850> being<00:13:23.089> sort<00:13:23.420> of<00:13:23.509> an<00:13:23.720> untrusted 00:13:24.400 --> 00:13:24.410 align:start position:0% one being sort of an untrusted 00:13:24.410 --> 00:13:26.410 align:start position:0% one being sort of an untrusted computation<00:13:25.040> environment<00:13:25.579> and<00:13:25.790> another<00:13:26.269> one 00:13:26.410 --> 00:13:26.420 align:start position:0% computation environment and another one 00:13:26.420 --> 00:13:28.480 align:start position:0% computation environment and another one being<00:13:26.630> an<00:13:26.779> eavesdrop<00:13:27.230> environment<00:13:27.769> and<00:13:27.980> we 00:13:28.480 --> 00:13:28.490 align:start position:0% being an eavesdrop environment and we 00:13:28.490 --> 00:13:30.160 align:start position:0% being an eavesdrop environment and we want<00:13:28.699> to<00:13:28.790> make<00:13:28.910> sure<00:13:28.940> that<00:13:29.269> a<00:13:29.329> user<00:13:29.600> has<00:13:29.990> to 00:13:30.160 --> 00:13:30.170 align:start position:0% want to make sure that a user has to 00:13:30.170 --> 00:13:31.960 align:start position:0% want to make sure that a user has to send<00:13:30.410> their<00:13:30.529> private<00:13:30.889> data<00:13:31.100> through<00:13:31.790> this 00:13:31.960 --> 00:13:31.970 align:start position:0% send their private data through this 00:13:31.970 --> 00:13:33.910 align:start position:0% send their private data through this environment<00:13:32.569> that<00:13:32.779> they<00:13:33.019> can<00:13:33.170> also<00:13:33.380> eavesdrop 00:13:33.910 --> 00:13:33.920 align:start position:0% environment that they can also eavesdrop 00:13:33.920 --> 00:13:35.439 align:start position:0% environment that they can also eavesdrop on<00:13:34.100> and<00:13:34.399> therefore<00:13:34.730> it<00:13:34.940> can<00:13:35.060> learn<00:13:35.209> their<00:13:35.360> own 00:13:35.439 --> 00:13:35.449 align:start position:0% on and therefore it can learn their own 00:13:35.449 --> 00:13:38.290 align:start position:0% on and therefore it can learn their own private<00:13:35.779> data<00:13:36.490> and<00:13:37.490> the<00:13:37.910> way<00:13:38.029> we<00:13:38.149> generate 00:13:38.290 --> 00:13:38.300 align:start position:0% private data and the way we generate 00:13:38.300 --> 00:13:40.240 align:start position:0% private data and the way we generate these<00:13:38.600> proofs<00:13:38.899> is<00:13:39.050> we<00:13:39.170> require<00:13:39.529> some<00:13:40.009> proof 00:13:40.240 --> 00:13:40.250 align:start position:0% these proofs is we require some proof 00:13:40.250 --> 00:13:41.650 align:start position:0% these proofs is we require some proof scheme<00:13:40.519> that<00:13:40.759> matches<00:13:41.180> these<00:13:41.329> two 00:13:41.650 --> 00:13:41.660 align:start position:0% scheme that matches these two 00:13:41.660 --> 00:13:43.840 align:start position:0% scheme that matches these two cryptographic<00:13:41.990> definitions<00:13:42.769> the<00:13:43.699> two 00:13:43.840 --> 00:13:43.850 align:start position:0% cryptographic definitions the two 00:13:43.850 --> 00:13:45.040 align:start position:0% cryptographic definitions the two important<00:13:44.240> properties<00:13:44.389> here<00:13:44.750> are<00:13:44.839> number 00:13:45.040 --> 00:13:45.050 align:start position:0% important properties here are number 00:13:45.050 --> 00:13:45.790 align:start position:0% important properties here are number three<00:13:45.259> and<00:13:45.380> four 00:13:45.790 --> 00:13:45.800 align:start position:0% three and four 00:13:45.800 --> 00:13:48.100 align:start position:0% three and four the<00:13:46.339> first<00:13:46.579> one<00:13:46.730> is<00:13:46.850> unforgeable<00:13:47.329> ax<00:13:47.569> t<00:13:47.690> that 00:13:48.100 --> 00:13:48.110 align:start position:0% the first one is unforgeable ax t that 00:13:48.110 --> 00:13:50.110 align:start position:0% the first one is unforgeable ax t that means<00:13:48.259> i<00:13:48.500> can't<00:13:48.800> prove<00:13:49.009> to<00:13:49.220> you<00:13:49.370> that<00:13:49.639> i<00:13:49.970> know 00:13:50.110 --> 00:13:50.120 align:start position:0% means i can't prove to you that i know 00:13:50.120 --> 00:13:53.050 align:start position:0% means i can't prove to you that i know some<00:13:50.420> secret<00:13:50.750> data<00:13:51.339> that<00:13:52.339> i<00:13:52.370> actually<00:13:52.639> don't 00:13:53.050 --> 00:13:53.060 align:start position:0% some secret data that i actually don't 00:13:53.060 --> 00:13:56.110 align:start position:0% some secret data that i actually don't know<00:13:53.240> right<00:13:53.899> and<00:13:54.139> the<00:13:55.009> second<00:13:55.339> one<00:13:55.459> is<00:13:55.730> secret 00:13:56.110 --> 00:13:56.120 align:start position:0% know right and the second one is secret 00:13:56.120 --> 00:13:58.629 align:start position:0% know right and the second one is secret eavesdropping<00:13:56.720> which<00:13:57.350> says<00:13:57.860> that<00:13:58.130> i<00:13:58.160> have<00:13:58.310> the 00:13:58.629 --> 00:13:58.639 align:start position:0% eavesdropping which says that i have the 00:13:58.639 --> 00:14:00.579 align:start position:0% eavesdropping which says that i have the ability<00:13:58.670> to<00:13:59.060> eavesdrop<00:13:59.569> on<00:13:59.660> my<00:13:59.839> own<00:13:59.990> data<00:14:00.230> and 00:14:00.579 --> 00:14:00.589 align:start position:0% ability to eavesdrop on my own data and 00:14:00.589 --> 00:14:03.249 align:start position:0% ability to eavesdrop on my own data and nobody<00:14:01.490> else<00:14:01.699> in<00:14:02.329> the<00:14:02.480> network<00:14:02.779> can<00:14:02.810> tell 00:14:03.249 --> 00:14:03.259 align:start position:0% nobody else in the network can tell 00:14:03.259 --> 00:14:04.660 align:start position:0% nobody else in the network can tell whether<00:14:03.560> or<00:14:03.680> not<00:14:03.860> i<00:14:03.920> actually<00:14:04.190> did<00:14:04.550> this 00:14:04.660 --> 00:14:04.670 align:start position:0% whether or not i actually did this 00:14:04.670 --> 00:14:07.449 align:start position:0% whether or not i actually did this eavesdropping<00:14:05.300> or<00:14:05.389> not<00:14:05.769> if<00:14:06.769> they<00:14:07.040> could<00:14:07.250> tell 00:14:07.449 --> 00:14:07.459 align:start position:0% eavesdropping or not if they could tell 00:14:07.459 --> 00:14:08.949 align:start position:0% eavesdropping or not if they could tell whether<00:14:07.730> i<00:14:07.819> actually<00:14:08.240> did<00:14:08.360> the<00:14:08.449> eavesdropping 00:14:08.949 --> 00:14:08.959 align:start position:0% whether i actually did the eavesdropping 00:14:08.959 --> 00:14:11.110 align:start position:0% whether i actually did the eavesdropping or<00:14:09.050> not<00:14:09.230> they<00:14:09.829> could<00:14:09.889> simply<00:14:10.160> require<00:14:10.699> me<00:14:10.970> not 00:14:11.110 --> 00:14:11.120 align:start position:0% or not they could simply require me not 00:14:11.120 --> 00:14:12.370 align:start position:0% or not they could simply require me not to<00:14:11.269> do<00:14:11.360> the<00:14:11.449> eavesdropping<00:14:11.839> when<00:14:12.079> they<00:14:12.170> bribe 00:14:12.370 --> 00:14:12.380 align:start position:0% to do the eavesdropping when they bribe 00:14:12.380 --> 00:14:14.889 align:start position:0% to do the eavesdropping when they bribe me<00:14:12.560> so<00:14:12.800> it's<00:14:12.949> very<00:14:13.069> critical<00:14:13.399> that<00:14:13.790> the<00:14:14.690> data 00:14:14.889 --> 00:14:14.899 align:start