WEBVTT Kind: captions Language: en 00:00:13.480 --> 00:00:18.310 align:start position:0% can<00:00:14.480> I<00:00:15.309> talk<00:00:16.309> today<00:00:16.520> I'm<00:00:17.000> Nikolas<00:00:17.320> co-founder 00:00:18.310 --> 00:00:18.320 align:start position:0% can I talk today I'm Nikolas co-founder 00:00:18.320 --> 00:00:20.710 align:start position:0% can I talk today I'm Nikolas co-founder and<00:00:18.470> CTO<00:00:18.620> Fletcher<00:00:19.210> manufacturer<00:00:20.210> of<00:00:20.270> fine 00:00:20.710 --> 00:00:20.720 align:start position:0% and CTO Fletcher manufacturer of fine 00:00:20.720 --> 00:00:22.900 align:start position:0% and CTO Fletcher manufacturer of fine other<00:00:21.050> wallet<00:00:21.380> I<00:00:21.680> talked<00:00:22.400> to<00:00:22.550> there<00:00:22.700> would<00:00:22.880> be 00:00:22.900 --> 00:00:22.910 align:start position:0% other wallet I talked to there would be 00:00:22.910 --> 00:00:24.970 align:start position:0% other wallet I talked to there would be about<00:00:23.210> hardening<00:00:23.900> smart<00:00:24.200> contract<00:00:24.680> with 00:00:24.970 --> 00:00:24.980 align:start position:0% about hardening smart contract with 00:00:24.980 --> 00:00:28.120 align:start position:0% about hardening smart contract with hardware<00:00:25.400> security<00:00:25.910> an<00:00:26.710> alternative<00:00:27.710> title 00:00:28.120 --> 00:00:28.130 align:start position:0% hardware security an alternative title 00:00:28.130 --> 00:00:30.100 align:start position:0% hardware security an alternative title could<00:00:28.400> be<00:00:28.460> who<00:00:28.880> to<00:00:29.090> build<00:00:29.300> how<00:00:29.600> to<00:00:29.660> design<00:00:30.050> a 00:00:30.100 --> 00:00:30.110 align:start position:0% could be who to build how to design a 00:00:30.110 --> 00:00:32.889 align:start position:0% could be who to build how to design a platform<00:00:30.440> to<00:00:31.280> design<00:00:31.640> hardware<00:00:32.210> wallets<00:00:32.629> on 00:00:32.889 --> 00:00:32.899 align:start position:0% platform to design hardware wallets on 00:00:32.899 --> 00:00:35.190 align:start position:0% platform to design hardware wallets on different<00:00:33.379> kind<00:00:33.590> of<00:00:33.680> secure<00:00:34.010> hardware<00:00:34.400> so 00:00:35.190 --> 00:00:35.200 align:start position:0% different kind of secure hardware so 00:00:35.200 --> 00:00:38.920 align:start position:0% different kind of secure hardware so let's<00:00:36.200> move<00:00:36.380> forward<00:00:36.440> so<00:00:37.250> first<00:00:37.610> why<00:00:38.510> do<00:00:38.570> you 00:00:38.920 --> 00:00:38.930 align:start position:0% let's move forward so first why do you 00:00:38.930 --> 00:00:41.140 align:start position:0% let's move forward so first why do you why<00:00:39.530> do<00:00:39.590> we<00:00:39.770> need<00:00:39.920> to<00:00:40.100> secure<00:00:40.310> smart<00:00:40.700> contracts 00:00:41.140 --> 00:00:41.150 align:start position:0% why do we need to secure smart contracts 00:00:41.150 --> 00:00:43.420 align:start position:0% why do we need to secure smart contracts because<00:00:41.540> smart<00:00:42.290> contracts<00:00:42.739> themselves<00:00:43.310> are 00:00:43.420 --> 00:00:43.430 align:start position:0% because smart contracts themselves are 00:00:43.430 --> 00:00:45.729 align:start position:0% because smart contracts themselves are extremely<00:00:43.520> secure<00:00:44.150> they<00:00:44.480> are<00:00:44.600> running<00:00:44.900> into 00:00:45.729 --> 00:00:45.739 align:start position:0% extremely secure they are running into 00:00:45.739 --> 00:00:49.750 align:start position:0% extremely secure they are running into the<00:00:46.280> ETM<00:00:47.649> VM<00:00:48.649> blockchain<00:00:49.190> I<00:00:49.220> mean<00:00:49.520> they<00:00:49.670> are 00:00:49.750 --> 00:00:49.760 align:start position:0% the ETM VM blockchain I mean they are 00:00:49.760 --> 00:00:51.490 align:start position:0% the ETM VM blockchain I mean they are secured<00:00:50.090> by<00:00:50.390> the<00:00:50.450> consensus<00:00:51.050> is<00:00:51.170> securing 00:00:51.490 --> 00:00:51.500 align:start position:0% secured by the consensus is securing 00:00:51.500 --> 00:00:54.100 align:start position:0% secured by the consensus is securing smart<00:00:51.770> contracts<00:00:52.190> but<00:00:52.760> there<00:00:53.390> are<00:00:53.480> some<00:00:53.809> nasty 00:00:54.100 --> 00:00:54.110 align:start position:0% smart contracts but there are some nasty 00:00:54.110 --> 00:00:55.780 align:start position:0% smart contracts but there are some nasty things<00:00:54.559> that<00:00:54.739> could<00:00:54.950> happen<00:00:55.100> around<00:00:55.489> the 00:00:55.780 --> 00:00:55.790 align:start position:0% things that could happen around the 00:00:55.790 --> 00:00:57.960 align:start position:0% things that could happen around the edges<00:00:56.120> if<00:00:56.809> we<00:00:56.989> look<00:00:57.110> at<00:00:57.230> the<00:00:57.350> right<00:00:57.530> thing 00:00:57.960 --> 00:00:57.970 align:start position:0% edges if we look at the right thing 00:00:57.970 --> 00:01:00.850 align:start position:0% edges if we look at the right thing first<00:00:58.970> mat<00:00:59.180> contract<00:00:59.660> can<00:00:59.870> receive<00:01:00.230> data<00:01:00.440> from 00:01:00.850 --> 00:01:00.860 align:start position:0% first mat contract can receive data from 00:01:00.860 --> 00:01:03.340 align:start position:0% first mat contract can receive data from external<00:01:01.070> sources<00:01:01.610> so<00:01:02.360> here<00:01:02.719> this<00:01:02.930> external 00:01:03.340 --> 00:01:03.350 align:start position:0% external sources so here this external 00:01:03.350 --> 00:01:05.710 align:start position:0% external sources so here this external source<00:01:03.559> which<00:01:03.710> is<00:01:03.890> a<00:01:03.920> picture<00:01:04.489> from<00:01:04.670> Delfy 00:01:05.710 --> 00:01:05.720 align:start position:0% source which is a picture from Delfy 00:01:05.720 --> 00:01:08.710 align:start position:0% source which is a picture from Delfy who<00:01:06.260> as<00:01:06.440> you<00:01:06.620> know<00:01:06.650> is<00:01:07.100> telling<00:01:07.700> the<00:01:07.850> future<00:01:08.000> so 00:01:08.710 --> 00:01:08.720 align:start position:0% who as you know is telling the future so 00:01:08.720 --> 00:01:11.289 align:start position:0% who as you know is telling the future so some<00:01:09.020> people<00:01:09.170> are<00:01:09.470> calling<00:01:09.740> that<00:01:10.060> Oracle's<00:01:11.060> I 00:01:11.289 --> 00:01:11.299 align:start position:0% some people are calling that Oracle's I 00:01:11.299 --> 00:01:13.330 align:start position:0% some people are calling that Oracle's I decided<00:01:11.900> to<00:01:12.110> stop<00:01:12.380> doing<00:01:12.650> that<00:01:12.830> after<00:01:13.040> getting 00:01:13.330 --> 00:01:13.340 align:start position:0% decided to stop doing that after getting 00:01:13.340 --> 00:01:15.969 align:start position:0% decided to stop doing that after getting some<00:01:13.760> nasty<00:01:14.120> gram<00:01:14.330> from<00:01:14.360> a<00:01:14.720> database<00:01:15.560> or 00:01:15.969 --> 00:01:15.979 align:start position:0% some nasty gram from a database or 00:01:15.979 --> 00:01:18.280 align:start position:0% some nasty gram from a database or designing<00:01:16.400> company<00:01:16.850> but<00:01:17.119> you<00:01:17.570> get<00:01:17.720> the<00:01:17.840> idea 00:01:18.280 --> 00:01:18.290 align:start position:0% designing company but you get the idea 00:01:18.290 --> 00:01:20.920 align:start position:0% designing company but you get the idea so<00:01:18.680> if<00:01:19.040> they<00:01:19.790> are<00:01:19.820> not<00:01:20.060> twisted<00:01:20.540> the<00:01:20.690> smart 00:01:20.920 --> 00:01:20.930 align:start position:0% so if they are not twisted the smart 00:01:20.930 --> 00:01:23.200 align:start position:0% so if they are not twisted the smart contract<00:01:21.110> can<00:01:21.619> act<00:01:21.950> and<00:01:22.250> perform<00:01:22.880> some 00:01:23.200 --> 00:01:23.210 align:start position:0% contract can act and perform some 00:01:23.210 --> 00:01:25.630 align:start position:0% contract can act and perform some mistakes<00:01:23.630> on<00:01:24.260> the<00:01:24.530> other<00:01:24.650> hand<00:01:25.040> smart 00:01:25.630 --> 00:01:25.640 align:start position:0% mistakes on the other hand smart 00:01:25.640 --> 00:01:27.370 align:start position:0% mistakes on the other hand smart contract<00:01:26.060> are<00:01:26.210> interacting<00:01:26.780> with<00:01:26.960> users<00:01:27.140> who 00:01:27.370 --> 00:01:27.380 align:start position:0% contract are interacting with users who 00:01:27.380 --> 00:01:31.480 align:start position:0% contract are interacting with users who are<00:01:27.860> holding<00:01:28.640> keys<00:01:29.060> so<00:01:29.840> generic<00:01:30.229> user<00:01:30.710> PC<00:01:31.220> is 00:01:31.480 --> 00:01:31.490 align:start position:0% are holding keys so generic user PC is 00:01:31.490 --> 00:01:34.420 align:start position:0% are holding keys so generic user PC is not<00:01:31.670> extremely<00:01:32.030> secure<00:01:32.860> also<00:01:33.860> as<00:01:33.979> you<00:01:34.070> can<00:01:34.100> see 00:01:34.420 --> 00:01:34.430 align:start position:0% not extremely secure also as you can see 00:01:34.430 --> 00:01:37.740 align:start position:0% not extremely secure also as you can see here<00:01:34.760> so<00:01:35.240> we<00:01:35.450> need<00:01:35.600> to<00:01:35.750> secure<00:01:36.080> key<00:01:36.650> protection 00:01:37.740 --> 00:01:37.750 align:start position:0% here so we need to secure key protection 00:01:37.750 --> 00:01:41.050 align:start position:0% here so we need to secure key protection here<00:01:38.750> we<00:01:39.170> have<00:01:39.290> two<00:01:39.560> items<00:01:40.040> to<00:01:40.460> secure<00:01:40.850> and 00:01:41.050 --> 00:01:41.060 align:start position:0% here we have two items to secure and 00:01:41.060 --> 00:01:42.730 align:start position:0% here we have two items to secure and we'll<00:01:41.240> see<00:01:41.450> how<00:01:41.630> secure<00:01:41.960> Hardware<00:01:42.320> can<00:01:42.530> help 00:01:42.730 --> 00:01:42.740 align:start position:0% we'll see how secure Hardware can help 00:01:42.740 --> 00:01:45.520 align:start position:0% we'll see how secure Hardware can help with<00:01:42.920> that<00:01:43.479> so<00:01:44.479> what<00:01:44.720> kind<00:01:44.960> of<00:01:45.049> rights 00:01:45.520 --> 00:01:45.530 align:start position:0% with that so what kind of rights 00:01:45.530 --> 00:01:49.240 align:start position:0% with that so what kind of rights can<00:01:45.979> we<00:01:46.159> get<00:01:46.930> against<00:01:47.930> the<00:01:48.049> edges<00:01:48.170> first<00:01:49.070> we 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malware that can 00:01:55.220 --> 00:01:57.640 align:start position:0% keys or smart or malware that can manipulate<00:01:55.869> contracts<00:01:56.869> I'll<00:01:56.990> just<00:01:57.200> feed<00:01:57.439> bad 00:01:57.640 --> 00:01:57.650 align:start position:0% manipulate contracts I'll just feed bad 00:01:57.650 --> 00:02:00.969 align:start position:0% manipulate contracts I'll just feed bad data<00:01:57.890> to<00:01:58.130> the<00:01:58.250> user<00:01:58.990> first<00:01:59.990> then<00:02:00.710> we<00:02:00.890> have 00:02:00.969 --> 00:02:00.979 align:start position:0% data to the user first then we have 00:02:00.979 --> 00:02:03.789 align:start position:0% data to the user first then we have physical<00:02:01.400> attacks<00:02:01.729> so<00:02:02.270> we<00:02:02.450> can<00:02:02.630> have<00:02:02.810> messy 00:02:03.789 --> 00:02:03.799 align:start position:0% physical attacks so we can have messy 00:02:03.799 --> 00:02:05.469 align:start position:0% physical attacks so we can have messy physical<00:02:04.280> attacks<00:02:04.610> with<00:02:04.880> which<00:02:05.240> are 00:02:05.469 --> 00:02:05.479 align:start position:0% physical attacks with which are 00:02:05.479 --> 00:02:06.399 align:start position:0% physical attacks with which are extremely<00:02:05.900> powerful 00:02:06.399 --> 00:02:06.409 align:start position:0% extremely powerful 00:02:06.409 --> 00:02:08.380 align:start position:0% extremely powerful if<00:02:06.829> the<00:02:07.159> algorithms<00:02:07.700> are<00:02:07.820> not<00:02:07.880> properly 00:02:08.380 --> 00:02:08.390 align:start position:0% if the algorithms are not properly 00:02:08.390 --> 00:02:11.170 align:start position:0% if the algorithms are not properly define<00:02:08.840> an<00:02:09.110> attacker<00:02:09.500> can<00:02:09.830> manage<00:02:10.220> by<00:02:10.759> looking 00:02:11.170 --> 00:02:11.180 align:start position:0% define an attacker can manage by looking 00:02:11.180 --> 00:02:13.620 align:start position:0% define an attacker can manage by looking at<00:02:11.330> the<00:02:11.480> chip<00:02:11.750> power<00:02:12.020> consumption<00:02:12.709> or 00:02:13.620 --> 00:02:13.630 align:start position:0% at the chip power consumption or 00:02:13.630 --> 00:02:15.400 align:start position:0% at the chip power consumption or significative 00:02:15.400 --> 00:02:15.410 align:start position:0% significative 00:02:15.410 --> 00:02:17.590 align:start position:0% significative things<00:02:15.890> I<00:02:16.070> mean<00:02:16.190> changing<00:02:16.610> with<00:02:16.760> a<00:02:16.790> chip<00:02:17.150> can 00:02:17.590 --> 00:02:17.600 align:start position:0% things I mean changing with a chip can 00:02:17.600 --> 00:02:19.630 align:start position:0% things I mean changing with a chip can retrieve<00:02:17.990> private<00:02:18.380> keys<00:02:18.620> and<00:02:18.920> can<00:02:19.310> basically 00:02:19.630 --> 00:02:19.640 align:start position:0% retrieve private keys and can basically 00:02:19.640 --> 00:02:22.590 align:start position:0% retrieve private keys and can basically steal<00:02:20.300> that<00:02:20.480> from<00:02:20.990> the<00:02:21.230> executing<00:02:21.980> process 00:02:22.590 --> 00:02:22.600 align:start position:0% steal that from the executing process 00:02:22.600 --> 00:02:25.780 align:start position:0% steal that from the executing process then<00:02:23.600> physical<00:02:24.200> attacks<00:02:24.530> requiring<00:02:25.370> access 00:02:25.780 --> 00:02:25.790 align:start position:0% then physical attacks requiring access 00:02:25.790 --> 00:02:27.880 align:start position:0% then physical attacks requiring access to<00:02:26.270> the<00:02:26.390> chip<00:02:26.570> itself<00:02:26.900> which<00:02:27.470> can<00:02:27.680> be 00:02:27.880 --> 00:02:27.890 align:start position:0% to the chip itself which can be 00:02:27.890 --> 00:02:30.730 align:start position:0% to the chip itself which can be leveraged<00:02:28.310> on<00:02:28.580> to<00:02:29.150> change<00:02:30.020> the<00:02:30.230> behavior<00:02:30.470> of 00:02:30.730 --> 00:02:30.740 align:start position:0% leveraged on to change the behavior of 00:02:30.740 --> 00:02:32.860 align:start position:0% leveraged on to change the behavior of the<00:02:30.980> chip<00:02:31.250> by<00:02:31.670> performing<00:02:32.240> some<00:02:32.450> glitching 00:02:32.860 --> 00:02:32.870 align:start position:0% the chip by performing some glitching 00:02:32.870 --> 00:02:35.410 align:start position:0% the chip by performing some glitching attacks<00:02:33.230> so<00:02:33.770> here<00:02:34.100> people<00:02:34.460> might<00:02:35.000> think<00:02:35.030> that 00:02:35.410 --> 00:02:35.420 align:start position:0% attacks so here people might think that 00:02:35.420 --> 00:02:37.950 align:start position:0% attacks so here people might think that glitching<00:02:36.080> is<00:02:36.320> going<00:02:36.860> to<00:02:37.100> open<00:02:37.520> something 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align:start position:0% managed to glitch a physical device the right<00:02:52.580> way<00:02:52.820> you<00:02:53.240> can<00:02:53.270> also<00:02:53.690> extract<00:02:54.050> keys<00:02:54.470> so 00:02:54.940 --> 00:02:54.950 align:start position:0% right way you can also extract keys so 00:02:54.950 --> 00:02:56.440 align:start position:0% right way you can also extract keys so we<00:02:55.100> have<00:02:55.220> to<00:02:55.340> consider<00:02:55.640> all<00:02:55.790> those<00:02:56.090> frights 00:02:56.440 --> 00:02:56.450 align:start position:0% we have to consider all those frights 00:02:56.450 --> 00:02:59.290 align:start position:0% we have to consider all those frights when<00:02:56.780> dealing<00:02:56.990> with<00:02:57.140> secure<00:02:57.800> hardware<00:02:58.300> so 00:02:59.290 --> 00:02:59.300 align:start position:0% when dealing with secure hardware so 00:02:59.300 --> 00:03:00.790 align:start position:0% when dealing with secure hardware so secure<00:02:59.630> other<00:02:59.810> way<00:02:59.960> here<00:03:00.260> we'll<00:03:00.470> be<00:03:00.590> bringing 00:03:00.790 --> 00:03:00.800 align:start position:0% secure other way here we'll be bringing 00:03:00.800 --> 00:03:03.010 align:start position:0% secure other way here we'll be bringing an<00:03:01.220> isolated<00:03:01.940> environment<00:03:02.060> to<00:03:02.690> run<00:03:02.870> the 00:03:03.010 --> 00:03:03.020 align:start position:0% an isolated environment to run the 00:03:03.020 --> 00:03:05.740 align:start position:0% an isolated environment to run the different<00:03:03.410> applications<00:03:03.980> so<00:03:04.730> we<00:03:05.150> want<00:03:05.390> secure 00:03:05.740 --> 00:03:05.750 align:start position:0% different applications so we want secure 00:03:05.750 --> 00:03:07.510 align:start position:0% different applications so we want secure hardware<00:03:06.170> that<00:03:06.380> let<00:03:06.650> us<00:03:06.680> execute<00:03:07.100> code 00:03:07.510 --> 00:03:07.520 align:start position:0% hardware that let us execute code 00:03:07.520 --> 00:03:09.790 align:start position:0% hardware that let us execute code otherwise<00:03:07.970> we<00:03:08.180> can't<00:03:08.360> do<00:03:08.480> much<00:03:08.630> we<00:03:09.590> want 00:03:09.790 --> 00:03:09.800 align:start position:0% otherwise we can't do much we want 00:03:09.800 --> 00:03:11.440 align:start position:0% otherwise we can't do much we want ideally<00:03:10.280> secure<00:03:10.700> hardware<00:03:11.120> that<00:03:11.270> is 00:03:11.440 --> 00:03:11.450 align:start position:0% ideally secure hardware that is 00:03:11.450 --> 00:03:13.720 align:start position:0% ideally secure hardware that is physically<00:03:11.930> resistant<00:03:12.530> so<00:03:13.040> secure<00:03:13.340> Hardware 00:03:13.720 --> 00:03:13.730 align:start position:0% physically resistant so secure Hardware 00:03:13.730 --> 00:03:16.990 align:start position:0% physically resistant so secure Hardware on<00:03:14.000> which<00:03:14.300> it's<00:03:14.570> hard<00:03:14.900> to<00:03:15.110> extract<00:03:15.500> data<00:03:16.000> sick 00:03:16.990 --> 00:03:17.000 align:start position:0% on which it's hard to extract data sick 00:03:17.000 --> 00:03:19.150 align:start position:0% on which it's hard to extract data sick we<00:03:17.300> also<00:03:17.540> want<00:03:17.960> secure<00:03:18.260> adware<00:03:18.680> to<00:03:18.830> give<00:03:19.010> us 00:03:19.150 --> 00:03:19.160 align:start position:0% we also want secure adware to give us 00:03:19.160 --> 00:03:21.760 align:start position:0% we also want secure adware to give us proof<00:03:19.430> of<00:03:19.580> execution<00:03:20.210> on<00:03:20.600> the<00:03:21.110> platform<00:03:21.590> so 