WEBVTT Kind: captions Language: en 00:00:01.070 --> 00:00:14.799 align:start position:0% [Applause] 00:00:14.799 --> 00:00:14.809 align:start position:0% 00:00:14.809 --> 00:00:17.930 align:start position:0% so<00:00:15.809> if<00:00:16.110> you<00:00:16.230> put<00:00:16.470> disclaimers<00:00:17.070> if<00:00:17.369> you<00:00:17.580> come<00:00:17.820> to 00:00:17.930 --> 00:00:17.940 align:start position:0% so if you put disclaimers if you come to 00:00:17.940 --> 00:00:19.370 align:start position:0% so if you put disclaimers if you come to see<00:00:18.090> this<00:00:18.210> talk<00:00:18.510> we<00:00:18.689> really<00:00:18.960> hope<00:00:19.110> you<00:00:19.260> have 00:00:19.370 --> 00:00:19.380 align:start position:0% see this talk we really hope you have 00:00:19.380 --> 00:00:20.960 align:start position:0% see this talk we really hope you have familiarity<00:00:19.770> with<00:00:20.250> your<00:00:20.430> knowledge<00:00:20.610> pretty 00:00:20.960 --> 00:00:20.970 align:start position:0% familiarity with your knowledge pretty 00:00:20.970 --> 00:00:24.500 align:start position:0% familiarity with your knowledge pretty smart<00:00:21.570> encryption<00:00:22.640> and<00:00:23.640> really<00:00:24.119> hoping<00:00:24.450> to 00:00:24.500 --> 00:00:24.510 align:start position:0% smart encryption and really hoping to 00:00:24.510 --> 00:00:27.019 align:start position:0% smart encryption and really hoping to provide<00:00:24.960> as<00:00:25.380> unbiased<00:00:25.980> that<00:00:26.400> the<00:00:26.490> discussion 00:00:27.019 --> 00:00:27.029 align:start position:0% provide as unbiased that the discussion 00:00:27.029 --> 00:00:29.089 align:start position:0% provide as unbiased that the discussion as<00:00:27.270> possible<00:00:27.810> here<00:00:28.020> you<00:00:28.500> feel<00:00:28.650> like<00:00:28.829> we're<00:00:28.980> not 00:00:29.089 --> 00:00:29.099 align:start position:0% as possible here you feel like we're not 00:00:29.099 --> 00:00:29.990 align:start position:0% as possible here you feel like we're not doing<00:00:29.340> a<00:00:29.369> good<00:00:29.460> job<00:00:29.520> of<00:00:29.820> that 00:00:29.990 --> 00:00:30.000 align:start position:0% doing a good job of that 00:00:30.000 --> 00:00:31.640 align:start position:0% doing a good job of that who<00:00:30.180> eats<00:00:30.390> people<00:00:30.750> feel<00:00:30.900> free<00:00:31.169> and<00:00:31.290> call<00:00:31.470> us 00:00:31.640 --> 00:00:31.650 align:start position:0% who eats people feel free and call us 00:00:31.650 --> 00:00:36.319 align:start position:0% who eats people feel free and call us out<00:00:33.320> so<00:00:34.320> what<00:00:34.920> does<00:00:35.070> a<00:00:35.100> private<00:00:35.460> citizen<00:00:35.700> smart 00:00:36.319 --> 00:00:36.329 align:start position:0% out so what does a private citizen smart 00:00:36.329 --> 00:00:38.240 align:start position:0% out so what does a private citizen smart phone<00:00:36.570> chimes<00:00:36.870> there's<00:00:37.680> a<00:00:37.739> few<00:00:37.920> different 00:00:38.240 --> 00:00:38.250 align:start position:0% phone chimes there's a few different 00:00:38.250 --> 00:00:39.950 align:start position:0% phone chimes there's a few different like<00:00:38.489> components<00:00:39.329> of<00:00:39.390> properties<00:00:39.810> and 00:00:39.950 --> 00:00:39.960 align:start position:0% like components of properties and 00:00:39.960 --> 00:00:41.510 align:start position:0% like components of properties and present<00:00:40.410> Pacific's<00:00:40.800> markup<00:00:41.130> caps<00:00:41.340> that<00:00:41.460> are 00:00:41.510 --> 00:00:41.520 align:start position:0% present Pacific's markup caps that are 00:00:41.520 --> 00:00:43.400 align:start position:0% present Pacific's markup caps that are going<00:00:41.670> to<00:00:41.760> go<00:00:41.880> over<00:00:42.120> it<00:00:42.210> with<00:00:42.240> exactly<00:00:42.870> what 00:00:43.400 --> 00:00:43.410 align:start position:0% going to go over it with exactly what 00:00:43.410 --> 00:00:47.630 align:start position:0% going to go over it with exactly what defines<00:00:43.800> them<00:00:45.380> another<00:00:46.380> case<00:00:46.650> privacy<00:00:47.490> is 00:00:47.630 --> 00:00:47.640 align:start position:0% defines them another case privacy is 00:00:47.640 --> 00:00:49.010 align:start position:0% defines them another case privacy is defined<00:00:48.030> by<00:00:48.420> two<00:00:48.540> properties 00:00:49.010 --> 00:00:49.020 align:start position:0% defined by two properties 00:00:49.020 --> 00:00:51.470 align:start position:0% defined by two properties confidentiality<00:00:49.560> and<00:00:50.160> anonymity<00:00:50.330> and<00:00:51.330> what 00:00:51.470 --> 00:00:51.480 align:start position:0% confidentiality and anonymity and what 00:00:51.480 --> 00:00:53.930 align:start position:0% confidentiality and anonymity and what we<00:00:51.600> define<00:00:51.900> privacy<00:00:52.470> is<00:00:52.620> in<00:00:53.100> this<00:00:53.370> case<00:00:53.520> that 00:00:53.930 --> 00:00:53.940 align:start position:0% we define privacy is in this case that 00:00:53.940 --> 00:00:55.940 align:start position:0% we define privacy is in this case that confidentiality<00:00:54.690> is<00:00:54.750> when<00:00:55.350> we<00:00:55.500> can<00:00:55.650> hide<00:00:55.920> the 00:00:55.940 --> 00:00:55.950 align:start position:0% confidentiality is when we can hide the 00:00:55.950 --> 00:00:58.400 align:start position:0% confidentiality is when we can hide the inlet<00:00:56.430> and<00:00:56.610> the<00:00:56.730> outputs<00:00:57.120> of<00:00:57.480> that<00:00:57.750> at<00:00:58.200> that 00:00:58.400 --> 00:00:58.410 align:start position:0% inlet and the outputs of that at that 00:00:58.410 --> 00:01:01.640 align:start position:0% inlet and the outputs of that at that state<00:00:58.740> machines<00:00:59.070> program<00:00:59.720> so<00:01:00.720> for<00:01:01.200> example 00:01:01.640 --> 00:01:01.650 align:start position:0% state machines program so for example 00:01:01.650 --> 00:01:03.230 align:start position:0% state machines program so for example like<00:01:01.740> in<00:01:01.920> a<00:01:01.950> slowly<00:01:02.220> smart<00:01:02.580> contract<00:01:03.000> we<00:01:03.150> all 00:01:03.230 --> 00:01:03.240 align:start position:0% like in a slowly smart contract we all 00:01:03.240 --> 00:01:05.600 align:start position:0% like in a slowly smart contract we all know<00:01:03.450> that<00:01:04.170> the<00:01:04.830> inputs<00:01:05.129> are<00:01:05.220> not<00:01:05.339> private 00:01:05.600 --> 00:01:05.610 align:start position:0% know that the inputs are not private 00:01:05.610 --> 00:01:07.700 align:start position:0% know that the inputs are not private everybody<00:01:06.090> can<00:01:06.240> see<00:01:06.360> them<00:01:06.509> as<00:01:07.320> well<00:01:07.500> as<00:01:07.619> they 00:01:07.700 --> 00:01:07.710 align:start position:0% everybody can see them as well as they 00:01:07.710 --> 00:01:09.770 align:start position:0% everybody can see them as well as they are<00:01:07.740> also<00:01:07.979> no<00:01:08.189> no<00:01:08.400> buts<00:01:08.670> there<00:01:09.000> the<00:01:09.299> inputs<00:01:09.659> are 00:01:09.770 --> 00:01:09.780 align:start position:0% are also no no buts there the inputs are 00:01:09.780 --> 00:01:12.230 align:start position:0% are also no no buts there the inputs are not<00:01:10.189> confidential<00:01:11.189> and<00:01:11.460> also<00:01:11.939> they<00:01:12.119> don't 00:01:12.230 --> 00:01:12.240 align:start position:0% not confidential and also they don't 00:01:12.240 --> 00:01:13.700 align:start position:0% not confidential and also they don't find<00:01:12.509> the<00:01:12.659> users<00:01:12.900> involved<00:01:13.350> in<00:01:13.560> that 00:01:13.700 --> 00:01:13.710 align:start position:0% find the users involved in that 00:01:13.710 --> 00:01:16.760 align:start position:0% find the users involved in that confrontation<00:01:14.040> so<00:01:14.970> we<00:01:15.240> have<00:01:15.360> two<00:01:15.770> properties 00:01:16.760 --> 00:01:16.770 align:start position:0% confrontation so we have two properties 00:01:16.770 --> 00:01:17.899 align:start position:0% confrontation so we have two properties that<00:01:16.890> we've<00:01:17.100> been<00:01:17.220> finding<00:01:17.520> but<00:01:17.790> is 00:01:17.899 --> 00:01:17.909 align:start position:0% that we've been finding but is 00:01:17.909 --> 00:01:20.480 align:start position:0% that we've been finding but is confidentiality<00:01:18.659> so<00:01:19.470> that's<00:01:20.040> like<00:01:20.159> the<00:01:20.220> bare 00:01:20.480 --> 00:01:20.490 align:start position:0% confidentiality so that's like the bare 00:01:20.490 --> 00:01:22.610 align:start position:0% confidentiality so that's like the bare minimum<00:01:20.880> which<00:01:21.450> is<00:01:21.570> like<00:01:21.720> just<00:01:21.930> and<00:01:22.140> puts<00:01:22.500> it 00:01:22.610 --> 00:01:22.620 align:start position:0% minimum which is like just and puts it 00:01:22.620 --> 00:01:24.560 align:start position:0% minimum which is like just and puts it in<00:01:22.770> and<00:01:23.460> then<00:01:23.610> and<00:01:23.850> there<00:01:24.030> would<00:01:24.240> be<00:01:24.270> like<00:01:24.479> a 00:01:24.560 --> 00:01:24.570 align:start position:0% in and then and there would be like a 00:01:24.570 --> 00:01:27.230 align:start position:0% in and then and there would be like a more<00:01:24.810> complete<00:01:25.710> solution<00:01:26.400> where<00:01:26.820> it<00:01:26.909> applies 00:01:27.230 --> 00:01:27.240 align:start position:0% more complete solution where it applies 00:01:27.240 --> 00:01:30.290 align:start position:0% more complete solution where it applies confidentiality<00:01:28.970> you're<00:01:29.970> probably<00:01:30.150> familiar 00:01:30.290 --> 00:01:30.300 align:start position:0% confidentiality you're probably familiar 00:01:30.300 --> 00:01:32.000 align:start position:0% confidentiality you're probably familiar with<00:01:30.540> some<00:01:30.780> of<00:01:30.810> the<00:01:30.930> use<00:01:31.020> cases<00:01:31.050> for<00:01:31.680> smart 00:01:32.000 --> 00:01:32.010 align:start position:0% with some of the use cases for smart 00:01:32.010 --> 00:01:34.219 align:start position:0% with some of the use cases for smart contracts<00:01:32.490> in<00:01:32.670> case<00:01:32.820> you<00:01:32.940> didn't<00:01:33.240> know<00:01:33.360> so<00:01:34.080> our 00:01:34.219 --> 00:01:34.229 align:start position:0% contracts in case you didn't know so our 00:01:34.229 --> 00:01:37.010 align:start position:0% contracts in case you didn't know so our contracts<00:01:34.800> are<00:01:35.070> also<00:01:35.490> a<00:01:36.030> form<00:01:36.300> of<00:01:36.570> private 00:01:37.010 --> 00:01:37.020 align:start position:0% contracts are also a form of private 00:01:37.020 --> 00:01:38.570 align:start position:0% contracts are also a form of private transaction<00:01:37.620> so<00:01:37.799> like<00:01:38.070> a<00:01:38.100> Bitcoin 00:01:38.570 --> 00:01:38.580 align:start position:0% transaction so like a Bitcoin 00:01:38.580 --> 00:01:42.020 align:start position:0% transaction so like a Bitcoin transaction<00:01:39.240> is<00:01:39.420> a<00:01:40.350> smart<00:01:40.950> contract<00:01:41.400> to<00:01:41.580> some 00:01:42.020 --> 00:01:42.030 align:start position:0% transaction is a smart contract to some 00:01:42.030 --> 00:01:43.969 align:start position:0% transaction is a smart contract to some extent<00:01:42.360> so<00:01:42.900> in<00:01:43.290> the<00:01:43.380> case<00:01:43.530> of<00:01:43.560> private 00:01:43.969 --> 00:01:43.979 align:start position:0% extent so in the case of private 00:01:43.979 --> 00:01:46.090 align:start position:0% extent so in the case of private transactions<00:01:44.580> there<00:01:45.000> are<00:01:45.090> viewing<00:01:45.570> with 00:01:46.090 --> 00:01:46.100 align:start position:0% transactions there are viewing with 00:01:46.100 --> 00:01:49.950 align:start position:0% transactions there are viewing with these<00:01:46.280> Z<00:01:46.970> cash<00:01:47.210> banana<00:01:47.659> and<00:01:48.080> two<00:01:48.409> major<00:01:48.620> ones 00:01:49.950 --> 00:01:49.960 align:start position:0% these Z cash banana and two major ones 00:01:49.960 --> 00:01:52.510 align:start position:0% these Z cash banana and two major ones private<00:01:50.960> Bodi<00:01:51.170> is<00:01:51.590> known<00:01:51.890> as<00:01:52.070> case<00:01:52.280> where 00:01:52.510 --> 00:01:52.520 align:start position:0% private Bodi is known as case where 00:01:52.520 --> 00:01:54.760 align:start position:0% private Bodi is known as case where people<00:01:52.940> actually<00:01:53.360> need<00:01:53.720> to<00:01:53.930> have<00:01:54.110> their<00:01:54.380> some 00:01:54.760 --> 00:01:54.770 align:start position:0% people actually need to have their some 00:01:54.770 --> 00:01:56.380 align:start position:0% people actually need to have their some privacy<00:01:55.160> some<00:01:55.490> degree<00:01:55.729> of<00:01:55.760> maybe<00:01:56.180> even 00:01:56.380 --> 00:01:56.390 align:start position:0% privacy some degree of maybe even 00:01:56.390 --> 00:01:59.260 align:start position:0% privacy some degree of maybe even anonymity<00:01:56.750> when<00:01:57.320> they<00:01:57.440> vote<00:01:57.680> to<00:01:58.070> cast<00:01:58.760> ballots 00:01:59.260 --> 00:01:59.270 align:start position:0% anonymity when they vote to cast ballots 00:01:59.270 --> 00:02:03.670 align:start position:0% anonymity when they vote to cast ballots as<00:02:00.080> well<00:02:00.320> as<00:02:00.460> auctions<00:02:01.460> there's<00:02:02.450> a<00:02:02.540> really<00:02:02.930> big 00:02:03.670 --> 00:02:03.680 align:start position:0% as well as auctions there's a really big 00:02:03.680 --> 00:02:06.910 align:start position:0% as well as auctions there's a really big market<00:02:03.740> for<00:02:04.160> wanted<00:02:04.790> options<00:02:05.240> and<00:02:06.110> keeping 00:02:06.910 --> 00:02:06.920 align:start position:0% market for wanted options and keeping 00:02:06.920 --> 00:02:08.499 align:start position:0% market for wanted options and keeping that<00:02:07.040> who<00:02:07.250> is<00:02:07.369> paying<00:02:07.580> for<00:02:07.700> what<00:02:08.000> how<00:02:08.360> much 00:02:08.499 --> 00:02:08.509 align:start position:0% that who is paying for what how much 00:02:08.509 --> 00:02:14.170 align:start position:0% that who is paying for what how much they're<00:02:08.720> paying<00:02:08.750> right<00:02:12.520> so<00:02:13.520> there<00:02:13.970> are<00:02:14.060> some 00:02:14.170 --> 00:02:14.180 align:start position:0% they're paying right so there are some 00:02:14.180 --> 00:02:16.860 align:start position:0% they're paying right so there are some considerations<00:02:14.510> for<00:02:14.959> preserving<00:02:15.800> smart<00:02:16.160> cat 00:02:16.860 --> 00:02:16.870 align:start position:0% considerations for preserving smart cat 00:02:16.870 --> 00:02:19.210 align:start position:0% considerations for preserving smart cat an<00:02:17.870> honor<00:02:18.080> talk<00:02:18.320> were<00:02:18.500> mainly<00:02:18.770> going<00:02:18.920> to<00:02:19.130> focus 00:02:19.210 --> 00:02:19.220 align:start position:0% an honor talk were mainly going to focus 00:02:19.220 --> 00:02:21.880 align:start position:0% an honor talk were mainly going to focus on<00:02:19.870> transaction<00:02:20.870> privacy<00:02:21.290> the<00:02:21.410> reason<00:02:21.709> why<00:02:21.830> is 00:02:21.880 --> 00:02:21.890 align:start position:0% on transaction privacy the reason why is 00:02:21.890 --> 00:02:24.250 align:start position:0% on transaction privacy the reason why is because<00:02:22.070> transaction<00:02:22.850> privacy<00:02:23.270> is<00:02:23.480> a<00:02:23.900> small 00:02:24.250 --> 00:02:24.260 align:start position:0% because transaction privacy is a small 00:02:24.260 --> 00:02:27.930 align:start position:0% because transaction privacy is a small subset<00:02:24.530> problem<00:02:25.280> of<00:02:25.840> private<00:02:26.840> transit<00:02:27.650> of 00:02:27.930 --> 00:02:27.940 align:start position:0% subset problem of private transit of 00:02:27.940 --> 00:02:30.400 align:start position:0% subset problem of private transit of privacy<00:02:28.940> you<00:02:28.970> preserving<00:02:29.510> smart<00:02:29.810> contracts 00:02:30.400 --> 00:02:30.410 align:start position:0% privacy you preserving smart contracts 00:02:30.410 --> 00:02:32.470 align:start position:0% privacy you preserving smart contracts and<00:02:30.560> the<00:02:31.070> cool<00:02:31.250> thing<00:02:31.430> about<00:02:31.520> transactions<00:02:32.390> is 