position:0% me so it's very critical that the data 00:14:14.899 --> 00:14:17.199 align:start position:0% me so it's very critical that the data is<00:14:15.139> able<00:14:15.500> to<00:14:15.620> be<00:14:15.709> eavesdropped<00:14:16.130> on<00:14:16.279> but<00:14:16.730> sort 00:14:17.199 --> 00:14:17.209 align:start position:0% is able to be eavesdropped on but sort 00:14:17.209 --> 00:14:19.780 align:start position:0% is able to be eavesdropped on but sort of<00:14:17.269> in<00:14:17.389> the<00:14:17.509> dark<00:14:17.540> and<00:14:17.930> in<00:14:18.019> secret<00:14:18.290> and<00:14:18.790> the 00:14:19.780 --> 00:14:19.790 align:start position:0% of in the dark and in secret and the 00:14:19.790 --> 00:14:21.400 align:start position:0% of in the dark and in secret and the basic<00:14:20.180> solutions<00:14:20.569> we<00:14:20.660> use<00:14:20.779> for<00:14:20.990> this<00:14:21.079> are 00:14:21.400 --> 00:14:21.410 align:start position:0% basic solutions we use for this are 00:14:21.410 --> 00:14:23.920 align:start position:0% basic solutions we use for this are actually<00:14:21.740> quite<00:14:21.980> surprising<00:14:22.540> so<00:14:23.540> there's<00:14:23.720> two 00:14:23.920 --> 00:14:23.930 align:start position:0% actually quite surprising so there's two 00:14:23.930 --> 00:14:26.110 align:start position:0% actually quite surprising so there's two possible<00:14:24.410> schemes<00:14:24.709> here<00:14:25.009> one<00:14:25.759> of<00:14:25.880> which<00:14:26.000> is 00:14:26.110 --> 00:14:26.120 align:start position:0% possible schemes here one of which is 00:14:26.120 --> 00:14:28.059 align:start position:0% possible schemes here one of which is based<00:14:26.300> on<00:14:26.509> Bitcoin<00:14:26.810> Asics<00:14:27.319> and<00:14:27.560> another<00:14:27.829> one 00:14:28.059 --> 00:14:28.069 align:start position:0% based on Bitcoin Asics and another one 00:14:28.069 --> 00:14:30.069 align:start position:0% based on Bitcoin Asics and another one of<00:14:28.189> which<00:14:28.310> is<00:14:28.459> based<00:14:28.699> on<00:14:28.850> SG<00:14:29.389> X<00:14:29.540> or<00:14:29.750> trusted 00:14:30.069 --> 00:14:30.079 align:start position:0% of which is based on SG X or trusted 00:14:30.079 --> 00:14:32.949 align:start position:0% of which is based on SG X or trusted hardware<00:14:30.730> so<00:14:31.730> the<00:14:31.819> Bitcoin<00:14:32.120> ASIC<00:14:32.449> solution<00:14:32.810> is 00:14:32.949 --> 00:14:32.959 align:start position:0% hardware so the Bitcoin ASIC solution is 00:14:32.959 --> 00:14:34.210 align:start position:0% hardware so the Bitcoin ASIC solution is to<00:14:33.079> basically<00:14:33.350> do<00:14:33.560> a<00:14:33.589> proof-of-work 00:14:34.210 --> 00:14:34.220 align:start position:0% to basically do a proof-of-work 00:14:34.220 --> 00:14:35.980 align:start position:0% to basically do a proof-of-work on<00:14:34.399> your<00:14:34.610> secret<00:14:34.790> key<00:14:35.060> as<00:14:35.269> well<00:14:35.689> as<00:14:35.839> some 00:14:35.980 --> 00:14:35.990 align:start position:0% on your secret key as well as some 00:14:35.990 --> 00:14:39.340 align:start position:0% on your secret key as well as some challenge<00:14:36.639> and<00:14:37.639> then<00:14:37.880> generate<00:14:38.300> a<00:14:38.329> snark<00:14:38.720> that 00:14:39.340 --> 00:14:39.350 align:start position:0% challenge and then generate a snark that 00:14:39.350 --> 00:14:42.340 align:start position:0% challenge and then generate a snark that some<00:14:39.680> ASIC<00:14:40.160> has<00:14:40.189> done<00:14:40.880> this<00:14:41.029> proof<00:14:41.360> on<00:14:41.750> a 00:14:42.340 --> 00:14:42.350 align:start position:0% some ASIC has done this proof on a 00:14:42.350 --> 00:14:44.769 align:start position:0% some ASIC has done this proof on a secret<00:14:42.829> key<00:14:43.009> that<00:14:43.699> the<00:14:43.880> snort<00:14:44.120> keep<00:14:44.360> secret 00:14:44.769 --> 00:14:44.779 align:start position:0% secret key that the snort keep secret 00:14:44.779 --> 00:14:47.350 align:start position:0% secret key that the snort keep secret that<00:14:45.620> corresponds<00:14:46.339> to<00:14:46.370> a<00:14:46.519> public<00:14:46.939> key<00:14:47.149> that 00:14:47.350 --> 00:14:47.360 align:start position:0% that corresponds to a public key that 00:14:47.360 --> 00:14:50.259 align:start position:0% that corresponds to a public key that the<00:14:47.689> snark<00:14:47.959> makes<00:14:48.259> public<00:14:48.699> so<00:14:49.699> when<00:14:49.939> the<00:14:50.029> snark 00:14:50.259 --> 00:14:50.269 align:start position:0% the snark makes public so when the snark 00:14:50.269 --> 00:14:51.340 align:start position:0% the snark makes public so when the snark is<00:14:50.360> submitted<00:14:50.660> to<00:14:50.689> the<00:14:50.779> network<00:14:51.079> you<00:14:51.259> know 00:14:51.340 --> 00:14:51.350 align:start position:0% is submitted to the network you know 00:14:51.350 --> 00:14:52.749 align:start position:0% is submitted to the network you know that<00:14:51.500> at<00:14:51.589> some<00:14:51.829> point<00:14:52.069> someone<00:14:52.370> put<00:14:52.639> that 00:14:52.749 --> 00:14:52.759 align:start position:0% that at some point someone put that 00:14:52.759 --> 00:14:54.550 align:start position:0% that at some point someone put that secret<00:14:53.089> key<00:14:53.209> into<00:14:53.540> an<00:14:53.660> ASIC<00:14:53.959> to<00:14:54.139> generate<00:14:54.439> the 00:14:54.550 --> 00:14:54.560 align:start position:0% secret key into an ASIC to generate the 00:14:54.560 --> 00:14:58.360 align:start position:0% secret key into an ASIC to generate the pal<00:14:55.089> the<00:14:56.089> SGX<00:14:56.600> solution<00:14:57.019> similarly<00:14:57.620> forces 00:14:58.360 --> 00:14:58.370 align:start position:0% pal the SGX solution similarly forces 00:14:58.370 --> 00:15:00.160 align:start position:0% pal the SGX solution similarly forces you<00:14:58.459> to<00:14:58.490> send<00:14:58.730> the<00:14:58.850> secret<00:14:59.180> key<00:14:59.300> as<00:14:59.480> input<00:14:59.990> or 00:15:00.160 --> 00:15:00.170 align:start position:0% you to send the secret key as input or 00:15:00.170 --> 00:15:02.829 align:start position:0% you to send the secret key as input or the<00:15:00.290> secret<00:15:00.500> data<00:15:00.709> as<00:15:00.920> input<00:15:01.220> raw<00:15:02.089> unencrypted 00:15:02.829 --> 00:15:02.839 align:start position:0% the secret data as input raw unencrypted 00:15:02.839 --> 00:15:06.009 align:start position:0% the secret data as input raw unencrypted input<00:15:03.199> into<00:15:03.680> an<00:15:03.800> SG<00:15:04.069> X<00:15:04.189> chip<00:15:04.569> so<00:15:05.569> on<00:15:05.720> the<00:15:05.839> left 00:15:06.009 --> 00:15:06.019 align:start position:0% input into an SG X chip so on the left 00:15:06.019 --> 00:15:07.749 align:start position:0% input into an SG X chip so on the left this<00:15:06.380> allows<00:15:06.649> users<00:15:06.980> to<00:15:07.009> eavesdrop<00:15:07.490> on<00:15:07.610> their 00:15:07.749 --> 00:15:07.759 align:start position:0% this allows users to eavesdrop on their 00:15:07.759 --> 00:15:09.550 align:start position:0% this allows users to eavesdrop on their own<00:15:07.850> data<00:15:08.120> because<00:15:08.509> Asics<00:15:08.930> are<00:15:08.990> not<00:15:09.170> secured 00:15:09.550 --> 00:15:09.560 align:start position:0% own data because Asics are not secured 00:15:09.560 --> 00:15:10.990 align:start position:0% own