00:03:21.760 --> 00:03:21.770 align:start position:0% proof of execution on the platform so 00:03:21.770 --> 00:03:24.460 align:start position:0% proof of execution on the platform so when<00:03:22.340> we<00:03:22.520> run<00:03:22.700> code<00:03:23.030> and<00:03:23.240> secure<00:03:23.540> hardware<00:03:23.750> we 00:03:24.460 --> 00:03:24.470 align:start position:0% when we run code and secure hardware we 00:03:24.470 --> 00:03:26.680 align:start position:0% when we run code and secure hardware we must<00:03:24.740> be<00:03:24.890> able<00:03:25.010> to<00:03:25.160> be<00:03:25.490> able<00:03:25.580> to<00:03:25.730> prove<00:03:26.120> to<00:03:26.420> an 00:03:26.680 --> 00:03:26.690 align:start position:0% must be able to be able to prove to an 00:03:26.690 --> 00:03:28.660 align:start position:0% must be able to be able to prove to an external<00:03:26.990> party<00:03:27.530> that<00:03:28.010> the<00:03:28.130> platform<00:03:28.550> is 00:03:28.660 --> 00:03:28.670 align:start position:0% external party that the platform is 00:03:28.670 --> 00:03:30.310 align:start position:0% external party that the platform is healthy<00:03:29.120> so<00:03:29.360> that<00:03:29.390> the<00:03:29.630> platform<00:03:30.020> has<00:03:30.140> not 00:03:30.310 --> 00:03:30.320 align:start position:0% healthy so that the platform has not 00:03:30.320 --> 00:03:33.520 align:start position:0% healthy so that the platform has not been<00:03:30.500> broken<00:03:31.210> into<00:03:32.210> and<00:03:32.540> that<00:03:33.080> the<00:03:33.260> code 00:03:33.520 --> 00:03:33.530 align:start position:0% been broken into and that the code 00:03:33.530 --> 00:03:35.110 align:start position:0% been broken into and that the code running<00:03:33.980> into<00:03:34.310> the<00:03:34.460> hardware<00:03:34.730> has<00:03:34.970> been 00:03:35.110 --> 00:03:35.120 align:start position:0% running into the hardware has been 00:03:35.120 --> 00:03:36.630 align:start position:0% running into the hardware has been running<00:03:35.420> into<00:03:35.540> the<00:03:35.720> right<00:03:35.840> platform<00:03:36.320> and 00:03:36.630 --> 00:03:36.640 align:start position:0% running into the right platform and 00:03:36.640 --> 00:03:39.430 align:start position:0% running into the right platform and ideally<00:03:37.640> if<00:03:37.910> depending<00:03:38.690> on<00:03:38.960> the<00:03:39.140> hardware 00:03:39.430 --> 00:03:39.440 align:start position:0% ideally if depending on the hardware 00:03:39.440 --> 00:03:41.860 align:start position:0% ideally if depending on the hardware were<00:03:39.710> running<00:03:40.010> on<00:03:40.160> we<00:03:40.610> might<00:03:40.760> want<00:03:41.120> to<00:03:41.360> we 00:03:41.860 --> 00:03:41.870 align:start position:0% were running on we might want to we 00:03:41.870 --> 00:03:43.570 align:start position:0% were running on we might want to we might<00:03:42.050> and<00:03:42.260> we<00:03:42.620> might<00:03:42.770> want<00:03:42.950> to<00:03:43.070> strengthen 00:03:43.570 --> 00:03:43.580 align:start position:0% might and we might want to strengthen 00:03:43.580 --> 00:03:46.090 align:start position:0% might and we might want to strengthen the<00:03:43.730> cryptographic<00:03:44.030> primitives<00:03:44.990> to<00:03:45.650> prevent 00:03:46.090 --> 00:03:46.100 align:start position:0% the cryptographic primitives to prevent 00:03:46.100 --> 00:03:48.190 align:start position:0% the cryptographic primitives to prevent the<00:03:46.310> passes<00:03:46.910> to<00:03:47.240> prevent<00:03:47.810> the<00:03:47.870> passive 00:03:48.190 --> 00:03:48.200 align:start position:0% the passes to prevent the passive 00:03:48.200 --> 00:03:49.420 align:start position:0% the passes to prevent the passive attacks<00:03:48.530> we<00:03:48.709> have<00:03:48.800> been<00:03:48.980> talking<00:03:49.310> about 00:03:49.420 --> 00:03:49.430 align:start position:0% attacks we have been talking about 00:03:49.430 --> 00:03:53.620 align:start position:0% attacks we have been talking about before<00:03:49.760> so<00:03:51.730> when<00:03:52.730> considering<00:03:53.120> secure 00:03:53.620 --> 00:03:53.630 align:start position:0% before so when considering secure 00:03:53.630 --> 00:03:56.380 align:start position:0% before so when considering secure Hardware<00:03:54.050> people<00:03:54.890> do<00:03:55.430> not<00:03:55.580> feel<00:03:55.820> comfortable 00:03:56.380 --> 00:03:56.390 align:start position:0% Hardware people do not feel comfortable 00:03:56.390 --> 00:03:59.530 align:start position:0% Hardware people do not feel comfortable about<00:03:56.540> them<00:03:57.010> because<00:03:58.010> of<00:03:58.340> because<00:03:59.150> of<00:03:59.180> binary 00:03:59.530 --> 00:03:59.540 align:start position:0% about them because of because of binary 00:03:59.540 --> 00:04:02.280 align:start position:0% about them because of because of binary blobs<00:03:59.990> and<00:04:00.140> NGA's<00:04:00.709> around<00:04:01.280> secure<00:04:01.730> hardware 00:04:02.280 --> 00:04:02.290 align:start position:0% blobs and NGA's around secure hardware 00:04:02.290 --> 00:04:05.440 align:start position:0% blobs and NGA's around secure hardware but<00:04:03.290> the<00:04:03.440> general<00:04:03.770> idea<00:04:03.860> here<00:04:04.430> is<00:04:04.640> that<00:04:05.000> today 00:04:05.440 --> 00:04:05.450 align:start position:0% but the general idea here is that today 00:04:05.450 --> 00:04:07.600 align:start position:0% but the general idea here is that today we<00:04:05.510> don't<00:04:05.750> have<00:04:06.140> any<00:04:06.320> kind<00:04:06.650> of<00:04:06.770> open<00:04:07.130> hardware 00:04:07.600 --> 00:04:07.610 align:start position:0% we don't have any kind of open hardware 00:04:07.610 --> 00:04:09.820 align:start position:0% we don't have any kind of open hardware really<00:04:08.240> available<00:04:08.750> if<00:04:09.110> you<00:04:09.350> look<00:04:09.500> closely 00:04:09.820 --> 00:04:09.830 align:start position:0% really available if you look closely 00:04:09.830 --> 00:04:12.100 align:start position:0% really available if you look closely into<00:04:10.250> the<00:04:10.550> different<00:04:11.000> architecture<00:04:11.840> of<00:04:11.930> the 00:04:12.100 --> 00:04:12.110 align:start position:0% into the different architecture of the 00:04:12.110 --> 00:04:14.080 align:start position:0% into the different architecture of the hardware<00:04:12.470> that<00:04:12.560> you<00:04:12.709> are<00:04:12.830> using<00:04:13.010> you<00:04:13.610> never 00:04:14.080 --> 00:04:14.090 align:start position:0% hardware that you are using you never 00:04:14.090 --> 00:04:16.420 align:start position:0% hardware that you are using you never fully<00:04:14.450> own<00:04:14.780> your<00:04:14.959> hardware<00:04:15.380> I<00:04:15.590> mean<00:04:15.770> at<00:04:16.130> least 00:04:16.420 --> 00:04:16.430 align:start position:0% fully own your hardware I mean at least 00:04:16.430 --> 00:04:18.550 align:start position:0% fully own your hardware I mean at least for<00:04:16.700> all<00:04:16.910> generic<00:04:17.330> for<00:04:17.750> all<00:04:17.900> general-purpose 00:04:18.550 --> 00:04:18.560 align:start position:0% for all generic for all general-purpose 00:04:18.560 --> 00:04:20.940 align:start position:0% for all generic for all general-purpose computers<00:04:19.280> available<00:04:19.730> today<00:04:19.910> on<00:04:20.270> your<00:04:20.690> CPU 00:04:20.940 --> 00:04:20.950 align:start position:0% computers available today on your CPU 00:04:20.950 --> 00:04:23.770 align:start position:0% computers available today on your CPU people<00:04:21.950> can<00:04:22.130> modify<00:04:22.400> the<00:04:22.610> microcode<00:04:23.240> of<00:04:23.479> your 00:04:23.770 --> 00:04:23.780 align:start position:0% people can modify the microcode of your 00:04:23.780 --> 00:04:26.110 align:start position:0% people can modify the microcode of your CPU<00:04:23.930> so<00:04:24.380> the<00:04:24.440> way<00:04:24.680> it<00:04:24.800> behaves<00:04:25.010> if<00:04:25.790> you<00:04:25.970> are 00:04:26.110 --> 00:04:26.120 align:start position:0% CPU so the way it behaves if you are 00:04:26.120 --> 00:04:29.190 align:start position:0% CPU so the way it behaves if you are using<00:04:26.270> an<00:04:26.510> stm32<00:04:27.500> which<00:04:27.830> is<00:04:28.040> a<00:04:28.070> very<00:04:28.370> common 00:04:29.190 --> 00:04:29.200 align:start position:0% using an stm32 which is a very common 00:04:29.200 --> 00:04:31.950 align:start position:0% using an stm32 which is a very common when<00:04:29.820> microcontroller<00:04:30.820> use<00:04:31.150> for<00:04:31.540> hardware 00:04:31.950 --> 00:04:31.960 align:start position:0% when microcontroller use for hardware 00:04:31.960 --> 00:04:33.810 align:start position:0% when microcontroller use for hardware wallets<00:04:32.260> you<00:04:32.710> don't<00:04:32.920> really<00:04:33.220> know<00:04:33.430> how<00:04:33.760> the 00:04:33.810 --> 00:04:33.820 align:start position:0% wallets you don't really know how the 00:04:33.820 --> 00:04:35.820 align:start position:0% wallets you don't really know how the chip<00:04:34.120> is<00:04:34.270> behaving<00:04:34.570> itself<00:04:34.870> as<00:04:35.230> well<00:04:35.410> because 00:04:35.820 --> 00:04:35.830 align:start position:0% chip is behaving itself as well because 00:04:35.830 --> 00:04:37.950 align:start position:0% chip is behaving itself as well because it<00:04:35.950> has<00:04:35.980> critical<00:04:36.610> parts<00:04:36.970> regarding<00:04:37.720> to<00:04:37.840> the 00:04:37.950 --> 00:04:37.960 align:start position:0% it has critical parts regarding to the 00:04:37.960 --> 00:04:40.200 align:start position:0% it has critical parts regarding to the related<00:04:38.620> to<00:04:38.920> the<00:04:39.040> security<00:04:39.460> of<00:04:39.640> the<00:04:40.000> chip 00:04:40.200 --> 00:04:40.210 align:start position:0% related to the security of the chip 00:04:40.210 --> 00:04:43.380 align:start position:0% related to the security of the chip itself<00:04:40.510> so<00:04:41.320> I<00:04:41.620> am<00:04:42.220> taking<00:04:42.820> a<00:04:43.060> pragmatic 00:04:43.380 --> 00:04:43.390 align:start position:0% itself so I am taking a pragmatic 00:04:43.390 --> 00:04:45.720 align:start position:0% itself so I am taking a pragmatic approach<00:04:43.840> about<00:04:44.500> that<00:04:44.770> I'm<00:04:45.070> basically 00:04:45.720 --> 00:04:45.730 align:start position:0% approach about that I'm basically 00:04:45.730 --> 00:04:48.720 align:start position:0% approach about that I'm basically considering<00:04:46.450> that<00:04:47.190> secure<00:04:48.190> hardware<00:04:48.430> is 00:04:48.720 --> 00:04:48.730 align:start position:0% considering that secure hardware is 00:04:48.730 --> 00:04:50.640 align:start position:0% considering that secure hardware is considered<00:04:49.210> to<00:04:49.360> be<00:04:49.390> best<00:04:49.720> of<00:04:49.900> class<00:04:50.140> right<00:04:50.500> to 00:04:50.640 --> 00:04:50.650 align:start position:0% considered to be best of class right to 00:04:50.650 --> 00:04:53.190 align:start position:0% considered to be best of class right to protect<00:04:51.010> data<00:04:51.160> and<00:04:51.610> if<00:04:52.180> it's<00:04:52.360> available<00:04:52.600> and 00:04:53.190 --> 00:04:53.200 align:start position:0% protect data and if it's available and 00:04:53.200 --> 00:04:55.410 align:start position:0% protect data and if it's available and if<00:04:53.590> we<00:04:53.860> think<00:04:54.130> about<00:04:54.370> the<00:04:54.670> different<00:04:55.060> threats 00:04:55.410 --> 00:04:55.420 align:start position:0% if we think about the different threats 00:04:55.420 --> 00:04:57.480 align:start position:0% if we think about the different threats and<00:04:55.690> if<00:04:55.780> we<00:04:55.900> try<00:04:56.110> to<00:04:56.140> limit<00:04:56.440> them<00:04:56.770> it<00:04:57.190> seems 00:04:57.480 --> 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00:05:06.060 --> 00:05:06.070 align:start position:0% mean if you are using as if you are 00:05:06.070 --> 00:05:08.100 align:start position:0% mean if you are using as if you are using<00:05:06.250> an<00:05:06.490> Intel<00:05:06.880> CPU<00:05:07.360> today<00:05:07.660> and<00:05:07.810> you<00:05:07.900> don't 00:05:08.100 --> 00:05:08.110 align:start position:0% using an Intel CPU today and you don't 00:05:08.110 --> 00:05:11.130 align:start position:0% using an Intel CPU today and you don't want<00:05:08.380> to<00:05:08.470> use<00:05:08.620> SGX<00:05:09.220> I<00:05:09.520> would<00:05:10.060> just<00:05:10.450> remind<00:05:10.870> you 00:05:11.130 --> 00:05:11.140 align:start position:0% want to use SGX I would just remind you 00:05:11.140 --> 00:05:12.480 align:start position:0% want to use SGX I would just remind you that<00:05:11.170> you<00:05:11.470> are<00:05:11.500> already<00:05:12.010> using<00:05:12.280> the 00:05:12.480 --> 00:05:12.490 align:start position:0% that you are already using the 00:05:12.490 --> 00:05:14.670 align:start position:0% that you are already using the management<00:05:12.760> engine<00:05:13.330> which<00:05:14.020> can<00:05:14.200> do<00:05:14.350> a<00:05:14.380> lot<00:05:14.530> of 00:05:14.670 --> 00:05:14.680 align:start position:0% management engine which can do a lot of 00:05:14.680 --> 00:05:16.380 align:start position:0% management engine which can do a lot of stuff<00:05:14.920> behind<00:05:15.100> your<00:05:15.430> back<00:05:15.640> so<00:05:15.970> if<00:05:16.180> you<00:05:16.300> are 00:05:16.380 --> 00:05:16.390 align:start position:0% stuff behind your back so if you are 00:05:16.390 --> 00:05:17.850 align:start position:0% stuff behind your back so if you are using<00:05:16.540> the<00:05:16.720> management<00:05:17.140> in<00:05:17.260> giant<00:05:17.560> for<00:05:17.740> the 00:05:17.850 --> 00:05:17.860 align:start position:0% using the management in giant for the 00:05:17.860 --> 00:05:19.980 align:start position:0% using the management in giant for the bad<00:05:18.070> parts<00:05:18.460> we<00:05:18.550> can<00:05:18.700> also<00:05:19.060> use<00:05:19.420> it<00:05:19.570> was<00:05:19.750> a<00:05:19.780> good 00:05:19.980 --> 00:05:19.990 align:start position:0% bad parts we can also use it was a good 00:05:19.990 --> 00:05:24.960 align:start position:0% bad parts we can also use it was a good parts<00:05:21.570> small<00:05:22.570> very<00:05:23.260> quick<00:05:23.560> history<00:05:23.980> of<00:05:24.130> secure 00:05:24.960 --> 00:05:24.970 align:start position:0% parts small very quick history of secure 00:05:24.970 --> 00:05:27.000 align:start position:0% parts small very quick history of secure hardware<00:05:25.120> so<00:05:25.870> the<00:05:25.990> general<00:05:26.350> idea<00:05:26.440> here<00:05:26.920> is 00:05:27.000 --> 00:05:27.010 align:start position:0% hardware so the general idea here is 00:05:27.010 --> 00:05:28.560 align:start position:0% hardware so the general idea here is that<00:05:27.040> secure<00:05:27.490> hardware<00:05:27.700> is<00:05:28.000> getting<00:05:28.330> more 00:05:28.560 --> 00:05:28.570 align:start position:0% that secure hardware is getting more 00:05:28.570 --> 00:05:29.460 align:start position:0% that secure hardware is getting more open<00:05:28.810> over<00:05:29.020> time 00:05:29.460 --> 00:05:29.470 align:start position:0% open over time 00:05:29.470 --> 00:05:31.560 align:start position:0% open over time so<00:05:29.830> initially<00:05:30.610> everything<00:05:30.910> started<00:05:31.450> with 00:05:31.560 --> 00:05:31.570 align:start position:0% so initially everything started with 00:05:31.570 --> 00:05:34.260 align:start position:0% so initially everything started with smart<00:05:31.840> cards<00:05:32.170> in<00:05:32.290> CIT<00:05:32.590> smart<00:05:33.520> cards<00:05:33.880> were<00:05:34.000> not 00:05:34.260 --> 00:05:34.270 align:start position:0% smart cards in CIT smart cards were not 00:05:34.270 --> 00:05:36.300 align:start position:0% smart cards in CIT smart cards were not very<00:05:34.480> powerful<00:05:34.690> and<00:05:35.230> when<00:05:35.410> I'm<00:05:35.530> not<00:05:35.770> easy<00:05:36.040> to 00:05:36.300 --> 00:05:36.310 align:start position:0% very powerful and when I'm not easy to 00:05:36.310 --> 00:05:38.250 align:start position:0% very powerful and when I'm not easy to use<00:05:36.340> you<00:05:36.790> had<00:05:36.910> to<00:05:37.090> buy<00:05:37.240> a<00:05:37.270> specific<00:05:37.570> video<00:05:38.020> to 00:05:38.250 --> 00:05:38.260 align:start position:0% use you had to buy a specific video to 00:05:38.260 --> 00:05:39.900 align:start position:0% use you had to buy a specific video to use<00:05:38.440> them<00:05:38.680> they<00:05:39.130> were<00:05:39.250> absolutely<00:05:39.670> not 00:05:39.900 --> 00:05:39.910 align:start position:0% use them they were absolutely not 00:05:39.910 --> 00:05:42.600 align:start position:0% use them they were absolutely not internet<00:05:40.360> friendly<00:05:40.750> in<00:05:41.260> 2005<00:05:41.980> yubico 00:05:42.600 --> 00:05:42.610 align:start position:0% internet friendly in 2005 yubico 00:05:42.610 --> 00:05:44.550 align:start position:0% internet friendly in 2005 yubico innovated<00:05:43.210> with<00:05:43.420> something<00:05:43.900> more 00:05:44.550 --> 00:05:44.560 align:start position:0% innovated with something more 00:05:44.560 --> 00:05:47.280 align:start position:0% innovated with something more sophisticated<00:05:44.740> on<00:05:45.640> which<00:05:46.060> you<00:05:46.420> could<00:05:47.020> bring 00:05:47.280 --> 00:05:47.290 align:start position:0% sophisticated on which you could bring 00:05:47.290 --> 00:05:49.260 align:start position:0% sophisticated on which you could bring user<00:05:47.560> presence<00:05:48.130> and<00:05:48.400> you<00:05:48.790> didn't<00:05:49.090> need<00:05:49.210> a 00:05:49.260 --> 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a new set of secure 00:05:57.940 --> 00:06:00.210 align:start position:0% have seen really a new set of secure hardware<00:05:58.150> coming<00:05:58.810> with<00:05:59.650> cryptocurrencies 00:06:00.210 --> 00:06:00.220 align:start position:0% hardware coming with cryptocurrencies 00:06:00.220 --> 00:06:03.210 align:start position:0% hardware coming with cryptocurrencies because<00:06:01.320> how<00:06:02.320> do<00:06:02.380> I<00:06:02.530> wallets<00:06:02.860> have<00:06:03.040> been 00:06:03.210 --> 00:06:03.220 align:start position:0% because how do I wallets have been 00:06:03.220 --> 00:06:05.730 align:start position:0% because how do I wallets have been designed<00:06:03.640> to<00:06:03.850> be<00:06:04.390> able<00:06:05.050> to<00:06:05.260> work<00:06:05.440> in<00:06:05.650> an 00:06:05.730 --> 00:06:05.740 align:start position:0% designed to be able to work in an 00:06:05.740 --> 00:06:08.480 align:start position:0% designed to be able to work in an extremely<00:06:06.070> hostile<00:06:06.700> environment<00:06:07.390> in<00:06:07.600> which 00:06:08.480 --> 00:06:08.490 align:start position:0% extremely hostile environment in which 00:06:08.490 --> 00:06:10.980 align:start position:0% extremely hostile environment in which malware<00:06:09.490> could<00:06:09.790> change<00:06:10.120> things<00:06:10.480> on<00:06:10.690> the<00:06:10.810> user 00:06:10.980 --> 00:06:10.990 align:start position:0% malware could change things on the user 00:06:10.990 --> 00:06:13.620 