00:02:32.470 --> 00:02:32.480 align:start position:0% and the cool thing about transactions is 00:02:32.480 --> 00:02:34.330 align:start position:0% and the cool thing about transactions is that<00:02:32.600> when<00:02:32.720> you<00:02:32.810> make<00:02:33.140> them<00:02:33.350> private<00:02:33.620> you<00:02:34.190> can 00:02:34.330 --> 00:02:34.340 align:start position:0% that when you make them private you can 00:02:34.340 --> 00:02:37.390 align:start position:0% that when you make them private you can actually<00:02:34.430> sometimes<00:02:35.030> generalize<00:02:35.810> these<00:02:36.400> into 00:02:37.390 --> 00:02:37.400 align:start position:0% actually sometimes generalize these into 00:02:37.400 --> 00:02:39.400 align:start position:0% actually sometimes generalize these into more<00:02:37.610> broad<00:02:37.970> definitions<00:02:38.900> of<00:02:39.140> smart 00:02:39.400 --> 00:02:39.410 align:start position:0% more broad definitions of smart 00:02:39.410 --> 00:02:40.750 align:start position:0% more broad definitions of smart contracts<00:02:39.769> so<00:02:39.920> they<00:02:39.950> can<00:02:40.130> actually<00:02:40.280> make<00:02:40.580> them 00:02:40.750 --> 00:02:40.760 align:start position:0% contracts so they can actually make them 00:02:40.760 --> 00:02:42.070 align:start position:0% contracts so they can actually make them into<00:02:40.970> more<00:02:41.180> intelligent<00:02:41.630> Asians 00:02:42.070 --> 00:02:42.080 align:start position:0% into more intelligent Asians 00:02:42.080 --> 00:02:44.350 align:start position:0% into more intelligent Asians now<00:02:42.440> don't<00:02:42.890> that<00:02:43.190> weren't<00:02:43.519> just<00:02:43.700> transactions 00:02:44.350 --> 00:02:44.360 align:start position:0% now don't that weren't just transactions 00:02:44.360 --> 00:02:45.940 align:start position:0% now don't that weren't just transactions there<00:02:44.450> may<00:02:44.570> be<00:02:44.600> involved<00:02:44.930> like<00:02:45.410> whole<00:02:45.650> state 00:02:45.940 --> 00:02:45.950 align:start position:0% there may be involved like whole state 00:02:45.950 --> 00:02:47.350 align:start position:0% there may be involved like whole state machine<00:02:46.220> you<00:02:46.250> can<00:02:46.489> pull<00:02:46.640> an<00:02:46.730> execution<00:02:47.209> we'll 00:02:47.350 --> 00:02:47.360 align:start position:0% machine you can pull an execution we'll 00:02:47.360 --> 00:02:50.320 align:start position:0% machine you can pull an execution we'll be<00:02:47.450> getting<00:02:47.660> more<00:02:47.870> into<00:02:48.080> that<00:02:48.170> later<00:02:48.880> so<00:02:49.880> we 00:02:50.320 --> 00:02:50.330 align:start position:0% be getting more into that later so we 00:02:50.330 --> 00:02:51.400 align:start position:0% be getting more into that later so we believe<00:02:50.480> there<00:02:50.900> are<00:02:50.989> four<00:02:51.260> main 00:02:51.400 --> 00:02:51.410 align:start position:0% believe there are four main 00:02:51.410 --> 00:02:52.960 align:start position:0% believe there are four main considerations<00:02:52.190> that<00:02:52.310> go<00:02:52.549> into<00:02:52.580> actually 00:02:52.960 --> 00:02:52.970 align:start position:0% considerations that go into actually 00:02:52.970 --> 00:02:55.270 align:start position:0% considerations that go into actually developing<00:02:53.750> a<00:02:53.930> privacy<00:02:54.380> preserving<00:02:54.560> smart 00:02:55.270 --> 00:02:55.280 align:start position:0% developing a privacy preserving smart 00:02:55.280 --> 00:02:56.140 align:start position:0% developing a privacy preserving smart contract 00:02:56.140 --> 00:02:56.150 align:start position:0% contract 00:02:56.150 --> 00:02:58.870 align:start position:0% contract so<00:02:56.390> we've<00:02:56.840> separating<00:02:57.410> things<00:02:57.500> out<00:02:57.739> in<00:02:58.040> queue 00:02:58.870 --> 00:02:58.880 align:start position:0% so we've separating things out in queue 00:02:58.880 --> 00:03:01.350 align:start position:0% so we've separating things out in queue the<00:02:59.000> privacy<00:02:59.840> security<00:03:00.230> and<00:03:00.650> functionality 00:03:01.350 --> 00:03:01.360 align:start position:0% the privacy security and functionality 00:03:01.360 --> 00:03:03.760 align:start position:0% the privacy security and functionality within<00:03:02.360> each<00:03:02.630> of<00:03:02.660> us<00:03:02.840> there's<00:03:03.350> a<00:03:03.500> lot<00:03:03.530> of 00:03:03.760 --> 00:03:03.770 align:start position:0% within each of us there's a lot of 00:03:03.770 --> 00:03:06.190 align:start position:0% within each of us there's a lot of complexities<00:03:04.460> so<00:03:05.090> in<00:03:05.360> efficiency<00:03:05.930> you<00:03:06.050> can 00:03:06.190 --> 00:03:06.200 align:start position:0% complexities so in efficiency you can 00:03:06.200 --> 00:03:08.230 align:start position:0% complexities so in efficiency you can ask<00:03:06.350> yourself<00:03:06.830> how<00:03:07.160> long<00:03:07.190> does<00:03:07.640> it<00:03:07.700> take<00:03:08.000> to 00:03:08.230 --> 00:03:08.240 align:start position:0% ask yourself how long does it take to 00:03:08.240 --> 00:03:10.090 align:start position:0% ask yourself how long does it take to actually<00:03:08.600> generate<00:03:08.840> the<00:03:09.140> transaction 00:03:10.090 --> 00:03:10.100 align:start position:0% actually generate the transaction 00:03:10.100 --> 00:03:12.700 align:start position:0% actually generate the transaction what<00:03:10.460> about<00:03:10.550> verifying<00:03:11.300> a<00:03:11.450> transaction<00:03:12.170> what 00:03:12.700 --> 00:03:12.710 align:start position:0% what about verifying a transaction what 00:03:12.710 --> 00:03:14.650 align:start position:0% what about verifying a transaction what is<00:03:12.830> the<00:03:12.950> actual<00:03:13.310> communication<00:03:14.060> complexity 00:03:14.650 --> 00:03:14.660 align:start position:0% is the actual communication complexity 00:03:14.660 --> 00:03:17.170 align:start position:0% is the actual communication complexity setup<00:03:15.260> string<00:03:15.560> size<00:03:15.830> set-up<00:03:16.550> time<00:03:16.790> that's 00:03:17.170 --> 00:03:17.180 align:start position:0% setup string size set-up time that's 00:03:17.180 --> 00:03:19.600 align:start position:0% setup string size set-up time that's entering<00:03:17.630> size<00:03:17.960> what<00:03:18.950> are<00:03:19.070> the<00:03:19.160> hardware 00:03:19.600 --> 00:03:19.610 align:start position:0% entering size what are the hardware 00:03:19.610 --> 00:03:21.850 align:start position:0% entering size what are the hardware resources<00:03:19.820> required<00:03:20.630> government<00:03:21.140> zero 00:03:21.850 --> 00:03:21.860 align:start position:0% resources required government zero 00:03:21.860 --> 00:03:25.240 align:start position:0% resources required government zero knowledge<00:03:22.100> systems<00:03:22.820> do<00:03:23.090> you<00:03:23.180> have<00:03:23.420> a<00:03:24.070> lot<00:03:25.070> of 00:03:25.240 --> 00:03:25.250 align:start position:0% knowledge systems do you have a lot of 00:03:25.250 --> 00:03:26.950 align:start position:0% knowledge systems do you have a lot of hardware<00:03:25.610> resources<00:03:26.150> required<00:03:26.570> and<00:03:26.870> they 00:03:26.950 --> 00:03:26.960 align:start position:0% hardware resources required and they 00:03:26.960 --> 00:03:29.710 align:start position:0% hardware resources required and they tend<00:03:27.230> to<00:03:27.320> gloss<00:03:27.470> over<00:03:27.740> that<00:03:28.040> aspect<00:03:28.490> and<00:03:29.180> how 00:03:29.710 --> 00:03:29.720 align:start position:0% tend to gloss over that aspect and how 00:03:29.720 --> 00:03:32.710 align:start position:0% tend to gloss over that aspect and how does<00:03:29.930> it<00:03:30.050> actually<00:03:30.080> scale<00:03:31.040> with<00:03:31.760> privacy<00:03:32.210> as 00:03:32.710 --> 00:03:32.720 align:start position:0% does it actually scale with privacy as 00:03:32.720 --> 00:03:34.960 align:start position:0% does it actually scale with privacy as we<00:03:33.050> mentioned<00:03:33.470> before<00:03:33.800> can<00:03:34.100> we<00:03:34.550> provide 00:03:34.960 --> 00:03:34.970 align:start position:0% we mentioned before can we provide 00:03:34.970 --> 00:03:38.470 align:start position:0% we mentioned before can we provide confidentiality<00:03:35.810> or<00:03:36.500> anonymity<00:03:36.680> and<00:03:37.370> is<00:03:38.300> the 00:03:38.470 --> 00:03:38.480 align:start position:0% confidentiality or anonymity and is the 00:03:38.480 --> 00:03:39.970 align:start position:0% confidentiality or anonymity and is the privacy<00:03:38.870> based<00:03:39.200> on<00:03:39.440> cryptographic 00:03:39.970 --> 00:03:39.980 align:start position:0% privacy based on cryptographic 00:03:39.980 --> 00:03:42.970 align:start position:0% privacy based on cryptographic techniques<00:03:40.940> so<00:03:41.450> do<00:03:41.660> we<00:03:41.810> have<00:03:41.840> some<00:03:42.080> truthful 00:03:42.970 --> 00:03:42.980 align:start position:0% techniques so do we have some truthful 00:03:42.980 --> 00:03:45.790 align:start position:0% techniques so do we have some truthful form<00:03:43.250> of<00:03:43.430> privacy<00:03:44.000> or<00:03:44.660> are<00:03:45.080> we<00:03:45.230> using<00:03:45.440> other 00:03:45.790 --> 00:03:45.800 align:start position:0% form of privacy or are we using other 00:03:45.800 --> 00:03:47.320 align:start position:0% form of privacy or are we using other techniques<00:03:46.310> such<00:03:46.640> as<00:03:46.670> tumblers<00:03:47.300> for 00:03:47.320 --> 00:03:47.330 align:start position:0% techniques such as tumblers for 00:03:47.330 --> 00:03:50.290 align:start position:0% techniques such as tumblers for anonymity<00:03:48.140> or<00:03:48.500> stealth<00:03:48.800> addresses<00:03:49.300> security 00:03:50.290 --> 00:03:50.300 align:start position:0% anonymity or stealth addresses security 00:03:50.300 --> 00:03:52.420 align:start position:0% anonymity or stealth addresses security has<00:03:50.510> similar<00:03:51.140> considerations<00:03:51.860> is<00:03:52.100> the 00:03:52.420 --> 00:03:52.430 align:start position:0% has similar considerations is the 00:03:52.430 --> 00:03:55.150 align:start position:0% has similar considerations is the security<00:03:53.000> based<00:03:53.270> on<00:03:53.800> cryptography 00:03:55.150 --> 00:03:55.160 align:start position:0% security based on cryptography 00:03:55.160 --> 00:03:57.700 align:start position:0% security based on cryptography do<00:03:55.460> we<00:03:55.640> have<00:03:55.850> provable<00:03:56.420> security<00:03:57.050> or<00:03:57.410> is 00:03:57.700 --> 00:03:57.710 align:start position:0% do we have provable security or is 00:03:57.710 --> 00:03:59.830 align:start position:0% do we have provable security or is security<00:03:58.280> based<00:03:58.580> on<00:03:58.760> non<00:03:59.390> cryptographic 00:03:59.830 --> 00:03:59.840 align:start position:0% security based on non cryptographic 00:03:59.840 --> 00:04:03.190 align:start position:0% security based on non cryptographic techniques<00:04:00.700> we<00:04:01.700> can<00:04:01.730> look<00:04:02.180> at<00:04:02.360> trusted<00:04:02.810> setup 00:04:03.190 --> 00:04:03.200 align:start position:0% techniques we can look at trusted setup 00:04:03.200 --> 00:04:05.830 align:start position:0% techniques we can look at trusted setup we<00:04:03.800> also<00:04:04.100> have<00:04:04.400> to<00:04:04.580> consider<00:04:04.790> LAN<00:04:05.270> standard 00:04:05.830 --> 00:04:05.840 align:start position:0% we also have to consider LAN standard 00:04:05.840 --> 00:04:08.020 align:start position:0% we also have to consider LAN standard cryptographic<00:04:06.170> assumptions<00:04:07.010> such<00:04:07.340> as<00:04:07.580> using 00:04:08.020 --> 00:04:08.030 align:start position:0% cryptographic assumptions such as using 00:04:08.030 --> 00:04:10.060 align:start position:0% cryptographic assumptions such as using the<00:04:08.120> algebraic<00:04:08.600> remodel<00:04:09.230> knowledge<00:04:09.920> of 00:04:10.060 --> 00:04:10.070 align:start position:0% the algebraic remodel knowledge of 00:04:10.070 --> 00:04:11.980 align:start position:0% the algebraic remodel knowledge of exponent<00:04:10.640> which<00:04:10.790> are<00:04:10.940> slightly<00:04:11.210> on<00:04:11.480> standard 00:04:11.980 --> 00:04:11.990 align:start position:0% exponent which are slightly on standard 00:04:11.990 --> 00:04:14.170 align:start position:0% exponent which are slightly on standard and<00:04:12.710> we<00:04:12.860> have<00:04:12.950> to<00:04:13.130> consider<00:04:13.280> what<00:04:13.850> kind<00:04:14.060> of 00:04:14.170 --> 00:04:14.180 align:start position:0% and we have to consider what kind of 00:04:14.180 --> 00:04:16.390 align:start position:0% and we have to consider what kind of adversary<00:04:14.780> is<00:04:15.140> our<00:04:15.350> scheme<00:04:15.620> actually<00:04:16.100> secure 00:04:16.390 --> 00:04:16.400 align:start position:0% adversary is our scheme actually secure 00:04:16.400 --> 00:04:18.280 align:start position:0% adversary is our scheme actually secure against<00:04:16.640> a<00:04:16.850> post<00:04:17.120> one-to-one<00:04:17.870> a<00:04:17.900> semi 00:04:18.280 --> 00:04:18.290 align:start position:0% against a post one-to-one a semi 00:04:18.290 --> 00:04:20.710 align:start position:0% against a post one-to-one a semi malicious<00:04:18.799> one<00:04:19.040> and<00:04:19.489> then<00:04:20.000> finally<00:04:20.510> and 00:04:20.710 --> 00:04:20.720 align:start position:0% malicious one and then finally and 00:04:20.720 --> 00:04:22.690 align:start position:0% malicious one and then finally and arguably<00:04:21.320> to<00:04:21.590> us<00:04:21.739> the<00:04:22.010> most<00:04:22.130> important 00:04:22.690 --> 00:04:22.700 align:start position:0% arguably to us the most important 00:04:22.700 --> 00:04:24.790 align:start position:0% arguably to us the most important consideration<00:04:23.390> is<00:04:23.510> functionalities<00:04:24.320> when 00:04:24.790 --> 00:04:24.800 align:start position:0% consideration is functionalities when 00:04:24.800 --> 00:04:26.610 align:start position:0% consideration is functionalities when they're<00:04:24.920> talking<00:04:25.160> about<00:04:25.430> developing<00:04:26.180> PTSD 00:04:26.610 --> 00:04:26.620 align:start position:0% they're talking about developing PTSD 00:04:26.620 --> 00:04:29.200 align:start position:0% they're talking about developing PTSD can<00:04:27.620> you<00:04:27.830> actually<00:04:28.250> adapt<00:04:28.610> your<00:04:28.850> scheme<00:04:29.180> to 00:04:29.200 --> 00:04:29.210 align:start position:0% can you actually adapt your scheme to 00:04:29.210 --> 00:04:31.900 align:start position:0% can you actually adapt your scheme to new<00:04:29.630> settings<00:04:30.290> is<00:04:30.710> it<00:04:30.950> possible<00:04:31.460> to<00:04:31.520> really 00:04:31.900 --> 00:04:31.910 align:start position:0% new settings is it possible to really 00:04:31.910 --> 00:04:34.660 align:start position:0% new settings is it possible to really express<00:04:32.450> any<00:04:32.780> arbitrary<00:04:33.680> computation<00:04:34.460> with 00:04:34.660 --> 00:04:34.670 align:start position:0% express any arbitrary computation with 00:04:34.670 --> 00:04:36.790 align:start position:0% express any arbitrary computation with your<00:04:34.820> scheme<00:04:35.150> and<00:04:35.630> more<00:04:35.900> importantly<00:04:36.380> is 00:04:36.790 --> 00:04:36.800 align:start position:0% your scheme and more importantly is 00:04:36.800 --> 00:04:38.770 align:start position:0% your scheme and more importantly is there<00:04:36.980> support<00:04:37.310> for<00:04:37.400> stateful<00:04:38.000> computations 00:04:38.770 --> 00:04:38.780 align:start position:0% there support for stateful computations 00:04:38.780 --> 00:04:41.790 align:start position:0% there support for stateful computations like<00:04:39.080> area 00:04:41.790 --> 00:04:41.800 align:start position:0% like area 00:04:41.800 --> 00:04:44.590 align:start position:0% like area so<00:04:42.800> that<00:04:43.190> leads<00:04:43.430> us<00:04:43.550> into<00:04:43.880> what<00:04:44.060> we<00:04:44.240> believe 00:04:44.590 --> 00:04:44.600 align:start position:0% so that leads us into what we believe 00:04:44.600 --> 00:04:46.540 align:start position:0% so that leads us into what we believe are<00:04:44.870> the<00:04:44.990> four<00:04:45.200> definitions<00:04:45.440> for<00:04:46.280> these 00:04:46.540 --> 00:04:46.550 align:start position:0% are the