data because Asics are not secured you<00:15:09.800> don't<00:15:09.980> know<00:15:10.130> what<00:15:10.310> firmware<00:15:10.699> someone 00:15:10.990 --> 00:15:11.000 align:start position:0% you don't know what firmware someone 00:15:11.000 --> 00:15:12.370 align:start position:0% you don't know what firmware someone else<00:15:11.120> is<00:15:11.240> running<00:15:11.389> on<00:15:11.600> their<00:15:11.720> own<00:15:11.839> ASIC<00:15:12.230> and 00:15:12.370 --> 00:15:12.380 align:start position:0% else is running on their own ASIC and 00:15:12.380 --> 00:15:13.660 align:start position:0% else is running on their own ASIC and whether<00:15:12.589> it<00:15:12.740> lets<00:15:12.889> them<00:15:13.009> eavesdrop<00:15:13.430> on<00:15:13.519> their 00:15:13.660 --> 00:15:13.670 align:start position:0% whether it lets them eavesdrop on their 00:15:13.670 --> 00:15:16.840 align:start position:0% whether it lets them eavesdrop on their data<00:15:13.850> or<00:15:13.939> not<00:15:14.209> on<00:15:14.540> the<00:15:15.350> right<00:15:15.560> SG<00:15:16.250> X<00:15:16.370> achieves 00:15:16.840 --> 00:15:16.850 align:start position:0% data or not on the right SG X achieves 00:15:16.850 --> 00:15:20.379 align:start position:0% data or not on the right SG X achieves this<00:15:17.060> because<00:15:17.420> as<00:15:17.750> G<00:15:17.959> X<00:15:18.050> enclaves<00:15:19.029> have<00:15:20.029> to<00:15:20.269> be 00:15:20.379 --> 00:15:20.389 align:start position:0% this because as G X enclaves have to be 00:15:20.389 --> 00:15:22.030 align:start position:0% this because as G X enclaves have to be communicated<00:15:21.019> with<00:15:21.050> through<00:15:21.380> an<00:15:21.470> unsecured 00:15:22.030 --> 00:15:22.040 align:start position:0% communicated with through an unsecured 00:15:22.040 --> 00:15:24.400 align:start position:0% communicated with through an unsecured OS<00:15:22.339> and<00:15:22.639> nobody<00:15:23.420> is<00:15:23.720> sort<00:15:23.930> of<00:15:24.019> in<00:15:24.139> the<00:15:24.290> broader 00:15:24.400 --> 00:15:24.410 align:start position:0% OS and nobody is sort of in the broader 00:15:24.410 --> 00:15:26.379 align:start position:0% OS and nobody is sort of in the broader network<00:15:24.860> can<00:15:25.160> tell<00:15:25.339> if<00:15:25.550> the<00:15:25.699> OS<00:15:26.029> that<00:15:26.269> was 00:15:26.379 --> 00:15:26.389 align:start position:0% network can tell if the OS that was 00:15:26.389 --> 00:15:28.480 align:start position:0% network can tell if the OS that was communicating<00:15:27.019> with<00:15:27.139> the<00:15:27.230> Enclave<00:15:27.680> did<00:15:28.370> or 00:15:28.480 --> 00:15:28.490 align:start position:0% communicating with the Enclave did or 00:15:28.490 --> 00:15:31.030 align:start position:0% communicating with the Enclave did or did<00:15:28.610> not<00:15:28.639> need<00:15:28.939> to<00:15:29.000> drop<00:15:29.180> on<00:15:29.360> its<00:15:29.480> secrets<00:15:30.040> so 00:15:31.030 --> 00:15:31.040 align:start position:0% did not need to drop on its secrets so 00:15:31.040 --> 00:15:32.740 align:start position:0% did not need to drop on its secrets so I'm<00:15:31.370> not<00:15:31.490> gonna<00:15:31.639> go<00:15:31.760> through<00:15:31.910> these<00:15:32.059> but<00:15:32.360> check 00:15:32.740 --> 00:15:32.750 align:start position:0% I'm not gonna go through these but check 00:15:32.750 --> 00:15:33.970 align:start position:0% I'm not gonna go through these but check them<00:15:32.870> out<00:15:32.930> later<00:15:32.990> if<00:15:33.350> you're<00:15:33.470> interested<00:15:33.889> in 00:15:33.970 --> 00:15:33.980 align:start position:0% them out later if you're interested in 00:15:33.980 --> 00:15:34.820 align:start position:0% them out later if you're interested in sort<00:15:34.160> of<00:15:34.189> the<00:15:34.309> formal 00:15:34.820 --> 00:15:34.830 align:start position:0% sort of the formal 00:15:34.830 --> 00:15:36.140 align:start position:0% sort of the formal the<00:15:34.920> graphic<00:15:35.250> definitions<00:15:35.700> of<00:15:35.820> both<00:15:35.910> of<00:15:36.060> those 00:15:36.140 --> 00:15:36.150 align:start position:0% the graphic definitions of both of those 00:15:36.150 --> 00:15:38.840 align:start position:0% the graphic definitions of both of those schemes<00:15:36.890> what<00:15:37.890> we're<00:15:38.040> actually<00:15:38.190> implementing 00:15:38.840 --> 00:15:38.850 align:start position:0% schemes what we're actually implementing 00:15:38.850 --> 00:15:40.400 align:start position:0% schemes what we're actually implementing is<00:15:38.940> a<00:15:38.970> little<00:15:39.180> bit<00:15:39.300> different<00:15:39.630> so<00:15:39.900> the<00:15:40.050> problem 00:15:40.400 --> 00:15:40.410 align:start position:0% is a little bit different so the problem 00:15:40.410 --> 00:15:41.660 align:start position:0% is a little bit different so the problem with<00:15:40.560> the<00:15:40.800> schemes<00:15:41.100> that<00:15:41.220> I<00:15:41.280> just<00:15:41.490> mentioned 00:15:41.660 --> 00:15:41.670 align:start position:0% with the schemes that I just mentioned 00:15:41.670 --> 00:15:43.310 align:start position:0% with the schemes that I just mentioned is<00:15:41.940> they're<00:15:42.120> a<00:15:42.150> little<00:15:42.300> bit<00:15:42.510> heavy<00:15:42.810> handed<00:15:43.230> and 00:15:43.310 --> 00:15:43.320 align:start position:0% is they're a little bit heavy handed and 00:15:43.320 --> 00:15:45.380 align:start position:0% is they're a little bit heavy handed and inefficient<00:15:44.030> generating<00:15:45.030> the<00:15:45.120> snark 00:15:45.380 --> 00:15:45.390 align:start position:0% inefficient generating the snark 00:15:45.390 --> 00:15:47.330 align:start position:0% inefficient generating the snark actually<00:15:45.750> takes<00:15:45.990> quite<00:15:46.200> some<00:15:46.410> time<00:15:46.650> so 00:15:47.330 --> 00:15:47.340 align:start position:0% actually takes quite some time so 00:15:47.340 --> 00:15:48.500 align:start position:0% actually takes quite some time so there's<00:15:47.520> this<00:15:47.610> cute<00:15:47.880> little<00:15:47.970> trick<00:15:48.330> you<00:15:48.360> can 00:15:48.500 --> 00:15:48.510 align:start position:0% there's this cute little trick you can 00:15:48.510 --> 00:15:50.570 align:start position:0% there's this cute little trick you can do<00:15:48.750> for<00:15:49.020> the<00:15:49.080> proof-of-work<00:15:49.380> version<00:15:49.920> where 00:15:50.570 --> 00:15:50.580 align:start position:0% do for the proof-of-work version where 00:15:50.580 --> 00:15:52.430 align:start position:0% do for the proof-of-work version where you<00:15:50.610> restrict<00:15:51.120> the<00:15:51.240> non-space<00:15:51.750> of<00:15:51.960> the<00:15:52.050> ASIC 00:15:52.430 --> 00:15:52.440 align:start position:0% you restrict the non-space of the ASIC 00:15:52.440 --> 00:15:54.560 align:start position:0% you restrict the non-space of the ASIC and<00:15:52.590> requires<00:15:53.400> someone<00:15:53.760> to<00:15:53.790> try<00:15:54.060> multiple 00:15:54.560 --> 00:15:54.570 align:start position:0% and requires someone to try multiple 00:15:54.570 --> 00:15:57.050 align:start position:0% and requires someone to try multiple times<00:15:54.780> to<00:15:55.200> sort<00:15:55.500> of<00:15:55.560> generate<00:15:55.950> a<00:15:56.010> proof<00:15:56.280> such 00:15:57.050 --> 00:15:57.060 align:start position:0% times to sort of generate a proof such 00:15:57.060 --> 00:15:58.820 align:start