align:start position:0% malware could change things on the user computer<00:06:11.650> and<00:06:11.920> the<00:06:12.490> hardware<00:06:12.850> wallet<00:06:13.180> had<00:06:13.390> to 00:06:13.620 --> 00:06:13.630 align:start position:0% computer and the hardware wallet had to 00:06:13.630 --> 00:06:16.140 align:start position:0% computer and the hardware wallet had to always<00:06:13.870> operate<00:06:14.530> properly<00:06:14.770> otherwise<00:06:15.160> people 00:06:16.140 --> 00:06:16.150 align:start position:0% always operate properly otherwise people 00:06:16.150 --> 00:06:19.080 align:start position:0% always operate properly otherwise people would<00:06:16.330> be<00:06:16.480> losing<00:06:16.630> money<00:06:17.250> so<00:06:18.250> I'm<00:06:18.460> considering 00:06:19.080 --> 00:06:19.090 align:start position:0% would be losing money so I'm considering 00:06:19.090 --> 00:06:21.480 align:start position:0% would be losing money so I'm considering Hardware<00:06:19.600> wallets<00:06:19.930> today<00:06:20.290> as<00:06:20.920> the<00:06:21.220> next 00:06:21.480 --> 00:06:21.490 align:start position:0% Hardware wallets today as the next 00:06:21.490 --> 00:06:23.670 align:start position:0% Hardware wallets today as the next evolution<00:06:22.060> in<00:06:22.240> smart<00:06:22.810> cards<00:06:23.140> because<00:06:23.530> they 00:06:23.670 --> 00:06:23.680 align:start position:0% evolution in smart cards because they 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history of generic hardware<00:06:33.100> so<00:06:33.370> wide<00:06:33.640> secure<00:06:34.270> hard<00:06:34.480> way<00:06:34.660> is 00:06:34.710 --> 00:06:34.720 align:start position:0% hardware so wide secure hard way is 00:06:34.720 --> 00:06:36.810 align:start position:0% hardware so wide secure hard way is getting<00:06:34.900> mopin<00:06:35.560> generic<00:06:36.340> how<00:06:36.520> do<00:06:36.580> I<00:06:36.760> is 00:06:36.810 --> 00:06:36.820 align:start position:0% getting mopin generic how do I is 00:06:36.820 --> 00:06:39.330 align:start position:0% getting mopin generic how do I is getting<00:06:37.150> more<00:06:37.300> secure<00:06:37.720> so<00:06:38.380> they<00:06:38.890> will<00:06:39.040> meet<00:06:39.160> at 00:06:39.330 --> 00:06:39.340 align:start position:0% getting more secure so they will meet at 00:06:39.340 --> 00:06:41.320 align:start position:0% getting more secure so they will meet at some<00:06:39.490> point<00:06:39.730> that's<00:06:40.210> the<00:06:40.330> idea<00:06:40.630> so 00:06:41.320 --> 00:06:41.330 align:start position:0% some point that's the idea so 00:06:41.330 --> 00:06:44.170 align:start position:0% some point that's the idea so here<00:06:42.039> initially<00:06:43.039> if<00:06:43.370> we<00:06:43.550> if<00:06:43.759> we<00:06:43.789> want<00:06:44.090> to 00:06:44.170 --> 00:06:44.180 align:start position:0% here initially if we if we want to 00:06:44.180 --> 00:06:46.270 align:start position:0% here initially if we if we want to consider<00:06:44.419> the<00:06:44.810> generate<00:06:45.139> CPUs<00:06:45.650> I'm 00:06:46.270 --> 00:06:46.280 align:start position:0% consider the generate CPUs I'm 00:06:46.280 --> 00:06:48.279 align:start position:0% consider the generate CPUs I'm introduced<00:06:46.970> redzone<00:06:47.449> which<00:06:47.750> I'll<00:06:47.930> set<00:06:48.259> up 00:06:48.279 --> 00:06:48.289 align:start position:0% introduced redzone which I'll set up 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create<00:06:56.930> a<00:06:56.960> normal<00:06:57.409> world<00:06:57.650> and<00:06:57.949> a<00:06:57.979> secure<00:06:58.460> world 00:06:58.629 --> 00:06:58.639 align:start position:0% create a normal world and a secure world 00:06:58.639 --> 00:07:00.520 align:start position:0% create a normal world and a secure world in<00:06:58.879> which<00:06:59.030> secure<00:06:59.449> application<00:07:00.020> can<00:07:00.259> execute 00:07:00.520 --> 00:07:00.530 align:start position:0% in which secure application can execute 00:07:00.530 --> 00:07:02.260 align:start position:0% in which secure application can execute without<00:07:01.189> being<00:07:01.460> interrupted<00:07:01.699> by<00:07:02.090> the 00:07:02.260 --> 00:07:02.270 align:start position:0% without being interrupted by the 00:07:02.270 --> 00:07:05.260 align:start position:0% without being interrupted by the operating<00:07:02.659> system<00:07:03.699> Intel<00:07:04.699> did<00:07:04.939> the<00:07:05.030> same 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is providing a set of 00:07:14.000 --> 00:07:16.209 align:start position:0% primitives in hgx is providing a set of API<00:07:14.360> that<00:07:14.690> you<00:07:14.840> can<00:07:14.870> use<00:07:15.199> to<00:07:15.440> run<00:07:15.560> any<00:07:15.889> kind<00:07:16.099> of 00:07:16.209 --> 00:07:16.219 align:start position:0% API that you can use to run any kind of 00:07:16.219 --> 00:07:17.860 align:start position:0% API that you can use to run any kind of application<00:07:16.849> without<00:07:17.090> writing<00:07:17.569> the 00:07:17.860 --> 00:07:17.870 align:start position:0% application without writing the 00:07:17.870 --> 00:07:20.680 align:start position:0% application without writing the operating<00:07:18.289> system<00:07:18.590> yourself<00:07:18.740> and<00:07:19.330> then<00:07:20.330> a<00:07:20.360> bit 00:07:20.680 --> 00:07:20.690 align:start position:0% operating system yourself and then a bit 00:07:20.690 --> 00:07:21.100 align:start position:0% operating system yourself and then a bit later 00:07:21.100 --> 00:07:21.110 align:start position:0% later 00:07:21.110 --> 00:07:23.320 align:start position:0% later we<00:07:21.530> have<00:07:21.650> seen<00:07:21.889> some<00:07:22.069> evolutions<00:07:22.639> of<00:07:22.789> tours<00:07:23.120> on 00:07:23.320 --> 00:07:23.330 align:start position:0% we have seen some evolutions of tours on 00:07:23.330 --> 00:07:25.209 align:start position:0% we have seen some evolutions of tours on and<00:07:23.599> mostly<00:07:24.110> trails<00:07:24.560> on<00:07:24.770> coming<00:07:25.190> with 00:07:25.209 --> 00:07:25.219 align:start position:0% and mostly trails on coming with 00:07:25.219 --> 00:07:27.520 align:start position:0% and mostly trails on coming with hardware<00:07:25.879> components<00:07:26.530> optimizing 00:07:27.520 --> 00:07:27.530 align:start position:0% hardware components optimizing 00:07:27.530 --> 00:07:29.140 align:start position:0% hardware components optimizing cryptographic<00:07:27.860> primitives<00:07:28.669> that<00:07:28.789> we<00:07:29.030> have 00:07:29.140 --> 00:07:29.150 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives that we have 00:07:29.150 --> 00:07:31.089 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives that we have been<00:07:29.300> talking<00:07:29.539> about<00:07:29.750> before<00:07:30.319> and<00:07:30.500> one 00:07:31.089 --> 00:07:31.099 align:start position:0% been talking about before and one 00:07:31.099 --> 00:07:32.950 align:start position:0% been talking about before and one interesting<00:07:31.610> chip<00:07:32.060> if<00:07:32.240> you<00:07:32.360> want<00:07:32.569> to<00:07:32.690> look<00:07:32.840> at 00:07:32.950 --> 00:07:32.960 align:start position:0% interesting chip if you want to look at 00:07:32.960 --> 00:07:35.619 align:start position:0% interesting chip if you want to look at that<00:07:33.139> it<00:07:33.409> is<00:07:34.039> all<00:07:34.520> the<00:07:34.550> latest<00:07:34.940> chip<00:07:35.360> are 00:07:35.619 --> 00:07:35.629 align:start position:0% that it is all the latest chip are 00:07:35.629 --> 00:07:38.469 align:start position:0% that it is all the latest chip are including<00:07:36.169> ble<00:07:36.560> from<00:07:36.860> Nordic<00:07:37.400> which<00:07:38.240> has 00:07:38.469 --> 00:07:38.479 align:start position:0% including ble from Nordic which has 00:07:38.479 --> 00:07:40.779 align:start position:0% including ble from Nordic which has chosen<00:07:39.080> which<00:07:39.529> has<00:07:39.740> frozen<00:07:40.099> and<00:07:40.550> a 00:07:40.779 --> 00:07:40.789 align:start position:0% chosen which has frozen and a 00:07:40.789 --> 00:07:43.089 align:start position:0% chosen which has frozen and a cryptographic<00:07:41.090> accelerator<00:07:41.870> so<00:07:42.469> those<00:07:42.770> chips 00:07:43.089 --> 00:07:43.099 align:start position:0% cryptographic accelerator so those chips 00:07:43.099 --> 00:07:44.860 align:start position:0% cryptographic accelerator so those chips are<00:07:43.310> extremely<00:07:43.849> close<00:07:44.060> to<00:07:44.210> secure<00:07:44.539> element 00:07:44.860 --> 00:07:44.870 align:start position:0% are extremely close to secure element 00:07:44.870 --> 00:07:46.920 align:start position:0% are extremely close to secure element today<00:07:45.110> they<00:07:45.650> don't<00:07:45.830> have<00:07:46.069> exactly<00:07:46.520> the<00:07:46.759> same 00:07:46.920 --> 00:07:46.930 align:start position:0% today they don't have exactly the same 00:07:46.930 --> 00:07:49.689 align:start position:0% today they don't have exactly the same physical<00:07:47.930> properties<00:07:48.229> I<00:07:48.979> mean<00:07:49.250> regarding 00:07:49.689 --> 00:07:49.699 align:start position:0% physical properties I mean regarding 00:07:49.699 --> 00:07:51.700 align:start position:0% physical properties I mean regarding resistance<00:07:50.270> to<00:07:50.599> hardware<00:07:51.110> attacks<00:07:51.469> and 00:07:51.700 --> 00:07:51.710 align:start position:0% resistance to hardware attacks and 00:07:51.710 --> 00:07:53.709 align:start position:0% resistance to hardware attacks and proving<00:07:52.460> the<00:07:52.610> origin<00:07:53.000> of<00:07:53.120> the<00:07:53.210> chip<00:07:53.479> but 00:07:53.709 --> 00:07:53.719 align:start position:0% proving the origin of the chip but 00:07:53.719 --> 00:07:55.719 align:start position:0% proving the origin of the chip but otherwise<00:07:54.020> they<00:07:54.800> are<00:07:54.830> they<00:07:55.250> are<00:07:55.370> extremely 00:07:55.719 --> 00:07:55.729 align:start position:0% otherwise they are they are extremely 00:07:55.729 --> 00:07:59.860 align:start position:0% otherwise they are they are extremely close<00:07:56.770> so<00:07:57.770> now<00:07:57.949> what<00:07:58.310> do<00:07:58.580> we<00:07:58.819> what<00:07:59.419> is<00:07:59.810> a 00:07:59.860 --> 00:07:59.870 align:start position:0% close so now what do we what is a 00:07:59.870 --> 00:08:01.809 align:start position:0% close so now what do we what is a hardware<00:08:00.440> wallet<00:08:00.800> and<00:08:00.979> what<00:08:01.190> do<00:08:01.339> we<00:08:01.460> want<00:08:01.639> to 00:08:01.809 --> 00:08:01.819 align:start position:0% hardware wallet and what do we want to 00:08:01.819 --> 00:08:03.909 align:start position:0% hardware wallet and what do we want to build<00:08:01.969> if<00:08:02.449> we<00:08:02.690> are<00:08:02.810> splitting<00:08:03.110> the<00:08:03.529> different 00:08:03.909 --> 00:08:03.919 align:start position:0% build if we are splitting the different 00:08:03.919 --> 00:08:05.680 align:start position:0% build if we are splitting the different parts<00:08:04.279> of<00:08:04.370> hardware<00:08:04.940> wallet<00:08:05.270> into<00:08:05.569> an 00:08:05.680 --> 00:08:05.690 align:start position:0% parts of hardware wallet into an 00:08:05.690 --> 00:08:07.360 align:start position:0% parts of hardware wallet into an architecture<00:08:06.289> that<00:08:06.800> I<00:08:06.830> will<00:08:07.039> call<00:08:07.219> the 00:08:07.360 --> 00:08:07.370 align:start position:0% architecture that I will call the 00:08:07.370 --> 00:08:09.339 align:start position:0% architecture that I will call the transaction<00:08:07.849> interface<00:08:08.300> so<00:08:08.990> the<00:08:09.080> transaction 00:08:09.339 --> 00:08:09.349 align:start position:0% transaction interface so the transaction 00:08:09.349 --> 00:08:11.589 align:start position:0% transaction interface so the transaction interface<00:08:09.979> will<00:08:10.190> interact<00:08:10.520> with<00:08:10.849> secret<00:08:11.360> data 00:08:11.589 --> 00:08:11.599 align:start position:0% interface will interact with secret data 00:08:11.599 --> 00:08:14.800 align:start position:0% interface will interact with secret data which<00:08:12.469> is<00:08:12.710> basically<00:08:13.460> as<00:08:13.849> the<00:08:14.210> seed<00:08:14.449> of<00:08:14.479> the 00:08:14.800 --> 00:08:14.810 align:start position:0% which is basically as the seed of the 00:08:14.810 --> 00:08:17.079 align:start position:0% which is basically as the seed of the user<00:08:15.020> if<00:08:15.409> we<00:08:15.589> are<00:08:15.680> considering<00:08:16.219> if<00:08:16.849> we<00:08:17.000> are 00:08:17.079 --> 00:08:17.089 align:start position:0% user if we are considering if we are 00:08:17.089 --> 00:08:18.519 align:start position:0% user if we are considering if we are considering<00:08:17.419> keys<00:08:17.870> and<00:08:18.169> if<00:08:18.289> you<00:08:18.440> are 00:08:18.519 --> 00:08:18.529 align:start position:0% considering keys and if you are 00:08:18.529 --> 00:08:20.589 align:start position:0% considering keys and if you are considering<00:08:18.889> deriving<00:08:19.339> keys<00:08:19.699> several 00:08:20.589 --> 00:08:20.599 align:start position:0% considering deriving keys several 00:08:20.599 --> 00:08:22.240 align:start position:0% considering deriving keys several applications<00:08:21.229> will<00:08:21.529> be<00:08:21.560> interacting<00:08:22.219> with 00:08:22.240 --> 00:08:22.250 align:start position:0% applications will be interacting with 00:08:22.250 --> 00:08:23.740 align:start position:0% applications will be interacting with those<00:08:22.550> keys<00:08:22.789> we<00:08:23.150> don't<00:08:23.360> want<00:08:23.629> those 00:08:23.740 --> 00:08:23.750 align:start position:0% those keys we don't want those 00:08:23.750 --> 00:08:25.600 align:start position:0% those keys we don't want those applications<00:08:24.379> who<00:08:24.560> interact<00:08:25.009> directly<00:08:25.310> with 00:08:25.600 --> 00:08:25.610 align:start position:0% applications who interact directly with 00:08:25.610 --> 00:08:27.790 align:start position:0% applications who interact directly with the<00:08:25.819> secrets<00:08:26.240> otherwise<00:08:26.810> they<00:08:27.050> can<00:08:27.259> steal<00:08:27.650> the 00:08:27.790 --> 00:08:27.800 align:start position:0% the secrets otherwise they can steal the 00:08:27.800 --> 00:08:29.619 align:start position:0% the secrets otherwise they can steal the secrets<00:08:28.159> and<00:08:28.339> we<00:08:28.819> want<00:08:29.029> to<00:08:29.150> iterate<00:08:29.300> the 00:08:29.619 --> 00:08:29.629 align:start position:0% secrets and we want to iterate the 00:08:29.629 --> 00:08:31.570 align:start position:0% secrets and we want to iterate the applications<00:08:30.169> from<00:08:30.349> each<00:08:30.500> other<00:08:30.710> so 00:08:31.570 --> 00:08:31.580 align:start position:0% applications from each other so 00:08:31.580 --> 00:08:33.579 align:start position:0% applications from each other so applications<00:08:32.479> have<00:08:32.779> to<00:08:33.050> call<00:08:33.320> the 00:08:33.579 --> 00:08:33.589 align:start position:0% applications have to call the 00:08:33.589 --> 00:08:35.500 align:start position:0% applications have to call the transaction<00:08:34.070> interface<00:08:34.550> over<00:08:34.789> a<00:08:35.120> secured 00:08:35.500 --> 00:08:35.510 align:start position:0% transaction interface over a secured 00:08:35.510 --> 00:08:37.870 align:start position:0% transaction interface over a secured pass<00:08:35.750> which<00:08:36.409> won't<00:08:36.680> reveal<00:08:36.979> the<00:08:37.159> secret<00:08:37.550> and 00:08:37.870 --> 00:08:37.880 align:start position:0% pass which won't reveal the secret and 00:08:37.880 --> 00:08:40.449 align:start position:0% pass which won't reveal the secret and will<00:08:38.029> only<00:08:38.269> let<00:08:38.690> them<00:08:38.990> run<00:08:39.560> a<00:08:39.589> specific<00:08:40.219> set<00:08:40.430> of 00:08:40.449 --> 00:08:40.459 align:start position:0% will only let them run a specific set of 00:08:40.459 --> 00:08:43.480 align:start position:0% will only let them run a specific set of of<00:08:40.880> algorithms<00:08:41.599> and<00:08:41.810> further<00:08:42.709> we<00:08:43.010> can<00:08:43.219> lock 00:08:43.480 --> 00:08:43.490 align:start position:0% of algorithms and further we can lock 00:08:43.490 --> 00:08:46.000 align:start position:0% of algorithms and further we can lock the<00:08:43.760> applications<00:08:44.390> on<00:08:44.630> several<00:08:45.380> properties 00:08:46.000 --> 00:08:46.010 align:start position:0% the applications on several properties 00:08:46.010 --> 00:08:49.120 align:start position:0% the applications on several properties for<00:08:46.279> example<00:08:46.670> we<00:08:47.089> can<00:08:47.269> lock<00:08:47.480> them<00:08:47.690> on<00:08:47.930> an<00:08:48.440> HDD 00:08:49.120 --> 00:08:49.130 align:start position:0% for example we can lock them on an HDD 00:08:49.130 --> 00:08:52.030 align:start position:0% for example we can lock them on an HDD revision<00:08:49.640> pass<00:08:49.880> which<00:08:50.480> means<00:08:50.810> that<00:08:51.079> here<00:08:51.770> if 00:08:52.030 --> 00:08:52.040 align:start position:0% revision pass which means that here if 00:08:52.040 --> 00:08:54.430 align:start position:0% revision pass which means that here if an<00:08:52.339> application<00:08:52.699> gets<00:08:53.120> compromised<00:08:53.690> the<00:08:54.199> only 00:08:54.430 --> 00:08:54.440 align:start position:0% an application gets compromised the only 00:08:54.440 --> 00:08:55.030 align:start position:0% an application gets compromised the only derivation 00:08:55.030 --> 00:08:55.040 align:start position:0% derivation 00:08:55.040 --> 00:08:58.090 align:start position:0% derivation pass<00:08:55.190> that<00:08:55.430> can<00:08:55.580> leak<00:08:55.820> is<00:08:56.210> a<00:08:56.270> specific<00:08:57.080> is<00:08:57.590> past 00:08:58.090 --> 00:08:58.100 align:start position:0% pass that can leak is a specific is past 00:08:58.100 --> 00:09:00.700 align:start position:0% pass that can leak is a specific is past specific<00:08:58.580> to<00:08:58.700> this<00:08:58.820> application<00:08:58.970> so<00:08:59.780> here<00:09:00.200> I'm 00:09:00.700 --> 00:09:00.710 align:start position:0% specific to this application so here I'm 00:09:00.710 --> 00:09:02.980 align:start position:0% specific to this application so here I'm referring<00:09:01.220> to<00:09:01.700> your<00:09:01.820> article<00:09:02.180> deterministic 00:09:02.980 --> 00:09:02.990 align:start position:0% referring to your article deterministic 00:09:02.990 --> 00:09:06.040 align:start position:0% referring to your article deterministic wallets<00:09:03.410> which<00:09:04.190> are<00:09:04.370> getting<00:09:04.670> used<00:09:04.970> on<00:09:05.240> now 00:09:06.040 --> 00:09:06.050 align:start position:0% wallets which are getting used on now 00:09:06.050 --> 00:09:08.440 align:start position:0% wallets which are getting used on now significantly<00:09:06.830> I<00:09:06.950> mean<00:09:07.310> for<00:09:07.610> for<00:09:07.850> atrium<00:09:08.270> and 00:09:08.440 --> 00:09:08.450 align:start position:0% significantly I mean for for atrium and 00:09:08.450 --> 00:09:10.780 align:start position:0% significantly I mean for for