four definitions for these 00:04:46.550 --> 00:04:49.090 align:start position:0% are the four definitions for these qualities<00:04:47.300> for<00:04:47.540> efficiency<00:04:48.140> in<00:04:48.560> the<00:04:48.710> ideal 00:04:49.090 --> 00:04:49.100 align:start position:0% qualities for efficiency in the ideal 00:04:49.100 --> 00:04:51.550 align:start position:0% qualities for efficiency in the ideal world<00:04:49.130> it<00:04:49.730> should<00:04:49.880> be<00:04:50.060> quick<00:04:50.480> to<00:04:50.750> generate<00:04:51.320> and 00:04:51.550 --> 00:04:51.560 align:start position:0% world it should be quick to generate and 00:04:51.560 --> 00:04:54.010 align:start position:0% world it should be quick to generate and verify<00:04:52.070> transactions<00:04:52.850> that<00:04:53.540> it<00:04:53.720> should<00:04:53.900> be 00:04:54.010 --> 00:04:54.020 align:start position:0% verify transactions that it should be 00:04:54.020 --> 00:04:55.360 align:start position:0% verify transactions that it should be fast<00:04:54.320> there<00:04:54.650> should<00:04:54.830> be<00:04:54.950> a<00:04:54.980> small 00:04:55.360 --> 00:04:55.370 align:start position:0% fast there should be a small 00:04:55.370 --> 00:04:58.120 align:start position:0% fast there should be a small communication<00:04:56.270> cost<00:04:56.830> it<00:04:57.830> should<00:04:58.040> be 00:04:58.120 --> 00:04:58.130 align:start position:0% communication cost it should be 00:04:58.130 --> 00:04:59.950 align:start position:0% communication cost it should be efficient<00:04:58.610> when<00:04:58.760> scaling<00:04:59.300> and<00:04:59.480> minimal 00:04:59.950 --> 00:04:59.960 align:start position:0% efficient when scaling and minimal 00:04:59.960 --> 00:05:02.200 align:start position:0% efficient when scaling and minimal hardware<00:05:00.440> resources<00:05:00.950> are<00:05:01.340> required<00:05:01.490> with 00:05:02.200 --> 00:05:02.210 align:start position:0% hardware resources are required with 00:05:02.210 --> 00:05:03.940 align:start position:0% hardware resources are required with privacy<00:05:02.660> we<00:05:03.020> should<00:05:03.320> be<00:05:03.470> able<00:05:03.590> to<00:05:03.740> get 00:05:03.940 --> 00:05:03.950 align:start position:0% privacy we should be able to get 00:05:03.950 --> 00:05:06.790 align:start position:0% privacy we should be able to get anonymity<00:05:04.550> not<00:05:05.210> just<00:05:05.540> confidentiality<00:05:06.530> it 00:05:06.790 --> 00:05:06.800 align:start position:0% anonymity not just confidentiality it 00:05:06.800 --> 00:05:09.240 align:start position:0% anonymity not just confidentiality it should<00:05:07.070> be<00:05:07.190> based<00:05:07.340> solely<00:05:07.940> on<00:05:08.090> cryptography 00:05:09.240 --> 00:05:09.250 align:start position:0% should be based solely on cryptography 00:05:09.250 --> 00:05:11.860 align:start position:0% should be based solely on cryptography security<00:05:10.250> is<00:05:10.370> similar<00:05:10.790> it<00:05:11.210> should<00:05:11.420> be<00:05:11.570> based 00:05:11.860 --> 00:05:11.870 align:start position:0% security is similar it should be based 00:05:11.870 --> 00:05:14.590 align:start position:0% security is similar it should be based solely<00:05:12.140> on<00:05:12.650> cryptography<00:05:13.190> we<00:05:13.850> do<00:05:14.030> not<00:05:14.210> want<00:05:14.480> to 00:05:14.590 --> 00:05:14.600 align:start position:0% solely on cryptography we do not want to 00:05:14.600 --> 00:05:17.080 align:start position:0% solely on cryptography we do not want to use<00:05:14.810> a<00:05:14.840> trusted<00:05:15.200> set<00:05:15.650> up<00:05:15.800> both<00:05:16.160> for<00:05:16.520> security 00:05:17.080 --> 00:05:17.090 align:start position:0% use a trusted set up both for security 00:05:17.090 --> 00:05:19.750 align:start position:0% use a trusted set up both for security and<00:05:17.180> functionality<00:05:17.420> reasons<00:05:18.380> and<00:05:19.280> it<00:05:19.610> should 00:05:19.750 --> 00:05:19.760 align:start position:0% and functionality reasons and it should 00:05:19.760 --> 00:05:21.910 align:start position:0% and functionality reasons and it should be<00:05:19.910> secure<00:05:20.420> against<00:05:20.780> strong<00:05:21.140> adversaries 00:05:21.910 --> 00:05:21.920 align:start position:0% be secure against strong adversaries 00:05:21.920 --> 00:05:24.850 align:start position:0% be secure against strong adversaries we've<00:05:22.190> left<00:05:22.490> this<00:05:22.700> deliberately<00:05:23.860> ambiguous 00:05:24.850 --> 00:05:24.860 align:start position:0% we've left this deliberately ambiguous 00:05:24.860 --> 00:05:26.710 align:start position:0% we've left this deliberately ambiguous because<00:05:25.790> it<00:05:25.910> depends<00:05:26.210> what<00:05:26.390> you<00:05:26.480> can<00:05:26.630> achieve 00:05:26.710 --> 00:05:26.720 align:start position:0% because it depends what you can achieve 00:05:26.720 --> 00:05:28.690 align:start position:0% because it depends what you can achieve a<00:05:26.930> nurse<00:05:27.200> eat<00:05:27.530> and<00:05:27.950> buy<00:05:28.220> these<00:05:28.280> are 00:05:28.690 --> 00:05:28.700 align:start position:0% a nurse eat and buy these are 00:05:28.700 --> 00:05:30.490 align:start position:0% a nurse eat and buy these are functionality<00:05:29.390> we<00:05:29.690> should<00:05:29.900> be<00:05:30.020> able<00:05:30.110> to<00:05:30.230> check 00:05:30.490 --> 00:05:30.500 align:start position:0% functionality we should be able to check 00:05:30.500 --> 00:05:33.280 align:start position:0% functionality we should be able to check off<00:05:30.710> all<00:05:30.920> three<00:05:31.280> boxes<00:05:31.790> that<00:05:31.970> we<00:05:32.120> just<00:05:32.330> saw<00:05:32.510> we 00:05:33.280 --> 00:05:33.290 align:start position:0% off all three boxes that we just saw we 00:05:33.290 --> 00:05:35.830 align:start position:0% off all three boxes that we just saw we want<00:05:33.530> it<00:05:33.620> to<00:05:33.740> be<00:05:33.860> easily<00:05:34.280> to<00:05:34.550> easy<00:05:35.000> adapt<00:05:35.570> to 00:05:35.830 --> 00:05:35.840 align:start position:0% want it to be easily to easy adapt to 00:05:35.840 --> 00:05:37.450 align:start position:0% want it to be easily to easy adapt to new<00:05:35.960> settings<00:05:36.440> you<00:05:36.800> should<00:05:37.010> be<00:05:37.190> able<00:05:37.280> to 00:05:37.450 --> 00:05:37.460 align:start position:0% new settings you should be able to 00:05:37.460 --> 00:05:40.000 align:start position:0% new settings you should be able to express<00:05:37.940> any<00:05:38.420> kind<00:05:38.870> of<00:05:39.110> program<00:05:39.560> with<00:05:39.830> our 00:05:40.000 --> 00:05:40.010 align:start position:0% express any kind of program with our 00:05:40.010 --> 00:05:42.010 align:start position:0% express any kind of program with our scheme<00:05:40.340> and<00:05:40.730> finally<00:05:41.420> it<00:05:41.660> should<00:05:41.870> support 00:05:42.010 --> 00:05:42.020 align:start position:0% scheme and finally it should support 00:05:42.020 --> 00:05:45.790 align:start position:0% scheme and finally it should support stateful<00:05:42.710> contributions<00:05:44.170> so<00:05:45.170> how<00:05:45.590> do<00:05:45.650> we 00:05:45.790 --> 00:05:45.800 align:start position:0% stateful contributions so how do we 00:05:45.800 --> 00:05:47.350 align:start position:0% stateful contributions so how do we actually<00:05:46.280> achieve<00:05:46.760> these<00:05:47.090> four 00:05:47.350 --> 00:05:47.360 align:start position:0% actually achieve these four 00:05:47.360 --> 00:05:49.000 align:start position:0% actually achieve these four characteristics<00:05:47.930> we're<00:05:48.560> going<00:05:48.740> to<00:05:48.800> focus 00:05:49.000 --> 00:05:49.010 align:start position:0% characteristics we're going to focus 00:05:49.010 --> 00:05:50.620 align:start position:0% characteristics we're going to focus exclusively<00:05:49.370> on<00:05:49.940> the<00:05:50.270> cryptographic 00:05:50.620 --> 00:05:50.630 align:start position:0% exclusively on the cryptographic 00:05:50.630 --> 00:05:52.690 align:start position:0% exclusively on the cryptographic techniques<00:05:51.440> because<00:05:51.890> we<00:05:52.070> believe<00:05:52.370> in<00:05:52.520> through 00:05:52.690 --> 00:05:52.700 align:start position:0% techniques because we believe in through 00:05:52.700 --> 00:05:55.720 align:start position:0% techniques because we believe in through the<00:05:52.850> whole<00:05:53.000> security<00:05:53.300> and<00:05:53.780> privacy<00:05:54.490> the<00:05:55.490> first 00:05:55.720 --> 00:05:55.730 align:start position:0% the whole security and privacy the first 00:05:55.730 --> 00:05:57.160 align:start position:0% the whole security and privacy the first one<00:05:55.940> we're<00:05:56.090> going<00:05:56.180> to<00:05:56.240> look<00:05:56.390> at<00:05:56.570> is<00:05:56.780> of<00:05:56.930> course 00:05:57.160 --> 00:05:57.170 align:start position:0% one we're going to look at is of course 00:05:57.170 --> 00:05:59.440 align:start position:0% one we're going to look at is of course zero<00:05:57.560> knowledge<00:05:57.830> proof<00:05:58.040> and<00:05:58.640> there<00:05:59.030> are<00:05:59.120> three 00:05:59.440 --> 00:05:59.450 align:start position:0% zero knowledge proof and there are three 00:05:59.450 --> 00:06:00.880 align:start position:0% zero knowledge proof and there are three main<00:05:59.660> schemes<00:06:00.110> that<00:06:00.350> everyone's<00:06:00.770> familiar 00:06:00.880 --> 00:06:00.890 align:start position:0% main schemes that everyone's familiar 00:06:00.890 --> 00:06:05.170 align:start position:0% main schemes that everyone's familiar with<00:06:01.190> snarks<00:06:02.030> starts<00:06:02.960> and<00:06:03.260> Moltres<00:06:04.220> so<00:06:04.940> four 00:06:05.170 --> 00:06:05.180 align:start position:0% with snarks starts and Moltres so four 00:06:05.180 --> 00:06:08.170 align:start position:0% with snarks starts and Moltres so four starts<00:06:05.570> they<00:06:05.840> have<00:06:06.050> trusted<00:06:06.740> set<00:06:06.980> up<00:06:07.180> however 00:06:08.170 --> 00:06:08.180 align:start position:0% starts they have trusted set up however 00:06:08.180 --> 00:06:10.510 align:start position:0% starts they have trusted set up however that<00:06:08.750> allows<00:06:09.020> us<00:06:09.050> to<00:06:09.290> get<00:06:09.530> the<00:06:09.710> smallest<00:06:10.070> reach 00:06:10.510 --> 00:06:10.520 align:start position:0% that allows us to get the smallest reach 00:06:10.520 --> 00:06:12.790 align:start position:0% that allows us to get the smallest reach sizes<00:06:11.000> out<00:06:11.210> of<00:06:11.360> the<00:06:11.480> three<00:06:11.750> and<00:06:11.990> the<00:06:12.290> fastest 00:06:12.790 --> 00:06:12.800 align:start position:0% sizes out of the three and the fastest 00:06:12.800 --> 00:06:15.700 align:start position:0% sizes out of the three and the fastest verification<00:06:13.550> possible<00:06:14.090> but<00:06:14.810> they<00:06:15.020> also<00:06:15.200> use 00:06:15.700 --> 00:06:15.710 align:start position:0% verification possible but they also use 00:06:15.710 --> 00:06:17.620 align:start position:0% verification possible but they also use a<00:06:15.920> slightly<00:06:16.250> non-standard<00:06:17.180> cryptographic 00:06:17.620 --> 00:06:17.630 align:start position:0% a slightly non-standard cryptographic 00:06:17.630 --> 00:06:19.360 align:start position:0% a slightly non-standard cryptographic assumption<00:06:18.440> which<00:06:18.740> is<00:06:18.770> knowledge<00:06:19.130> of 00:06:19.360 --> 00:06:19.370 align:start position:0% assumption which is knowledge of 00:06:19.370 --> 00:06:22.129 align:start position:0% assumption which is knowledge of exponent<00:06:19.970> Starks<00:06:20.780> are<00:06:20.990> arguably<00:06:21.530> in<00:06:21.710> a<00:06:21.770> true 00:06:22.129 --> 00:06:22.139 align:start position:0% exponent Starks are arguably in a true 00:06:22.139 --> 00:06:24.559 align:start position:0% exponent Starks are arguably in a true on<00:06:22.469> Starks<00:06:23.009> and<00:06:23.189> that<00:06:23.400> they<00:06:23.580> have<00:06:23.819> no<00:06:24.030> trusted 00:06:24.559 --> 00:06:24.569 align:start position:0% on Starks and that they have no trusted 00:06:24.569 --> 00:06:27.290 align:start position:0% on Starks and that they have no trusted setup<00:06:24.930> and<00:06:25.199> they<00:06:25.379> use<00:06:25.620> a<00:06:25.650> much<00:06:26.300> better 00:06:27.290 --> 00:06:27.300 align:start position:0% setup and they use a much better 00:06:27.300 --> 00:06:29.450 align:start position:0% setup and they use a much better understood<00:06:28.110> and<00:06:28.379> partners<00:06:28.800> assumption<00:06:29.310> of 00:06:29.450 --> 00:06:29.460 align:start position:0% understood and partners assumption of 00:06:29.460 --> 00:06:31.879 align:start position:0% understood and partners assumption of hash<00:06:29.639> functions<00:06:30.020> but<00:06:31.020> that<00:06:31.349> comes<00:06:31.590> at<00:06:31.740> the 00:06:31.879 --> 00:06:31.889 align:start position:0% hash functions but that comes at the 00:06:31.889 --> 00:06:33.920 align:start position:0% hash functions but that comes at the cost<00:06:31.919> of<00:06:32.460> incredibly<00:06:33.120> large<00:06:33.330> group<00:06:33.689> sizes 00:06:33.920 --> 00:06:33.930 align:start position:0% cost of incredibly large group sizes 00:06:33.930 --> 00:06:36.649 align:start position:0% cost of incredibly large group sizes compared<00:06:34.560> to<00:06:34.710> the<00:06:34.800> other<00:06:34.979> two<00:06:35.279> and<00:06:36.120> some 00:06:36.649 --> 00:06:36.659 align:start position:0% compared to the other two and some 00:06:36.659 --> 00:06:38.629 align:start position:0% compared to the other two and some expensive<00:06:37.229> partners<00:06:37.650> needed<00:06:38.069> and<00:06:38.279> the<00:06:38.370> form 00:06:38.629 --> 00:06:38.639 align:start position:0% expensive partners needed and the form 00:06:38.639 --> 00:06:40.339 align:start position:0% expensive partners needed and the form of<00:06:38.759> extra<00:06:39.180> RAM<00:06:39.389> to<00:06:39.659> actually<00:06:40.080> get<00:06:40.229> the 00:06:40.339 --> 00:06:40.349 align:start position:0% of extra RAM to actually get the 00:06:40.349 --> 00:06:42.679 align:start position:0% of extra RAM to actually get the efficiency<00:06:40.860> they<00:06:40.979> talk<00:06:41.189> about<00:06:41.360> 5min<00:06:42.360> fulla 00:06:42.679 --> 00:06:42.689 align:start position:0% efficiency they talk about 5min fulla 00:06:42.689 --> 00:06:44.179 align:start position:0% efficiency they talk about 5min fulla troops<00:06:43.020> they<00:06:43.259> fall<00:06:43.499> somewhere<00:06:43.830> in<00:06:44.129> between 00:06:44.179 --> 00:06:44.189 align:start position:0% troops they fall somewhere in between 00:06:44.189 --> 00:06:47.179 align:start position:0% troops they fall somewhere in between the<00:06:44.699> two<00:06:44.729> there<00:06:45.599> is<00:06:45.960> no<00:06:46.199> trusted<00:06:46.680> setup<00:06:47.009> which 00:06:47.179 --> 00:06:47.189 align:start position:0% the two there is no trusted setup which 00:06:47.189 --> 00:06:48.230 align:start position:0% the two there is no trusted setup which is<00:06:47.340> fantastic 00:06:48.230 --> 00:06:48.240 align:start position:0% is fantastic 00:06:48.240 --> 00:06:50.360 align:start position:0% is fantastic they<00:06:48.360> have<00:06:48.569> moderate<00:06:49.020> proof<00:06:49.349> sizes<00:06:49.860> but<00:06:50.159> they 00:06:50.360 --> 00:06:50.370 align:start position:0% they have moderate proof sizes but they 00:06:50.370 --> 00:06:52.129 align:start position:0% they have moderate proof sizes but they have<00:06:50.550> some<00:06:50.849> of<00:06:50.969> the<00:06:51.090> worst<00:06:51.270> verification 00:06:52.129 --> 00:06:52.139 align:start position:0% have some of the worst verification 00:06:52.139 --> 00:06:54.860 align:start position:0% have some of the worst verification times<00:06:52.409> however<00:06:53.159> they<00:06:53.699> can<00:06:53.879> be<00:06:53.909> improved<00:06:54.449> when 00:06:54.860 --> 00:06:54.870 align:start position:0% times however they can be improved when 00:06:54.870 --> 00:06:56.779 align:start position:0% times however they can be improved when batching<00:06:55.409> them<00:06:55.560> together<00:06:55.710> and<00:06:56.189> they're<00:06:56.580> based 00:06:56.779 --> 00:06:56.789 align:start position:0% batching them together and they're based 00:06:56.789 --> 00:06:59.209 align:start position:0% batching them together