position:0% times to sort of generate a proof such that<00:15:57.270> if<00:15:57.420> they<00:15:57.570> try<00:15:57.630> more<00:15:58.080> than<00:15:58.140> once<00:15:58.440> they<00:15:58.680> can 00:15:58.820 --> 00:15:58.830 align:start position:0% that if they try more than once they can 00:15:58.830 --> 00:16:01.430 align:start position:0% that if they try more than once they can recover<00:15:59.070> their<00:15:59.310> own<00:15:59.430> key<00:15:59.750> and<00:16:00.750> with<00:16:01.290> high 00:16:01.430 --> 00:16:01.440 align:start position:0% recover their own key and with high 00:16:01.440 --> 00:16:02.960 align:start position:0% recover their own key and with high probability<00:16:01.650> then<00:16:02.160> they'll<00:16:02.340> be<00:16:02.490> able<00:16:02.730> to<00:16:02.820> sort 00:16:02.960 --> 00:16:02.970 align:start position:0% probability then they'll be able to sort 00:16:02.970 --> 00:16:08.390 align:start position:0% probability then they'll be able to sort of<00:16:03.090> eavesdrop<00:16:03.480> on<00:16:03.600> themselves<00:16:04.580> so<00:16:07.400> basically 00:16:08.390 --> 00:16:08.400 align:start position:0% of eavesdrop on themselves so basically 00:16:08.400 --> 00:16:10.910 align:start position:0% of eavesdrop on themselves so basically the<00:16:09.030> math<00:16:09.210> here<00:16:09.480> works<00:16:09.690> so<00:16:10.530> let's<00:16:10.740> talk<00:16:10.860> about 00:16:10.910 --> 00:16:10.920 align:start position:0% the math here works so let's talk about 00:16:10.920 --> 00:16:13.310 align:start position:0% the math here works so let's talk about the<00:16:11.190> proof<00:16:11.340> of<00:16:11.460> work<00:16:11.550> version<00:16:12.020> the<00:16:13.020> proof<00:16:13.200> of 00:16:13.310 --> 00:16:13.320 align:start position:0% the proof of work version the proof of 00:16:13.320 --> 00:16:14.870 align:start position:0% the proof of work version the proof of work<00:16:13.410> version<00:16:13.770> fails<00:16:14.010> in<00:16:14.370> one<00:16:14.550> of<00:16:14.670> several 00:16:14.870 --> 00:16:14.880 align:start position:0% work version fails in one of several 00:16:14.880 --> 00:16:16.790 align:start position:0% work version fails in one of several cases<00:16:15.150> so<00:16:15.900> the<00:16:15.990> proof<00:16:16.110> of<00:16:16.260> work<00:16:16.350> version<00:16:16.680> will 00:16:16.790 --> 00:16:16.800 align:start position:0% cases so the proof of work version will 00:16:16.800 --> 00:16:18.560 align:start position:0% cases so the proof of work version will fail<00:16:17.010> if<00:16:17.280> you<00:16:17.370> can<00:16:17.520> use<00:16:17.640> a<00:16:17.670> CPU<00:16:18.090> to<00:16:18.270> generate 00:16:18.560 --> 00:16:18.570 align:start position:0% fail if you can use a CPU to generate 00:16:18.570 --> 00:16:20.720 align:start position:0% fail if you can use a CPU to generate the<00:16:18.660> proof<00:16:18.840> of<00:16:18.900> work<00:16:19.080> then<00:16:19.710> SGX<00:16:20.310> can<00:16:20.520> just 00:16:20.720 --> 00:16:20.730 align:start position:0% the proof of work then SGX can just 00:16:20.730 --> 00:16:22.370 align:start position:0% the proof of work then SGX can just directly<00:16:21.150> make<00:16:21.360> this<00:16:21.480> proof<00:16:21.750> even<00:16:22.170> though<00:16:22.260> the 00:16:22.370 --> 00:16:22.380 align:start position:0% directly make this proof even though the 00:16:22.380 --> 00:16:24.100 align:start position:0% directly make this proof even though the secret<00:16:22.650> data<00:16:22.770> is<00:16:22.950> never<00:16:23.130> known<00:16:23.310> to<00:16:23.460> the<00:16:23.550> user 00:16:24.100 --> 00:16:24.110 align:start position:0% secret data is never known to the user 00:16:24.110 --> 00:16:27.410 align:start position:0% secret data is never known to the user it<00:16:25.110> also<00:16:25.470> fails<00:16:25.740> if<00:16:26.130> the<00:16:26.490> ASIC<00:16:26.850> fails<00:16:27.090> to<00:16:27.270> find 00:16:27.410 --> 00:16:27.420 align:start position:0% it also fails if the ASIC fails to find 00:16:27.420 --> 00:16:29.270 align:start position:0% it also fails if the ASIC fails to find a<00:16:27.540> proof<00:16:27.720> then<00:16:28.290> a<00:16:28.320> user<00:16:28.590> that<00:16:28.800> actually<00:16:29.130> knows 00:16:29.270 --> 00:16:29.280 align:start position:0% a proof then a user that actually knows 00:16:29.280 --> 00:16:30.890 align:start position:0% a proof then a user that actually knows their<00:16:29.520> own<00:16:29.550> secret<00:16:29.970> data<00:16:30.090> won't<00:16:30.570> be<00:16:30.690> able<00:16:30.810> to 00:16:30.890 --> 00:16:30.900 align:start position:0% their own secret data won't be able to 00:16:30.900 --> 00:16:32.230 align:start position:0% their own secret data won't be able to prove<00:16:31.110> that<00:16:31.260> to<00:16:31.380> the<00:16:31.470> network 00:16:32.230 --> 00:16:32.240 align:start position:0% prove that to the network 00:16:32.240 --> 00:16:34.820 align:start position:0% prove that to the network fortunately<00:16:33.240> Bitcoin<00:16:33.630> Asics<00:16:34.020> are<00:16:34.170> much<00:16:34.500> much 00:16:34.820 --> 00:16:34.830 align:start position:0% fortunately Bitcoin Asics are much much 00:16:34.830 --> 00:16:36.920 align:start position:0% fortunately Bitcoin Asics are much much much<00:16:35.160> faster<00:16:35.370> than<00:16:35.580> CPUs<00:16:36.120> so<00:16:36.480> a<00:16:36.510> hundred 00:16:36.920 --> 00:16:36.930 align:start position:0% much faster than CPUs so a hundred 00:16:36.930 --> 00:16:38.210 align:start position:0% much faster than CPUs so a hundred thousand<00:16:37.380> times<00:16:37.530> faster<00:16:38.100> than 00:16:38.210 --> 00:16:38.220 align:start position:0% thousand times faster than 00:16:38.220 --> 00:16:40.490 align:start position:0% thousand times faster than state-of-the-art<00:16:38.670> CPUs<00:16:39.210> at<00:16:39.990> this<00:16:40.200> sort<00:16:40.410> of 00:16:40.490 --> 00:16:40.500 align:start position:0% state-of-the-art CPUs at this sort of 00:16:40.500 --> 00:16:44.210 align:start position:0% state-of-the-art CPUs at this sort of work<00:16:40.710> and<00:16:41.700> you<00:16:41.790> can<00:16:41.940> see<00:16:42.090> that<00:16:42.410> given<00:16:43.410> even<00:16:43.980> if 00:16:44.210 --> 00:16:44.220 align:start position:0% work and you can see that given even if 00:16:44.220 --> 00:16:46.130 align:start position:0% work and you can see that given even if they're<00:16:44.430> only<00:16:44.580> a<00:16:44.670> hundred<00:16:44.970> times<00:16:45.180> faster<00:16:45.390> the 00:16:46.130 --> 00:16:46.140 align:start position:0% they're only a hundred times faster the 00:16:46.140 --> 00:16:47.690 align:start position:0% they're only a hundred times faster the probability<00:16:46.650> that<00:16:46.680> an<00:16:46.860> ASIC<00:16:47.280> will<00:16:47.400> find<00:16:47.610> a 00:16:47.690 --> 00:16:47.700 align:start position:0% probability that an ASIC will find a 00:16:47.700 --> 00:16:49.880 align:start position:0% probability that an ASIC will find a solution<00:16:47.910> before<00:16:48.150> a<00:16:48.330> CPU<00:16:48.780> is<00:16:49.200> basically<00:16:49.650> won 00:16:49.880 --> 00:16:49.890 align:start position:0% solution before a CPU is basically won 00:16:49.890 --> 00:16:51.950 align:start position:0% solution before a CPU is basically won right<00:16:50.850> so<00:16:51.270> there's<00:16:51.450> sort<00:16:51.540> of<00:16:51.630> a<00:16:51.720> broad<00:16:51.930> range 