atrium and have<00:09:08.960> been<00:09:09.110> used<00:09:09.350> in<00:09:09.530> Bitcoin<00:09:09.950> for<00:09:10.250> a<00:09:10.670> long 00:09:10.780 --> 00:09:10.790 align:start position:0% have been used in Bitcoin for a long 00:09:10.790 --> 00:09:13.000 align:start position:0% have been used in Bitcoin for a long time<00:09:11.060> but<00:09:11.330> we<00:09:11.570> can<00:09:11.720> generalize<00:09:12.170> a<00:09:12.230> concept<00:09:12.740> for 00:09:13.000 --> 00:09:13.010 align:start position:0% time but we can generalize a concept for 00:09:13.010 --> 00:09:17.650 align:start position:0% time but we can generalize a concept for all<00:09:13.130> set<00:09:13.370> of<00:09:13.490> keys<00:09:15.070> how<00:09:16.070> do<00:09:16.130> we<00:09:16.460> so<00:09:16.760> what<00:09:17.090> kind 00:09:17.650 --> 00:09:17.660 align:start position:0% all set of keys how do we so what kind 00:09:17.660 --> 00:09:19.390 align:start position:0% all set of keys how do we so what kind of<00:09:17.780> components<00:09:18.380> do<00:09:18.500> we<00:09:18.620> need<00:09:18.800> to<00:09:19.040> build<00:09:19.190> the 00:09:19.390 --> 00:09:19.400 align:start position:0% of components do we need to build the 00:09:19.400 --> 00:09:20.710 align:start position:0% of components do we need to build the transaction<00:09:19.850> in<00:09:19.940> their<00:09:20.060> place<00:09:20.270> and<00:09:20.480> secure 00:09:20.710 --> 00:09:20.720 align:start position:0% transaction in their place and secure 00:09:20.720 --> 00:09:23.140 align:start position:0% transaction in their place and secure Hardware<00:09:21.170> we<00:09:21.770> need<00:09:21.920> to<00:09:22.190> build<00:09:22.430> the<00:09:22.670> iteration 00:09:23.140 --> 00:09:23.150 align:start position:0% Hardware we need to build the iteration 00:09:23.150 --> 00:09:25.360 align:start position:0% Hardware we need to build the iteration first<00:09:23.510> so<00:09:23.960> because<00:09:24.380> if<00:09:24.740> we<00:09:24.920> want<00:09:25.130> to<00:09:25.190> run 00:09:25.360 --> 00:09:25.370 align:start position:0% first so because if we want to run 00:09:25.370 --> 00:09:27.220 align:start position:0% first so because if we want to run several<00:09:25.820> applications<00:09:26.390> together<00:09:26.750> we<00:09:27.050> need<00:09:27.170> to 00:09:27.220 --> 00:09:27.230 align:start position:0% several applications together we need to 00:09:27.230 --> 00:09:29.320 align:start position:0% several applications together we need to isolate<00:09:27.470> them<00:09:27.980> and<00:09:28.130> we<00:09:28.610> need<00:09:28.730> to<00:09:28.880> easily<00:09:29.180> the 00:09:29.320 --> 00:09:29.330 align:start position:0% isolate them and we need to easily the 00:09:29.330 --> 00:09:31.900 align:start position:0% isolate them and we need to easily the part<00:09:29.750> into<00:09:30.050> writing<00:09:30.230> with<00:09:30.560> secret<00:09:30.920> data<00:09:31.100> from 00:09:31.900 --> 00:09:31.910 align:start position:0% part into writing with secret data from 00:09:31.910 --> 00:09:33.940 align:start position:0% part into writing with secret data from the<00:09:32.060> applications<00:09:32.600> then<00:09:33.260> we<00:09:33.650> need<00:09:33.800> to 00:09:33.940 --> 00:09:33.950 align:start position:0% the applications then we need to 00:09:33.950 --> 00:09:36.520 align:start position:0% the applications then we need to guarantee<00:09:34.160> secure<00:09:34.850> storage<00:09:35.060> we<00:09:36.050> need<00:09:36.230> to 00:09:36.520 --> 00:09:36.530 align:start position:0% guarantee secure storage we need to 00:09:36.530 --> 00:09:38.770 align:start position:0% guarantee secure storage we need to guarantee<00:09:36.740> a<00:09:37.340> secure<00:09:37.730> implementation<00:09:38.540> of<00:09:38.690> the 00:09:38.770 --> 00:09:38.780 align:start position:0% guarantee a secure implementation of the 00:09:38.780 --> 00:09:41.020 align:start position:0% guarantee a secure implementation of the cryptographic<00:09:39.110> primitives<00:09:39.950> so<00:09:40.250> referring<00:09:40.790> to 00:09:41.020 --> 00:09:41.030 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives so referring to 00:09:41.030 --> 00:09:43.570 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives so referring to the<00:09:41.500> passive<00:09:42.500> attacks<00:09:42.860> that<00:09:43.070> we<00:09:43.220> talked<00:09:43.460> about 00:09:43.570 --> 00:09:43.580 align:start position:0% the passive attacks that we talked about 00:09:43.580 --> 00:09:46.780 align:start position:0% the passive attacks that we talked about before<00:09:43.940> and<00:09:44.390> then<00:09:45.140> we<00:09:45.650> need<00:09:45.830> to<00:09:46.040> make<00:09:46.190> we<00:09:46.640> need 00:09:46.780 --> 00:09:46.790 align:start position:0% before and then we need to make we need 00:09:46.790 --> 00:09:48.940 align:start position:0% before and then we need to make we need to<00:09:46.940> provide<00:09:47.240> a<00:09:47.300> way<00:09:47.420> for<00:09:47.570> the<00:09:48.020> external<00:09:48.530> party 00:09:48.940 --> 00:09:48.950 align:start position:0% to provide a way for the external party 00:09:48.950 --> 00:09:50.890 align:start position:0% to provide a way for the external party to<00:09:49.130> verify<00:09:49.640> that<00:09:49.910> the<00:09:50.360> platform<00:09:50.780> is 00:09:50.890 --> 00:09:50.900 align:start position:0% to verify that the platform is 00:09:50.900 --> 00:09:52.450 align:start position:0% to verify that the platform is legitimate<00:09:51.530> and<00:09:51.770> that<00:09:51.950> an<00:09:52.070> application 00:09:52.450 --> 00:09:52.460 align:start position:0% legitimate and that an application 00:09:52.460 --> 00:09:54.430 align:start position:0% legitimate and that an application running<00:09:52.880> on<00:09:53.120> the<00:09:53.240> platform<00:09:53.630> is<00:09:53.780> legitimate 00:09:54.430 --> 00:09:54.440 align:start position:0% running on the platform is legitimate 00:09:54.440 --> 00:09:56.470 align:start position:0% running on the platform is legitimate and<00:09:54.680> on<00:09:55.160> top<00:09:55.370> of<00:09:55.520> that<00:09:55.700> because<00:09:56.030> we<00:09:56.390> are 00:09:56.470 --> 00:09:56.480 align:start position:0% and on top of that because we are 00:09:56.480 --> 00:09:58.300 align:start position:0% and on top of that because we are running<00:09:56.630> in<00:09:56.930> a<00:09:56.990> world<00:09:57.230> with<00:09:57.470> smart<00:09:57.710> contracts 00:09:58.300 --> 00:09:58.310 align:start position:0% running in a world with smart contracts 00:09:58.310 --> 00:10:00.160 align:start position:0% running in a world with smart contracts we<00:09:58.730> want<00:09:58.910> to<00:09:59.030> provide<00:09:59.360> a<00:09:59.420> way<00:09:59.690> to<00:09:59.750> authenticate 00:10:00.160 --> 00:10:00.170 align:start position:0% we want to provide a way to authenticate 00:10:00.170 --> 00:10:03.040 align:start position:0% we want to provide a way to authenticate this<00:10:00.740> on<00:10:00.980> chain<00:10:01.280> so<00:10:01.850> typically<00:10:02.360> we<00:10:02.630> want<00:10:02.750> to<00:10:02.960> be 00:10:03.040 --> 00:10:03.050 align:start position:0% this on chain so typically we want to be 00:10:03.050 --> 00:10:04.570 align:start position:0% this on chain so typically we want to be able<00:10:03.230> to<00:10:03.350> prove<00:10:03.560> and<00:10:03.770> change<00:10:04.070> that<00:10:04.310> we<00:10:04.490> are 00:10:04.570 --> 00:10:04.580 align:start position:0% able to prove and change that we are 00:10:04.580 --> 00:10:06.490 align:start position:0% able to prove and change that we are running<00:10:04.790> the<00:10:05.300> right<00:10:05.480> application<00:10:06.080> on<00:10:06.260> the 00:10:06.490 --> 00:10:06.500 align:start position:0% running the right application on the 00:10:06.500 --> 00:10:08.770 align:start position:0% running the right application on the right<00:10:06.650> platform<00:10:07.100> and<00:10:07.370> now<00:10:07.970> we<00:10:08.030> will<00:10:08.210> see<00:10:08.510> how 00:10:08.770 --> 00:10:08.780 align:start position:0% right platform and now we will see how 00:10:08.780 --> 00:10:10.660 align:start position:0% right platform and now we will see how to<00:10:08.810> implement<00:10:09.260> this<00:10:09.590> different<00:10:10.040> components 00:10:10.660 --> 00:10:10.670 align:start position:0% to implement this different components 00:10:10.670 --> 00:10:12.160 align:start position:0% to implement this different components on<00:10:10.790> different<00:10:11.210> hardware<00:10:11.420> and<00:10:11.870> the 00:10:12.160 --> 00:10:12.170 align:start position:0% on different hardware and the 00:10:12.170 --> 00:10:16.900 align:start position:0% on different hardware and the consequences<00:10:13.630> so<00:10:14.630> first<00:10:15.160> why<00:10:16.160> are<00:10:16.460> we 00:10:16.900 --> 00:10:16.910 align:start position:0% consequences so first why are we 00:10:16.910 --> 00:10:18.850 align:start position:0% consequences so first why are we designing<00:10:17.180> a<00:10:17.600> traditional<00:10:18.110> interface<00:10:18.350> rather 00:10:18.850 --> 00:10:18.860 align:start position:0% designing a traditional interface rather 00:10:18.860 --> 00:10:21.280 align:start position:0% designing a traditional interface rather than<00:10:19.250> running<00:10:19.610> with<00:10:19.850> a<00:10:20.090> set<00:10:20.690> of<00:10:20.870> different 00:10:21.280 --> 00:10:21.290 align:start position:0% than running with a set of different 00:10:21.290 --> 00:10:23.680 align:start position:0% than running with a set of different applications<00:10:21.950> point<00:10:22.790> is<00:10:23.000> we<00:10:23.180> are<00:10:23.240> saving<00:10:23.540> time 00:10:23.680 --> 00:10:23.690 align:start position:0% applications point is we are saving time 00:10:23.690 --> 00:10:26.410 align:start position:0% applications point is we are saving time by<00:10:24.290> in<00:10:24.410> doing<00:10:24.650> that<00:10:24.830> rather<00:10:25.430> than<00:10:25.850> just 00:10:26.410 --> 00:10:26.420 align:start position:0% by in doing that rather than just 00:10:26.420 --> 00:10:30.070 align:start position:0% by in doing that rather than just letting<00:10:27.200> each<00:10:27.920> provider<00:10:28.520> design<00:10:29.090> his<00:10:29.510> own<00:10:29.750> set 00:10:30.070 --> 00:10:30.080 align:start position:0% letting each provider design his own set 00:10:30.080 --> 00:10:32.320 align:start position:0% letting each provider design his own set of<00:10:30.110> applications<00:10:30.830> as<00:10:31.070> we've<00:10:31.820> seen<00:10:32.090> before 00:10:32.320 --> 00:10:32.330 align:start position:0% of applications as we've seen before 00:10:32.330 --> 00:10:34.840 align:start position:0% of applications as we've seen before formal<00:10:33.080> validation<00:10:33.800> is<00:10:34.010> quite<00:10:34.460> complicated 00:10:34.840 --> 00:10:34.850 align:start position:0% formal validation is quite complicated 00:10:34.850 --> 00:10:37.240 align:start position:0% formal validation is quite complicated so<00:10:35.210> that's<00:10:35.540> just<00:10:35.660> an<00:10:35.840> example<00:10:35.930> if<00:10:36.620> we<00:10:36.950> want<00:10:37.130> a 00:10:37.240 --> 00:10:37.250 align:start position:0% so that's just an example if we want a 00:10:37.250 --> 00:10:39.610 align:start position:0% so that's just an example if we want a formal<00:10:37.610> validation<00:10:38.270> of<00:10:38.480> a<00:10:38.600> secure<00:10:39.140> Hardware 00:10:39.610 --> 00:10:39.620 align:start position:0% formal validation of a secure Hardware 00:10:39.620 --> 00:10:41.290 align:start position:0% formal validation of a secure Hardware it's<00:10:40.040> better<00:10:40.280> to<00:10:40.520> do<00:10:40.640> it<00:10:40.670> on<00:10:40.820> a<00:10:41.000> common 00:10:41.290 --> 00:10:41.300 align:start position:0% it's better to do it on a common 00:10:41.300 --> 00:10:43.750 align:start position:0% it's better to do it on a common interface<00:10:41.600> than<00:10:42.230> to<00:10:42.560> duplicate<00:10:43.130> the<00:10:43.310> work<00:10:43.550> on 00:10:43.750 --> 00:10:43.760 align:start position:0% interface than to duplicate the work on 00:10:43.760 --> 00:10:47.530 align:start position:0% interface than to duplicate the work on a<00:10:44.360> set<00:10:44.750> of<00:10:44.930> applications<00:10:45.220> so<00:10:46.220> here<00:10:46.610> the<00:10:47.270> right 00:10:47.530 --> 00:10:47.540 align:start position:0% a set of applications so here the right 00:10:47.540 --> 00:10:49.030 align:start position:0% a set of applications so here the right parts<00:10:47.960> has<00:10:48.050> a<00:10:48.080> critical<00:10:48.560> path<00:10:48.770> the 00:10:49.030 --> 00:10:49.040 align:start position:0% parts has a critical path the 00:10:49.040 --> 00:10:50.890 align:start position:0% parts has a critical path the transaction<00:10:49.580> interface<00:10:50.030> is<00:10:50.180> critical<00:10:50.690> and 00:10:50.890 --> 00:10:50.900 align:start position:0% transaction interface is critical and 00:10:50.900 --> 00:10:53.500 align:start position:0% transaction interface is critical and all<00:10:51.290> the<00:10:51.650> stubs<00:10:52.010> are<00:10:52.310> that<00:10:52.700> the<00:10:52.940> others<00:10:53.240> that 00:10:53.500 --> 00:10:53.510 align:start position:0% all the stubs are that the others that 00:10:53.510 --> 00:10:55.060 align:start position:0% all the stubs are that the others that the<00:10:53.600> other<00:10:53.720> application<00:10:54.320> would<00:10:54.530> call<00:10:54.830> which 00:10:55.060 --> 00:10:55.070 align:start position:0% the other application would call which 00:10:55.070 --> 00:10:56.770 align:start position:0% the other application would call which are<00:10:55.280> still<00:10:55.520> executing<00:10:56.030> in<00:10:56.150> the<00:10:56.240> secure<00:10:56.540> world 00:10:56.770 --> 00:10:56.780 align:start position:0% are still executing in the secure world 00:10:56.780 --> 00:10:59.560 align:start position:0% are still executing in the secure world are<00:10:57.650> protected<00:10:58.640> by<00:10:58.910> the<00:10:58.970> transaction 00:10:59.560 --> 00:10:59.570 align:start position:0% are protected by the transaction 00:10:59.570 --> 00:11:01.960 align:start position:0% are protected by the transaction interface<00:11:00.050> so<00:11:00.680> you<00:11:00.740> don't<00:11:01.010> need<00:11:01.160> to<00:11:01.310> spend<00:11:01.670> too 00:11:01.960 --> 00:11:01.970 align:start position:0% interface so you don't need to spend too 00:11:01.970 --> 00:11:03.940 align:start position:0% interface so you don't need to spend too much<00:11:02.150> time<00:11:02.210> in<00:11:02.660> that<00:11:02.690> case<00:11:03.110> validating<00:11:03.740> them 00:11:03.940 --> 00:11:03.950 align:start position:0% much time in that case validating them 00:11:03.950 --> 00:11:05.680 align:start position:0% much time in that case validating them because<00:11:04.430> the<00:11:04.640> platform<00:11:04.850> will<00:11:05.300> already 00:11:05.680 --> 00:11:05.690 align:start position:0% because the platform will already 00:11:05.690 --> 00:11:08.110 align:start position:0% because the platform will already guarantee<00:11:06.260> that<00:11:06.410> they<00:11:06.560> can't<00:11:06.770> leak<00:11:07.070> thanks<00:11:08.000> to 00:11:08.110 --> 00:11:08.120 align:start position:0% guarantee that they can't leak thanks to 00:11:08.120 --> 00:11:08.809 align:start position:0% guarantee that they can't leak thanks to the<00:11:08.270> iteration 00:11:08.809 --> 00:11:08.819 align:start position:0% the iteration 00:11:08.819 --> 00:11:13.129 align:start position:0% the iteration properties<00:11:10.039> if<00:11:11.179> we<00:11:12.179> want<00:11:12.389> to<00:11:12.569> implement<00:11:12.809> that 00:11:13.129 --> 00:11:13.139 align:start position:0% properties if we want to implement that 00:11:13.139 --> 00:11:15.949 align:start position:0% properties if we want to implement that on<00:11:13.410> arm<00:11:13.649> so<00:11:14.279> that's<00:11:14.549> regular<00:11:15.299> the<00:11:15.749> most 00:11:15.949 --> 00:11:15.959 align:start position:0% on arm so that's regular the most 00:11:15.959 --> 00:11:17.449 align:start position:0% on arm so that's regular the most regular<00:11:16.259> use<00:11:16.499> case<00:11:16.769> which<00:11:17.069> will<00:11:17.339> be 00:11:17.449 --> 00:11:17.459 align:start position:0% regular use case which will be 00:11:17.459 --> 00:11:20.059 align:start position:0% regular use case which will be completely<00:11:17.910> native<00:11:18.119> we<00:11:19.019> can<00:11:19.199> use<00:11:19.439> the<00:11:19.859> native 00:11:20.059 --> 00:11:20.069 align:start position:0% completely native we can use the native 00:11:20.069 --> 00:11:22.789 align:start position:0% completely native we can use the native properties<00:11:20.789> of<00:11:20.970> an<00:11:21.209> see<00:11:21.479> of<00:11:21.660> arm<00:11:21.989> CPUs<00:11:22.499> to<00:11:22.529> do 00:11:22.789 --> 00:11:22.799 align:start position:0% properties of an see of arm CPUs to do 00:11:22.799 --> 00:11:25.669 align:start position:0% properties of an see of arm CPUs to do that<00:11:23.039> so<00:11:23.609> we<00:11:23.789> can<00:11:23.939> iterate<00:11:24.239> the<00:11:24.629> secrets<00:11:25.079> using 00:11:25.669 --> 00:11:25.679 align:start position:0% that so we can iterate the secrets using 00:11:25.679 --> 00:11:27.919 align:start position:0% that so we can iterate the secrets using memory<00:11:26.309> management<00:11:26.759> you<00:11:27.029> need<00:11:27.179> our<00:11:27.449> memory 00:11:27.919 --> 00:11:27.929 align:start position:0% memory management you need our memory 00:11:27.929 --> 00:11:31.099 align:start position:0% memory management you need our memory protection<00:11:28.529> unit<00:11:28.799> and<00:11:29.119> when<00:11:30.119> the<00:11:30.539> course<00:11:30.809> that 00:11:31.099 --> 00:11:31.109 align:start position:0% protection unit and when the course that 00:11:31.109 --> 00:11:34.189 align:start position:0% protection unit and when the course that will<00:11:31.379> be<00:11:31.619> done<00:11:32.459> over<00:11:33.149> from<00:11:33.479> the<00:11:33.629> applications 00:11:34.189 --> 00:11:34.199 align:start position:0% will be done over from the applications 00:11:34.199 --> 00:11:35.929 align:start position:0% will be done over from the applications to<00:11:34.350> the<00:11:34.470> transaction<00:11:34.889> in<00:11:35.009> their<00:11:35.160> face<00:11:35.369> can<00:11:35.910> be 00:11:35.929 --> 00:11:35.939 align:start position:0% to the transaction in their face can be 00:11:35.939 --> 00:11:38.259 align:start position:0% to the transaction in their face can be directly<00:11:36.449> mapped<00:11:36.720> to<00:11:36.959> arm<00:11:37.169> service<00:11:37.529> calls 00:11:38.259 --> 00:11:38.269 align:start position:0% directly mapped to arm service calls 00:11:38.269 --> 00:11:41.989 align:start position:0% directly mapped to arm service calls so<00:11:39.269> here<00:11:39.720> the<00:11:40.229> architecture<00:11:40.859> is<00:11:41.129> extremely 00:11:41.989 --> 00:11:41.999 align:start position:0% so here the architecture is extremely 00:11:41.999 --> 00:11:43.639 align:start position:0% so here the architecture is extremely close<00:11:42.239> to<00:11:42.389> the<00:11:42.509> first<00:11:42.720> one<00:11:43.019> we<00:11:43.499> are<00:11:43.559> just 