and they're based on<00:06:57.060> well<00:06:57.360> understood<00:06:57.960> hardness<00:06:58.889> assumptions 00:06:59.209 --> 00:06:59.219 align:start position:0% on well understood hardness assumptions 00:06:59.219 --> 00:07:04.459 align:start position:0% on well understood hardness assumptions using<00:07:00.090> discrete<00:07:00.389> locks<00:07:02.210> so<00:07:03.210> if<00:07:03.599> we<00:07:03.779> look<00:07:04.259> at 00:07:04.459 --> 00:07:04.469 align:start position:0% using discrete locks so if we look at 00:07:04.469 --> 00:07:06.649 align:start position:0% using discrete locks so if we look at the<00:07:04.650> three<00:07:04.979> and<00:07:05.159> see<00:07:05.729> how<00:07:05.939> they<00:07:06.120> compare<00:07:06.270> in 00:07:06.649 --> 00:07:06.659 align:start position:0% the three and see how they compare in 00:07:06.659 --> 00:07:08.149 align:start position:0% the three and see how they compare in terms<00:07:06.750> of<00:07:07.050> the<00:07:07.110> four<00:07:07.319> qualities<00:07:07.800> we've 00:07:08.149 --> 00:07:08.159 align:start position:0% terms of the four qualities we've 00:07:08.159 --> 00:07:10.700 align:start position:0% terms of the four qualities we've ignored<00:07:08.430> privacy<00:07:09.240> because<00:07:09.930> arguably<00:07:10.139> all 00:07:10.700 --> 00:07:10.710 align:start position:0% ignored privacy because arguably all 00:07:10.710 --> 00:07:12.200 align:start position:0% ignored privacy because arguably all share<00:07:10.979> of<00:07:11.069> knowledge<00:07:11.370> proof<00:07:11.550> systems<00:07:12.000> better 00:07:12.200 --> 00:07:12.210 align:start position:0% share of knowledge proof systems better 00:07:12.210 --> 00:07:15.230 align:start position:0% share of knowledge proof systems better compute<00:07:12.689> provide<00:07:13.199> confidentiality<00:07:13.949> in<00:07:14.669> terms 00:07:15.230 --> 00:07:15.240 align:start position:0% compute provide confidentiality in terms 00:07:15.240 --> 00:07:17.510 align:start position:0% compute provide confidentiality in terms of<00:07:15.389> efficiency<00:07:15.990> starts<00:07:16.349> come<00:07:16.650> out<00:07:16.740> ahead<00:07:17.069> with 00:07:17.510 --> 00:07:17.520 align:start position:0% of efficiency starts come out ahead with 00:07:17.520 --> 00:07:19.040 align:start position:0% of efficiency starts come out ahead with the<00:07:17.669> smallest<00:07:17.939> reach<00:07:18.270> sizes<00:07:18.719> and<00:07:18.990> the 00:07:19.040 --> 00:07:19.050 align:start position:0% the smallest reach sizes and the 00:07:19.050 --> 00:07:21.619 align:start position:0% the smallest reach sizes and the founders<00:07:19.439> verification<00:07:20.129> however<00:07:20.939> you<00:07:21.509> know 00:07:21.619 --> 00:07:21.629 align:start position:0% founders verification however you know 00:07:21.629 --> 00:07:23.360 align:start position:0% founders verification however you know their<00:07:21.779> trusted<00:07:22.199> set<00:07:22.409> up<00:07:22.560> functionalities 00:07:23.360 --> 00:07:23.370 align:start position:0% their trusted set up functionalities 00:07:23.370 --> 00:07:25.429 align:start position:0% their trusted set up functionalities impacted<00:07:23.969> a<00:07:24.029> lot<00:07:24.210> it's<00:07:24.539> very<00:07:24.749> difficult<00:07:25.229> to 00:07:25.429 --> 00:07:25.439 align:start position:0% impacted a lot it's very difficult to 00:07:25.439 --> 00:07:28.909 align:start position:0% impacted a lot it's very difficult to port<00:07:25.710> receive<00:07:26.099> in<00:07:26.370> settings<00:07:27.169> starts<00:07:28.169> have 00:07:28.909 --> 00:07:28.919 align:start position:0% port receive in settings starts have 00:07:28.919 --> 00:07:31.309 align:start position:0% port receive in settings starts have very<00:07:29.490> poor<00:07:29.759> efficiency<00:07:30.000> as<00:07:30.449> you<00:07:30.599> see<00:07:30.839> because 00:07:31.309 --> 00:07:31.319 align:start position:0% very poor efficiency as you see because 00:07:31.319 --> 00:07:33.170 align:start position:0% very poor efficiency as you see because they<00:07:31.500> need<00:07:31.710> additional<00:07:32.039> hardware<00:07:32.729> resources 00:07:33.170 --> 00:07:33.180 align:start position:0% they need additional hardware resources 00:07:33.180 --> 00:07:35.269 align:start position:0% they need additional hardware resources and<00:07:33.569> they<00:07:33.689> have<00:07:33.870> absolutely<00:07:34.169> giant<00:07:35.129> true 00:07:35.269 --> 00:07:35.279 align:start position:0% and they have absolutely giant true 00:07:35.279 --> 00:07:37.850 align:start position:0% and they have absolutely giant true sizes<00:07:35.759> but<00:07:36.270> they<00:07:36.419> do<00:07:36.569> very<00:07:36.839> well<00:07:36.900> in<00:07:37.349> security 00:07:37.850 --> 00:07:37.860 align:start position:0% sizes but they do very well in security 00:07:37.860 --> 00:07:40.459 align:start position:0% sizes but they do very well in security and<00:07:37.949> functionality<00:07:38.129> as<00:07:38.939> do<00:07:39.659> both<00:07:39.899> groups<00:07:40.259> and 00:07:40.459 --> 00:07:40.469 align:start position:0% and functionality as do both groups and 00:07:40.469 --> 00:07:42.379 align:start position:0% and functionality as do both groups and both<00:07:40.919> of<00:07:40.979> ears<00:07:41.310> fall<00:07:41.580> somewhere<00:07:41.969> in<00:07:42.120> between 00:07:42.379 --> 00:07:42.389 align:start position:0% both of ears fall somewhere in between 00:07:42.389 --> 00:07:46.969 align:start position:0% both of ears fall somewhere in between mature<00:07:44.599> so<00:07:45.599> that<00:07:45.960> leads<00:07:46.229> us<00:07:46.349> into<00:07:46.589> the<00:07:46.830> next 00:07:46.969 --> 00:07:46.979 align:start position:0% mature so that leads us into the next 00:07:46.979 --> 00:07:48.469 align:start position:0% mature so that leads us into the next building<00:07:47.430> block<00:07:47.490> that<00:07:47.849> touches<00:07:48.240> going<00:07:48.419> to 00:07:48.469 --> 00:07:48.479 align:start position:0% building block that touches going to 00:07:48.479 --> 00:07:50.839 align:start position:0% building block that touches going to bail<00:07:48.599> them<00:07:48.750> out<00:07:48.899> so<00:07:49.439> the<00:07:49.919> next<00:07:50.099> one<00:07:50.279> is<00:07:50.310> that<00:07:50.550> is 00:07:50.839 --> 00:07:50.849 align:start position:0% bail them out so the next one is that is 00:07:50.849 --> 00:07:52.790 align:start position:0% bail them out so the next one is that is called<00:07:51.240> multi-party<00:07:51.779> computation<00:07:52.080> something 00:07:52.790 --> 00:07:52.800 align:start position:0% called multi-party computation something 00:07:52.800 --> 00:07:54.200 align:start position:0% called multi-party computation something I<00:07:52.860> probably<00:07:53.250> shared<00:07:53.610> a<00:07:53.699> lot<00:07:53.879> of<00:07:53.969> you<00:07:54.060> are 00:07:54.200 --> 00:07:54.210 align:start position:0% I probably shared a lot of you are 00:07:54.210 --> 00:07:55.670 align:start position:0% I probably shared a lot of you are already<00:07:54.689> familiar<00:07:54.870> with<00:07:55.169> in<00:07:55.319> the<00:07:55.409> form<00:07:55.620> of 00:07:55.670 --> 00:07:55.680 align:start position:0% already familiar with in the form of 00:07:55.680 --> 00:07:57.320 align:start position:0% already familiar with in the form of secret<00:07:55.979> sharing<00:07:56.189> scheme<00:07:56.310> such<00:07:56.969> a<00:07:57.000> severe 00:07:57.320 --> 00:07:57.330 align:start position:0% secret sharing scheme such a severe 00:07:57.330 --> 00:07:59.589 align:start position:0% secret sharing scheme such a severe situation<00:07:58.099> so 00:07:59.589 --> 00:07:59.599 align:start position:0% situation so 00:07:59.599 --> 00:08:02.029 align:start position:0% situation so multi-party<00:08:00.599> computation<00:08:00.839> is<00:08:01.259> a<00:08:01.409> type<00:08:02.009> of 00:08:02.029 --> 00:08:02.039 align:start position:0% multi-party computation is a type of 00:08:02.039 --> 00:08:04.189 align:start position:0% multi-party computation is a type of privacy<00:08:02.759> preserving<00:08:02.969> computation<00:08:03.779> technique 00:08:04.189 --> 00:08:04.199 align:start position:0% privacy preserving computation technique 00:08:04.199 --> 00:08:07.820 align:start position:0% privacy preserving computation technique which<00:08:04.770> allows<00:08:04.919> us<00:08:05.279> to<00:08:05.460> secure<00:08:05.899> the<00:08:06.899> inputs<00:08:07.379> to 00:08:07.820 --> 00:08:07.830 align:start position:0% which allows us to secure the inputs to 00:08:07.830 --> 00:08:11.959 align:start position:0% which allows us to secure the inputs to some<00:08:08.930> predetermined<00:08:09.930> program<00:08:10.319> and<00:08:10.789> we<00:08:11.789> have 00:08:11.959 --> 00:08:11.969 align:start position:0% some predetermined program and we have 00:08:11.969 --> 00:08:12.470 align:start position:0% some predetermined program and we have multiple 00:08:12.470 --> 00:08:12.480 align:start position:0% multiple 00:08:12.480 --> 00:08:14.390 align:start position:0% multiple artists<00:08:12.780> who<00:08:13.230> collaborate<00:08:13.830> together<00:08:14.040> and 00:08:14.390 --> 00:08:14.400 align:start position:0% artists who collaborate together and 00:08:14.400 --> 00:08:16.850 align:start position:0% artists who collaborate together and work<00:08:14.550> together<00:08:14.790> to<00:08:15.780> execute<00:08:16.350> this<00:08:16.620> program 00:08:16.850 --> 00:08:16.860 align:start position:0% work together to execute this program 00:08:16.860 --> 00:08:18.290 align:start position:0% work together to execute this program and<00:08:17.310> then<00:08:17.400> the<00:08:17.520> outlet<00:08:17.880> they<00:08:18.030> should<00:08:18.180> have 00:08:18.290 --> 00:08:18.300 align:start position:0% and then the outlet they should have 00:08:18.300 --> 00:08:19.790 align:start position:0% and then the outlet they should have been<00:08:18.420> tried<00:08:18.720> that<00:08:18.900> outlet<00:08:19.350> that<00:08:19.440> only<00:08:19.620> the 00:08:19.790 --> 00:08:19.800 align:start position:0% been tried that outlet that only the 00:08:19.800 --> 00:08:21.140 align:start position:0% been tried that outlet that only the person<00:08:19.920> who<00:08:20.130> requested<00:08:20.340> that<00:08:20.760> competition 00:08:21.140 --> 00:08:21.150 align:start position:0% person who requested that competition 00:08:21.150 --> 00:08:24.020 align:start position:0% person who requested that competition should<00:08:21.480> know<00:08:22.130> like<00:08:23.130> I<00:08:23.250> said<00:08:23.460> one<00:08:23.850> of<00:08:23.880> these 00:08:24.020 --> 00:08:24.030 align:start position:0% should know like I said one of these 00:08:24.030 --> 00:08:25.580 align:start position:0% should know like I said one of these examples<00:08:24.300> should<00:08:24.600> be<00:08:24.720> super<00:08:24.990> charity<00:08:25.290> which 00:08:25.580 --> 00:08:25.590 align:start position:0% examples should be super charity which 00:08:25.590 --> 00:08:27.380 align:start position:0% examples should be super charity which you're<00:08:26.310> all<00:08:26.520> probably<00:08:26.760> familiar<00:08:26.970> with<00:08:27.210> in 00:08:27.380 --> 00:08:27.390 align:start position:0% you're all probably familiar with in 00:08:27.390 --> 00:08:28.940 align:start position:0% you're all probably familiar with in like<00:08:27.540> the<00:08:27.660> cases<00:08:27.960> like<00:08:28.080> wallets 00:08:28.940 --> 00:08:28.950 align:start position:0% like the cases like wallets 00:08:28.950 --> 00:08:33.020 align:start position:0% like the cases like wallets how<00:08:29.940> does<00:08:30.150> put<00:08:30.450> up<00:08:30.540> your<00:08:30.660> wallets<00:08:30.990> and<00:08:32.030> so 00:08:33.020 --> 00:08:33.030 align:start position:0% how does put up your wallets and so 00:08:33.030 --> 00:08:36.020 align:start position:0% how does put up your wallets and so so<00:08:33.600> maybe<00:08:33.840> this<00:08:34.140> is<00:08:34.290> the<00:08:34.470> most<00:08:35.430> predominant 00:08:36.020 --> 00:08:36.030 align:start position:0% so maybe this is the most predominant 00:08:36.030 --> 00:08:37.610 align:start position:0% so maybe this is the most predominant issue<00:08:36.150> that<00:08:36.540> everybody<00:08:36.870> should<00:08:37.110> understand 00:08:37.610 --> 00:08:37.620 align:start position:0% issue that everybody should understand 00:08:37.620 --> 00:08:38.780 align:start position:0% issue that everybody should understand what<00:08:37.740> we're<00:08:37.890> talking<00:08:38.130> about<00:08:38.160> multi-party 00:08:38.780 --> 00:08:38.790 align:start position:0% what we're talking about multi-party 00:08:38.790 --> 00:08:42.140 align:start position:0% what we're talking about multi-party computation<00:08:39.110> is<00:08:40.110> how<00:08:40.890> interactive<00:08:41.729> it<00:08:41.820> is<00:08:41.940> it 00:08:42.140 --> 00:08:42.150 align:start position:0% computation is how interactive it is it 00:08:42.150 --> 00:08:44.270 align:start position:0% computation is how interactive it is it is<00:08:42.270> incredibly<00:08:43.140> interactive<00:08:43.590> depending<00:08:44.190> on 00:08:44.270 --> 00:08:44.280 align:start position:0% is incredibly interactive depending on 00:08:44.280 --> 00:08:46.820 align:start position:0% is incredibly interactive depending on the<00:08:44.370> number<00:08:44.640> of<00:08:44.760> parties<00:08:45.090> you<00:08:45.360> have<00:08:45.830> so 00:08:46.820 --> 00:08:46.830 align:start position:0% the number of parties you have so 00:08:46.830 --> 00:08:48.710 align:start position:0% the number of parties you have so anything<00:08:47.640> more<00:08:47.880> than<00:08:48.030> usually<00:08:48.390> two<00:08:48.540> or<00:08:48.570> three 00:08:48.710 --> 00:08:48.720 align:start position:0% anything more than usually two or three 00:08:48.720 --> 00:08:51.110 align:start position:0% anything more than usually two or three participants<00:08:49.680> we<00:08:50.100> start<00:08:50.340> seeing<00:08:50.550> some<00:08:50.850> really 00:08:51.110 --> 00:08:51.120 align:start position:0% participants we start seeing some really 00:08:51.120 --> 00:08:52.910 align:start position:0% participants we start seeing some really massive<00:08:51.510> problems<00:08:51.930> and<00:08:52.170> for<00:08:52.590> many<00:08:52.740> other 00:08:52.910 --> 00:08:52.920 align:start position:0% massive problems and for many other 00:08:52.920 --> 00:08:55.880 align:start position:0% massive problems and for many other protocols<00:08:53.430> that<00:08:53.550> requires<00:08:54.350> something<00:08:55.350> like 00:08:55.880 --> 00:08:55.890 align:start position:0% protocols that requires something like 00:08:55.890 --> 00:08:57.590 align:start position:0% protocols that requires something like zero<00:08:56.190> knowledge<00:08:56.340> proves<00:08:56.760> to<00:08:57.240> keep<00:08:57.480> the 00:08:57.590 --> 00:08:57.600 align:start position:0% zero knowledge proves to keep the 00:08:57.600 --> 00:09:00.620 align:start position:0% zero knowledge proves to keep the protocol<00:08:58.020> actually<00:08:58.260> fair<00:08:59.300> so<00:09:00.300> what<00:09:00.540> that 00:09:00.620 --> 00:09:00.630 align:start position:0% protocol actually fair so what that 00:09:00.630 --> 00:09:02.180 align:start position:0% protocol actually fair so what that means<00:09:00.840> essentially<00:09:01.170> is<00:09:01.320> we<00:09:01.770> have<00:09:01.950> like 00:09:02.180 --> 00:09:02.190 align:start position:0% means essentially is we have like 00:09:02.190 --> 00:09:05.120 align:start position:0% means essentially is we have like complexity<00:09:02.790> layers<00:09:03.000> and<00:09:03.360> our<00:09:03.510> NPC<00:09:04.440> protocols 00:09:05.120 --> 00:09:05.130 align:start position:0% complexity layers and our NPC protocols 00:09:05.130 --> 00:09:07.490 align:start position:0% complexity layers and our NPC protocols like<00:09:05.880> the<00:09:06.000> very<00:09:06.180> first<00:09:06.450> layer<00:09:06.690> we<00:09:06.900> can<00:09:06.990> imagine 00:09:07.490 --> 00:09:07.500 align:start position:0% like the very first layer we can imagine 00:09:07.500 --> 00:09:08.960 align:start position:0% like the very first layer we can imagine the<00:09:07.590> network<00:09:07.950> so<00:09:08.250> all<00:09:08.490> of<00:09:08.580> our<00:09:08.670> participants 00:09:08.960 --> 00:09:08.970 align:start position:0% the network so all of our participants 00:09:08.970 --> 00:09:10.520 align:start position:0% the network so