00:16:51.950 --> 00:16:51.960 align:start position:0% right so there's sort of a broad range 00:16:51.960 --> 00:16:54.590 align:start position:0% right so there's sort of a broad range of<00:16:52.380> parameters<00:16:52.830> here<00:16:53.130> for<00:16:53.700> which<00:16:53.850> it's<00:16:54.210> highly 00:16:54.590 --> 00:16:54.600 align:start position:0% of parameters here for which it's highly 00:16:54.600 --> 00:16:56.330 align:start position:0% of parameters here for which it's highly likely<00:16:54.630> that<00:16:54.990> an<00:16:55.260> ASIC<00:16:55.620> will<00:16:55.770> be<00:16:55.860> able<00:16:55.980> to<00:16:56.130> find 00:16:56.330 --> 00:16:56.340 align:start position:0% likely that an ASIC will be able to find 00:16:56.340 --> 00:16:58.340 align:start position:0% likely that an ASIC will be able to find this<00:16:56.490> proof<00:16:56.670> of<00:16:56.730> work<00:16:56.910> but<00:16:57.450> a<00:16:57.510> CPU<00:16:57.930> will<00:16:58.170> not 00:16:58.340 --> 00:16:58.350 align:start position:0% this proof of work but a CPU will not 00:16:58.350 --> 00:17:01.010 align:start position:0% this proof of work but a CPU will not and<00:16:58.560> therefore<00:16:58.770> no<00:16:59.220> sort<00:16:59.580> of<00:16:59.670> SGX<00:17:00.210> process<00:17:00.750> or 00:17:01.010 --> 00:17:01.020 align:start position:0% and therefore no sort of SGX process or 00:17:01.020 --> 00:17:03.470 align:start position:0% and therefore no sort of SGX process or multi-party<00:17:01.620> computation<00:17:01.920> can<00:17:02.850> also<00:17:03.090> solve 00:17:03.470 --> 00:17:03.480 align:start position:0% multi-party computation can also solve 00:17:03.480 --> 00:17:05.570 align:start position:0% multi-party computation can also solve this<00:17:03.630> proof<00:17:03.840> of<00:17:03.960> work<00:17:04.160> so<00:17:05.160> these<00:17:05.280> are<00:17:05.430> the 00:17:05.570 --> 00:17:05.580 align:start position:0% this proof of work so these are the 00:17:05.580 --> 00:17:09.140 align:start position:0% this proof of work so these are the marginal<00:17:06.860> CDF's<00:17:07.860> of<00:17:08.190> sort<00:17:08.400> of<00:17:08.490> the<00:17:08.640> times<00:17:08.910> to 00:17:09.140 --> 00:17:09.150 align:start position:0% marginal CDF's of sort of the times to 00:17:09.150 --> 00:17:11.030 align:start position:0% marginal CDF's of sort of the times to solve<00:17:09.360> blue<00:17:10.110> you<00:17:10.290> see<00:17:10.440> the<00:17:10.530> probability<00:17:10.740> that 00:17:11.030 --> 00:17:11.040 align:start position:0% solve blue you see the probability that 00:17:11.040 --> 00:17:13.370 align:start position:0% solve blue you see the probability that an<00:17:11.250> ASIC<00:17:11.610> has<00:17:11.880> solved<00:17:12.150> the<00:17:12.240> puzzle<00:17:12.540> and<00:17:12.720> read 00:17:13.370 --> 00:17:13.380 align:start position:0% an ASIC has solved the puzzle and read 00:17:13.380 --> 00:17:15.020 align:start position:0% an ASIC has solved the puzzle and read the<00:17:13.560> probability<00:17:13.980> that<00:17:14.040> a<00:17:14.100> CPU<00:17:14.520> has<00:17:14.790> solved 00:17:15.020 --> 00:17:15.030 align:start position:0% the probability that a CPU has solved 00:17:15.030 --> 00:17:16.760 align:start position:0% the probability that a CPU has solved the<00:17:15.089> puzzle<00:17:15.660> and<00:17:15.930> you<00:17:16.320> can<00:17:16.440> see<00:17:16.560> the<00:17:16.650> ASIC 00:17:16.760 --> 00:17:16.770 align:start position:0% the puzzle and you can see the ASIC 00:17:16.770 --> 00:17:19.340 align:start position:0% the puzzle and you can see the ASIC slope<00:17:17.160> is<00:17:17.280> just<00:17:17.459> much<00:17:17.640> steeper<00:17:18.050> so<00:17:19.050> you<00:17:19.140> can 00:17:19.340 --> 00:17:19.350 align:start position:0% slope is just much steeper so you can 00:17:19.350 --> 00:17:20.870 align:start position:0% slope is just much steeper so you can sort<00:17:19.560> of<00:17:19.589> parameterize<00:17:20.100> your<00:17:20.370> system<00:17:20.670> to<00:17:20.850> make 00:17:20.870 --> 00:17:20.880 align:start position:0% sort of parameterize your system to make 00:17:20.880 --> 00:17:22.610 align:start position:0% sort of parameterize your system to make sure<00:17:21.030> that<00:17:21.150> an<00:17:21.390> ASIC<00:17:21.750> can<00:17:21.959> always<00:17:22.290> give<00:17:22.500> you 00:17:22.610 --> 00:17:22.620 align:start position:0% sure that an ASIC can always give you 00:17:22.620 --> 00:17:24.620 align:start position:0% sure that an ASIC can always give you this<00:17:22.740> proof<00:17:23.040> but<00:17:23.520> a<00:17:23.550> CPU<00:17:23.970> can<00:17:24.180> never<00:17:24.360> give<00:17:24.540> you 00:17:24.620 --> 00:17:24.630 align:start position:0% this proof but a CPU can never give you 00:17:24.630 --> 00:17:26.689 align:start position:0% this proof but a CPU can never give you this<00:17:24.720> proof<00:17:24.990> and<00:17:25.230> therefore<00:17:25.770> no<00:17:26.040> constrained 00:17:26.689 --> 00:17:26.699 align:start position:0% this proof and therefore no constrained 00:17:26.699 --> 00:17:28.160 align:start position:0% this proof and therefore no constrained or<00:17:26.850> shackled<00:17:27.240> computing<00:17:27.630> environment<00:17:28.050> can 00:17:28.160 --> 00:17:28.170 align:start position:0% or shackled computing environment can 00:17:28.170 --> 00:17:31.070 align:start position:0% or shackled computing environment can never<00:17:28.290> give<00:17:28.470> you<00:17:28.530> this<00:17:28.680> proof<00:17:29.720> so<00:17:30.720> what<00:17:30.990> we're 00:17:31.070 --> 00:17:31.080 align:start position:0% never give you this proof so what we're 00:17:31.080 --> 00:17:32.960 align:start position:0% never give you this proof so what we're gonna<00:17:31.140> be<00:17:31.350> doing<00:17:31.620> is<00:17:31.770> releasing<00:17:31.950> this<00:17:32.490> sort<00:17:32.910> of 00:17:32.960 --> 00:17:32.970 align:start position:0% gonna be doing is releasing this sort of 00:17:32.970 --> 00:17:34.700 align:start position:0% gonna be doing is releasing this sort of system<00:17:33.180> on<00:17:33.510> aetherium<00:17:33.930> using<00:17:34.290> this<00:17:34.410> kind<00:17:34.590> of 00:17:34.700 --> 00:17:34.710 align:start position:0% system on aetherium using this kind of 00:17:34.710 --> 00:17:36.500 align:start position:0% system on aetherium using this kind of an<00:17:34.830> architecture<00:17:35.310> so<00:17:35.880> all<00:17:36.060> you're<00:17:36.210> gonna<00:17:36.270> need 00:17:36.500 --> 00:17:36.510 align:start position:0% an architecture so all you're gonna need 00:17:36.510 --> 00:17:38.420 align:start position:0% an architecture so all you're gonna need to<00:17:36.600> do<00:17:36.720> in<00:17:36.990> your<00:17:37.170> voting<00:17:37.800> contract<00:17:38.280> or 00:17:38.420 --> 00:17:38.430 align:start position:0% to do in your voting contract or 00:17:38.430 --> 00:17:40.130 align:start position:0% to do in your voting contract or anti-bribery<00:17:38.880> mechanism<00:17:39.570> is<00:17:39.750> called<00:17:40.050> a 00:17:40.130 --> 00:17:40.140 align:start position:0% anti-bribery mechanism is called a 00:17:40.140 --> 00:17:42.800 align:start position:0% anti-bribery mechanism is called a single<00:17:40.410> function<00:17:40.800> on<00:17:40.950> our<00:17:41.010> registry<00:17:41.550> when<00:17:42.300> ck 00:17:42.800 --> 00:17:42.810 align:start position:0% single function on our registry