00:11:43.639 --> 00:11:43.649 align:start position:0% close to the first one we are just 00:11:43.649 --> 00:11:45.859 align:start position:0% close to the first one we are just replacing<00:11:43.979> all<00:11:44.729> the<00:11:44.910> calls<00:11:45.209> and<00:11:45.479> all<00:11:45.660> the 00:11:45.859 --> 00:11:45.869 align:start position:0% replacing all the calls and all the 00:11:45.869 --> 00:11:48.049 align:start position:0% replacing all the calls and all the iteration<00:11:46.410> by<00:11:46.619> native<00:11:47.069> arm<00:11:47.279> properties<00:11:47.819> and 00:11:48.049 --> 00:11:48.059 align:start position:0% iteration by native arm properties and 00:11:48.059 --> 00:11:50.119 align:start position:0% iteration by native arm properties and the<00:11:48.539> applications<00:11:49.109> themselves<00:11:49.259> are<00:11:49.739> native 00:11:50.119 --> 00:11:50.129 align:start position:0% the applications themselves are native 00:11:50.129 --> 00:11:52.189 align:start position:0% the applications themselves are native we<00:11:50.459> don't<00:11:50.669> need<00:11:50.850> to<00:11:51.089> run<00:11:51.269> a<00:11:51.299> VM<00:11:51.749> when<00:11:52.019> you<00:11:52.109> are 00:11:52.189 --> 00:11:52.199 align:start position:0% we don't need to run a VM when you are 00:11:52.199 --> 00:11:54.199 align:start position:0% we don't need to run a VM when you are using<00:11:52.410> arm<00:11:52.829> because<00:11:53.519> the<00:11:53.669> hardware<00:11:54.119> is 00:11:54.199 --> 00:11:54.209 align:start position:0% using arm because the hardware is 00:11:54.209 --> 00:11:56.299 align:start position:0% using arm because the hardware is allowing<00:11:54.600> is<00:11:54.749> allowing<00:11:55.350> us<00:11:55.529> to<00:11:55.589> perform<00:11:56.160> the 00:11:56.299 --> 00:11:56.309 align:start position:0% allowing is allowing us to perform the 00:11:56.309 --> 00:12:00.309 align:start position:0% allowing is allowing us to perform the iteration<00:11:56.789> by<00:11:56.939> itself<00:11:58.189> now<00:11:59.189> let's<00:11:59.879> consider 00:12:00.309 --> 00:12:00.319 align:start position:0% iteration by itself now let's consider 00:12:00.319 --> 00:12:04.129 align:start position:0% iteration by itself now let's consider hgx<00:12:01.319> so<00:12:01.829> hgx<00:12:02.489> is<00:12:02.759> kind<00:12:03.329> of<00:12:03.479> different 00:12:04.129 --> 00:12:04.139 align:start position:0% hgx so hgx is kind of different 00:12:04.139 --> 00:12:06.619 align:start position:0% hgx so hgx is kind of different we<00:12:04.589> don't<00:12:04.769> have<00:12:04.949> ax<00:12:05.160> we<00:12:05.399> don't<00:12:05.579> work<00:12:05.819> close<00:12:06.449> to 00:12:06.619 --> 00:12:06.629 align:start position:0% we don't have ax we don't work close to 00:12:06.629 --> 00:12:08.569 align:start position:0% we don't have ax we don't work close to the<00:12:06.749> metal<00:12:06.959> we<00:12:07.379> can't<00:12:07.679> really<00:12:08.129> easy<00:12:08.339> right 00:12:08.569 --> 00:12:08.579 align:start position:0% the metal we can't really easy right 00:12:08.579 --> 00:12:11.179 align:start position:0% the metal we can't really easy right enclaves<00:12:09.269> so<00:12:09.749> enclaves<00:12:10.259> being<00:12:10.589> application 00:12:11.179 --> 00:12:11.189 align:start position:0% enclaves so enclaves being application 00:12:11.189 --> 00:12:13.299 align:start position:0% enclaves so enclaves being application running<00:12:11.429> an<00:12:11.609> edge<00:12:11.729> reacts<00:12:12.119> from<00:12:12.539> each<00:12:12.660> other 00:12:13.299 --> 00:12:13.309 align:start position:0% running an edge reacts from each other 00:12:13.309 --> 00:12:15.769 align:start position:0% running an edge reacts from each other we<00:12:14.309> don't<00:12:14.549> have<00:12:14.759> either<00:12:15.059> and<00:12:15.479> attestation 00:12:15.769 --> 00:12:15.779 align:start position:0% we don't have either and attestation 00:12:15.779 --> 00:12:18.109 align:start position:0% we don't have either and attestation schemes<00:12:16.379> that<00:12:16.529> can<00:12:16.709> run<00:12:16.889> on<00:12:17.129> chain<00:12:17.489> so<00:12:17.999> the 00:12:18.109 --> 00:12:18.119 align:start position:0% schemes that can run on chain so the 00:12:18.119 --> 00:12:20.749 align:start position:0% schemes that can run on chain so the attestation<00:12:18.329> scheme<00:12:18.929> and<00:12:19.079> HTX<00:12:19.529> is<00:12:19.829> Intel 00:12:20.749 --> 00:12:20.759 align:start position:0% attestation scheme and HTX is Intel 00:12:20.759 --> 00:12:22.609 align:start position:0% attestation scheme and HTX is Intel proprietary<00:12:21.209> and<00:12:21.689> we<00:12:21.809> have<00:12:21.929> to<00:12:22.079> call<00:12:22.289> a<00:12:22.319> server 00:12:22.609 --> 00:12:22.619 align:start position:0% proprietary and we have to call a server 00:12:22.619 --> 00:12:24.590 align:start position:0% proprietary and we have to call a server on<00:12:22.829> Intel<00:12:23.159> side<00:12:23.429> to<00:12:23.939> guarantee<00:12:24.329> that<00:12:24.359> the 00:12:24.590 --> 00:12:24.600 align:start position:0% on Intel side to guarantee that the 00:12:24.600 --> 00:12:27.409 align:start position:0% on Intel side to guarantee that the platform<00:12:24.989> is<00:12:25.049> legitimate<00:12:25.909> so<00:12:26.909> in<00:12:26.999> this<00:12:27.149> case 00:12:27.409 --> 00:12:27.419 align:start position:0% platform is legitimate so in this case 00:12:27.419 --> 00:12:31.039 align:start position:0% platform is legitimate so in this case our<00:12:27.779> one<00:12:28.529> simple<00:12:29.369> use<00:12:29.639> case<00:12:29.789> that<00:12:30.299> I<00:12:30.449> suggest 00:12:31.039 --> 00:12:31.049 align:start position:0% our one simple use case that I suggest 00:12:31.049 --> 00:12:34.489 align:start position:0% our one simple use case that I suggest is<00:12:31.439> to<00:12:31.799> use<00:12:32.039> a<00:12:32.069> virtual<00:12:32.309> CPU<00:12:32.939> so<00:12:33.359> it<00:12:33.479> might<00:12:34.019> look 00:12:34.489 --> 00:12:34.499 align:start position:0% is to use a virtual CPU so it might look 00:12:34.499 --> 00:12:36.949 align:start position:0% is to use a virtual CPU so it might look complex<00:12:35.459> to<00:12:35.759> use<00:12:35.789> a<00:12:35.909> virtual<00:12:36.149> CPU<00:12:36.720> but 00:12:36.949 --> 00:12:36.959 align:start position:0% complex to use a virtual CPU but 00:12:36.959 --> 00:12:39.439 align:start position:0% complex to use a virtual CPU but thankfully<00:12:37.470> there<00:12:38.220> are<00:12:38.309> things<00:12:38.729> like<00:12:38.939> Moxie 00:12:39.439 --> 00:12:39.449 align:start position:0% thankfully there are things like Moxie 00:12:39.449 --> 00:12:42.169 align:start position:0% thankfully there are things like Moxie which<00:12:40.109> happens<00:12:40.559> was<00:12:40.889> already<00:12:41.429> very<00:12:41.519> easy<00:12:42.059> to 00:12:42.169 --> 00:12:42.179 align:start position:0% which happens was already very easy to 00:12:42.179 --> 00:12:44.899 align:start position:0% which happens was already very easy to test<00:12:42.479> and<00:12:42.809> already<00:12:43.319> almost<00:12:43.889> problem<00:12:44.609> I<00:12:44.729> would 00:12:44.899 --> 00:12:44.909 align:start position:0% test and already almost problem I would 00:12:44.909 --> 00:12:46.939 align:start position:0% test and already almost problem I would say<00:12:45.119> so<00:12:45.689> it<00:12:45.869> has<00:12:45.989> been<00:12:46.139> used<00:12:46.319> by<00:12:46.439> different 00:12:46.939 --> 00:12:46.949 align:start position:0% say so it has been used by different 00:12:46.949 --> 00:12:49.579 align:start position:0% say so it has been used by different projects<00:12:47.399> in<00:12:47.489> the<00:12:47.579> Bitcoin<00:12:47.759> space<00:12:48.059> and<00:12:48.589> why 00:12:49.579 --> 00:12:49.589 align:start position:0% projects in the Bitcoin space and why 00:12:49.589 --> 00:12:51.739 align:start position:0% projects in the Bitcoin space and why would<00:12:49.979> we<00:12:50.009> use<00:12:50.189> that<00:12:50.429> rather<00:12:50.939> than<00:12:51.209> the<00:12:51.359> AVM 00:12:51.739 --> 00:12:51.749 align:start position:0% would we use that rather than the AVM 00:12:51.749 --> 00:12:54.259 align:start position:0% would we use that rather than the AVM the<00:12:52.139> most<00:12:52.379> I<00:12:52.709> mean<00:12:53.249> the<00:12:53.429> easiest<00:12:53.519> reason<00:12:54.089> is 00:12:54.259 --> 00:12:54.269 align:start position:0% the most I mean the easiest reason is 00:12:54.269 --> 00:12:56.479 align:start position:0% the most I mean the easiest reason is that<00:12:54.299> if<00:12:54.569> we<00:12:54.720> want<00:12:54.929> to<00:12:54.989> guarantee<00:12:55.489> Portability 00:12:56.479 --> 00:12:56.489 align:start position:0% that if we want to guarantee Portability 00:12:56.489 --> 00:12:59.389 align:start position:0% that if we want to guarantee Portability and<00:12:56.519> easy<00:12:57.179> possibility<00:12:58.019> between<00:12:58.589> different 00:12:59.389 --> 00:12:59.399 align:start position:0% and easy possibility between different 00:12:59.399 --> 00:13:02.239 align:start position:0% and easy possibility between different secure<00:13:00.089> environment<00:13:00.689> targeting<00:13:01.499> C<00:13:01.799> is<00:13:02.009> a<00:13:02.039> good 00:13:02.239 --> 00:13:02.249 align:start position:0% secure environment targeting C is a good 00:13:02.249 --> 00:13:05.059 align:start position:0% secure environment targeting C is a good call<00:13:02.489> because<00:13:03.029> when<00:13:03.809> we<00:13:04.139> are<00:13:04.259> when<00:13:04.679> we<00:13:04.799> will<00:13:04.949> be 00:13:05.059 --> 00:13:05.069 align:start position:0% call because when we are when we will be 00:13:05.069 --> 00:13:07.219 align:start position:0% call because when we are when we will be working<00:13:05.399> on<00:13:05.489> arm<00:13:05.699> we<00:13:06.569> will<00:13:06.720> have<00:13:06.809> native 00:13:07.219 --> 00:13:07.229 align:start position:0% working on arm we will have native 00:13:07.229 --> 00:13:10.009 align:start position:0% working on arm we will have native iteration<00:13:07.829> and<00:13:08.039> here<00:13:08.819> we<00:13:09.239> simulate<00:13:09.809> the 00:13:10.009 --> 00:13:10.019 align:start position:0% iteration and here we simulate the 00:13:10.019 --> 00:13:12.499 align:start position:0% iteration and here we simulate the native<00:13:10.319> iteration<00:13:10.889> by<00:13:11.159> running<00:13:11.459> with<00:13:12.059> virtual 00:13:12.499 --> 00:13:12.509 align:start position:0% native iteration by running with virtual 00:13:12.509 --> 00:13:15.619 align:start position:0% native iteration by running with virtual CPUs<00:13:12.959> so<00:13:13.379> of<00:13:13.829> course<00:13:14.129> just<00:13:14.759> a<00:13:14.909> situation<00:13:15.419> I 00:13:15.619 --> 00:13:15.629 align:start position:0% CPUs so of course just a situation I 00:13:15.629 --> 00:13:17.269 align:start position:0% CPUs so of course just a situation I would<00:13:15.959> say<00:13:16.139> this<00:13:16.619> architecture<00:13:17.189> is 00:13:17.269 --> 00:13:17.279 align:start position:0% would say this architecture is 00:13:17.279 --> 00:13:20.659 align:start position:0% would say this architecture is completely<00:13:17.879> open<00:13:18.359> for<00:13:18.720> for<00:13:19.489> comments<00:13:20.489> and 00:13:20.659 --> 00:13:20.669 align:start position:0% completely open for for comments and 00:13:20.669 --> 00:13:22.820 align:start position:0% completely open for for comments and don't<00:13:21.600> hesitate<00:13:22.079> to 00:13:22.820 --> 00:13:22.830 align:start position:0% don't hesitate to 00:13:22.830 --> 00:13:26.990 align:start position:0% don't hesitate to for<00:13:23.160> some<00:13:23.340> other<00:13:23.520> ideas<00:13:24.800> now<00:13:25.800> secure<00:13:26.790> storage 00:13:26.990 --> 00:13:27.000 align:start position:0% for some other ideas now secure storage 00:13:27.000 --> 00:13:29.870 align:start position:0% for some other ideas now secure storage so<00:13:27.720> how<00:13:28.080> are<00:13:28.410> we<00:13:28.440> going<00:13:28.740> to<00:13:28.860> unload<00:13:29.460> secure 00:13:29.870 --> 00:13:29.880 align:start position:0% so how are we going to unload secure 00:13:29.880 --> 00:13:32.780 align:start position:0% so how are we going to unload secure storage<00:13:30.200> depending<00:13:31.200> on<00:13:31.320> the<00:13:31.410> platforms<00:13:31.980> if<00:13:32.460> we 00:13:32.780 --> 00:13:32.790 align:start position:0% storage depending on the platforms if we 00:13:32.790 --> 00:13:34.760 align:start position:0% storage depending on the platforms if we are<00:13:32.880> running<00:13:33.090> on<00:13:33.330> our<00:13:33.420> own<00:13:33.720> platform<00:13:34.020> natively 00:13:34.760 --> 00:13:34.770 align:start position:0% are running on our own platform natively 00:13:34.770 --> 00:13:36.830 align:start position:0% are running on our own platform natively and<00:13:35.160> we<00:13:35.220> don't<00:13:35.400> have<00:13:35.520> any<00:13:35.730> problem<00:13:36.090> because<00:13:36.600> we 00:13:36.830 --> 00:13:36.840 align:start position:0% and we don't have any problem because we 00:13:36.840 --> 00:13:38.510 align:start position:0% and we don't have any problem because we can<00:13:36.870> just<00:13:37.230> stop<00:13:37.440> things<00:13:37.740> natively<00:13:38.250> on<00:13:38.340> the 00:13:38.510 --> 00:13:38.520 align:start position:0% can just stop things natively on the 00:13:38.520 --> 00:13:41.300 align:start position:0% can just stop things natively on the platform<00:13:38.970> if<00:13:39.450> we<00:13:39.810> are<00:13:39.870> running<00:13:40.170> on<00:13:40.290> a<00:13:40.380> host<00:13:40.620> on 00:13:41.300 --> 00:13:41.310 align:start position:0% platform if we are running on a host on 00:13:41.310 --> 00:13:43.760 align:start position:0% platform if we are running on a host on which<00:13:41.700> we<00:13:42.030> can<00:13:42.180> store<00:13:42.510> anything<00:13:42.870> which<00:13:43.440> is<00:13:43.500> an 00:13:43.760 --> 00:13:43.770 align:start position:0% which we can store anything which is an 00:13:43.770 --> 00:13:46.190 align:start position:0% which we can store anything which is an example<00:13:44.070> for<00:13:44.400> enclaves<00:13:44.940> and<00:13:45.120> HDX 00:13:46.190 --> 00:13:46.200 align:start position:0% example for enclaves and HDX 00:13:46.200 --> 00:13:48.080 align:start position:0% example for enclaves and HDX we<00:13:46.560> have<00:13:46.680> to<00:13:46.830> be<00:13:46.950> a<00:13:46.980> little<00:13:47.250> bit<00:13:47.430> more<00:13:47.640> creative 00:13:48.080 --> 00:13:48.090 align:start position:0% we have to be a little bit more creative 00:13:48.090 --> 00:13:51.800 align:start position:0% we have to be a little bit more creative in<00:13:48.390> this<00:13:48.630> case<00:13:49.070> so<00:13:50.070> one<00:13:50.490> way<00:13:50.880> to<00:13:50.940> do<00:13:51.270> that<00:13:51.420> is 00:13:51.800 --> 00:13:51.810 align:start position:0% in this case so one way to do that is 00:13:51.810 --> 00:13:54.500 align:start position:0% in this case so one way to do that is every<00:13:52.320> time<00:13:52.350> move<00:13:52.770> on<00:13:52.920> to<00:13:53.100> use<00:13:53.250> secret<00:13:53.670> data<00:13:53.850> we 00:13:54.500 --> 00:13:54.510 align:start position:0% every time move on to use secret data we 00:13:54.510 --> 00:13:56.330 align:start position:0% every time move on to use secret data we can<00:13:54.690> encrypt<00:13:55.020> it<00:13:55.260> by<00:13:55.410> a<00:13:55.440> key<00:13:55.770> which<00:13:55.980> is<00:13:56.160> owned 00:13:56.330 --> 00:13:56.340 align:start position:0% can encrypt it by a key which is owned 00:13:56.340 --> 00:13:59.390 align:start position:0% can encrypt it by a key which is owned by<00:13:56.730> the<00:13:56.880> application<00:13:57.450> running<00:13:58.140> into<00:13:58.500> HDX 00:13:59.390 --> 00:13:59.400 align:start position:0% by the application running into HDX 00:13:59.400 --> 00:14:01.400 align:start position:0% by the application running into HDX running<00:13:59.850> into<00:14:00.030> the<00:14:00.120> secure<00:14:00.390> environment<00:14:00.900> we 00:14:01.400 --> 00:14:01.410 align:start position:0% running into the secure environment we 00:14:01.410 --> 00:14:03.590 align:start position:0% running into the secure environment we can<00:14:01.590> store<00:14:01.950> this<00:14:02.130> on<00:14:02.310> the<00:14:02.370> host<00:14:02.730> because<00:14:03.300> then 00:14:03.590 --> 00:14:03.600 align:start position:0% can store this on the host because then 00:14:03.600 --> 00:14:06.590 align:start position:0% can store this on the host because then it's<00:14:04.170> not<00:14:04.410> dangerous<00:14:04.680> because<00:14:05.490> this<00:14:06.090> I<00:14:06.360> mean 00:14:06.590 --> 00:14:06.600 align:start position:0% it's not dangerous because this I mean 00:14:06.600 --> 00:14:08.450 align:start position:0% it's not dangerous because this I mean this<00:14:06.810> blob<00:14:07.080> is<00:14:07.200> encrypted<00:14:07.560> and<00:14:07.830> cannot<00:14:08.280> be 00:14:08.450 --> 00:14:08.460 align:start position:0% this blob is encrypted and cannot be 00:14:08.460 --> 00:14:10.820 align:start position:0% this blob is encrypted and cannot be cannot<00:14:08.850> be<00:14:08.970> used<00:14:09.270> by<00:14:09.390> the<00:14:09.450> host<00:14:09.780> and<00:14:10.050> when<00:14:10.680> we 00:14:10.820 --> 00:14:10.830 align:start position:0% cannot be used by the host and when we 00:14:10.830 --> 00:14:12.500 align:start position:0% cannot be used by the host and when we want<00:14:11.010> to<00:14:11.160> use<00:14:11.340> it<00:14:11.520> we<00:14:11.640> will<00:14:11.790> just<00:14:12.000> pass<00:14:12.180> it<00:14:12.360> back 00:14:12.500 --> 00:14:12.510 align:start position:0% want to use it we will just pass it back 00:14:12.510 --> 00:14:15.590 align:start position:0% want to use it we will just pass it back to<00:14:12.570> the<00:14:12.840> Enclave<00:14:13.580> we<00:14:14.580> can<00:14:14.850> also<00:14:15.150> choose<00:14:15.570> to 00:14:15.590 --> 00:14:15.600 align:start position:0% to the Enclave we can also choose to 00:14:15.600 --> 00:14:18.590 align:start position:0% to the Enclave we can also choose to bind<00:14:16.050> the<00:14:16.290> data<00:14:16.410> to<00:14:16.830> different<00:14:17.310> items<00:14:18.150> so<00:14:18.390> we 00:14:18.590 --> 00:14:18.600 align:start position:0% bind the data to different items so we 00:14:18.600 --> 00:14:20.660 align:start position:0% bind the data to different items so we can<00:14:18.780> bind<00:14:19.020> it<00:14:19.200> to<00:14:19.470> the<00:14:19.620> interface<00:14:20.010> itself<00:14:20.370> we 00:14:20.660 --> 00:14:20.670 align:start position:0% can bind it to the interface itself we 00:14:20.670 --> 00:14:22.730 align:start position:0% can bind it to the interface itself we can<00:14:20.790> bind<00:14:21.030> it<00:14:21.180> to<00:14:21.330> the<00:14:21.450> device<00:14:21.720> or<00:14:22.260> we<00:14:22.410> can<00:14:22.530> bind 00:14:22.730 --> 00:14:22.740 align:start position:0% can bind it to the device or we can bind 00:14:22.740 --> 00:14:24.890 align:start position:0% can bind it to the device or we can bind