all of our participants have<00:09:09.300> to<00:09:09.390> communicate<00:09:09.870> with<00:09:09.990> each<00:09:10.020> other<00:09:10.230> but 00:09:10.520 --> 00:09:10.530 align:start position:0% have to communicate with each other but 00:09:10.530 --> 00:09:12.650 align:start position:0% have to communicate with each other but we<00:09:10.650> start<00:09:11.550> having<00:09:11.670> similar<00:09:12.060> problems<00:09:12.180> like 00:09:12.650 --> 00:09:12.660 align:start position:0% we start having similar problems like 00:09:12.660 --> 00:09:14.360 align:start position:0% we start having similar problems like traffic<00:09:13.410> you<00:09:13.830> know<00:09:13.920> when<00:09:14.070> you<00:09:14.130> get<00:09:14.220> in<00:09:14.310> a 00:09:14.360 --> 00:09:14.370 align:start position:0% traffic you know when you get in a 00:09:14.370 --> 00:09:15.980 align:start position:0% traffic you know when you get in a traffic<00:09:14.550> jam<00:09:14.730> the<00:09:15.030> first<00:09:15.270> person<00:09:15.660> in<00:09:15.900> the 00:09:15.980 --> 00:09:15.990 align:start position:0% traffic jam the first person in the 00:09:15.990 --> 00:09:17.930 align:start position:0% traffic jam the first person in the front<00:09:16.200> of<00:09:16.350> the<00:09:16.800> traffic<00:09:17.010> gym<00:09:17.340> steps<00:09:17.760> on<00:09:17.880> the 00:09:17.930 --> 00:09:17.940 align:start position:0% front of the traffic gym steps on the 00:09:17.940 --> 00:09:19.400 align:start position:0% front of the traffic gym steps on the brakes<00:09:18.180> which<00:09:18.360> causes<00:09:18.720> everybody<00:09:18.960> else's 00:09:19.400 --> 00:09:19.410 align:start position:0% brakes which causes everybody else's 00:09:19.410 --> 00:09:20.540 align:start position:0% brakes which causes everybody else's 7212 00:09:20.540 --> 00:09:20.550 align:start position:0% 7212 00:09:20.550 --> 00:09:22.460 align:start position:0% 7212 so<00:09:21.000> we<00:09:21.180> started<00:09:21.450> seeing<00:09:21.600> network<00:09:21.900> latency<00:09:22.350> to 00:09:22.460 --> 00:09:22.470 align:start position:0% so we started seeing network latency to 00:09:22.470 --> 00:09:24.020 align:start position:0% so we started seeing network latency to filter<00:09:22.830> through<00:09:23.070> the<00:09:23.220> entire<00:09:23.490> property 00:09:24.020 --> 00:09:24.030 align:start position:0% filter through the entire property 00:09:24.030 --> 00:09:26.000 align:start position:0% filter through the entire property through<00:09:24.420> the<00:09:24.510> entire<00:09:24.780> network<00:09:24.990> like<00:09:25.350> that<00:09:25.560> and 00:09:26.000 --> 00:09:26.010 align:start position:0% through the entire network like that and 00:09:26.010 --> 00:09:28.070 align:start position:0% through the entire network like that and it<00:09:26.100> causes<00:09:26.310> massive<00:09:26.910> problems<00:09:27.540> especially 00:09:28.070 --> 00:09:28.080 align:start position:0% it causes massive problems especially 00:09:28.080 --> 00:09:29.660 align:start position:0% it causes massive problems especially when<00:09:28.440> a<00:09:28.500> lot<00:09:28.710> of<00:09:28.740> communication<00:09:29.430> is<00:09:29.520> required 00:09:29.660 --> 00:09:29.670 align:start position:0% when a lot of communication is required 00:09:29.670 --> 00:09:32.000 align:start position:0% when a lot of communication is required for<00:09:30.030> more<00:09:30.240> complex<00:09:30.840> things<00:09:31.140> like<00:09:31.380> we<00:09:31.890> can 00:09:32.000 --> 00:09:32.010 align:start position:0% for more complex things like we can 00:09:32.010 --> 00:09:33.290 align:start position:0% for more complex things like we can imagine<00:09:32.430> for<00:09:32.610> a<00:09:32.640> privacy-preserving 00:09:33.290 --> 00:09:33.300 align:start position:0% imagine for a privacy-preserving 00:09:33.300 --> 00:09:36.050 align:start position:0% imagine for a privacy-preserving smartphone<00:09:34.080> track<00:09:34.760> another<00:09:35.760> thing<00:09:35.940> is<00:09:36.030> that 00:09:36.050 --> 00:09:36.060 align:start position:0% smartphone track another thing is that 00:09:36.060 --> 00:09:38.750 align:start position:0% smartphone track another thing is that as<00:09:36.600> game<00:09:36.840> theoretic<00:09:37.080> and<00:09:37.470> security<00:09:38.340> sometimes 00:09:38.750 --> 00:09:38.760 align:start position:0% as game theoretic and security sometimes 00:09:38.760 --> 00:09:42.830 align:start position:0% as game theoretic and security sometimes where<00:09:40.010> we<00:09:41.010> may<00:09:41.460> require<00:09:41.790> novice<00:09:42.210> majority<00:09:42.690> and 00:09:42.830 --> 00:09:42.840 align:start position:0% where we may require novice majority and 00:09:42.840 --> 00:09:44.840 align:start position:0% where we may require novice majority and to<00:09:43.350> keep<00:09:43.530> things<00:09:43.770> fair<00:09:43.980> we<00:09:44.370> require<00:09:44.730> another 00:09:44.840 --> 00:09:44.850 align:start position:0% to keep things fair we require another 00:09:44.850 --> 00:09:47.000 align:start position:0% to keep things fair we require another layer<00:09:45.270> of<00:09:45.390> complexity<00:09:45.750> like<00:09:46.020> that 00:09:47.000 --> 00:09:47.010 align:start position:0% layer of complexity like that 00:09:47.010 --> 00:09:49.340 align:start position:0% layer of complexity like that produce<00:09:47.660> when<00:09:48.660> we<00:09:48.750> start<00:09:48.990> having<00:09:49.020> to 00:09:49.340 --> 00:09:49.350 align:start position:0% produce when we start having to 00:09:49.350 --> 00:09:51.200 align:start position:0% produce when we start having to integrate<00:09:49.620> proofs<00:09:50.250> to<00:09:50.670> ensure<00:09:51.000> that 00:09:51.200 --> 00:09:51.210 align:start position:0% integrate proofs to ensure that 00:09:51.210 --> 00:09:53.600 align:start position:0% integrate proofs to ensure that everybody<00:09:51.450> is<00:09:51.720> acting<00:09:52.080> appropriately<00:09:52.290> and<00:09:52.950> if 00:09:53.600 --> 00:09:53.610 align:start position:0% everybody is acting appropriately and if 00:09:53.610 --> 00:09:55.220 align:start position:0% everybody is acting appropriately and if we<00:09:53.730> start<00:09:53.970> doing<00:09:54.120> this<00:09:54.300> now<00:09:54.690> we're<00:09:54.930> talking 00:09:55.220 --> 00:09:55.230 align:start position:0% we start doing this now we're talking 00:09:55.230 --> 00:09:59.150 align:start position:0% we start doing this now we're talking about<00:09:55.350> very<00:09:55.680> complex<00:09:55.890> and<00:09:56.460> long<00:09:56.760> protocol<00:09:58.160> so 00:09:59.150 --> 00:09:59.160 align:start position:0% about very complex and long protocol so 00:09:59.160 --> 00:10:01.040 align:start position:0% about very complex and long protocol so in<00:09:59.640> our<00:09:59.760> next<00:09:59.850> slide<00:10:00.030> we'll<00:10:00.480> be<00:10:00.600> talking<00:10:00.810> about 00:10:01.040 --> 00:10:01.050 align:start position:0% in our next slide we'll be talking about 00:10:01.050 --> 00:10:02.780 align:start position:0% in our next slide we'll be talking about some<00:10:01.550> implementations<00:10:02.550> of 00:10:02.780 --> 00:10:02.790 align:start position:0% some implementations of 00:10:02.790 --> 00:10:05.600 align:start position:0% some implementations of privacy-preserving<00:10:03.450> select<00:10:04.020> projects<00:10:04.440> so<00:10:05.430> if 00:10:05.600 --> 00:10:05.610 align:start position:0% privacy-preserving select projects so if 00:10:05.610 --> 00:10:07.370 align:start position:0% privacy-preserving select projects so if you<00:10:05.760> have<00:10:05.880> the<00:10:06.000> most<00:10:06.150> recent<00:10:06.690> approaches<00:10:07.170> that 00:10:07.370 --> 00:10:07.380 align:start position:0% you have the most recent approaches that 00:10:07.380 --> 00:10:09.590 align:start position:0% you have the most recent approaches that are<00:10:07.530> based<00:10:07.740> on<00:10:07.920> etherion<00:10:08.370> are<00:10:08.610> Aztec<00:10:08.910> and 00:10:09.590 --> 00:10:09.600 align:start position:0% are based on etherion are Aztec and 00:10:09.600 --> 00:10:11.960 align:start position:0% are based on etherion are Aztec and Caesar<00:10:10.080> both<00:10:10.740> of<00:10:10.890> the<00:10:10.980> collapsed<00:10:11.460> perform 00:10:11.960 --> 00:10:11.970 align:start position:0% Caesar both of the collapsed perform 00:10:11.970 --> 00:10:14.950 align:start position:0% Caesar both of the collapsed perform confidential<00:10:12.810> transaction<00:10:13.050> on<00:10:13.740> Imperium<00:10:14.340> as 00:10:14.950 --> 00:10:14.960 align:start position:0% confidential transaction on Imperium as 00:10:14.960 --> 00:10:18.260 align:start position:0% confidential transaction on Imperium as head<00:10:15.990> it<00:10:16.170> uses<00:10:16.380> a<00:10:16.680> cute<00:10:16.920> EXO<00:10:17.430> model<00:10:17.850> whereas 00:10:18.260 --> 00:10:18.270 align:start position:0% head it uses a cute EXO model whereas 00:10:18.270 --> 00:10:20.330 align:start position:0% head it uses a cute EXO model whereas these<00:10:18.570> are<00:10:18.630> uses<00:10:19.200> an<00:10:19.410> account<00:10:19.710> based<00:10:19.890> model 00:10:20.330 --> 00:10:20.340 align:start position:0% these are uses an account based model 00:10:20.340 --> 00:10:22.910 align:start position:0% these are uses an account based model both<00:10:20.790> of<00:10:21.000> them<00:10:21.180> in<00:10:21.420> theory<00:10:22.050> are<00:10:22.560> able<00:10:22.890> to 00:10:22.910 --> 00:10:22.920 align:start position:0% both of them in theory are able to 00:10:22.920 --> 00:10:26.180 align:start position:0% both of them in theory are able to achieve<00:10:23.160> in<00:10:23.790> on<00:10:24.000> Amity<00:10:24.360> and<00:10:24.510> however<00:10:25.190> Aztec 00:10:26.180 --> 00:10:26.190 align:start position:0% achieve in on Amity and however Aztec 00:10:26.190 --> 00:10:28.730 align:start position:0% achieve in on Amity and however Aztec uses<00:10:26.580> stealth<00:10:26.940> addresses<00:10:27.480> which<00:10:27.780> doesn't 00:10:28.730 --> 00:10:28.740 align:start position:0% uses stealth addresses which doesn't 00:10:28.740 --> 00:10:30.340 align:start position:0% uses stealth addresses which doesn't really<00:10:28.860> satisfy<00:10:29.070> the<00:10:29.520> cryptographic 00:10:30.340 --> 00:10:30.350 align:start position:0% really satisfy the cryptographic 00:10:30.350 --> 00:10:33.350 align:start position:0% really satisfy the cryptographic definition<00:10:31.350> of<00:10:31.470> privacy<00:10:31.890> we<00:10:32.040> want<00:10:32.360> Caesar 00:10:33.350 --> 00:10:33.360 align:start position:0% definition of privacy we want Caesar 00:10:33.360 --> 00:10:36.080 align:start position:0% definition of privacy we want Caesar does<00:10:34.050> do<00:10:34.380> ring<00:10:34.650> signatures<00:10:35.220> however<00:10:35.670> it's<00:10:35.940> too 00:10:36.080 --> 00:10:36.090 align:start position:0% does do ring signatures however it's too 00:10:36.090 --> 00:10:38.330 align:start position:0% does do ring signatures however it's too expensive<00:10:36.420> to<00:10:36.960> implement<00:10:37.350> on<00:10:37.770> Imperium 00:10:38.330 --> 00:10:38.340 align:start position:0% expensive to implement on Imperium 00:10:38.340 --> 00:10:41.480 align:start position:0% expensive to implement on Imperium passes<00:10:39.710> Seifer<00:10:40.710> is<00:10:40.950> a<00:10:40.980> lot<00:10:41.280> more 00:10:41.480 --> 00:10:41.490 align:start position:0% passes Seifer is a lot more 00:10:41.490 --> 00:10:43.520 align:start position:0% passes Seifer is a lot more mathematically<00:10:42.210> sophisticated<00:10:43.110> it<00:10:43.290> comes 00:10:43.520 --> 00:10:43.530 align:start position:0% mathematically sophisticated it comes 00:10:43.530 --> 00:10:45.530 align:start position:0% mathematically sophisticated it comes from<00:10:43.710> the<00:10:43.830> same<00:10:44.040> authors<00:10:44.520> of<00:10:44.550> bulletproof<00:10:45.060> and 00:10:45.530 --> 00:10:45.540 align:start position:0% from the same authors of bulletproof and 00:10:45.540 --> 00:10:47.750 align:start position:0% from the same authors of bulletproof and utilizes<00:10:46.290> commitment<00:10:46.860> schemes<00:10:47.220> held<00:10:47.460> long 00:10:47.750 --> 00:10:47.760 align:start position:0% utilizes commitment schemes held long 00:10:47.760 --> 00:10:49.940 align:start position:0% utilizes commitment schemes held long frictions<00:10:48.330> and<00:10:48.570> it<00:10:48.840> actually<00:10:49.170> combines<00:10:49.350> bold 00:10:49.940 --> 00:10:49.950 align:start position:0% frictions and it actually combines bold 00:10:49.950 --> 00:10:51.680 align:start position:0% frictions and it actually combines bold approach<00:10:50.040> than<00:10:50.490> Sigma<00:10:50.790> protocols<00:10:51.270> into 00:10:51.680 --> 00:10:51.690 align:start position:0% approach than Sigma protocols into 00:10:51.690 --> 00:10:52.519 align:start position:0% approach than Sigma protocols into something<00:10:52.050> called 00:10:52.519 --> 00:10:52.529 align:start position:0% something called 00:10:52.529 --> 00:10:55.369 align:start position:0% something called bonus<00:10:53.009> aspect<00:10:53.999> is<00:10:54.209> significantly<00:10:54.899> simpler 00:10:55.369 --> 00:10:55.379 align:start position:0% bonus aspect is significantly simpler 00:10:55.379 --> 00:10:57.469 align:start position:0% bonus aspect is significantly simpler but<00:10:55.829> they<00:10:56.009> use<00:10:56.159> a<00:10:56.189> trusted<00:10:56.519> setup<00:10:57.059> there<00:10:57.329> are<00:10:57.449> a 00:10:57.469 --> 00:10:57.479 align:start position:0% but they use a trusted setup there are a 00:10:57.479 --> 00:10:59.749 align:start position:0% but they use a trusted setup there are a lot<00:10:57.689> more<00:10:57.719> efficient<00:10:58.409> than<00:10:58.469> Zener<00:10:58.949> and<00:10:59.249> they 00:10:59.749 --> 00:10:59.759 align:start position:0% lot more efficient than Zener and they 00:10:59.759 --> 00:11:01.819 align:start position:0% lot more efficient than Zener and they just<00:10:59.969> rely<00:11:00.269> exclusively<00:11:00.809> on<00:11:01.229> commitment 00:11:01.819 --> 00:11:01.829 align:start position:0% just rely exclusively on commitment 00:11:01.829 --> 00:11:03.829 align:start position:0% just rely exclusively on commitment themes<00:11:02.069> and<00:11:02.369> similar<00:11:02.819> protocols<00:11:03.299> to<00:11:03.539> achieve 00:11:03.829 --> 00:11:03.839 align:start position:0% themes and similar protocols to achieve 00:11:03.839 --> 00:11:09.679 align:start position:0% themes and similar protocols to achieve this<00:11:05.569> so<00:11:06.569> what<00:11:07.529> to<00:11:07.769> z13<00:11:08.459> Gnostic<00:11:08.909> have<00:11:09.509> in 00:11:09.679 --> 00:11:09.689 align:start position:0% this so what to z13 Gnostic have in 00:11:09.689 --> 00:11:10.999 align:start position:0% this so what to z13 Gnostic have in common 00:11:10.999 --> 00:11:11.009 align:start position:0% common 00:11:11.009 --> 00:11:12.409 align:start position:0% common we're<00:11:11.489> talking<00:11:11.759> about<00:11:11.849> the<00:11:12.029> ability<00:11:12.119> to 00:11:12.409 --> 00:11:12.419 align:start position:0% we're talking about the ability to 00:11:12.419 --> 00:11:14.029 align:start position:0% we're talking about the ability to eligible<00:11:12.869> encryption<00:11:13.409> what<00:11:13.889> they're 00:11:14.029 --> 00:11:14.039 align:start position:0% eligible encryption what they're 00:11:14.039 --> 00:11:15.529 align:start position:0% eligible encryption what they're actually<00:11:14.219> easily<00:11:14.549> utilizing<00:11:15.149> there's<00:11:15.449> a 00:11:15.529 --> 00:11:15.539 align:start position:0% actually easily utilizing there's a 00:11:15.539 --> 00:11:17.719 align:start position:0% actually easily utilizing there's a property<00:11:15.929> called<00:11:16.139> how<00:11:16.709> to<00:11:16.769> become<00:11:17.309> a<00:11:17.339> morphic 00:11:17.719 --> 00:11:17.729 align:start position:0% property called how to become a morphic 00:11:17.729 --> 00:11:19.759 align:start position:0% property called how to become a morphic by<00:11:18.239> encryption<00:11:18.779> or<00:11:18.959> given<00:11:19.379> commitment 00:11:19.759 --> 00:11:19.769 align:start position:0% by encryption or given commitment 00:11:19.769 --> 00:11:21.739 align:start position:0% by encryption or given commitment schemes<00:11:19.979> so<00:11:20.669> what<00:11:21.059> does<00:11:21.149> it<00:11:21.299> mean<00:11:21.419> to<00:11:21.659> be 