when ck 00:17:42.810 --> 00:17:44.900 align:start position:0% single function on our registry when ck which<00:17:43.500> will<00:17:43.680> tell<00:17:43.860> you<00:17:43.980> the<00:17:44.010> last<00:17:44.160> time<00:17:44.430> that<00:17:44.880> a 00:17:44.900 --> 00:17:44.910 align:start position:0% which will tell you the last time that a 00:17:44.910 --> 00:17:46.910 align:start position:0% which will tell you the last time that a complete<00:17:45.720> knowledge<00:17:45.900> proof<00:17:46.290> was<00:17:46.500> generated 00:17:46.910 --> 00:17:46.920 align:start position:0% complete knowledge proof was generated 00:17:46.920 --> 00:17:48.050 align:start position:0% complete knowledge proof was generated on<00:17:46.980> some<00:17:47.220> key 00:17:48.050 --> 00:17:48.060 align:start position:0% on some key 00:17:48.060 --> 00:17:49.700 align:start position:0% on some key the<00:17:48.150> last<00:17:48.360> time<00:17:48.600> some<00:17:48.870> user<00:17:49.050> proved<00:17:49.470> to<00:17:49.620> the 00:17:49.700 --> 00:17:49.710 align:start position:0% the last time some user proved to the 00:17:49.710 --> 00:17:51.230 align:start position:0% the last time some user proved to the system<00:17:50.010> that<00:17:50.130> they<00:17:50.250> actually<00:17:50.640> are<00:17:50.850> able<00:17:51.060> to 00:17:51.230 --> 00:17:51.240 align:start position:0% system that they actually are able to 00:17:51.240 --> 00:17:54.590 align:start position:0% system that they actually are able to learn<00:17:51.510> their<00:17:51.750> key<00:17:52.010> right<00:17:53.010> and<00:17:53.450> users<00:17:54.450> can 00:17:54.590 --> 00:17:54.600 align:start position:0% learn their key right and users can 00:17:54.600 --> 00:17:56.210 align:start position:0% learn their key right and users can choose<00:17:54.900> like<00:17:55.050> several<00:17:55.410> backends<00:17:55.890> to<00:17:55.980> do<00:17:56.070> this 00:17:56.210 --> 00:17:56.220 align:start position:0% choose like several backends to do this 00:17:56.220 --> 00:17:58.040 align:start position:0% choose like several backends to do this if<00:17:56.460> they<00:17:56.640> prefer<00:17:56.820> to<00:17:56.970> do<00:17:57.180> it<00:17:57.270> through<00:17:57.420> SGX<00:17:57.840> they 00:17:58.040 --> 00:17:58.050 align:start position:0% if they prefer to do it through SGX they 00:17:58.050 --> 00:17:59.690 align:start position:0% if they prefer to do it through SGX they can<00:17:58.200> do<00:17:58.290> it<00:17:58.380> through<00:17:58.470> SGX<00:17:58.890> if<00:17:59.130> they<00:17:59.310> prefer<00:17:59.490> to 00:17:59.690 --> 00:17:59.700 align:start position:0% can do it through SGX if they prefer to 00:17:59.700 --> 00:18:01.130 align:start position:0% can do it through SGX if they prefer to do<00:17:59.790> it<00:17:59.910> through<00:18:00.090> a<00:18:00.150> Bitcoin<00:18:00.480> ASIC<00:18:00.780> they<00:18:00.900> can<00:18:01.050> do 00:18:01.130 --> 00:18:01.140 align:start position:0% do it through a Bitcoin ASIC they can do 00:18:01.140 --> 00:18:04.130 align:start position:0% do it through a Bitcoin ASIC they can do that<00:18:01.760> and<00:18:02.760> interestingly<00:18:03.270> enough<00:18:03.750> this<00:18:03.930> also 00:18:04.130 --> 00:18:04.140 align:start position:0% that and interestingly enough this also 00:18:04.140 --> 00:18:05.750 align:start position:0% that and interestingly enough this also gives<00:18:04.380> us<00:18:04.470> an<00:18:04.590> opportunity<00:18:04.650> to<00:18:05.190> recycle<00:18:05.460> old 00:18:05.750 --> 00:18:05.760 align:start position:0% gives us an opportunity to recycle old 00:18:05.760 --> 00:18:08.000 align:start position:0% gives us an opportunity to recycle old Bitcoin<00:18:06.150> Asics<00:18:06.600> because<00:18:07.140> even<00:18:07.440> old<00:18:07.650> Asics 00:18:08.000 --> 00:18:08.010 align:start position:0% Bitcoin Asics because even old Asics 00:18:08.010 --> 00:18:09.470 align:start position:0% Bitcoin Asics because even old Asics that<00:18:08.130> are<00:18:08.250> no<00:18:08.370> longer<00:18:08.640> profitable<00:18:08.820> for<00:18:09.240> mining 00:18:09.470 --> 00:18:09.480 align:start position:0% that are no longer profitable for mining 00:18:09.480 --> 00:18:10.700 align:start position:0% that are no longer profitable for mining on<00:18:09.570> the<00:18:09.630> network<00:18:09.900> are<00:18:10.110> still<00:18:10.320> much<00:18:10.530> much 00:18:10.700 --> 00:18:10.710 align:start position:0% on the network are still much much 00:18:10.710 --> 00:18:12.500 align:start position:0% on the network are still much much faster<00:18:10.920> than<00:18:11.160> state-of-the-art<00:18:11.730> CPUs<00:18:12.270> and 00:18:12.500 --> 00:18:12.510 align:start position:0% faster than state-of-the-art CPUs and 00:18:12.510 --> 00:18:14.180 align:start position:0% faster than state-of-the-art CPUs and can<00:18:12.990> still<00:18:13.170> be<00:18:13.260> used<00:18:13.410> kind<00:18:13.650> of<00:18:13.740> to<00:18:13.860> generate 00:18:14.180 --> 00:18:14.190 align:start position:0% can still be used kind of to generate 00:18:14.190 --> 00:18:17.930 align:start position:0% can still be used kind of to generate these<00:18:14.340> proofs<00:18:15.680> so<00:18:16.680> I<00:18:16.980> recommend<00:18:17.550> to<00:18:17.580> you<00:18:17.760> that 00:18:17.930 --> 00:18:17.940 align:start position:0% these proofs so I recommend to you that 00:18:17.940 --> 00:18:19.040 align:start position:0% these proofs so I recommend to you that if<00:18:18.030> you're<00:18:18.150> designing<00:18:18.480> a<00:18:18.630> system<00:18:18.810> where 00:18:19.040 --> 00:18:19.050 align:start position:0% if you're designing a system where 00:18:19.050 --> 00:18:21.140 align:start position:0% if you're designing a system where bribery<00:18:19.470> is<00:18:19.710> a<00:18:19.740> big<00:18:20.040> deal<00:18:20.220> you<00:18:20.520> should<00:18:21.000> use 00:18:21.140 --> 00:18:21.150 align:start position:0% bribery is a big deal you should use 00:18:21.150 --> 00:18:22.370 align:start position:0% bribery is a big deal you should use this<00:18:21.300> technique<00:18:21.660> to<00:18:21.840> make<00:18:22.050> sure<00:18:22.200> users 00:18:22.370 --> 00:18:22.380 align:start position:0% this technique to make sure users 00:18:22.380 --> 00:18:23.960 align:start position:0% this technique to make sure users actually<00:18:22.920> know<00:18:23.070> their<00:18:23.250> data<00:18:23.430> and<00:18:23.700> they're<00:18:23.880> not 00:18:23.960 --> 00:18:23.970 align:start position:0% actually know their data and they're not 00:18:23.970 --> 00:18:26.180 align:start position:0% actually know their data and they're not being<00:18:24.210> bribed<00:18:24.510> by<00:18:24.840> some<00:18:25.080> sort<00:18:25.350> of<00:18:25.410> shackling 00:18:26.180 --> 00:18:26.190 align:start position:0% being bribed by some sort of shackling 00:18:26.190 --> 00:18:28.130 align:start position:0% being bribed by some sort of shackling mechanism<00:18:26.730> some<00:18:26.970> anti<00:18:27.390> mechanism<00:18:27.870> like<00:18:28.050> we 00:18:28.130 --> 00:18:28.140 align:start position:0% mechanism some anti mechanism like we 00:18:28.140 --> 00:18:29.930 align:start position:0% mechanism some anti mechanism like we described<00:18:28.500> earlier 00:18:29.930 --> 00:18:29.940 align:start position:0% described earlier 00:18:29.940 --> 00:18:32.000 align:start position:0% described earlier