it<00:14:22.950> to<00:14:23.070> a<00:14:23.100> specific<00:14:23.520> application<00:14:23.670> so<00:14:24.600> we<00:14:24.750> have 00:14:24.890 --> 00:14:24.900 align:start position:0% it to a specific application so we have 00:14:24.900 --> 00:14:27.200 align:start position:0% it to a specific application so we have all<00:14:25.200> kind<00:14:25.500> of<00:14:25.650> granularity<00:14:26.460> in<00:14:26.610> the<00:14:26.820> way<00:14:26.970> we 00:14:27.200 --> 00:14:27.210 align:start position:0% all kind of granularity in the way we 00:14:27.210 --> 00:14:29.690 align:start position:0% all kind of granularity in the way we relate<00:14:27.650> secrets<00:14:28.650> from<00:14:28.980> other<00:14:29.220> applications 00:14:29.690 --> 00:14:29.700 align:start position:0% relate secrets from other applications 00:14:29.700 --> 00:14:33.770 align:start position:0% relate secrets from other applications even<00:14:30.390> when<00:14:30.570> running<00:14:30.690> on<00:14:30.960> an<00:14:31.050> enclave<00:14:32.540> we<00:14:33.540> still 00:14:33.770 --> 00:14:33.780 align:start position:0% even when running on an enclave we still 00:14:33.780 --> 00:14:36.020 align:start position:0% even when running on an enclave we still have<00:14:33.900> some<00:14:34.230> some<00:14:34.800> problems<00:14:35.280> if<00:14:35.460> we<00:14:35.490> want<00:14:35.820> to 00:14:36.020 --> 00:14:36.030 align:start position:0% have some some problems if we want to 00:14:36.030 --> 00:14:39.290 align:start position:0% have some some problems if we want to consider<00:14:36.600> secure<00:14:37.080> storage<00:14:37.470> on<00:14:37.820> Enclave<00:14:38.820> so<00:14:39.120> on 00:14:39.290 --> 00:14:39.300 align:start position:0% consider secure storage on Enclave so on 00:14:39.300 --> 00:14:41.110 align:start position:0% consider secure storage on Enclave so on which<00:14:39.510> we<00:14:39.690> can<00:14:39.810> store<00:14:40.110> things<00:14:40.320> natively 00:14:41.110 --> 00:14:41.120 align:start position:0% which we can store things natively 00:14:41.120 --> 00:14:43.610 align:start position:0% which we can store things natively typically<00:14:42.120> on<00:14:42.240> TV<00:14:42.600> play<00:14:42.840> is<00:14:43.080> a<00:14:43.110> critical 00:14:43.610 --> 00:14:43.620 align:start position:0% typically on TV play is a critical 00:14:43.620 --> 00:14:45.950 align:start position:0% typically on TV play is a critical feature<00:14:43.770> if<00:14:44.460> we<00:14:44.850> want<00:14:45.060> to<00:14:45.210> implement<00:14:45.510> a<00:14:45.750> pin 00:14:45.950 --> 00:14:45.960 align:start position:0% feature if we want to implement a pin 00:14:45.960 --> 00:14:47.900 align:start position:0% feature if we want to implement a pin counter<00:14:46.410> and<00:14:46.680> we<00:14:46.920> don't<00:14:47.100> have<00:14:47.250> on<00:14:47.370> TV<00:14:47.670> play 00:14:47.900 --> 00:14:47.910 align:start position:0% counter and we don't have on TV play 00:14:47.910 --> 00:14:49.520 align:start position:0% counter and we don't have on TV play it's<00:14:48.150> not<00:14:48.240> going<00:14:48.540> to<00:14:48.690> work<00:14:48.870> because<00:14:49.140> then 00:14:49.520 --> 00:14:49.530 align:start position:0% it's not going to work because then 00:14:49.530 --> 00:14:51.050 align:start position:0% it's not going to work because then people<00:14:49.800> can<00:14:49.980> just<00:14:50.310> push<00:14:50.580> you<00:14:50.760> the<00:14:50.880> same 00:14:51.050 --> 00:14:51.060 align:start position:0% people can just push you the same 00:14:51.060 --> 00:14:52.820 align:start position:0% people can just push you the same counter<00:14:51.450> over<00:14:51.750> and<00:14:51.990> over<00:14:52.170> again<00:14:52.290> and<00:14:52.650> you<00:14:52.800> just 00:14:52.820 --> 00:14:52.830 align:start position:0% counter over and over again and you just 00:14:52.830 --> 00:14:55.280 align:start position:0% counter over and over again and you just can't<00:14:53.280> do<00:14:53.400> that<00:14:53.580> so<00:14:54.210> one<00:14:54.630> way<00:14:54.870> to<00:14:54.930> overcome 00:14:55.280 --> 00:14:55.290 align:start position:0% can't do that so one way to overcome 00:14:55.290 --> 00:14:58.160 align:start position:0% can't do that so one way to overcome this<00:14:55.830> this<00:14:56.580> limitation<00:14:57.000> is<00:14:57.330> to<00:14:57.480> use<00:14:57.660> monotonic 00:14:58.160 --> 00:14:58.170 align:start position:0% this this limitation is to use monotonic 00:14:58.170 --> 00:15:00.470 align:start position:0% this this limitation is to use monotonic contours<00:14:58.700> monitoring<00:14:59.700> contours<00:15:00.150> would<00:15:00.330> be 00:15:00.470 --> 00:15:00.480 align:start position:0% contours monitoring contours would be 00:15:00.480 --> 00:15:03.650 align:start position:0% contours monitoring contours would be counter<00:15:00.960> that<00:15:01.650> and<00:15:01.860> can<00:15:02.340> only<00:15:02.550> go<00:15:03.030> forward<00:15:03.240> and 00:15:03.650 --> 00:15:03.660 align:start position:0% counter that and can only go forward and 00:15:03.660 --> 00:15:05.930 align:start position:0% counter that and can only go forward and this<00:15:04.050> is<00:15:04.230> guaranteed<00:15:04.620> by<00:15:04.800> hardware<00:15:05.250> so<00:15:05.820> in 00:15:05.930 --> 00:15:05.940 align:start position:0% this is guaranteed by hardware so in 00:15:05.940 --> 00:15:07.460 align:start position:0% this is guaranteed by hardware so in this<00:15:06.090> case<00:15:06.390> we<00:15:06.690> would<00:15:06.810> use<00:15:07.050> a<00:15:07.080> monetary 00:15:07.460 --> 00:15:07.470 align:start position:0% this case we would use a monetary 00:15:07.470 --> 00:15:09.400 align:start position:0% this case we would use a monetary contour<00:15:08.070> put<00:15:08.460> it<00:15:08.580> in<00:15:08.730> the<00:15:08.880> object<00:15:08.970> reference 00:15:09.400 --> 00:15:09.410 align:start position:0% contour put it in the object reference 00:15:09.410 --> 00:15:12.230 align:start position:0% contour put it in the object reference store<00:15:10.410> the<00:15:10.560> value<00:15:10.860> increase<00:15:11.640> it<00:15:11.790> when<00:15:11.970> we<00:15:12.120> want 00:15:12.230 --> 00:15:12.240 align:start position:0% store the value increase it when we want 00:15:12.240 --> 00:15:14.960 align:start position:0% store the value increase it when we want to<00:15:12.420> change<00:15:12.450> it<00:15:12.900> and<00:15:13.140> it's<00:15:13.500> fine<00:15:13.800> because<00:15:14.520> this 00:15:14.960 --> 00:15:14.970 align:start position:0% to change it and it's fine because this 00:15:14.970 --> 00:15:16.940 align:start position:0% to change it and it's fine because this can't<00:15:15.210> be<00:15:15.330> replayed<00:15:15.690> this<00:15:16.200> can<00:15:16.410> be<00:15:16.560> replayed 00:15:16.940 --> 00:15:16.950 align:start position:0% can't be replayed this can be replayed 00:15:16.950 --> 00:15:19.490 align:start position:0% can't be replayed this can be replayed depending<00:15:17.790> on<00:15:17.910> the<00:15:18.030> condition<00:15:18.570> we<00:15:18.840> have<00:15:19.020> for 00:15:19.490 --> 00:15:19.500 align:start position:0% depending on the condition we have for 00:15:19.500 --> 00:15:21.410 align:start position:0% depending on the condition we have for the<00:15:19.650> implementation<00:15:19.920> of<00:15:20.430> monotonic<00:15:20.970> contours 00:15:21.410 --> 00:15:21.420 align:start position:0% the implementation of monotonic contours 00:15:21.420 --> 00:15:23.930 align:start position:0% the implementation of monotonic contours on<00:15:21.510> the<00:15:21.540> platform<00:15:22.080> so<00:15:22.590> here<00:15:22.920> again<00:15:23.130> keeping<00:15:23.820> in 00:15:23.930 --> 00:15:23.940 align:start position:0% on the platform so here again keeping in 00:15:23.940 --> 00:15:25.370 align:start position:0% on the platform so here again keeping in mind<00:15:24.210> that<00:15:24.390> you<00:15:24.510> have<00:15:24.630> to<00:15:24.750> consider<00:15:25.140> all 00:15:25.370 --> 00:15:25.380 align:start position:0% mind that you have to consider all 00:15:25.380 --> 00:15:27.410 align:start position:0% mind that you have to consider all threats<00:15:25.800> when<00:15:26.070> implementing<00:15:26.580> something<00:15:26.970> you 00:15:27.410 --> 00:15:27.420 align:start position:0% threats when implementing something you 00:15:27.420 --> 00:15:29.570 align:start position:0% threats when implementing something you want<00:15:27.600> to<00:15:27.690> verify<00:15:27.900> typically<00:15:28.770> if<00:15:29.130> there<00:15:29.460> is<00:15:29.550> a 00:15:29.570 --> 00:15:29.580 align:start position:0% want to verify typically if there is a 00:15:29.580 --> 00:15:31.820 align:start position:0% want to verify typically if there is a reset<00:15:30.030> condition<00:15:30.240> for<00:15:30.750> monetary<00:15:31.050> control<00:15:31.620> and 00:15:31.820 --> 00:15:31.830 align:start position:0% reset condition for monetary control and 00:15:31.830 --> 00:15:33.280 align:start position:0% reset condition for monetary control and how<00:15:32.130> that<00:15:32.310> would<00:15:32.460> work 00:15:33.280 --> 00:15:33.290 align:start position:0% how that would work 00:15:33.290 --> 00:15:36.530 align:start position:0% how that would work now<00:15:34.290> something<00:15:35.280> else<00:15:35.490> to<00:15:35.640> consider 00:15:36.530 --> 00:15:36.540 align:start position:0% now something else to consider 00:15:36.540 --> 00:15:38.870 align:start position:0% now something else to consider specifically<00:15:37.170> for<00:15:37.320> SGX<00:15:37.830> let's<00:15:38.400> say<00:15:38.580> you<00:15:38.640> want 00:15:38.870 --> 00:15:38.880 align:start position:0% specifically for SGX let's say you want 00:15:38.880 --> 00:15:41.030 align:start position:0% specifically for SGX let's say you want to<00:15:38.940> migrate<00:15:39.180> data<00:15:39.690> from<00:15:40.170> one<00:15:40.410> Enclave<00:15:40.830> to 00:15:41.030 --> 00:15:41.040 align:start position:0% to migrate data from one Enclave to 00:15:41.040 --> 00:15:43.580 align:start position:0% to migrate data from one Enclave to another<00:15:41.310> you<00:15:42.090> have<00:15:42.240> to<00:15:42.390> consider<00:15:42.750> if<00:15:43.110> you<00:15:43.140> want 00:15:43.580 --> 00:15:43.590 align:start position:0% another you have to consider if you want 00:15:43.590 --> 00:15:45.080 align:start position:0% another you have to consider if you want to<00:15:43.830> lock<00:15:44.010> your<00:15:44.250> secrets<00:15:44.700> to<00:15:44.940> your 00:15:45.080 --> 00:15:45.090 align:start position:0% to lock your secrets to your 00:15:45.090 --> 00:15:47.330 align:start position:0% to lock your secrets to your applications<00:15:45.690> or<00:15:45.960> lock<00:15:46.260> your<00:15:46.440> secrets<00:15:46.860> to 00:15:47.330 --> 00:15:47.340 align:start position:0% applications or lock your secrets to 00:15:47.340 --> 00:15:49.130 align:start position:0% applications or lock your secrets to your<00:15:47.490> issuer<00:15:48.000> if<00:15:48.600> you<00:15:48.810> lock<00:15:48.960> to<00:15:49.110> your 00:15:49.130 --> 00:15:49.140 align:start position:0% your issuer if you lock to your 00:15:49.140 --> 00:15:51.980 align:start position:0% your issuer if you lock to your application<00:15:49.830> then<00:15:50.370> secure<00:15:50.970> I<00:15:51.150> mean<00:15:51.390> security 00:15:51.980 --> 00:15:51.990 align:start position:0% application then secure I mean security 00:15:51.990 --> 00:15:54.590 align:start position:0% application then secure I mean security wise<00:15:52.170> is<00:15:52.380> quite<00:15:53.280> safe<00:15:53.640> because<00:15:54.360> if<00:15:54.510> the 00:15:54.590 --> 00:15:54.600 align:start position:0% wise is quite safe because if the 00:15:54.600 --> 00:15:56.450 align:start position:0% wise is quite safe because if the application<00:15:54.930> is<00:15:55.170> modified<00:15:55.740> you<00:15:56.220> are<00:15:56.310> losing 00:15:56.450 --> 00:15:56.460 align:start position:0% application is modified you are losing 00:15:56.460 --> 00:15:59.240 align:start position:0% application is modified you are losing secrets<00:15:57.000> but<00:15:57.390> it's<00:15:57.660> not<00:15:57.960> that<00:15:58.410> nice<00:15:58.800> for<00:15:59.130> the 00:15:59.240 --> 00:15:59.250 align:start position:0% secrets but it's not that nice for the 00:15:59.250 --> 00:16:00.830 align:start position:0% secrets but it's not that nice for the end-user<00:15:59.550> because<00:16:00.030> then<00:16:00.180> you<00:16:00.300> have<00:16:00.330> to<00:16:00.450> repose 00:16:00.830 --> 00:16:00.840 align:start position:0% end-user because then you have to repose 00:16:00.840 --> 00:16:01.790 align:start position:0% end-user because then you have to repose analyze<00:16:01.170> everything 00:16:01.790 --> 00:16:01.800 align:start position:0% analyze everything 00:16:01.800 --> 00:16:04.670 align:start position:0% analyze everything if<00:16:02.220> you<00:16:02.400> lock<00:16:02.550> to<00:16:02.820> the<00:16:02.850> issuer<00:16:03.440> everybody<00:16:04.440> can 00:16:04.670 --> 00:16:04.680 align:start position:0% if you lock to the issuer everybody can 00:16:04.680 --> 00:16:06.560 align:start position:0% if you lock to the issuer everybody can update<00:16:04.830> the<00:16:05.100> application<00:16:05.310> but<00:16:06.030> if<00:16:06.210> you<00:16:06.390> lose 00:16:06.560 --> 00:16:06.570 align:start position:0% update the application but if you lose 00:16:06.570 --> 00:16:08.900 align:start position:0% update the application but if you lose the<00:16:06.780> issuer<00:16:07.050> key<00:16:07.350> then<00:16:07.950> you<00:16:08.190> are<00:16:08.280> going<00:16:08.460> to<00:16:08.580> be 00:16:08.900 --> 00:16:08.910 align:start position:0% the issuer key then you are going to be 00:16:08.910 --> 00:16:10.640 align:start position:0% the issuer key then you are going to be you<00:16:09.330> are<00:16:09.360> going<00:16:09.630> to<00:16:09.840> be<00:16:09.930> able<00:16:10.020> to<00:16:10.170> compromise 00:16:10.640 --> 00:16:10.650 align:start position:0% you are going to be able to compromise 00:16:10.650 --> 00:16:13.940 align:start position:0% you are going to be able to compromise all<00:16:11.070> user<00:16:11.310> data<00:16:11.460> by<00:16:12.030> just<00:16:12.620> deploying<00:16:13.620> your<00:16:13.740> own 00:16:13.940 --> 00:16:13.950 align:start position:0% all user data by just deploying your own 00:16:13.950 --> 00:16:16.130 align:start position:0% all user data by just deploying your own Enclave<00:16:14.400> so<00:16:15.150> here<00:16:15.480> again<00:16:15.630> you<00:16:15.810> have<00:16:16.020> a 00:16:16.130 --> 00:16:16.140 align:start position:0% Enclave so here again you have a 00:16:16.140 --> 00:16:18.080 align:start position:0% Enclave so here again you have a trade-off<00:16:16.470> to<00:16:16.740> perform<00:16:17.190> between<00:16:17.400> security 00:16:18.080 --> 00:16:18.090 align:start position:0% trade-off to perform between security 00:16:18.090 --> 00:16:20.330 align:start position:0% trade-off to perform between security and<00:16:18.240> usability<00:16:18.390> and<00:16:19.170> think<00:16:19.560> carefully<00:16:20.040> about 00:16:20.330 --> 00:16:20.340 align:start position:0% and usability and think carefully about 00:16:20.340 --> 00:16:24.470 align:start position:0% and usability and think carefully about it<00:16:22.010> now<00:16:23.010> regarding<00:16:23.550> the<00:16:23.580> implementation<00:16:24.390> of 00:16:24.470 --> 00:16:24.480 align:start position:0% it now regarding the implementation of 00:16:24.480 --> 00:16:26.000 align:start position:0% it now regarding the implementation of cryptographic<00:16:24.840> primitives<00:16:25.650> you<00:16:25.800> have 00:16:26.000 --> 00:16:26.010 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives you have 00:16:26.010 --> 00:16:28.640 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives you have basically<00:16:26.430> two<00:16:26.730> choices<00:16:27.050> you<00:16:28.050> can<00:16:28.320> use 00:16:28.640 --> 00:16:28.650 align:start position:0% basically two choices you can use 00:16:28.650 --> 00:16:31.580 align:start position:0% basically two choices you can use cryptographic<00:16:29.460> primitives<00:16:30.270> given<00:16:31.110> to<00:16:31.290> you<00:16:31.410> by 00:16:31.580 --> 00:16:31.590 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives given to you by 00:16:31.590 --> 00:16:33.680 align:start position:0% cryptographic primitives given to you by the<00:16:31.650> platform<00:16:32.220> with<00:16:32.730> guarantees<00:16:33.330> that<00:16:33.360> they 00:16:33.680 --> 00:16:33.690 align:start position:0% the platform with guarantees that they 00:16:33.690 --> 00:16:36.110 align:start position:0% the platform with guarantees that they are<00:16:33.780> going<00:16:33.960> to<00:16:34.260> behave<00:16:34.440> very<00:16:34.890> well<00:16:35.040> and<00:16:35.400> they 00:16:36.110 --> 00:16:36.120 align:start position:0% are going to behave very well and they 00:16:36.120 --> 00:16:38.810 align:start position:0% are going to behave very well and they are<00:16:36.180> going<00:16:36.390> to<00:16:36.510> resist<00:16:37.020> all<00:16:37.200> kind<00:16:37.560> of<00:16:37.800> all<00:16:38.520> kind 00:16:38.810 --> 00:16:38.820 align:start position:0% are going to resist all kind of all kind 00:16:38.820 --> 00:16:40.760 align:start position:0% are going to resist all kind of all kind of<00:16:39.060> side-channel<00:16:39.570> attacks<00:16:39.600> or<00:16:40.290> you<00:16:40.470> can<00:16:40.620> use 00:16:40.760 --> 00:16:40.770 align:start position:0% of side-channel attacks or you can use 00:16:40.770 --> 00:16:43.580 align:start position:0% of side-channel attacks or you can use open<00:16:40.890> source<00:16:41.160> crypto<00:16:41.660> history<00:16:42.660> has<00:16:42.930> proven<00:16:43.260> so 00:16:43.580 --> 00:16:43.590 align:start position:0% open source crypto history has proven so 00:16:43.590 --> 00:16:45.200 align:start position:0% open source crypto history has proven so far<00:16:43.620> that<00:16:44.040> it's<00:16:44.190> better<00:16:44.370> to<00:16:44.640> use<00:16:44.670> open<00:16:45.090> source 00:16:45.200 --> 00:16:45.210 align:start position:0% far that it's better to use open source 00:16:45.210 --> 00:16:46.670 align:start position:0% far that it's better to use open source crypto<00:16:45.660> so<00:16:45.990> if<00:16:46.140> you<00:16:46.260> have<00:16:46.350> been<00:16:46.500> following 00:16:46.670 --> 00:16:46.680 align:start position:0% crypto so if you have been following 00:16:46.680 --> 00:16:50.000 align:start position:0% crypto so if you have been following security<00:16:47.220> news<00:16:47.670> in<00:16:48.300> an<00:16:48.690> infinite<00:16:49.200> library<00:16:49.740> as 00:16:50.000 --> 00:16:50.010 align:start position:0% security news in an infinite library as 00:16:50.010 --> 00:16:53.900 align:start position:0% security news in an infinite library as some<00:16:50.340> issues<00:16:50.760> recently<00:16:51.330> so<00:16:51.990> here<00:16:52.830> well<00:16:53.640> we 00:16:53.900 --> 00:16:53.910 align:start position:0% some issues recently so here well we 00:16:53.910 --> 00:16:56.030 align:start position:0% some issues recently so here well we have<00:16:54.030> good<00:16:54.330> typical<00:16:54.840> choices<00:16:55.350> to<00:16:55.530> implement 