00:11:21.739 --> 00:11:21.749 align:start position:0% schemes so what does it mean to be 00:11:21.749 --> 00:11:25.369 align:start position:0% schemes so what does it mean to be adamantly<00:11:22.469> not<00:11:22.739> amorphic<00:11:23.749> but<00:11:24.749> we<00:11:24.899> have<00:11:25.079> to 00:11:25.369 --> 00:11:25.379 align:start position:0% adamantly not amorphic but we have to 00:11:25.379 --> 00:11:27.769 align:start position:0% adamantly not amorphic but we have to all<00:11:25.619> talk<00:11:26.069> about<00:11:26.219> different<00:11:26.609> types<00:11:26.969> of<00:11:27.149> how 00:11:27.769 --> 00:11:27.779 align:start position:0% all talk about different types of how 00:11:27.779 --> 00:11:29.479 align:start position:0% all talk about different types of how morphisms<00:11:28.379> but<00:11:28.589> the<00:11:28.799> case<00:11:28.979> is<00:11:29.159> hotter<00:11:29.399> than 00:11:29.479 --> 00:11:29.489 align:start position:0% morphisms but the case is hotter than 00:11:29.489 --> 00:11:31.339 align:start position:0% morphisms but the case is hotter than thought<00:11:29.699> morphism<00:11:30.209> we<00:11:30.659> can<00:11:30.809> imagine<00:11:31.019> that<00:11:31.199> we 00:11:31.339 --> 00:11:31.349 align:start position:0% thought morphism we can imagine that we 00:11:31.349 --> 00:11:32.749 align:start position:0% thought morphism we can imagine that we have<00:11:31.439> the<00:11:31.589> encryption<00:11:32.129> of<00:11:32.219> something<00:11:32.639> of 00:11:32.749 --> 00:11:32.759 align:start position:0% have the encryption of something of 00:11:32.759 --> 00:11:35.059 align:start position:0% have the encryption of something of value<00:11:32.879> a<00:11:33.269> and<00:11:33.569> an<00:11:33.959> encryption<00:11:34.259> of<00:11:34.439> a<00:11:34.529> value<00:11:34.829> B 00:11:35.059 --> 00:11:35.069 align:start position:0% value a and an encryption of a value B 00:11:35.069 --> 00:11:38.239 align:start position:0% value a and an encryption of a value B and<00:11:35.629> if<00:11:36.629> we<00:11:36.839> take<00:11:37.109> these<00:11:37.319> two<00:11:37.379> Sacre<00:11:37.919> texts<00:11:38.189> to 00:11:38.239 --> 00:11:38.249 align:start position:0% and if we take these two Sacre texts to 00:11:38.249 --> 00:11:41.059 align:start position:0% and if we take these two Sacre texts to perform<00:11:38.609> it<00:11:38.759> and<00:11:39.029> a<00:11:39.529> addition<00:11:40.529> operation<00:11:40.979> of 00:11:41.059 --> 00:11:41.069 align:start position:0% perform it and a addition operation of 00:11:41.069 --> 00:11:43.279 align:start position:0% perform it and a addition operation of the<00:11:41.159> two<00:11:41.309> cipher<00:11:41.639> texts<00:11:41.939> we<00:11:42.479> actually<00:11:42.899> get<00:11:43.079> the 00:11:43.279 --> 00:11:43.289 align:start position:0% the two cipher texts we actually get the 00:11:43.289 --> 00:11:45.769 align:start position:0% the two cipher texts we actually get the encryption<00:11:44.249> of<00:11:44.459> what<00:11:45.209> would<00:11:45.329> be<00:11:45.479> the<00:11:45.509> output 00:11:45.769 --> 00:11:45.779 align:start position:0% encryption of what would be the output 00:11:45.779 --> 00:11:47.929 align:start position:0% encryption of what would be the output if<00:11:46.169> you<00:11:46.289> just<00:11:46.529> added<00:11:46.829> the<00:11:47.099> two<00:11:47.279> plaintext 00:11:47.929 --> 00:11:47.939 align:start position:0% if you just added the two plaintext 00:11:47.939 --> 00:11:50.839 align:start position:0% if you just added the two plaintext together<00:11:48.179> except<00:11:48.599> they're<00:11:48.749> now<00:11:48.899> imprinted<00:11:49.849> so 00:11:50.839 --> 00:11:50.849 align:start position:0% together except they're now imprinted so 00:11:50.849 --> 00:11:54.319 align:start position:0% together except they're now imprinted so how<00:11:51.749> this<00:11:52.019> is<00:11:52.079> built<00:11:52.529> around<00:11:52.799> to<00:11:53.609> print<00:11:54.119> it<00:11:54.179> up 00:11:54.319 --> 00:11:54.329 align:start position:0% how this is built around to print it up 00:11:54.329 --> 00:11:56.329 align:start position:0% how this is built around to print it up build<00:11:54.629> actual<00:11:55.169> confidential<00:11:55.709> transactions 00:11:56.329 --> 00:11:56.339 align:start position:0% build actual confidential transactions 00:11:56.339 --> 00:11:58.729 align:start position:0% build actual confidential transactions is<00:11:56.579> we<00:11:57.119> have<00:11:57.389> an<00:11:57.689> encryption<00:11:58.019> of<00:11:58.199> the<00:11:58.289> balance 00:11:58.729 --> 00:11:58.739 align:start position:0% is we have an encryption of the balance 00:11:58.739 --> 00:12:02.179 align:start position:0% is we have an encryption of the balance say<00:11:59.220> the<00:11:59.489> number<00:11:59.759> 3<00:12:00.269> and<00:12:00.509> then<00:12:01.470> we<00:12:01.649> have<00:12:01.829> the 00:12:02.179 --> 00:12:02.189 align:start position:0% say the number 3 and then we have the 00:12:02.189 --> 00:12:04.460 align:start position:0% say the number 3 and then we have the encryption<00:12:02.669> of<00:12:02.879> the<00:12:02.939> transfer<00:12:03.569> amount<00:12:03.869> say 00:12:04.460 --> 00:12:04.470 align:start position:0% encryption of the transfer amount say 00:12:04.470 --> 00:12:06.079 align:start position:0% encryption of the transfer amount say I'm<00:12:04.829> number<00:12:05.099> like<00:12:05.339> negative<00:12:05.519> 2<00:12:05.849> you're 00:12:06.079 --> 00:12:06.089 align:start position:0% I'm number like negative 2 you're 00:12:06.089 --> 00:12:09.259 align:start position:0% I'm number like negative 2 you're sending<00:12:06.479> 2<00:12:06.779> coins<00:12:07.199> to<00:12:07.470> somebody<00:12:07.879> so<00:12:08.879> when<00:12:09.179> you 00:12:09.259 --> 00:12:09.269 align:start position:0% sending 2 coins to somebody so when you 00:12:09.269 --> 00:12:11.929 align:start position:0% sending 2 coins to somebody so when you take<00:12:09.509> during<00:12:10.079> 50<00:12:10.499> pounds<00:12:10.799> of<00:12:10.889> 3<00:12:11.159> and<00:12:11.759> you're<00:12:11.909> a 00:12:11.929 --> 00:12:11.939 align:start position:0% take during 50 pounds of 3 and you're a 00:12:11.939 --> 00:12:13.429 align:start position:0% take during 50 pounds of 3 and you're a gifted<00:12:12.239> balance<00:12:12.569> of<00:12:12.689> things<00:12:12.809> there<00:12:13.169> you're 00:12:13.429 --> 00:12:13.439 align:start position:0% gifted balance of things there you're 00:12:13.439 --> 00:12:14.989 align:start position:0% gifted balance of things there you're good<00:12:13.619> to<00:12:13.709> transfer<00:12:14.099> at<00:12:14.220> negative<00:12:14.549> 2<00:12:14.669> you<00:12:14.789> add 00:12:14.989 --> 00:12:14.999 align:start position:0% good to transfer at negative 2 you add 00:12:14.999 --> 00:12:17.539 align:start position:0% good to transfer at negative 2 you add them<00:12:15.149> together<00:12:15.239> you<00:12:15.659> get<00:12:15.779> 1<00:12:16.109> so<00:12:16.799> that<00:12:17.339> would<00:12:17.429> be 00:12:17.539 --> 00:12:17.549 align:start position:0% them together you get 1 so that would be 00:12:17.549 --> 00:12:19.639 align:start position:0% them together you get 1 so that would be the<00:12:17.669> encryption<00:12:17.879> of<00:12:18.359> the<00:12:18.479> balance<00:12:18.989> after<00:12:19.139> that 00:12:19.639 --> 00:12:19.649 align:start position:0% the encryption of the balance after that 00:12:19.649 --> 00:12:22.729 align:start position:0% the encryption of the balance after that transaction<00:12:20.579> in<00:12:20.939> general<00:12:21.329> so<00:12:21.929> it<00:12:22.409> essentially 00:12:22.729 --> 00:12:22.739 align:start position:0% transaction in general so it essentially 00:12:22.739 --> 00:12:24.499 align:start position:0% transaction in general so it essentially lets<00:12:23.039> you<00:12:23.189> and<00:12:23.489> now<00:12:23.609> the<00:12:23.669> pub<00:12:23.970> organism<00:12:24.419> is 00:12:24.499 --> 00:12:24.509 align:start position:0% lets you and now the pub organism is 00:12:24.509 --> 00:12:26.989 align:start position:0% lets you and now the pub organism is simply<00:12:24.809> a<00:12:24.839> way<00:12:25.079> to<00:12:25.649> map<00:12:25.919> between<00:12:26.279> these<00:12:26.789> two 00:12:26.989 --> 00:12:26.999 align:start position:0% simply a way to map between these two 00:12:26.999 --> 00:12:28.969 align:start position:0% simply a way to map between these two domains<00:12:27.149> and<00:12:27.809> the<00:12:28.049> plaintext<00:12:28.470> of<00:12:28.739> a<00:12:28.829> team 00:12:28.969 --> 00:12:28.979 align:start position:0% domains and the plaintext of a team 00:12:28.979 --> 00:12:30.409 align:start position:0% domains and the plaintext of a team where<00:12:29.069> we<00:12:29.099> all<00:12:29.519> familiar<00:12:29.729> with<00:12:29.939> just<00:12:30.119> doing 00:12:30.409 --> 00:12:30.419 align:start position:0% where we all familiar with just doing 00:12:30.419 --> 00:12:33.109 align:start position:0% where we all familiar with just doing simple<00:12:30.959> addition<00:12:31.470> on<00:12:31.589> things<00:12:32.129> and<00:12:32.729> the<00:12:32.970> done 00:12:33.109 --> 00:12:33.119 align:start position:0% simple addition on things and the done 00:12:33.119 --> 00:12:34.699 align:start position:0% simple addition on things and the done in<00:12:33.239> the<00:12:33.329> encrypted<00:12:33.779> cipher<00:12:34.019> text<00:12:34.439> domain 00:12:34.699 --> 00:12:34.709 align:start position:0% in the encrypted cipher text domain 00:12:34.709 --> 00:12:37.099 align:start position:0% in the encrypted cipher text domain where<00:12:35.279> we<00:12:35.669> don't<00:12:36.149> normally<00:12:36.419> see<00:12:36.659> what<00:12:36.989> the 00:12:37.099 --> 00:12:37.109 align:start position:0% where we don't normally see what the 00:12:37.109 --> 00:12:38.250 align:start position:0% where we don't normally see what the values<00:12:37.379> under<00:12:37.619> info 00:12:38.250 --> 00:12:38.260 align:start position:0% values under info 00:12:38.260 --> 00:12:41.670 align:start position:0% values under info some<00:12:38.680> value<00:12:39.070> that<00:12:40.000> out<00:12:40.180> of<00:12:40.360> all<00:12:41.080> organism<00:12:41.530> is 00:12:41.670 --> 00:12:41.680 align:start position:0% some value that out of all organism is 00:12:41.680 --> 00:12:43.350 align:start position:0% some value that out of all organism is simply<00:12:41.980> an<00:12:42.070> operation<00:12:42.670> and<00:12:42.940> addition 00:12:43.350 --> 00:12:43.360 align:start position:0% simply an operation and addition 00:12:43.360 --> 00:12:45.720 align:start position:0% simply an operation and addition operation<00:12:43.870> that<00:12:44.410> lets<00:12:44.620> us<00:12:44.800> calculate<00:12:45.160> what 00:12:45.720 --> 00:12:45.730 align:start position:0% operation that lets us calculate what 00:12:45.730 --> 00:12:47.760 align:start position:0% operation that lets us calculate what that<00:12:46.090> would<00:12:46.510> that<00:12:46.630> would<00:12:46.690> be<00:12:46.930> able<00:12:47.260> plaintext 00:12:47.760 --> 00:12:47.770 align:start position:0% that would that would be able plaintext 00:12:47.770 --> 00:12:49.950 align:start position:0% that would that would be able plaintext space<00:12:47.950> so<00:12:48.490> you<00:12:48.550> can<00:12:48.700> simply<00:12:48.880> add<00:12:49.210> ciphertext 00:12:49.950 --> 00:12:49.960 align:start position:0% space so you can simply add ciphertext 00:12:49.960 --> 00:12:56.450 align:start position:0% space so you can simply add ciphertext the<00:12:50.050> other<00:12:50.200> to<00:12:50.380> get<00:12:50.500> there<00:12:50.710> played<00:12:51.040> exhale 00:12:56.450 --> 00:12:56.460 align:start position:0% 00:12:56.460 --> 00:12:58.980 align:start position:0% fully<00:12:57.460> homomorphic<00:12:57.640> encryption<00:12:58.060> much<00:12:58.630> scan 00:12:58.980 --> 00:12:58.990 align:start position:0% fully homomorphic encryption much scan 00:12:58.990 --> 00:13:01.290 align:start position:0% fully homomorphic encryption much scan that's<00:12:59.590> all<00:12:59.860> thought<00:13:00.070> about<00:13:00.100> as<00:13:00.580> we<00:13:00.940> just<00:13:01.120> saw 00:13:01.290 --> 00:13:01.300 align:start position:0% that's all thought about as we just saw 00:13:01.300 --> 00:13:03.600 align:start position:0% that's all thought about as we just saw some<00:13:01.870> schemes<00:13:02.260> do<00:13:02.440> you<00:13:02.530> utilize<00:13:02.740> homework<00:13:03.430> in 00:13:03.600 --> 00:13:03.610 align:start position:0% some schemes do you utilize homework in 00:13:03.610 --> 00:13:05.280 align:start position:0% some schemes do you utilize homework in addition<00:13:04.000> to<00:13:04.210> perform<00:13:04.630> confidential 00:13:05.280 --> 00:13:05.290 align:start position:0% addition to perform confidential 00:13:05.290 --> 00:13:07.740 align:start position:0% addition to perform confidential transactions<00:13:05.920> if<00:13:06.430> you<00:13:06.670> actually<00:13:06.880> extend<00:13:07.540> that 00:13:07.740 --> 00:13:07.750 align:start position:0% transactions if you actually extend that 00:13:07.750 --> 00:13:09.990 align:start position:0% transactions if you actually extend that and<00:13:07.990> consider<00:13:08.380> homomorphic<00:13:09.190> multiplication 00:13:09.990 --> 00:13:10.000 align:start position:0% and consider homomorphic multiplication 00:13:10.000 --> 00:13:12.150 align:start position:0% and consider homomorphic multiplication which<00:13:10.630> means<00:13:10.960> that<00:13:11.230> the<00:13:11.470> encryption<00:13:11.680> of<00:13:11.980> a 00:13:12.150 --> 00:13:12.160 align:start position:0% which means that the encryption of a 00:13:12.160 --> 00:13:14.790 align:start position:0% which means that the encryption of a times<00:13:12.790> the<00:13:12.970> encryption<00:13:13.420> of<00:13:13.510> B<00:13:13.660> is<00:13:13.930> the<00:13:13.990> same<00:13:14.440> as 00:13:14.790 --> 00:13:14.800 align:start position:0% times the encryption of B is the same as 00:13:14.800 --> 00:13:17.880 align:start position:0% times the encryption of B is the same as first<00:13:15.520> multiplying<00:13:16.270> a<00:13:16.570> and<00:13:16.600> B<00:13:16.900> together<00:13:17.380> and 00:13:17.880 --> 00:13:17.890 align:start position:0% first multiplying a and B together and 00:13:17.890 --> 00:13:20.400 align:start position:0% first multiplying a and B together and then<00:13:18.010> encrypting<00:13:18.460> so<00:13:19.150> what<00:13:19.540> might<00:13:19.750> happen<00:13:20.020> if 00:13:20.400 --> 00:13:20.410 align:start position:0% then encrypting so what might happen if 00:13:20.410 --> 00:13:22.560 align:start position:0% then encrypting so what might happen if we<00:13:20.560> were<00:13:20.710> to<00:13:20.740> create<00:13:21.010> a<00:13:21.160> PPS<00:13:21.790> scheme<00:13:22.150> that 00:13:22.560 --> 00:13:22.570 align:start position:0% we were to create a PPS scheme that 00:13:22.570 --> 00:13:25.020 align:start position:0% we were to create a PPS scheme that doesn't<00:13:23.080> only<00:13:23.260> just<00:13:23.860> do<00:13:24.070> homework 00:13:25.020 --> 00:13:25.030 align:start position:0% doesn't only just do homework 00:13:25.030 --> 00:13:27.960 align:start position:0% doesn't only just do homework but<00:13:25.630> also<00:13:25.900> does<00:13:26.410> homework<00:13:26.970> multiplication 00:13:27.960 --> 00:13:27.970 align:start position:0% but also does homework multiplication 00:13:27.970 --> 00:13:30.090 align:start position:0% but also does homework multiplication that<00:13:28.600> would<00:13:28.810> actually<00:13:29.260> give<00:13:29.440> us<00:13:29.590> something 00:13:30.090 --> 00:13:30.100 align:start position:0% that would actually give us something 00:13:30.100 --> 00:13:31.260 align:start position:0% that would actually give us something that<00:13:30.280> performs<00:13:30.640> fully<00:13:31.000> homomorphic 00:13:31.260 --> 00:13:31.270 align:start position:0% that performs fully homomorphic 00:13:31.270 --> 00:13:32.400 align:start position:0% that performs fully homomorphic encryption 00:13:32.400 --> 00:13:32.410 align:start position:0% encryption 00:13:32.410 --> 00:13:35.700 align:start position:0% encryption there<00:13:32.650> hasn't<00:13:32.890> been<00:13:33.190> any<00:13:34.030> epsp<00:13:34.810> scheme<00:13:35.230> that 00:13:35.700 --> 00:13:35.710 align:start position:0% there hasn't been any epsp scheme that 00:13:35.710 --> 00:13:37.980 align:start position:0% there hasn't