not<00:18:30.480> that<00:18:30.660> CK<00:18:30.990> is<00:18:31.110> enough<00:18:31.350> by<00:18:31.500> itself<00:18:31.530> though 00:18:32.000 --> 00:18:32.010 align:start position:0% not that CK is enough by itself though 00:18:32.010 --> 00:18:33.680 align:start position:0% not that CK is enough by itself though so<00:18:32.220> you<00:18:32.280> need<00:18:32.490> to<00:18:32.580> actually<00:18:32.910> follow<00:18:33.060> this<00:18:33.360> more 00:18:33.680 --> 00:18:33.690 align:start position:0% so you need to actually follow this more 00:18:33.690 --> 00:18:36.290 align:start position:0% so you need to actually follow this more complex<00:18:34.170> recipe<00:18:34.430> you<00:18:35.430> need<00:18:35.550> to<00:18:35.640> also<00:18:35.820> provide 00:18:36.290 --> 00:18:36.300 align:start position:0% complex recipe you need to also provide 00:18:36.300 --> 00:18:37.700 align:start position:0% complex recipe you need to also provide the<00:18:36.630> classical<00:18:37.080> notion<00:18:37.200> of<00:18:37.470> coercion 00:18:37.700 --> 00:18:37.710 align:start position:0% the classical notion of coercion 00:18:37.710 --> 00:18:40.040 align:start position:0% the classical notion of coercion resistance<00:18:38.310> which<00:18:39.060> basically<00:18:39.510> says<00:18:39.810> that<00:18:39.840> a 00:18:40.040 --> 00:18:40.050 align:start position:0% resistance which basically says that a 00:18:40.050 --> 00:18:41.720 align:start position:0% resistance which basically says that a user<00:18:40.260> can<00:18:40.530> secretly<00:18:40.830> change<00:18:41.250> their<00:18:41.460> mind 00:18:41.720 --> 00:18:41.730 align:start position:0% user can secretly change their mind 00:18:41.730 --> 00:18:44.210 align:start position:0% user can secretly change their mind whenever<00:18:42.060> they<00:18:42.240> want<00:18:42.530> so<00:18:43.530> if<00:18:43.650> a<00:18:43.770> user<00:18:43.890> can 00:18:44.210 --> 00:18:44.220 align:start position:0% whenever they want so if a user can 00:18:44.220 --> 00:18:45.530 align:start position:0% whenever they want so if a user can secretly<00:18:44.430> change<00:18:44.790> their<00:18:44.970> mind<00:18:45.150> whenever<00:18:45.300> they 00:18:45.530 --> 00:18:45.540 align:start position:0% secretly change their mind whenever they 00:18:45.540 --> 00:18:47.150 align:start position:0% secretly change their mind whenever they want<00:18:45.750> there's<00:18:46.200> no<00:18:46.350> point<00:18:46.590> in<00:18:46.740> bribing<00:18:46.950> the 00:18:47.150 --> 00:18:47.160 align:start position:0% want there's no point in bribing the 00:18:47.160 --> 00:18:48.200 align:start position:0% want there's no point in bribing the user<00:18:47.310> because<00:18:47.610> you<00:18:47.700> don't<00:18:47.880> know<00:18:47.970> if<00:18:48.090> they're 00:18:48.200 --> 00:18:48.210 align:start position:0% user because you don't know if they're 00:18:48.210 --> 00:18:49.280 align:start position:0% user because you don't know if they're just<00:18:48.270> gonna<00:18:48.390> go<00:18:48.600> and<00:18:48.750> change<00:18:48.960> their<00:18:49.110> mind 00:18:49.280 --> 00:18:49.290 align:start position:0% just gonna go and change their mind 00:18:49.290 --> 00:18:51.200 align:start position:0% just gonna go and change their mind later<00:18:49.560> you<00:18:50.160> can't<00:18:50.370> tell<00:18:50.580> if<00:18:50.700> they<00:18:50.820> did<00:18:50.970> that<00:18:51.090> or 00:18:51.200 --> 00:18:51.210 align:start position:0% later you can't tell if they did that or 00:18:51.210 --> 00:18:53.210 align:start position:0% later you can't tell if they did that or not<00:18:51.300> right 00:18:53.210 --> 00:18:53.220 align:start position:0% not right 00:18:53.220 --> 00:18:54.980 align:start position:0% not right and<00:18:53.340> because<00:18:53.790> you're<00:18:53.910> using<00:18:54.090> CK<00:18:54.540> you<00:18:54.600> know 00:18:54.980 --> 00:18:54.990 align:start position:0% and because you're using CK you know 00:18:54.990 --> 00:18:56.510 align:start position:0% and because you're using CK you know that<00:18:55.230> there's<00:18:55.410> no<00:18:55.560> sort<00:18:55.800> of<00:18:55.860> shackles<00:18:56.130> on<00:18:56.430> the 00:18:56.510 --> 00:18:56.520 align:start position:0% that there's no sort of shackles on the 00:18:56.520 --> 00:18:58.100 align:start position:0% that there's no sort of shackles on the user<00:18:56.670> that<00:18:57.090> prevent<00:18:57.450> them<00:18:57.570> from<00:18:57.630> changing 00:18:58.100 --> 00:18:58.110 align:start position:0% user that prevent them from changing 00:18:58.110 --> 00:19:01.040 align:start position:0% user that prevent them from changing their<00:18:58.230> mind<00:18:58.410> in<00:18:58.560> this<00:18:58.710> way<00:18:59.510> and<00:19:00.510> for<00:19:00.840> stake 00:19:01.040 --> 00:19:01.050 align:start position:0% their mind in this way and for stake 00:19:01.050 --> 00:19:02.510 align:start position:0% their mind in this way and for stake based<00:19:01.290> systems<00:19:01.590> we<00:19:01.710> want<00:19:01.890> to<00:19:01.950> require<00:19:02.190> this<00:19:02.370> on 00:19:02.510 --> 00:19:02.520 align:start position:0% based systems we want to require this on 00:19:02.520 --> 00:19:04.310 align:start position:0% based systems we want to require this on the<00:19:02.610> state<00:19:02.850> key<00:19:03.150> so<00:19:03.720> we<00:19:03.840> know<00:19:04.020> that<00:19:04.200> whoever 00:19:04.310 --> 00:19:04.320 align:start position:0% the state key so we know that whoever 00:19:04.320 --> 00:19:06.110 align:start position:0% the state key so we know that whoever signed<00:19:04.710> the<00:19:04.800> message<00:19:05.130> actually<00:19:05.370> has<00:19:05.760> skin<00:19:06.030> in 00:19:06.110 --> 00:19:06.120 align:start position:0% signed the message actually has skin in 00:19:06.120 --> 00:19:07.820 align:start position:0% signed the message actually has skin in the<00:19:06.210> game<00:19:06.240> and<00:19:06.600> actually<00:19:06.960> has<00:19:07.110> funds<00:19:07.410> at<00:19:07.620> risk 00:19:07.820 --> 00:19:07.830 align:start position:0% the game and actually has funds at risk 00:19:07.830 --> 00:19:09.920 align:start position:0% the game and actually has funds at risk sort<00:19:08.610> of<00:19:08.730> using<00:19:09.180> the<00:19:09.240> generation<00:19:09.720> of<00:19:09.810> this 00:19:09.920 --> 00:19:09.930 align:start position:0% sort of using the generation of this 00:19:09.930 --> 00:19:13.880 align:start position:0% sort of using the generation of this message<00:19:11.390> so<00:19:12.390> the<00:19:12.840> high-level<00:19:13.170> takeaway<00:19:13.650> here 00:19:13.880 --> 00:19:13.890 align:start position:0% message so the high-level takeaway here 00:19:13.890 --> 00:19:15.560 align:start position:0% message so the high-level takeaway here I<00:19:14.040> guess<00:19:14.310> is<00:19:14.550> that<00:19:14.640> if<00:19:14.910> you<00:19:15.000> don't<00:19:15.240> use<00:19:15.390> this 00:19:15.560 --> 00:19:15.570 align:start position:0% I guess is that if you don't use this 00:19:15.570 --> 00:19:17.540 align:start position:0% I guess is that if you don't use this system<00:19:15.780> your<00:19:16.410> protocol<00:19:16.890> is<00:19:17.070> vulnerable<00:19:17.460> to 00:19:17.540 --> 00:19:17.550 align:start position:0% system your protocol is vulnerable to 00:19:17.550 --> 00:19:20.270 align:start position:0% system your protocol is vulnerable to bribery<00:19:17.730> period<00:19:18.450> no<00:19:18.810> exceptions<00:19:19.320> so<00:19:19.920> please 