00:16:56.030 --> 00:16:56.040 align:start position:0% have good typical choices to implement 00:16:56.040 --> 00:16:57.710 align:start position:0% have good typical choices to implement several<00:16:56.190> cryptographic<00:16:56.670> primitives<00:16:57.450> are 00:16:57.710 --> 00:16:57.720 align:start position:0% several cryptographic primitives are 00:16:57.720 --> 00:16:59.780 align:start position:0% several cryptographic primitives are coming<00:16:58.110> from<00:16:58.260> Bitcoin<00:16:58.770> we<00:16:59.040> have<00:16:59.160> lipstick<00:16:59.550> P 00:16:59.780 --> 00:16:59.790 align:start position:0% coming from Bitcoin we have lipstick P 00:16:59.790 --> 00:17:05.900 align:start position:0% coming from Bitcoin we have lipstick P 256<00:17:00.390> K<00:17:00.930> 1<00:17:01.110> and<00:17:02.240> CT<00:17:03.240> AES<00:17:03.690> IES<00:17:04.589> and<00:17:04.829> we<00:17:05.520> have<00:17:05.640> also 00:17:05.900 --> 00:17:05.910 align:start position:0% 256 K 1 and CT AES IES and we have also 00:17:05.910 --> 00:17:08.120 align:start position:0% 256 K 1 and CT AES IES and we have also open<00:17:06.300> source<00:17:06.510> libraries<00:17:07.079> for<00:17:07.440> different<00:17:07.890> kind 00:17:08.120 --> 00:17:08.130 align:start position:0% open source libraries for different kind 00:17:08.130 --> 00:17:10.460 align:start position:0% open source libraries for different kind of<00:17:08.250> crypto<00:17:08.699> switch<00:17:09.089> have<00:17:09.329> been<00:17:09.510> tested<00:17:10.079> again 00:17:10.460 --> 00:17:10.470 align:start position:0% of crypto switch have been tested again 00:17:10.470 --> 00:17:12.319 align:start position:0% of crypto switch have been tested again side<00:17:10.860> channel<00:17:11.190> attacks<00:17:11.520> and<00:17:11.850> which<00:17:12.089> are 00:17:12.319 --> 00:17:12.329 align:start position:0% side channel attacks and which are 00:17:12.329 --> 00:17:15.110 align:start position:0% side channel attacks and which are reliable<00:17:12.959> I<00:17:13.290> would<00:17:13.920> consider<00:17:14.339> too<00:17:14.760> I<00:17:14.970> would 00:17:15.110 --> 00:17:15.120 align:start position:0% reliable I would consider too I would 00:17:15.120 --> 00:17:17.000 align:start position:0% reliable I would consider too I would consider<00:17:15.420> to<00:17:15.570> exert<00:17:16.050> extreme<00:17:16.500> caution<00:17:16.740> when 00:17:17.000 --> 00:17:17.010 align:start position:0% consider to exert extreme caution when 00:17:17.010 --> 00:17:19.730 align:start position:0% consider to exert extreme caution when picking<00:17:17.640> a<00:17:17.910> cryptographic<00:17:18.690> library<00:17:19.410> because 00:17:19.730 --> 00:17:19.740 align:start position:0% picking a cryptographic library because 00:17:19.740 --> 00:17:21.500 align:start position:0% picking a cryptographic library because there<00:17:20.370> are<00:17:20.430> a<00:17:20.550> lot<00:17:20.730> of<00:17:20.760> open<00:17:21.120> source 00:17:21.500 --> 00:17:21.510 align:start position:0% there are a lot of open source 00:17:21.510 --> 00:17:23.990 align:start position:0% there are a lot of open source cryptographic<00:17:21.930> libraries<00:17:22.709> when<00:17:23.010> where<00:17:23.760> these 00:17:23.990 --> 00:17:24.000 align:start position:0% cryptographic libraries when where these 00:17:24.000 --> 00:17:25.810 align:start position:0% cryptographic libraries when where these attacks<00:17:24.150> have<00:17:24.540> not<00:17:24.720> been<00:17:24.870> considered<00:17:25.110> but 00:17:25.810 --> 00:17:25.820 align:start position:0% attacks have not been considered but 00:17:25.820 --> 00:17:28.400 align:start position:0% attacks have not been considered but thanks<00:17:26.820> to<00:17:26.970> different<00:17:27.900> cryptocurrency 00:17:28.400 --> 00:17:28.410 align:start position:0% thanks to different cryptocurrency 00:17:28.410 --> 00:17:30.440 align:start position:0% thanks to different cryptocurrency projects<00:17:29.220> I've<00:17:29.490> already<00:17:29.790> picked<00:17:30.090> some<00:17:30.270> good 00:17:30.440 --> 00:17:30.450 align:start position:0% projects I've already picked some good 00:17:30.450 --> 00:17:32.630 align:start position:0% projects I've already picked some good libraries<00:17:30.930> for<00:17:31.170> us<00:17:31.290> so<00:17:31.770> we<00:17:31.920> can<00:17:32.070> use<00:17:32.280> that<00:17:32.460> in 00:17:32.630 --> 00:17:32.640 align:start position:0% libraries for us so we can use that in 00:17:32.640 --> 00:17:35.540 align:start position:0% libraries for us so we can use that in all<00:17:32.760> trades<00:17:33.000> as<00:17:33.150> well<00:17:34.010> now<00:17:35.010> the<00:17:35.070> proof<00:17:35.370> of 00:17:35.540 --> 00:17:35.550 align:start position:0% all trades as well now the proof of 00:17:35.550 --> 00:17:37.610 align:start position:0% all trades as well now the proof of execution<00:17:36.120> if<00:17:36.480> we<00:17:36.840> want<00:17:37.080> to<00:17:37.290> prove<00:17:37.590> that 00:17:37.610 --> 00:17:37.620 align:start position:0% execution if we want to prove that 00:17:37.620 --> 00:17:40.880 align:start position:0% execution if we want to prove that something<00:17:38.550> has<00:17:38.730> been<00:17:38.760> running<00:17:39.830> on<00:17:40.830> the 00:17:40.880 --> 00:17:40.890 align:start position:0% something has been running on the 00:17:40.890 --> 00:17:42.710 align:start position:0% something has been running on the trusted<00:17:41.580> platform<00:17:41.760> and<00:17:42.210> on<00:17:42.390> the<00:17:42.510> blockchain 00:17:42.710 --> 00:17:42.720 align:start position:0% trusted platform and on the blockchain 00:17:42.720 --> 00:17:45.260 align:start position:0% trusted platform and on the blockchain the<00:17:43.290> easiest<00:17:43.680> way<00:17:43.980> to<00:17:44.010> do<00:17:44.340> that<00:17:44.490> is<00:17:44.790> to<00:17:44.940> just 00:17:45.260 --> 00:17:45.270 align:start position:0% the easiest way to do that is to just 00:17:45.270 --> 00:17:47.840 align:start position:0% the easiest way to do that is to just include<00:17:45.720> the<00:17:45.960> hash<00:17:46.200> of<00:17:46.440> the<00:17:46.830> application<00:17:47.460> into 00:17:47.840 --> 00:17:47.850 align:start position:0% include the hash of the application into 00:17:47.850 --> 00:17:50.010 align:start position:0% include the hash of the application into a<00:17:48.240> primitive<00:17:48.540> that<00:17:48.960> we<00:17:49.140> will<00:17:49.290> call<00:17:49.560> to<00:17:49.800> let 00:17:50.010 --> 00:17:50.020 align:start position:0% a primitive that we will call to let 00:17:50.020 --> 00:17:52.320 align:start position:0% a primitive that we will call to let an<00:17:50.080> application<00:17:50.440> sign<00:17:50.860> a<00:17:50.890> message<00:17:51.130> we<00:17:51.970> can<00:17:52.150> do 00:17:52.320 --> 00:17:52.330 align:start position:0% an application sign a message we can do 00:17:52.330 --> 00:17:54.360 align:start position:0% an application sign a message we can do that<00:17:52.510> because<00:17:52.840> the<00:17:53.200> iteration<00:17:53.800> and<00:17:53.980> join<00:17:54.190> is 00:17:54.360 --> 00:17:54.370 align:start position:0% that because the iteration and join is 00:17:54.370 --> 00:17:56.490 align:start position:0% that because the iteration and join is knowing<00:17:54.820> which<00:17:55.030> application<00:17:55.660> is<00:17:55.870> running<00:17:56.140> and 00:17:56.490 --> 00:17:56.500 align:start position:0% knowing which application is running and 00:17:56.500 --> 00:17:58.830 align:start position:0% knowing which application is running and so<00:17:56.650> can<00:17:56.860> intercept<00:17:57.490> the<00:17:57.640> call<00:17:57.820> insert<00:17:58.630> the 00:17:58.830 --> 00:17:58.840 align:start position:0% so can intercept the call insert the 00:17:58.840 --> 00:18:00.450 align:start position:0% so can intercept the call insert the hash<00:17:59.050> of<00:17:59.320> the<00:17:59.440> application<00:17:59.920> in<00:18:00.040> the<00:18:00.190> middle 00:18:00.450 --> 00:18:00.460 align:start position:0% hash of the application in the middle 00:18:00.460 --> 00:18:02.850 align:start position:0% hash of the application in the middle and<00:18:00.700> walk<00:18:01.210> further<00:18:01.480> with<00:18:01.750> that<00:18:01.930> so<00:18:02.590> by 00:18:02.850 --> 00:18:02.860 align:start position:0% and walk further with that so by 00:18:02.860 --> 00:18:05.130 align:start position:0% and walk further with that so by implementing<00:18:03.340> this<00:18:03.670> we<00:18:04.390> have<00:18:04.510> something<00:18:04.960> that 00:18:05.130 --> 00:18:05.140 align:start position:0% implementing this we have something that 00:18:05.140 --> 00:18:07.680 align:start position:0% implementing this we have something that extremely<00:18:05.560> easy<00:18:05.890> to<00:18:06.010> verify<00:18:06.340> unchain<00:18:06.970> because 00:18:07.680 --> 00:18:07.690 align:start position:0% extremely easy to verify unchain because 00:18:07.690 --> 00:18:09.840 align:start position:0% extremely easy to verify unchain because it's<00:18:07.870> just<00:18:08.110> a<00:18:08.170> signature<00:18:08.560> and<00:18:08.890> typically<00:18:09.730> is 00:18:09.840 --> 00:18:09.850 align:start position:0% it's just a signature and typically is 00:18:09.850 --> 00:18:11.670 align:start position:0% it's just a signature and typically is as<00:18:10.240> always<00:18:10.600> this<00:18:10.930> has<00:18:11.110> already<00:18:11.350> been 00:18:11.670 --> 00:18:11.680 align:start position:0% as always this has already been 00:18:11.680 --> 00:18:14.670 align:start position:0% as always this has already been implemented<00:18:12.160> by<00:18:12.520> our<00:18:12.550> class<00:18:13.060> and<00:18:13.470> there<00:18:14.470> is<00:18:14.560> an 00:18:14.670 --> 00:18:14.680 align:start position:0% implemented by our class and there is an 00:18:14.680 --> 00:18:18.030 align:start position:0% implemented by our class and there is an example<00:18:15.130> you<00:18:15.220> can<00:18:15.430> you<00:18:15.670> can<00:18:15.850> you<00:18:16.090> can<00:18:16.240> check<00:18:17.040> on 00:18:18.030 --> 00:18:18.040 align:start position:0% example you can you can you can check on 00:18:18.040 --> 00:18:21.540 align:start position:0% example you can you can you can check on hgx<00:18:18.580> the<00:18:19.330> way<00:18:19.540> we<00:18:19.960> will<00:18:20.110> do<00:18:20.320> that<00:18:20.500> is<00:18:20.830> we<00:18:21.400> will 00:18:21.540 --> 00:18:21.550 align:start position:0% hgx the way we will do that is we will 00:18:21.550 --> 00:18:25.260 align:start position:0% hgx the way we will do that is we will go<00:18:21.970> through<00:18:22.300> one<00:18:22.600> step<00:18:22.990> we<00:18:23.680> will<00:18:23.800> call<00:18:24.100> IAS<00:18:24.910> so 00:18:25.260 --> 00:18:25.270 align:start position:0% go through one step we will call IAS so 00:18:25.270 --> 00:18:27.240 align:start position:0% go through one step we will call IAS so we'll<00:18:25.510> call<00:18:25.780> the<00:18:25.960> Intel<00:18:26.350> attestation<00:18:26.710> service 00:18:27.240 --> 00:18:27.250 align:start position:0% we'll call the Intel attestation service 00:18:27.250 --> 00:18:29.310 align:start position:0% we'll call the Intel attestation service at<00:18:27.370> some<00:18:27.580> point<00:18:27.850> because<00:18:28.540> that's<00:18:28.750> necessary 00:18:29.310 --> 00:18:29.320 align:start position:0% at some point because that's necessary 00:18:29.320 --> 00:18:32.250 align:start position:0% at some point because that's necessary to<00:18:29.800> initiate<00:18:30.120> the<00:18:31.120> chain<00:18:31.330> of<00:18:31.450> trust<00:18:31.750> and<00:18:31.990> then 00:18:32.250 --> 00:18:32.260 align:start position:0% to initiate the chain of trust and then 00:18:32.260 --> 00:18:33.870 align:start position:0% to initiate the chain of trust and then we<00:18:32.410> will<00:18:32.560> continue<00:18:32.770> the<00:18:33.100> chain<00:18:33.280> of<00:18:33.370> trust<00:18:33.640> from 00:18:33.870 --> 00:18:33.880 align:start position:0% we will continue the chain of trust from 00:18:33.880 --> 00:18:37.020 align:start position:0% we will continue the chain of trust from from<00:18:34.690> ourselves<00:18:34.840> so<00:18:35.680> in<00:18:35.920> the<00:18:36.130> end<00:18:36.310> we<00:18:36.700> end<00:18:36.850> up 00:18:37.020 --> 00:18:37.030 align:start position:0% from ourselves so in the end we end up 00:18:37.030 --> 00:18:38.790 align:start position:0% from ourselves so in the end we end up with<00:18:37.180> applications<00:18:37.810> that<00:18:37.930> we<00:18:38.110> can<00:18:38.260> verify<00:18:38.470> on 00:18:38.790 --> 00:18:38.800 align:start position:0% with applications that we can verify on 00:18:38.800 --> 00:18:41.070 align:start position:0% with applications that we can verify on chain<00:18:39.130> even<00:18:39.640> if<00:18:39.910> they<00:18:40.030> are<00:18:40.120> running<00:18:40.270> on<00:18:40.510> an<00:18:40.630> hgx 00:18:41.070 --> 00:18:41.080 align:start position:0% chain even if they are running on an hgx 00:18:41.080 --> 00:18:43.050 align:start position:0% chain even if they are running on an hgx Enclave<00:18:41.560> with<00:18:41.800> an<00:18:41.920> attestation<00:18:42.160> which<00:18:42.490> is<00:18:42.850> not 00:18:43.050 --> 00:18:43.060 align:start position:0% Enclave with an attestation which is not 00:18:43.060 --> 00:18:46.350 align:start position:0% Enclave with an attestation which is not supposed<00:18:43.360> to<00:18:43.480> run<00:18:43.630> on<00:18:43.690> chain<00:18:44.280> but<00:18:45.280> we<00:18:46.090> might 00:18:46.350 --> 00:18:46.360 align:start position:0% supposed to run on chain but we might 00:18:46.360 --> 00:18:48.270 align:start position:0% supposed to run on chain but we might still<00:18:46.390> want<00:18:47.110> from<00:18:47.350> time<00:18:47.620> to<00:18:47.770> time<00:18:47.800> to<00:18:48.250> check 00:18:48.270 --> 00:18:48.280 align:start position:0% still want from time to time to check 00:18:48.280 --> 00:18:50.430 align:start position:0% still want from time to time to check the<00:18:48.550> health<00:18:48.850> of<00:18:49.060> the<00:18:49.210> platform<00:18:49.660> because<00:18:49.990> the 00:18:50.430 --> 00:18:50.440 align:start position:0% the health of the platform because the 00:18:50.440 --> 00:18:52.500 align:start position:0% the health of the platform because the state<00:18:50.740> of<00:18:50.980> an<00:18:51.100> enclave<00:18:51.460> can<00:18:51.730> change<00:18:52.060> over<00:18:52.300> time 00:18:52.500 --> 00:18:52.510 align:start position:0% state of an enclave can change over time 00:18:52.510 --> 00:18:54.300 align:start position:0% state of an enclave can change over time typically<00:18:53.110> if<00:18:53.170> there<00:18:53.350> are<00:18:53.440> bugs<00:18:53.710> of<00:18:54.010> or 00:18:54.300 --> 00:18:54.310 align:start position:0% typically if there are bugs of or 00:18:54.310 --> 00:18:56.640 align:start position:0% typically if there are bugs of or exploit<00:18:54.700> that's<00:18:55.630> the<00:18:55.720> case<00:18:55.930> today<00:18:56.170> there<00:18:56.530> is<00:18:56.620> a 00:18:56.640 --> 00:18:56.650 align:start position:0% exploit that's the case today there is a 00:18:56.650 --> 00:18:59.130 align:start position:0% exploit that's the case today there is a bug<00:18:56.920> that's<00:18:57.160> going<00:18:57.400> to<00:18:57.520> be<00:18:57.640> patched<00:18:57.880> by<00:18:58.720> Intel 00:18:59.130 --> 00:18:59.140 align:start position:0% bug that's going to be patched by Intel 00:18:59.140 --> 00:19:03.300 align:start position:0% bug that's going to be patched by Intel shortly<00:18:59.980> so<00:19:00.640> we<00:19:01.570> we<00:19:02.380> have<00:19:02.500> a<00:19:02.530> system<00:19:02.980> that<00:19:03.190> we 00:19:03.300 --> 00:19:03.310 align:start position:0% shortly so we we have a system that we 00:19:03.310 --> 00:19:05.820 align:start position:0% shortly so we we have a system that we can<00:19:03.460> verify<00:19:03.700> or<00:19:04.060> unchain<00:19:04.660> we<00:19:05.200> still<00:19:05.470> have<00:19:05.620> to 00:19:05.820 --> 00:19:05.830 align:start position:0% can verify or unchain we still have to 00:19:05.830 --> 00:19:08.550 align:start position:0% can verify or unchain we still have to pay<00:19:06.400> some<00:19:06.640> attention<00:19:06.760> on<00:19:07.420> who<00:19:08.110> we<00:19:08.260> are<00:19:08.350> going 00:19:08.550 --> 00:19:08.560 align:start position:0% pay some attention on who we are going 00:19:08.560 --> 00:19:12.510 align:start position:0% pay some attention on who we are going to<00:19:08.680> patch<00:19:08.860> it<00:19:10.560> several<00:19:11.560> use<00:19:11.740> case<00:19:12.010> we<00:19:12.220> can<00:19:12.370> have 00:19:12.510 --> 00:19:12.520 align:start position:0% to patch it several use case we can have 00:19:12.520 --> 00:19:15.330 align:start position:0% to patch it several use case we can have with<00:19:13.120> all<00:19:13.270> those<00:19:13.480> systems<00:19:13.690> so<00:19:14.500> we<00:19:14.770> can<00:19:14.950> first 00:19:15.330 --> 00:19:15.340 align:start position:0% with all those systems so we can first 00:19:15.340 --> 00:19:18.180 align:start position:0% with all those systems so we can first this<00:19:15.970> decide<00:19:16.660> to<00:19:16.840> replace<00:19:17.230> hardware<00:19:17.860> wallets 00:19:18.180 --> 00:19:18.190 align:start position:0% this decide to replace hardware wallets 00:19:18.190 --> 00:19:21.660 align:start position:0% this decide to replace hardware wallets and<00:19:18.930> visualize<00:19:19.930> hardware<00:19:20.380> wallets<00:19:20.680> but<00:19:21.250> to<00:19:21.490> do 00:19:21.660 --> 00:19:21.670 align:start position:0% and visualize hardware wallets but to do 00:19:21.670 --> 00:19:23.340 align:start position:0% and visualize hardware wallets but to do that<00:19:21.880> we<00:19:22.150> first<00:19:22.330> need<00:19:22.600> to<00:19:22.630> have<00:19:22.810> a<00:19:22.930> twisted 00:19:23.340 --> 00:19:23.350 align:start position:0% that we first need to have a twisted 00:19:23.350 --> 00:19:25.950 align:start position:0% that we first need to have a twisted display<00:19:23.770> and<00:19:23.920> twisted<00:19:24.220> input<00:19:24.550> because<00:19:25.120> one<00:19:25.810> of 00:19:25.950 --> 00:19:25.960 align:start position:0% display and twisted input because one of 00:19:25.960 --> 00:19:27.870 align:start position:0% display and twisted input because one of the<00:19:26.080> key<00:19:26.260> part<00:19:26.500> of<00:19:26.620> hardware<00:19:26.980> wallets<00:19:27.340> is<00:19:27.550> not 00:19:27.870 --> 00:19:27.880 align:start position:0% the key part of hardware wallets is not 00:19:27.880 --> 00:19:29.670 align:start position:0% the key part of hardware wallets is not lying<00:19:28.270> to<00:19:28.600> the<00:19:28.720> user<00:19:28.930> when<00:19:29.290> displaying 00:19:29.670 --> 00:19:29.680 align:start position:0% lying to the user when displaying 00:19:29.680 --> 00:19:32.070 align:start position:0% lying to the user when displaying something<00:19:29.980> and<00:19:30.340> waiting<00:19:31.180> for<00:19:31.210> the<00:19:31.450> user<00:19:31.570> input 00:19:32.070 --> 00:19:32.080 align:start position:0% something and waiting for the user input 00:19:32.080 --> 00:19:34.410 