been any epsp scheme that does<00:13:36.040> fully<00:13:36.400> homomorphic<00:13:36.640> encryption<00:13:37.120> so<00:13:37.690> far 00:13:37.980 --> 00:13:37.990 align:start position:0% does fully homomorphic encryption so far 00:13:37.990 --> 00:13:39.660 align:start position:0% does fully homomorphic encryption so far but<00:13:38.500> it<00:13:38.620> might<00:13:38.770> be<00:13:38.920> interesting<00:13:39.100> to<00:13:39.460> consider 00:13:39.660 --> 00:13:39.670 align:start position:0% but it might be interesting to consider 00:13:39.670 --> 00:13:42.270 align:start position:0% but it might be interesting to consider how<00:13:40.480> much<00:13:40.660> more<00:13:40.930> how<00:13:41.140> we<00:13:41.200> would<00:13:41.620> get<00:13:41.770> from 00:13:42.270 --> 00:13:42.280 align:start position:0% how much more how we would get from 00:13:42.280 --> 00:13:46.020 align:start position:0% how much more how we would get from including<00:13:42.790> this<00:13:42.940> at<00:13:43.120> such<00:13:43.300> speed<00:13:45.000> we're<00:13:46.000> going 00:13:46.020 --> 00:13:46.030 align:start position:0% including this at such speed we're going 00:13:46.030 --> 00:13:48.060 align:start position:0% including this at such speed we're going to<00:13:46.270> quickly<00:13:46.600> look<00:13:46.870> at<00:13:47.020> you<00:13:47.290> non-aryan 00:13:48.060 --> 00:13:48.070 align:start position:0% to quickly look at you non-aryan 00:13:48.070 --> 00:13:51.000 align:start position:0% to quickly look at you non-aryan approaches<00:13:48.580> one<00:13:49.120> is<00:13:49.450> that<00:13:49.810> C<00:13:50.020> which<00:13:50.410> uses<00:13:50.800> the 00:13:51.000 --> 00:13:51.010 align:start position:0% approaches one is that C which uses the 00:13:51.010 --> 00:13:53.700 align:start position:0% approaches one is that C which uses the context<00:13:51.460> overlay<00:13:51.820> model<00:13:52.030> they<00:13:52.570> use<00:13:52.870> DK<00:13:53.260> starts 00:13:53.700 --> 00:13:53.710 align:start position:0% context overlay model they use DK starts 00:13:53.710 --> 00:13:55.740 align:start position:0% context overlay model they use DK starts for<00:13:53.890> performing<00:13:54.400> on<00:13:54.670> financial<00:13:55.090> transactions 00:13:55.740 --> 00:13:55.750 align:start position:0% for performing on financial transactions 00:13:55.750 --> 00:13:58.350 align:start position:0% for performing on financial transactions and<00:13:56.110> they<00:13:57.070> actually<00:13:57.220> have<00:13:57.640> an<00:13:57.790> even<00:13:58.090> stronger 00:13:58.350 --> 00:13:58.360 align:start position:0% and they actually have an even stronger 00:13:58.360 --> 00:14:00.030 align:start position:0% and they actually have an even stronger notion<00:13:58.720> of<00:13:58.990> privacy<00:13:59.350> than<00:13:59.650> the<00:13:59.740> one<00:13:59.890> you 00:14:00.030 --> 00:14:00.040 align:start position:0% notion of privacy than the one you 00:14:00.040 --> 00:14:02.550 align:start position:0% notion of privacy than the one you define<00:14:00.430> in<00:14:00.820> addition<00:14:01.270> to<00:14:01.360> hiding<00:14:02.020> the<00:14:02.110> inputs 00:14:02.550 --> 00:14:02.560 align:start position:0% define in addition to hiding the inputs 00:14:02.560 --> 00:14:04.320 align:start position:0% define in addition to hiding the inputs and<00:14:02.650> outputs<00:14:02.740> of<00:14:03.160> a<00:14:03.220> function<00:14:03.640> they<00:14:04.090> also 00:14:04.320 --> 00:14:04.330 align:start position:0% and outputs of a function they also 00:14:04.330 --> 00:14:06.690 align:start position:0% and outputs of a function they also discussed<00:14:04.960> hiding<00:14:05.470> the<00:14:05.590> function<00:14:06.070> itself<00:14:06.370> so 00:14:06.690 --> 00:14:06.700 align:start position:0% discussed hiding the function itself so 00:14:06.700 --> 00:14:08.400 align:start position:0% discussed hiding the function itself so what<00:14:06.970> we<00:14:07.090> can<00:14:07.270> call<00:14:07.390> function<00:14:07.960> privacy 00:14:08.400 --> 00:14:08.410 align:start position:0% what we can call function privacy 00:14:08.410 --> 00:14:10.530 align:start position:0% what we can call function privacy however<00:14:08.920> to<00:14:09.490> achieve<00:14:09.820> the<00:14:10.000> efficiency<00:14:10.510> that 00:14:10.530 --> 00:14:10.540 align:start position:0% however to achieve the efficiency that 00:14:10.540 --> 00:14:12.330 align:start position:0% however to achieve the efficiency that they're<00:14:10.810> talking<00:14:10.990> about<00:14:11.260> if<00:14:11.740> also<00:14:11.980> an 00:14:12.330 --> 00:14:12.340 align:start position:0% they're talking about if also an 00:14:12.340 --> 00:14:14.130 align:start position:0% they're talking about if also an expensive<00:14:12.910> scheme<00:14:13.210> and<00:14:13.450> the<00:14:13.570> sense<00:14:13.810> that<00:14:13.930> can 00:14:14.130 --> 00:14:14.140 align:start position:0% expensive scheme and the sense that can 00:14:14.140 --> 00:14:16.530 align:start position:0% expensive scheme and the sense that can mean<00:14:14.290> hundreds<00:14:15.040> of<00:14:15.190> gigabytes<00:14:15.370> of<00:14:15.820> RAM<00:14:16.060> to<00:14:16.390> get 00:14:16.530 --> 00:14:16.540 align:start position:0% mean hundreds of gigabytes of RAM to get 00:14:16.540 --> 00:14:18.440 align:start position:0% mean hundreds of gigabytes of RAM to get the<00:14:16.660> proving<00:14:16.990> types<00:14:17.230> of<00:14:17.380> compound<00:14:17.980> and 00:14:18.440 --> 00:14:18.450 align:start position:0% the proving types of compound and 00:14:18.450 --> 00:14:20.970 align:start position:0% the proving types of compound and there's<00:14:19.450> a<00:14:19.510> second<00:14:19.960> one<00:14:20.080> from<00:14:20.320> Oasis<00:14:20.770> class 00:14:20.970 --> 00:14:20.980 align:start position:0% there's a second one from Oasis class 00:14:20.980 --> 00:14:22.140 align:start position:0% there's a second one from Oasis class you<00:14:21.220> don't<00:14:21.400> actually<00:14:21.610> know<00:14:21.910> if<00:14:21.940> they're 00:14:22.140 --> 00:14:22.150 align:start position:0% you don't actually know if they're 00:14:22.150 --> 00:14:23.970 align:start position:0% you don't actually know if they're announced<00:14:22.480> today<00:14:22.720> are<00:14:23.230> just<00:14:23.260> gonna<00:14:23.590> refer<00:14:23.860> to 00:14:23.970 --> 00:14:23.980 align:start position:0% announced today are just gonna refer to 00:14:23.980 --> 00:14:26.430 align:start position:0% announced today are just gonna refer to it<00:14:24.130> as<00:14:24.280> the<00:14:24.400> project<00:14:24.820> from<00:14:24.940> Oasis<00:14:25.450> labs<00:14:25.690> they 00:14:26.430 --> 00:14:26.440 align:start position:0% it as the project from Oasis labs they 00:14:26.440 --> 00:14:28.170 align:start position:0% it as the project from Oasis labs they use<00:14:26.650> trusted<00:14:27.130> hardware<00:14:27.520> which<00:14:27.790> does<00:14:28.000> not 00:14:28.170 --> 00:14:28.180 align:start position:0% use trusted hardware which does not 00:14:28.180 --> 00:14:30.600 align:start position:0% use trusted hardware which does not satisfy<00:14:28.480> our<00:14:28.900> notions<00:14:29.350> of<00:14:29.530> security<00:14:30.520> and 00:14:30.600 --> 00:14:30.610 align:start position:0% satisfy our notions of security and 00:14:30.610 --> 00:14:32.370 align:start position:0% satisfy our notions of security and privacy<00:14:30.820> with<00:14:31.270> cryptography<00:14:31.570> and<00:14:32.170> we're<00:14:32.290> just 00:14:32.370 --> 00:14:32.380 align:start position:0% privacy with cryptography and we're just 00:14:32.380 --> 00:14:33.960 align:start position:0% privacy with cryptography and we're just going<00:14:32.560> to<00:14:32.650> gloss<00:14:32.800> over<00:14:33.040> their<00:14:33.340> work<00:14:33.490> but 00:14:33.960 --> 00:14:33.970 align:start position:0% going to gloss over their work but 00:14:33.970 --> 00:14:39.150 align:start position:0% going to gloss over their work but they're<00:14:34.120> also<00:14:34.270> in<00:14:34.480> this<00:14:34.660> space<00:14:37.200> so<00:14:38.200> briefly 00:14:39.150 --> 00:14:39.160 align:start position:0% they're also in this space so briefly 00:14:39.160 --> 00:14:40.560 align:start position:0% they're also in this space so briefly we'll<00:14:39.400> talk<00:14:39.580> about<00:14:39.730> some<00:14:39.970> comparisons 00:14:40.560 --> 00:14:40.570 align:start position:0% we'll talk about some comparisons 00:14:40.570 --> 00:14:41.830 align:start position:0% we'll talk about some comparisons between<00:14:40.660> the<00:14:40.900> type 00:14:41.830 --> 00:14:41.840 align:start position:0% between the type 00:14:41.840 --> 00:14:44.060 align:start position:0% between the type so<00:14:42.840> it's<00:14:43.260> really<00:14:43.440> difficult<00:14:43.710> to<00:14:43.980> actually 00:14:44.060 --> 00:14:44.070 align:start position:0% so it's really difficult to actually 00:14:44.070 --> 00:14:45.830 align:start position:0% so it's really difficult to actually compare<00:14:44.730> these<00:14:44.940> technologies<00:14:45.510> because<00:14:45.720> they 00:14:45.830 --> 00:14:45.840 align:start position:0% compare these technologies because they 00:14:45.840 --> 00:14:48.500 align:start position:0% compare these technologies because they all<00:14:45.960> accomplish<00:14:46.760> similar<00:14:47.760> things<00:14:47.940> with 00:14:48.500 --> 00:14:48.510 align:start position:0% all accomplish similar things with 00:14:48.510 --> 00:14:50.900 align:start position:0% all accomplish similar things with different<00:14:49.080> techniques<00:14:49.620> it's<00:14:49.980> they're<00:14:50.610> just 00:14:50.900 --> 00:14:50.910 align:start position:0% different techniques it's they're just 00:14:50.910 --> 00:14:52.820 align:start position:0% different techniques it's they're just not<00:14:51.120> really<00:14:51.480> that<00:14:51.600> easy<00:14:51.810> to<00:14:52.110> compare<00:14:52.440> together 00:14:52.820 --> 00:14:52.830 align:start position:0% not really that easy to compare together 00:14:52.830 --> 00:14:55.370 align:start position:0% not really that easy to compare together directly<00:14:53.820> but<00:14:54.300> they<00:14:54.510> do<00:14:54.570> satisfy<00:14:55.170> some 00:14:55.370 --> 00:14:55.380 align:start position:0% directly but they do satisfy some 00:14:55.380 --> 00:14:56.720 align:start position:0% directly but they do satisfy some properties<00:14:55.830> you<00:14:55.920> can<00:14:56.040> discuss<00:14:56.370> such<00:14:56.610> as 00:14:56.720 --> 00:14:56.730 align:start position:0% properties you can discuss such as 00:14:56.730 --> 00:14:58.670 align:start position:0% properties you can discuss such as performance<00:14:57.180> privacy<00:14:57.720> the<00:14:58.170> interactivity 00:14:58.670 --> 00:14:58.680 align:start position:0% performance privacy the interactivity 00:14:58.680 --> 00:15:00.050 align:start position:0% performance privacy the interactivity involved<00:14:59.220> in<00:14:59.340> the<00:14:59.400> cryptographic<00:14:59.550> security 00:15:00.050 --> 00:15:00.060 align:start position:0% involved in the cryptographic security 00:15:00.060 --> 00:15:03.350 align:start position:0% involved in the cryptographic security use<00:15:00.650> so<00:15:01.650> fully<00:15:02.010> homomorphic<00:15:02.160> encryption<00:15:02.550> and 00:15:03.350 --> 00:15:03.360 align:start position:0% use so fully homomorphic encryption and 00:15:03.360 --> 00:15:06.200 align:start position:0% use so fully homomorphic encryption and it's<00:15:03.540> complied<00:15:03.870> entirely<00:15:04.200> compute<00:15:04.710> bound<00:15:05.210> so 00:15:06.200 --> 00:15:06.210 align:start position:0% it's complied entirely compute bound so 00:15:06.210 --> 00:15:08.240 align:start position:0% it's complied entirely compute bound so the<00:15:06.240> performance<00:15:06.690> route<00:15:07.290> is<00:15:07.500> basically<00:15:07.950> built 00:15:08.240 --> 00:15:08.250 align:start position:0% the performance route is basically built 00:15:08.250 --> 00:15:11.420 align:start position:0% the performance route is basically built on<00:15:08.460> as<00:15:08.670> a<00:15:09.240> zombie<00:15:09.390> just<00:15:10.230> depends<00:15:10.650> on<00:15:11.040> how<00:15:11.400> long 00:15:11.420 --> 00:15:11.430 align:start position:0% on as a zombie just depends on how long 00:15:11.430 --> 00:15:13.730 align:start position:0% on as a zombie just depends on how long a<00:15:11.640> computer<00:15:12.210> can<00:15:12.780> actually<00:15:13.140> perform<00:15:13.320> these 00:15:13.730 --> 00:15:13.740 align:start position:0% a computer can actually perform these 00:15:13.740 --> 00:15:17.500 align:start position:0% a computer can actually perform these really<00:15:14.730> intense<00:15:15.170> operations<00:15:16.170> such<00:15:16.320> as<00:15:16.350> an<00:15:16.560> fft 00:15:17.500 --> 00:15:17.510 align:start position:0% really intense operations such as an fft 00:15:17.510 --> 00:15:19.850 align:start position:0% really intense operations such as an fft the<00:15:18.510> privacy<00:15:18.990> is<00:15:19.110> also<00:15:19.410> based<00:15:19.620> on<00:15:19.740> the 00:15:19.850 --> 00:15:19.860 align:start position:0% the privacy is also based on the 00:15:19.860 --> 00:15:20.960 align:start position:0% the privacy is also based on the encryption<00:15:20.250> scheme<00:15:20.490> which<00:15:20.700> if<00:15:20.850> you're 00:15:20.960 --> 00:15:20.970 align:start position:0% encryption scheme which if you're 00:15:20.970 --> 00:15:24.170 align:start position:0% encryption scheme which if you're familiar<00:15:21.000> with<00:15:21.360> any<00:15:21.630> cryptographic<00:15:23.180> security 00:15:24.170 --> 00:15:24.180 align:start position:0% familiar with any cryptographic security 00:15:24.180 --> 00:15:26.990 align:start position:0% familiar with any cryptographic security assumptions<00:15:24.900> any<00:15:25.520> standards<00:15:26.520> we<00:15:26.670> can<00:15:26.700> say 00:15:26.990 --> 00:15:27.000 align:start position:0% assumptions any standards we can say 00:15:27.000 --> 00:15:28.760 align:start position:0% assumptions any standards we can say that<00:15:27.210> you<00:15:27.510> know<00:15:27.600> usually<00:15:28.020> just<00:15:28.350> the<00:15:28.440> SteriPEN 00:15:28.760 --> 00:15:28.770 align:start position:0% that you know usually just the SteriPEN 00:15:28.770 --> 00:15:30.700 align:start position:0% that you know usually just the SteriPEN its<00:15:29.010> ie<00:15:29.220> D<00:15:29.400> CPA<00:15:29.760> security 00:15:30.700 --> 00:15:30.710 align:start position:0% its ie D CPA security 00:15:30.710 --> 00:15:33.590 align:start position:0% its ie D CPA security it<00:15:31.710> is<00:15:32.160> not<00:15:32.520> interactive<00:15:33.120> meaning<00:15:33.390> that<00:15:33.480> you 00:15:33.590 --> 00:15:33.600 align:start position:0% it is not interactive meaning that you 00:15:33.600 --> 00:15:34.760 align:start position:0% it is not interactive meaning that you don't<00:15:33.630> have<00:15:33.840> to<00:15:34.020> interact<00:15:34.170> with<00:15:34.410> a<00:15:34.500> bunch<00:15:34.680> of 00:15:34.760 --> 00:15:34.770 align:start position:0% don't have to interact with a bunch of 00:15:34.770 --> 00:15:37.220 align:start position:0% don't have to interact with a bunch of people<00:15:35.130> for<00:15:35.520> this<00:15:35.760> computation<00:15:36.060> you'll<00:15:36.960> need 00:15:37.220 --> 00:15:37.230 align:start position:0% people for this computation you'll need 00:15:37.230 --> 00:15:38.810 align:start position:0% people for this computation you'll need to<00:15:37.320> go<00:15:37.440> to<00:15:37.500> the<00:15:37.620> computing<00:15:38.010> party<00:15:38.340> scripts 00:15:38.810 --> 00:15:38.820 align:start position:0% to go to the computing party scripts 00:15:38.820 --> 00:15:40.310 align:start position:0% to go to the computing party scripts today<00:15:39.030> they<00:15:39.210> give<00:15:39.390> them<00:15:39.540> a<00:15:39.600> cake<00:15:39.810> and<00:15:40.080> they<00:15:40.170> can 00:15:40.310 --> 00:15:40.320 align:start position:0% today they give them a cake and they can 00:15:40.320 --> 00:15:41.840 align:start position:0% today they give them a cake and they can usually<00:15:40.440> perform<00:15:40.950> the<00:15:41.040> computation<00:15:41.280> on<00:15:41.670> it 00:15:41.840 --> 00:15:41.850 align:start position:0% usually perform the computation on it 00:15:41.850 --> 00:15:43.850 align:start position:0% usually perform the computation on it