00:19:20.270 --> 00:19:20.280 align:start position:0% bribery period no exceptions so please 00:19:20.280 --> 00:19:22.130 align:start position:0% bribery period no exceptions so please don't<00:19:20.730> DM<00:19:20.910> me<00:19:21.030> on<00:19:21.060> Twitter<00:19:21.360> and<00:19:21.570> ask<00:19:21.750> me<00:19:21.930> like 00:19:22.130 --> 00:19:22.140 align:start position:0% don't DM me on Twitter and ask me like 00:19:22.140 --> 00:19:23.270 align:start position:0% don't DM me on Twitter and ask me like are<00:19:22.290> we<00:19:22.410> vulnerable<00:19:22.500> to<00:19:22.860> bribery<00:19:23.010> in 00:19:23.270 --> 00:19:23.280 align:start position:0% are we vulnerable to bribery in 00:19:23.280 --> 00:19:25.220 align:start position:0% are we vulnerable to bribery in collusion<00:19:23.580> if<00:19:23.850> you<00:19:24.330> haven't<00:19:24.690> sort<00:19:24.840> of<00:19:24.930> studied 00:19:25.220 --> 00:19:25.230 align:start position:0% collusion if you haven't sort of studied 00:19:25.230 --> 00:19:26.750 align:start position:0% collusion if you haven't sort of studied this<00:19:25.320> kind<00:19:25.560> of<00:19:25.620> infrastructure<00:19:26.100> and<00:19:26.340> read 00:19:26.750 --> 00:19:26.760 align:start position:0% this kind of infrastructure and read 00:19:26.760 --> 00:19:27.920 align:start position:0% this kind of infrastructure and read this<00:19:26.910> background<00:19:27.120> material<00:19:27.660> because<00:19:27.900> you 00:19:27.920 --> 00:19:27.930 align:start position:0% this background material because you 00:19:27.930 --> 00:19:31.010 align:start position:0% this background material because you 100%<00:19:28.530> are<00:19:29.120> and<00:19:30.120> if<00:19:30.240> you're<00:19:30.390> interested<00:19:30.750> in 00:19:31.010 --> 00:19:31.020 align:start position:0% 100% are and if you're interested in 00:19:31.020 --> 00:19:32.120 align:start position:0% 100% are and if you're interested in learning<00:19:31.140> more<00:19:31.440> about<00:19:31.500> the<00:19:31.800> technical 00:19:32.120 --> 00:19:32.130 align:start position:0% learning more about the technical 00:19:32.130 --> 00:19:33.620 align:start position:0% learning more about the technical details<00:19:32.280> or<00:19:32.640> you<00:19:32.670> want<00:19:32.880> to<00:19:32.970> sort<00:19:33.150> of<00:19:33.240> use<00:19:33.420> this 00:19:33.620 --> 00:19:33.630 align:start position:0% details or you want to sort of use this 00:19:33.630 --> 00:19:36.590 align:start position:0% details or you want to sort of use this in<00:19:33.900> your<00:19:33.960> anti-bribery<00:19:34.770> systems<00:19:35.360> please<00:19:36.360> feel 00:19:36.590 --> 00:19:36.600 align:start position:0% in your anti-bribery systems please feel 00:19:36.600 --> 00:19:37.910 align:start position:0% in your anti-bribery systems please feel free<00:19:36.630> to<00:19:36.810> reach<00:19:36.960> out<00:19:37.140> to<00:19:37.170> me<00:19:37.380> and<00:19:37.470> I'm<00:19:37.590> happy<00:19:37.890> to 00:19:37.910 --> 00:19:37.920 align:start position:0% free to reach out to me and I'm happy to 00:19:37.920 --> 00:19:40.850 align:start position:0% free to reach out to me and I'm happy to chat<00:19:38.190> more<00:19:38.600> it's<00:19:39.600> a<00:19:39.720> very<00:19:39.930> complex<00:19:40.440> sort<00:19:40.770> of 00:19:40.850 --> 00:19:40.860 align:start position:0% chat more it's a very complex sort of 00:19:40.860 --> 00:19:42.890 align:start position:0% chat more it's a very complex sort of topic<00:19:41.220> I<00:19:41.430> only<00:19:41.820> had<00:19:42.030> 20<00:19:42.240> minutes<00:19:42.330> to<00:19:42.510> describe 00:19:42.890 --> 00:19:42.900 align:start position:0% topic I only had 20 minutes to describe 00:19:42.900 --> 00:19:44.900 align:start position:0% topic I only had 20 minutes to describe it<00:19:43.050> I<00:19:43.140> know<00:19:43.260> I<00:19:43.380> sort<00:19:43.650> of<00:19:43.770> flew<00:19:43.980> through<00:19:44.220> it<00:19:44.370> but 00:19:44.900 --> 00:19:44.910 align:start position:0% it I know I sort of flew through it but 00:19:44.910 --> 00:19:46.880 align:start position:0% it I know I sort of flew through it but hopefully<00:19:45.120> you<00:19:45.390> got<00:19:45.510> some<00:19:45.720> takeaways<00:19:46.140> that<00:19:46.770> we 00:19:46.880 --> 00:19:46.890 align:start position:0% hopefully you got some takeaways that we 00:19:46.890 --> 00:19:48.560 align:start position:0% hopefully you got some takeaways that we can<00:19:47.040> sort<00:19:47.310> of<00:19:47.340> make<00:19:47.550> sure<00:19:47.760> users<00:19:48.000> own<00:19:48.360> their 00:19:48.560 --> 00:19:48.570 align:start position:0% can sort of make sure users own their 00:19:48.570 --> 00:19:50.300 align:start position:0% can sort of make sure users own their own<00:19:48.600> data<00:19:48.750> in<00:19:49.140> these<00:19:49.230> systems<00:19:49.470> and<00:19:49.890> that's 00:19:50.300 --> 00:19:50.310 align:start position:0% own data in these systems and that's 00:19:50.310 --> 00:19:51.680 align:start position:0% own data in these systems and that's very<00:19:50.610> important<00:19:51.090> to<00:19:51.240> making<00:19:51.420> sure<00:19:51.540> that 00:19:51.680 --> 00:19:51.690 align:start position:0% very important to making sure that 00:19:51.690 --> 00:19:54.710 align:start position:0% very important to making sure that they're<00:19:51.990> not<00:19:52.020> being<00:19:52.170> bribed<00:19:53.390> all<00:19:54.390> right<00:19:54.540> if 00:19:54.710 --> 00:19:54.720 align:start position:0% they're not being bribed all right if 00:19:54.720 --> 00:19:56.060 align:start position:0% they're not being bribed all right if you'd<00:19:54.840> like<00:19:54.960> to<00:19:55.080> contact<00:19:55.230> me<00:19:55.560> or<00:19:55.590> learn 00:19:56.060 --> 00:19:56.070 align:start position:0% you'd like to contact me or learn 00:19:56.070 --> 00:19:57.530 align:start position:0% you'd like to contact me or learn anything<00:19:56.370> further<00:19:56.550> here's<00:19:56.910> my<00:19:57.030> information 00:19:57.530 --> 00:19:57.540 align:start position:0% anything further here's my information 00:19:57.540 --> 00:19:59.780 align:start position:0% anything further here's my information as<00:19:57.960> well<00:19:58.110> as<00:19:58.230> funding<00:19:58.620> and<00:19:58.860> a<00:19:59.190> big<00:19:59.370> thanks<00:19:59.670> to 00:19:59.780 --> 00:19:59.790 align:start position:0% as well as funding and a big thanks to 00:19:59.790 --> 00:20:01.379 align:start position:0% as well as funding and a big thanks to all<00:19:59.940> our<00:19:59.970> IC<00:20:00.390> 3<00:20:00.540> partners<00:20:00.990> and 00:20:01.379 --> 00:20:01.389 align:start position:0% all our IC 3 partners and 00:20:01.389 --> 00:20:03.419 align:start position:0% all our IC 3 partners and Tyrian<00:20:01.749> community<00:20:02.109> for<00:20:02.440> their<00:20:02.919> support<00:20:03.249> in 00:20:03.419 --> 00:20:03.429 align:start position:0% Tyrian community for their support in 00:20:03.429 --> 00:20:05.260 align:start position:0% Tyrian community for their support in this<00:20:03.579> research<00:20:03.879> thank<00:20:04.809> you 00:20:05.260 --> 00:20:05.270 align:start position:0% this research thank you 00:20:05.270 --> 00:20:15.570 align:start position:0% this research thank you [Applause] 00:20:15.570 --> 00:20:15.580 align:start position:0% 00:20:15.580 --> 00:20:17.640 align:start position:0% you