align:start position:0% something and waiting for the user input before<00:19:32.620> actually<00:19:33.340> performing<00:19:33.760> an<00:19:33.880> action<00:19:34.030> if 00:19:34.410 --> 00:19:34.420 align:start position:0% before actually performing an action if 00:19:34.420 --> 00:19:36.240 align:start position:0% before actually performing an action if you<00:19:34.570> want<00:19:34.750> to<00:19:34.900> do<00:19:35.020> that<00:19:35.230> we<00:19:35.530> need<00:19:35.680> specific 00:19:36.240 --> 00:19:36.250 align:start position:0% you want to do that we need specific 00:19:36.250 --> 00:19:38.940 align:start position:0% you want to do that we need specific primitives<00:19:36.820> that<00:19:37.000> might<00:19:37.630> be<00:19:37.870> not<00:19:38.080> implemented 00:19:38.940 --> 00:19:38.950 align:start position:0% primitives that might be not implemented 00:19:38.950 --> 00:19:39.930 align:start position:0% primitives that might be not implemented by<00:19:39.100> all<00:19:39.340> platforms 00:19:39.930 --> 00:19:39.940 align:start position:0% by all platforms 00:19:39.940 --> 00:19:42.990 align:start position:0% by all platforms typically<00:19:40.750> on<00:19:41.020> hgx<00:19:41.500> we<00:19:42.010> will<00:19:42.160> need<00:19:42.340> the 00:19:42.990 --> 00:19:43.000 align:start position:0% typically on hgx we will need the 00:19:43.000 --> 00:19:44.970 align:start position:0% typically on hgx we will need the twisted<00:19:43.330> display<00:19:43.720> school<00:19:44.020> PGD<00:19:44.530> whole<00:19:44.770> body 00:19:44.970 --> 00:19:44.980 align:start position:0% twisted display school PGD whole body 00:19:44.980 --> 00:19:46.650 align:start position:0% twisted display school PGD whole body heat<00:19:45.250> protection<00:19:45.640> display<00:19:46.210> projection 00:19:46.650 --> 00:19:46.660 align:start position:0% heat protection display projection 00:19:46.660 --> 00:19:48.840 align:start position:0% heat protection display projection display<00:19:47.110> sorry<00:19:47.590> we<00:19:48.250> need<00:19:48.430> to<00:19:48.610> have<00:19:48.730> this 00:19:48.840 --> 00:19:48.850 align:start position:0% display sorry we need to have this 00:19:48.850 --> 00:19:50.820 align:start position:0% display sorry we need to have this implemented<00:19:49.330> if<00:19:49.750> we<00:19:49.900> want<00:19:50.140> to<00:19:50.350> have<00:19:50.500> a<00:19:50.530> user 00:19:50.820 --> 00:19:50.830 align:start position:0% implemented if we want to have a user 00:19:50.830 --> 00:19:52.860 align:start position:0% implemented if we want to have a user wallet<00:19:51.250> which<00:19:51.460> is<00:19:51.610> similar<00:19:52.000> to<00:19:52.240> a<00:19:52.270> consumer 00:19:52.860 --> 00:19:52.870 align:start position:0% wallet which is similar to a consumer 00:19:52.870 --> 00:19:56.070 align:start position:0% wallet which is similar to a consumer product<00:19:53.110> we<00:19:54.010> can<00:19:54.280> still<00:19:54.700> perform<00:19:55.090> some<00:19:55.750> we 00:19:56.070 --> 00:19:56.080 align:start position:0% product we can still perform some we 00:19:56.080 --> 00:19:58.200 align:start position:0% product we can still perform some we have<00:19:56.200> some<00:19:56.470> mitigations<00:19:57.340> if<00:19:57.580> we<00:19:57.880> don't<00:19:58.060> have 00:19:58.200 --> 00:19:58.210 align:start position:0% have some mitigations if we don't have 00:19:58.210 --> 00:20:01.080 align:start position:0% have some mitigations if we don't have PTV<00:19:58.600> typically<00:19:59.260> we<00:19:59.440> can<00:19:59.620> use<00:19:59.800> to<00:20:00.040> unclip<00:20:00.490> to 00:20:01.080 --> 00:20:01.090 align:start position:0% PTV typically we can use to unclip to 00:20:01.090 --> 00:20:03.419 align:start position:0% PTV typically we can use to unclip to have<00:20:01.240> one<00:20:01.600> acting<00:20:02.170> as<00:20:02.320> a<00:20:02.350> secure<00:20:02.680> screen<00:20:03.040> and 00:20:03.419 --> 00:20:03.429 align:start position:0% have one acting as a secure screen and 00:20:03.429 --> 00:20:06.989 align:start position:0% have one acting as a secure screen and one<00:20:04.049> binding<00:20:05.049> to<00:20:05.289> the<00:20:05.440> other<00:20:05.559> but<00:20:06.249> yeah<00:20:06.759> that's 00:20:06.989 --> 00:20:06.999 align:start position:0% one binding to the other but yeah that's 00:20:06.999 --> 00:20:08.759 align:start position:0% one binding to the other but yeah that's kind<00:20:07.179> of<00:20:07.479> a<00:20:07.570> hack<00:20:07.809> and<00:20:08.049> not<00:20:08.289> extremely 00:20:08.759 --> 00:20:08.769 align:start position:0% kind of a hack and not extremely 00:20:08.769 --> 00:20:10.499 align:start position:0% kind of a hack and not extremely comfortable<00:20:09.219> if<00:20:09.519> you<00:20:09.639> tell<00:20:09.849> two<00:20:09.999> users<00:20:10.359> that 00:20:10.499 --> 00:20:10.509 align:start position:0% comfortable if you tell two users that 00:20:10.509 --> 00:20:11.879 align:start position:0% comfortable if you tell two users that you<00:20:10.659> are<00:20:10.749> going<00:20:10.929> to<00:20:11.080> make<00:20:11.259> their<00:20:11.440> life<00:20:11.589> easier 00:20:11.879 --> 00:20:11.889 align:start position:0% you are going to make their life easier 00:20:11.889 --> 00:20:14.579 align:start position:0% you are going to make their life easier but<00:20:12.820> still<00:20:12.999> require<00:20:13.749> need<00:20:14.019> to<00:20:14.229> have<00:20:14.379> two 00:20:14.579 --> 00:20:14.589 align:start position:0% but still require need to have two 00:20:14.589 --> 00:20:18.959 align:start position:0% but still require need to have two devices<00:20:14.889> to<00:20:15.639> work<00:20:15.789> properly<00:20:17.070> another<00:20:18.070> use 00:20:18.959 --> 00:20:18.969 align:start position:0% devices to work properly another use 00:20:18.969 --> 00:20:22.799 align:start position:0% devices to work properly another use case<00:20:19.119> which<00:20:19.899> is<00:20:20.169> probably<00:20:20.769> more<00:20:21.269> useful<00:20:22.269> and 00:20:22.799 --> 00:20:22.809 align:start position:0% case which is probably more useful and 00:20:22.809 --> 00:20:25.200 align:start position:0% case which is probably more useful and easier<00:20:23.139> to<00:20:23.169> deploy<00:20:23.589> in<00:20:23.739> that<00:20:23.889> case<00:20:24.159> is<00:20:24.519> to<00:20:24.969> use 00:20:25.200 --> 00:20:25.210 align:start position:0% easier to deploy in that case is to use 00:20:25.210 --> 00:20:27.599 align:start position:0% easier to deploy in that case is to use to<00:20:25.899> create<00:20:26.229> a<00:20:26.259> usage<00:20:26.739> specific<00:20:27.219> hardware 00:20:27.599 --> 00:20:27.609 align:start position:0% to create a usage specific hardware 00:20:27.609 --> 00:20:29.519 align:start position:0% to create a usage specific hardware wallet<00:20:27.909> so<00:20:28.389> how<00:20:28.690> do<00:20:28.749> I<00:20:28.869> wallet<00:20:29.169> that<00:20:29.320> would 00:20:29.519 --> 00:20:29.529 align:start position:0% wallet so how do I wallet that would 00:20:29.529 --> 00:20:31.649 align:start position:0% wallet so how do I wallet that would look<00:20:29.769> for<00:20:30.039> specific<00:20:30.460> contracts<00:20:31.089> for<00:20:31.239> specific 00:20:31.649 --> 00:20:31.659 align:start position:0% look for specific contracts for specific 00:20:31.659 --> 00:20:34.919 align:start position:0% look for specific contracts for specific addresses<00:20:31.979> for<00:20:32.979> specific<00:20:33.549> limits<00:20:34.330> or<00:20:34.599> code 00:20:34.919 --> 00:20:34.929 align:start position:0% addresses for specific limits or code 00:20:34.929 --> 00:20:37.700 align:start position:0% addresses for specific limits or code size<00:20:35.169> that<00:20:35.440> you<00:20:35.589> want<00:20:35.769> to<00:20:35.889> implement<00:20:36.159> on<00:20:36.580> the 00:20:37.700 --> 00:20:37.710 align:start position:0% size that you want to implement on the 00:20:37.710 --> 00:20:41.759 align:start position:0% size that you want to implement on the under<00:20:38.710> system<00:20:38.919> so<00:20:39.820> that's<00:20:40.509> easy<00:20:41.080> to<00:20:41.529> deploy 00:20:41.759 --> 00:20:41.769 align:start position:0% under system so that's easy to deploy 00:20:41.769 --> 00:20:44.269 align:start position:0% under system so that's easy to deploy even<00:20:42.339> if<00:20:42.460> you<00:20:42.580> don't<00:20:42.820> have<00:20:42.999> a<00:20:43.479> twisted<00:20:43.929> input 00:20:44.269 --> 00:20:44.279 align:start position:0% even if you don't have a twisted input 00:20:44.279 --> 00:20:47.009 align:start position:0% even if you don't have a twisted input question<00:20:45.279> is<00:20:45.429> you<00:20:45.580> might<00:20:45.759> wonder<00:20:46.089> why<00:20:46.359> this<00:20:46.659> is 00:20:47.009 --> 00:20:47.019 align:start position:0% question is you might wonder why this is 00:20:47.019 --> 00:20:47.989 align:start position:0% question is you might wonder why this is better<00:20:47.259> than<00:20:47.499> a<00:20:47.619> smart<00:20:47.859> contract 00:20:47.989 --> 00:20:47.999 align:start position:0% better than a smart contract 00:20:47.999 --> 00:20:50.339 align:start position:0% better than a smart contract implementation<00:20:48.999> that<00:20:49.179> could<00:20:49.419> do<00:20:49.599> all<00:20:49.869> this<00:20:50.109> by 00:20:50.339 --> 00:20:50.349 align:start position:0% implementation that could do all this by 00:20:50.349 --> 00:20:53.039 align:start position:0% implementation that could do all this by itself<00:20:50.710> so<00:20:51.249> first<00:20:51.729> if<00:20:52.089> you<00:20:52.389> want<00:20:52.570> to<00:20:52.690> deploy 00:20:53.039 --> 00:20:53.049 align:start position:0% itself so first if you want to deploy 00:20:53.049 --> 00:20:54.989 align:start position:0% itself so first if you want to deploy this<00:20:53.289> on<00:20:53.469> a<00:20:53.499> device<00:20:53.739> it's<00:20:54.369> a<00:20:54.489> great<00:20:54.700> way<00:20:54.969> to 00:20:54.989 --> 00:20:54.999 align:start position:0% this on a device it's a great way to 00:20:54.999 --> 00:20:57.359 align:start position:0% this on a device it's a great way to make<00:20:55.269> sure<00:20:55.509> that<00:20:55.719> your<00:20:55.899> device<00:20:56.080> keys<00:20:56.589> won't<00:20:57.249> be 00:20:57.359 --> 00:20:57.369 align:start position:0% make sure that your device keys won't be 00:20:57.369 --> 00:20:58.889 align:start position:0% make sure that your device keys won't be stolen<00:20:57.609> to<00:20:57.879> do<00:20:57.999> something<00:20:58.359> else<00:20:58.539> which<00:20:58.869> is 00:20:58.889 --> 00:20:58.899 align:start position:0% stolen to do something else which is 00:20:58.899 --> 00:21:03.089 align:start position:0% stolen to do something else which is still<00:21:00.899> compact<00:21:01.899> is<00:21:02.049> enforcing<00:21:02.559> things<00:21:02.889> and 00:21:03.089 --> 00:21:03.099 align:start position:0% still compact is enforcing things and 00:21:03.099 --> 00:21:05.729 align:start position:0% still compact is enforcing things and then<00:21:03.820> you<00:21:04.119> can<00:21:04.330> create<00:21:04.629> more<00:21:04.899> flexible<00:21:05.379> update 00:21:05.729 --> 00:21:05.739 align:start position:0% then you can create more flexible update 00:21:05.739 --> 00:21:07.709 align:start position:0% then you can create more flexible update rules<00:21:06.009> if<00:21:06.639> you<00:21:06.820> want<00:21:06.999> to<00:21:07.119> update<00:21:07.239> a<00:21:07.389> smart 00:21:07.709 --> 00:21:07.719 align:start position:0% rules if you want to update a smart 00:21:07.719 --> 00:21:09.389 align:start position:0% rules if you want to update a smart contract<00:21:07.869> today<00:21:08.440> either<00:21:08.589> you<00:21:08.919> have<00:21:09.039> to<00:21:09.070> think 00:21:09.389 --> 00:21:09.399 align:start position:0% contract today either you have to think 00:21:09.399 --> 00:21:12.149 align:start position:0% contract today either you have to think about<00:21:09.519> it<00:21:09.849> before<00:21:10.599> creating<00:21:11.109> it<00:21:11.469> or<00:21:11.739> you<00:21:12.009> would 00:21:12.149 --> 00:21:12.159 align:start position:0% about it before creating it or you would 00:21:12.159 --> 00:21:14.549 align:start position:0% about it before creating it or you would have<00:21:12.190> to<00:21:12.339> empty<00:21:13.179> it<00:21:13.299> and<00:21:13.629> transfer<00:21:14.109> its<00:21:14.320> funds 00:21:14.549 --> 00:21:14.559 align:start position:0% have to empty it and transfer its funds 00:21:14.559 --> 00:21:17.099 align:start position:0% have to empty it and transfer its funds as<00:21:14.739> well<00:21:15.129> so<00:21:15.759> doing<00:21:16.239> that<00:21:16.419> with<00:21:16.599> hardware 00:21:17.099 --> 00:21:17.109 align:start position:0% as well so doing that with hardware 00:21:17.109 --> 00:21:19.619 align:start position:0% as well so doing that with hardware might<00:21:17.710> be<00:21:17.919> more<00:21:18.099> convenient<00:21:18.519> in<00:21:18.879> in<00:21:19.179> many<00:21:19.419> use 00:21:19.619 --> 00:21:19.629 align:start position:0% might be more convenient in in many use 00:21:19.629 --> 00:21:24.539 align:start position:0% might be more convenient in in many use cases<00:21:21.869> you<00:21:22.869> can<00:21:23.139> also<00:21:23.499> use<00:21:23.950> the<00:21:24.129> service<00:21:24.519> to 00:21:24.539 --> 00:21:24.549 align:start position:0% cases you can also use the service to 00:21:24.549 --> 00:21:27.180 align:start position:0% cases you can also use the service to create<00:21:25.200> external<00:21:26.200> services<00:21:26.710> that<00:21:26.889> you<00:21:27.009> can 00:21:27.180 --> 00:21:27.190 align:start position:0% create external services that you can 00:21:27.190 --> 00:21:30.779 align:start position:0% create external services that you can verify<00:21:27.399> so<00:21:28.059> the<00:21:28.239> on<00:21:28.389> demas<00:21:28.929> random<00:21:29.669> Oracle<00:21:30.669> is 00:21:30.779 --> 00:21:30.789 align:start position:0% verify so the on demas random Oracle is 00:21:30.789 --> 00:21:33.599 align:start position:0% verify so the on demas random Oracle is an<00:21:30.909> example<00:21:31.450> also<00:21:31.719> for<00:21:32.139> moralize<00:21:32.619> creating<00:21:33.519> a 00:21:33.599 --> 00:21:33.609 align:start position:0% an example also for moralize creating a 00:21:33.609 --> 00:21:35.279 align:start position:0% an example also for moralize creating a random<00:21:33.759> source<00:21:34.210> and<00:21:34.450> verifying<00:21:34.960> that<00:21:35.049> the 00:21:35.279 --> 00:21:35.289 align:start position:0% random source and verifying that the 00:21:35.289 --> 00:21:37.200 align:start position:0% random source and verifying that the random<00:21:35.649> has<00:21:35.799> been<00:21:35.979> generated<00:21:36.580> by<00:21:36.759> a<00:21:36.789> trusted 00:21:37.200 --> 00:21:37.210 align:start position:0% random has been generated by a trusted 00:21:37.210 --> 00:21:41.190 align:start position:0% random has been generated by a trusted platform<00:21:37.389> and<00:21:38.700> finally<00:21:39.700> so<00:21:40.450> speaking<00:21:40.929> about 00:21:41.190 --> 00:21:41.200 align:start position:0% platform and finally so speaking about 00:21:41.200 --> 00:21:43.769 align:start position:0% platform and finally so speaking about those<00:21:41.559> architecture<00:21:42.419> we<00:21:43.419> have<00:21:43.599> an 00:21:43.769 --> 00:21:43.779 align:start position:0% those architecture we have an 00:21:43.779 --> 00:21:45.930 align:start position:0% those architecture we have an implementation<00:21:44.080> running<00:21:44.950> the<00:21:45.219> prototype 00:21:45.930 --> 00:21:45.940 align:start position:0% implementation running the prototype 00:21:45.940 --> 00:21:48.479 align:start position:0% implementation running the prototype that<00:21:46.239> you<00:21:46.419> can<00:21:46.629> already<00:21:47.019> play<00:21:47.320> with<00:21:47.559> so<00:21:48.129> I'm 00:21:48.479 --> 00:21:48.489 align:start position:0% that you can already play with so I'm 00:21:48.489 --> 00:21:50.820 align:start position:0% that you can already play with so I'm taking<00:21:48.789> all<00:21:49.269> kind<00:21:49.539> of<00:21:49.659> suggestions<00:21:50.169> about<00:21:50.499> it 00:21:50.820 --> 00:21:50.830 align:start position:0% taking all kind of suggestions about it 00:21:50.830 --> 00:21:53.339 align:start position:0% taking all kind of suggestions about it today's<00:21:51.729> a<00:21:51.909> reason<00:21:52.299> implementation<00:21:52.989> walking 00:21:53.339 --> 00:21:53.349 align:start position:0% today's a reason implementation walking 00:21:53.349 --> 00:21:56.629 align:start position:0% today's a reason implementation walking on<00:21:53.499> hgx<00:21:53.919> there<00:21:54.609> will<00:21:54.729> be<00:21:54.759> one<00:21:55.089> walking<00:21:55.450> on<00:21:55.719> arm 00:21:56.629 --> 00:21:56.639 align:start position:0% on hgx there will be one walking on arm 00:21:56.639 --> 00:22:00.479 align:start position:0% on hgx there will be one walking on arm shortly<00:21:57.639> next<00:21:57.940> year<00:21:58.149> so<00:21:58.989> it's<00:21:59.440> heavy<00:22:00.159> walking 00:22:00.479 --> 00:22:00.489 align:start position:0% shortly next year so it's heavy walking 00:22:00.489 --> 00:22:02.430 align:start position:0% shortly next year so it's heavy walking polar<00:22:00.909> ice<00:22:01.029> just<00:22:01.419> to<00:22:01.570> let<00:22:01.719> you<00:22:01.869> know<00:22:01.899> we<00:22:02.289> don't 00:22:02.430 --> 00:22:02.440 align:start position:0% polar ice just to let you know we don't 00:22:02.440 --> 00:22:05.129 align:start position:0% polar ice just to let you know we don't have<00:22:02.889> yet<00:22:03.159> an<00:22:03.429> ATM<00:22:03.879> one<00:22:04.089> at<00:22:04.179> available<00:22:04.749> but<00:22:04.989> you 00:22:05.129 --> 00:22:05.139 align:start position:0% have yet an ATM one at available but you 00:22:05.139 --> 00:22:06.989 align:start position:0% have yet an ATM one at available but you will<00:22:05.289> find<00:22:05.589> all<00:22:05.799> cryptographic<00:22:06.190> primitives 00:22:06.989 --> 00:22:06.999 align:start position:0% will find all cryptographic primitives 00:22:06.999 --> 00:22:09.239 align:start position:0% will find all cryptographic primitives and<00:22:07.419> if<00:22:07.690> you<00:22:07.839> want<00:22:08.049> to<00:22:08.200> start<00:22:08.499> playing<00:22:08.739> with<00:22:08.919> it 00:22:09.239 --> 00:22:09.249 align:start position:0% and if you want to start playing with it 00:22:09.249 --> 00:22:12.239 align:start position:0% and if you want to start playing with it and<00:22:09.489> then<00:22:09.759> asking<00:22:10.299> some<00:22:11.139> questions<00:22:11.169> well<00:22:11.979> I'm 00:22:12.239 --> 00:22:12.249 align:start position:0% and then asking some questions well I'm 00:22:12.249 --> 00:22:14.999 align:start position:0% and then asking some questions well I'm around<00:22:13.049> let's<00:22:14.049> get<00:22:14.200> the<00:22:14.469> conversation 00:22:14.999 --> 00:22:15.009 align:start position:0% around let's get the conversation 00:22:15.009 --> 00:22:23.260 align:start position:0% around let's get the conversation started 00:22:23.260 --> 00:22:23.270 align:start position:0% 00:22:23.270 --> 00:22:30.770 align:start position:0% [Music]