and<00:15:42.420> it<00:15:42.540> also<00:15:42.660> satisfies<00:15:42.960> some<00:15:43.530> cryptographic 00:15:43.850 --> 00:15:43.860 align:start position:0% and it also satisfies some cryptographic 00:15:43.860 --> 00:15:48.110 align:start position:0% and it also satisfies some cryptographic security<00:15:44.310> as<00:15:44.730> well<00:15:45.110> so<00:15:46.110> we<00:15:46.470> know<00:15:46.680> that<00:15:47.040> when<00:15:48.000> we 00:15:48.110 --> 00:15:48.120 align:start position:0% security as well so we know that when we 00:15:48.120 --> 00:15:51.590 align:start position:0% security as well so we know that when we do<00:15:48.470> plan<00:15:49.470> on<00:15:49.620> working<00:15:49.800> encryption<00:15:50.400> we<00:15:51.360> know 00:15:51.590 --> 00:15:51.600 align:start position:0% do plan on working encryption we know 00:15:51.600 --> 00:15:53.600 align:start position:0% do plan on working encryption we know that<00:15:51.930> it's<00:15:52.200> going<00:15:52.380> to<00:15:52.500> satisfy<00:15:52.740> math<00:15:53.339> and<00:15:53.550> I 00:15:53.600 --> 00:15:53.610 align:start position:0% that it's going to satisfy math and I 00:15:53.610 --> 00:15:55.250 align:start position:0% that it's going to satisfy math and I think<00:15:53.880> our<00:15:54.030> problem<00:15:54.210> that's<00:15:54.570> not<00:15:54.870> you<00:15:55.020> can 00:15:55.250 --> 00:15:55.260 align:start position:0% think our problem that's not you can 00:15:55.260 --> 00:15:58.340 align:start position:0% think our problem that's not you can solve<00:15:55.730> it<00:15:56.730> like<00:15:56.910> I<00:15:57.030> said<00:15:57.210> QVC<00:15:57.630> is<00:15:57.660> network<00:15:58.110> bout 00:15:58.340 --> 00:15:58.350 align:start position:0% solve it like I said QVC is network bout 00:15:58.350 --> 00:16:01.250 align:start position:0% solve it like I said QVC is network bout and<00:15:58.730> then<00:15:59.730> becomes<00:16:00.600> an<00:16:00.750> issue<00:16:00.900> when<00:16:01.170> you<00:16:01.200> have 00:16:01.250 --> 00:16:01.260 align:start position:0% and then becomes an issue when you have 00:16:01.260 --> 00:16:04.850 align:start position:0% and then becomes an issue when you have more<00:16:01.589> participants<00:16:02.520> in<00:16:02.610> it<00:16:03.020> it's<00:16:04.020> based<00:16:04.290> on<00:16:04.560> an 00:16:04.850 --> 00:16:04.860 align:start position:0% more participants in it it's based on an 00:16:04.860 --> 00:16:07.940 align:start position:0% more participants in it it's based on an encryption<00:16:05.640> scheme<00:16:05.820> and<00:16:06.360> not<00:16:07.140> a<00:16:07.170> collision<00:16:07.740> of 00:16:07.940 --> 00:16:07.950 align:start position:0% encryption scheme and not a collision of 00:16:07.950 --> 00:16:10.190 align:start position:0% encryption scheme and not a collision of that<00:16:08.430> people<00:16:08.730> privacy<00:16:09.150> so<00:16:09.720> a<00:16:09.750> first<00:16:09.960> major 00:16:10.190 --> 00:16:10.200 align:start position:0% that people privacy so a first major 00:16:10.200 --> 00:16:11.730 align:start position:0% that people privacy so a first major secret<00:16:10.470> sharing<00:16:10.740> your 00:16:11.730 --> 00:16:11.740 align:start position:0% secret sharing your 00:16:11.740 --> 00:16:12.930 align:start position:0% secret sharing your the<00:16:12.040> same<00:16:12.220> thing<00:16:12.340> that<00:16:12.490> your<00:16:12.610> friends<00:16:12.850> won't 00:16:12.930 --> 00:16:12.940 align:start position:0% the same thing that your friends won't 00:16:12.940 --> 00:16:14.660 align:start position:0% the same thing that your friends won't get<00:16:13.150> together<00:16:13.270> and<00:16:13.570> try<00:16:13.660> to<00:16:13.750> screw<00:16:14.050> you<00:16:14.170> over 00:16:14.660 --> 00:16:14.670 align:start position:0% get together and try to screw you over 00:16:14.670 --> 00:16:17.070 align:start position:0% get together and try to screw you over it<00:16:15.670> is<00:16:15.880> interactive<00:16:16.510> so<00:16:16.540> it<00:16:16.720> doesn't<00:16:16.930> sound 00:16:17.070 --> 00:16:17.080 align:start position:0% it is interactive so it doesn't sound 00:16:17.080 --> 00:16:19.800 align:start position:0% it is interactive so it doesn't sound like<00:16:17.290> that<00:16:17.470> and<00:16:17.850> the<00:16:18.850> cryptographic<00:16:19.390> security 00:16:19.800 --> 00:16:19.810 align:start position:0% like that and the cryptographic security 00:16:19.810 --> 00:16:22.980 align:start position:0% like that and the cryptographic security is<00:16:20.230> somewhat<00:16:20.920> similar<00:16:21.510> that<00:16:22.510> requires 00:16:22.980 --> 00:16:22.990 align:start position:0% is somewhat similar that requires 00:16:22.990 --> 00:16:24.780 align:start position:0% is somewhat similar that requires usually<00:16:23.320> ask<00:16:23.710> some<00:16:23.890> fairness<00:16:24.130> assumptions 00:16:24.780 --> 00:16:24.790 align:start position:0% usually ask some fairness assumptions 00:16:24.790 --> 00:16:26.040 align:start position:0% usually ask some fairness assumptions that<00:16:24.970> requires<00:16:25.330> you<00:16:25.480> to<00:16:25.540> listen<00:16:25.720> zero 00:16:26.040 --> 00:16:26.050 align:start position:0% that requires you to listen zero 00:16:26.050 --> 00:16:27.600 align:start position:0% that requires you to listen zero knowledge<00:16:26.200> groups<00:16:26.560> -<00:16:26.740> -<00:16:27.040> good 00:16:27.600 --> 00:16:27.610 align:start position:0% knowledge groups - - good 00:16:27.610 --> 00:16:29.700 align:start position:0% knowledge groups - - good trusting<00:16:28.210> hardware<00:16:28.540> is<00:16:28.720> kind<00:16:28.960> of<00:16:29.050> you<00:16:29.590> know 00:16:29.700 --> 00:16:29.710 align:start position:0% trusting hardware is kind of you know 00:16:29.710 --> 00:16:33.510 align:start position:0% trusting hardware is kind of you know in<00:16:30.580> my<00:16:30.700> opinion<00:16:32.070> it's<00:16:33.070> just<00:16:33.160> based 00:16:33.510 --> 00:16:33.520 align:start position:0% in my opinion it's just based 00:16:33.520 --> 00:16:35.010 align:start position:0% in my opinion it's just based on<00:16:33.670> hardware<00:16:33.970> security<00:16:34.240> which<00:16:34.600> you've<00:16:34.720> been 00:16:35.010 --> 00:16:35.020 align:start position:0% on hardware security which you've been 00:16:35.020 --> 00:16:37.230 align:start position:0% on hardware security which you've been paying<00:16:35.290> attention<00:16:35.740> to<00:16:36.040> the<00:16:36.190> space<00:16:36.430> recently 00:16:37.230 --> 00:16:37.240 align:start position:0% paying attention to the space recently 00:16:37.240 --> 00:16:39.120 align:start position:0% paying attention to the space recently you<00:16:37.810> know<00:16:37.930> we<00:16:38.080> have<00:16:38.170> spec<00:16:38.500> the<00:16:38.740> spectre 00:16:39.120 --> 00:16:39.130 align:start position:0% you know we have spec the spectre 00:16:39.130 --> 00:16:41.340 align:start position:0% you know we have spec the spectre meltdown<00:16:39.670> speculative<00:16:40.390> execution<00:16:40.480> italics 00:16:41.340 --> 00:16:41.350 align:start position:0% meltdown speculative execution italics 00:16:41.350 --> 00:16:43.470 align:start position:0% meltdown speculative execution italics that<00:16:42.070> like<00:16:42.310> we've<00:16:42.490> been<00:16:42.640> trying<00:16:42.910> for<00:16:43.000> years<00:16:43.330> to 00:16:43.470 --> 00:16:43.480 align:start position:0% that like we've been trying for years to 00:16:43.480 --> 00:16:46.170 align:start position:0% that like we've been trying for years to make<00:16:43.630> secure<00:16:44.410> processors<00:16:45.130> and<00:16:45.760> they're<00:16:45.970> not 00:16:46.170 --> 00:16:46.180 align:start position:0% make secure processors and they're not 00:16:46.180 --> 00:16:48.420 align:start position:0% make secure processors and they're not working<00:16:46.450> out<00:16:46.780> that<00:16:46.960> well<00:16:47.200> so<00:16:47.560> it's<00:16:47.710> time<00:16:47.920> the 00:16:48.420 --> 00:16:48.430 align:start position:0% working out that well so it's time the 00:16:48.430 --> 00:16:49.920 align:start position:0% working out that well so it's time the advancements<00:16:48.970> that's<00:16:49.120> going<00:16:49.330> to<00:16:49.420> take<00:16:49.630> to 00:16:49.920 --> 00:16:49.930 align:start position:0% advancements that's going to take to 00:16:49.930 --> 00:16:52.230 align:start position:0% advancements that's going to take to make<00:16:50.170> secure<00:16:50.590> processors<00:16:51.190> and<00:16:51.400> real<00:16:51.640> secure 00:16:52.230 --> 00:16:52.240 align:start position:0% make secure processors and real secure 00:16:52.240 --> 00:16:54.180 align:start position:0% make secure processors and real secure thing<00:16:52.480> it's<00:16:53.260> much<00:16:53.440> longer<00:16:53.710> than<00:16:53.980> it<00:16:54.070> will<00:16:54.130> be 00:16:54.180 --> 00:16:54.190 align:start position:0% thing it's much longer than it will be 00:16:54.190 --> 00:16:56.520 align:start position:0% thing it's much longer than it will be to<00:16:54.280> take<00:16:54.550> these<00:16:54.760> theoretical<00:16:55.530> advancements 00:16:56.520 --> 00:16:56.530 align:start position:0% to take these theoretical advancements 00:16:56.530 --> 00:16:58.710 align:start position:0% to take these theoretical advancements to<00:16:56.590> improve<00:16:56.890> these<00:16:57.010> rfh<00:16:57.430> here<00:16:57.610> at<00:16:57.730> PC<00:16:58.060> so<00:16:58.570> let's 00:16:58.710 --> 00:16:58.720 align:start position:0% to improve these rfh here at PC so let's 00:16:58.720 --> 00:17:00.660 align:start position:0% to improve these rfh here at PC so let's just<00:16:58.930> move<00:16:59.080> on<00:16:59.290> and<00:16:59.500> do<00:16:59.620> actual<00:17:00.190> provable 00:17:00.660 --> 00:17:00.670 align:start position:0% just move on and do actual provable 00:17:00.670 --> 00:17:02.040 align:start position:0% just move on and do actual provable security<00:17:01.150> and<00:17:01.270> not<00:17:01.420> just<00:17:01.600> deal<00:17:01.810> with<00:17:01.840> the 00:17:02.040 --> 00:17:02.050 align:start position:0% security and not just deal with the 00:17:02.050 --> 00:17:05.820 align:start position:0% security and not just deal with the stuff<00:17:02.260> that<00:17:02.470> kind<00:17:03.130> of<00:17:03.280> but<00:17:03.580> doesn't<00:17:03.940> work<00:17:04.110> so<00:17:05.110> I 00:17:05.820 --> 00:17:05.830 align:start position:0% stuff that kind of but doesn't work so I 00:17:05.830 --> 00:17:15.390 align:start position:0% stuff that kind of but doesn't work so I have<00:17:12.300> a<00:17:13.300> contract<00:17:13.930> approaches<00:17:14.560> so<00:17:14.709> far<00:17:15.010> we've 00:17:15.390 --> 00:17:15.400 align:start position:0% have a contract approaches so far we've 00:17:15.400 --> 00:17:16.860 align:start position:0% have a contract approaches so far we've already<00:17:15.580> seen<00:17:15.910> Caesar<00:17:16.209> and<00:17:16.600> it<00:17:16.690> really 00:17:16.860 --> 00:17:16.870 align:start position:0% already seen Caesar and it really 00:17:16.870 --> 00:17:19.260 align:start position:0% already seen Caesar and it really optimizes<00:17:17.680> for<00:17:17.920> security<00:17:18.580> and<00:17:18.700> the<00:17:18.820> principal 00:17:19.260 --> 00:17:19.270 align:start position:0% optimizes for security and the principal 00:17:19.270 --> 00:17:21.300 align:start position:0% optimizes for security and the principal sense<00:17:19.480> the<00:17:19.810> frequency<00:17:20.560> not<00:17:20.740> attack<00:17:21.100> but 00:17:21.300 --> 00:17:21.310 align:start position:0% sense the frequency not attack but 00:17:21.310 --> 00:17:24.060 align:start position:0% sense the frequency not attack but arguably<00:17:21.940> they're<00:17:22.209> not<00:17:22.390> as<00:17:22.570> VP<00:17:22.900> sec<00:17:23.230> they're 00:17:24.060 --> 00:17:24.070 align:start position:0% arguably they're not as VP sec they're 00:17:24.070 --> 00:17:25.940 align:start position:0% arguably they're not as VP sec they're just<00:17:24.280> trying<00:17:24.520> for<00:17:24.880> confidential 00:17:25.940 --> 00:17:25.950 align:start position:0% just trying for confidential 00:17:25.950 --> 00:17:28.630 align:start position:0% just trying for confidential they<00:17:26.520> really<00:17:26.910> optimized<00:17:27.420> for<00:17:27.750> its<00:17:27.900> efficiency 00:17:28.630 --> 00:17:28.640 align:start position:0% they really optimized for its efficiency 00:17:28.640 --> 00:17:31.520 align:start position:0% they really optimized for its efficiency Saxena<00:17:29.640> is<00:17:29.730> a<00:17:29.850> fantastic<00:17:30.540> job<00:17:30.780> optimizing 00:17:31.520 --> 00:17:31.530 align:start position:0% Saxena is a fantastic job optimizing 00:17:31.530 --> 00:17:33.470 align:start position:0% Saxena is a fantastic job optimizing drives<00:17:31.920> the<00:17:32.190> and<00:17:32.520> clock<00:17:32.820> which<00:17:33.150> we<00:17:33.300> haven't 00:17:33.470 --> 00:17:33.480 align:start position:0% drives the and clock which we haven't 00:17:33.480 --> 00:17:35.680 align:start position:0% drives the and clock which we haven't really<00:17:33.750> mentioned<00:17:34.020> but<00:17:34.500> is<00:17:34.740> a<00:17:34.770> lesser-known 00:17:35.680 --> 00:17:35.690 align:start position:0% really mentioned but is a lesser-known 00:17:35.690 --> 00:17:38.480 align:start position:0% really mentioned but is a lesser-known project<00:17:36.690> that<00:17:36.810> Z<00:17:36.990> cache<00:17:37.230> doesn't<00:17:37.890> really<00:17:38.250> do<00:17:38.460> a 00:17:38.480 --> 00:17:38.490 align:start position:0% project that Z cache doesn't really do a 00:17:38.490 --> 00:17:40.850 align:start position:0% project that Z cache doesn't really do a good<00:17:38.670> job<00:17:38.730> of<00:17:39.000> any<00:17:39.360> of<00:17:39.510> them<00:17:39.720> however<00:17:40.380> it's<00:17:40.800> the 00:17:40.850 --> 00:17:40.860 align:start position:0% good job of any of them however it's the 00:17:40.860 --> 00:17:42.800 align:start position:0% good job of any of them however it's the most<00:17:41.040> important<00:17:41.490> thing<00:17:41.550> to<00:17:41.820> focus<00:17:41.970> on<00:17:42.270> is<00:17:42.570> that 00:17:42.800 --> 00:17:42.810 align:start position:0% most important thing to focus on is that 00:17:42.810 --> 00:17:44.630 align:start position:0% most important thing to focus on is that none<00:17:43.110> of<00:17:43.140> the<00:17:43.350> approaches<00:17:43.800> so<00:17:44.010> far<00:17:44.340> has 00:17:44.630 --> 00:17:44.640 align:start position:0% none of the approaches so far has 00:17:44.640 --> 00:17:46.370 align:start position:0% none of the approaches so far has actually<00:17:45.090> tried<00:17:45.390> to<00:17:45.450> optimize<00:17:45.840> her 00:17:46.370 --> 00:17:46.380 align:start position:0% actually tried to optimize her 00:17:46.380 --> 00:17:48.860 align:start position:0% actually tried to optimize her functionality<00:17:47.040> so<00:17:47.730> it<00:17:47.910> might<00:17:48.060> be<00:17:48.120> interesting 00:17:48.860 --> 00:17:48.870 align:start position:0% functionality so it might be interesting 00:17:48.870 --> 00:17:51.350 align:start position:0% functionality so it might be interesting to<00:17:48.900> consider<00:17:49.290> what<00:17:50.130> happens<00:17:50.640> if<00:17:50.910> we<00:17:51.060> pick<00:17:51.330> a 00:17:51.350 --> 00:17:51.360 align:start position:0% to consider what happens if we pick a 00:17:51.360 --> 00:17:56.600 align:start position:0% to consider what happens if we pick a ppsv<00:17:52.170> scheme<00:17:54.650> what<00:17:55.650> happens<00:17:56.070> if<00:17:56.220> we<00:17:56.310> think<00:17:56.460> of 00:17:56.600 --> 00:17:56.610 align:start position:0% ppsv scheme what happens if we think of 00:17:56.610 --> 00:18:00.440 align:start position:0% ppsv scheme what happens if we think of PBS<00:17:57.060> DC<00:17:57.780> Steve<00:17:58.260> that<00:17:58.680> optimizes<00:17:59.280> for<00:17:59.730> security 00:18:00.440 --> 00:18:00.450 align:start position:0% PBS DC Steve that optimizes for security 00:18:00.450 --> 00:18:03.140 align:start position:0% PBS DC Steve that optimizes for security privacy<00:18:00.750> and<00:18:01.110> functionality<00:18:02.010> and<00:18:02.280> gives<00:18:03.000> a 00:18:03.140 --> 00:18:03.150 align:start position:0% privacy and functionality and gives a 00:18:03.150 --> 00:18:05.360 align:start position:0% privacy and functionality and gives a little<00:18:03.360> for<00:18:03.660> efficiency<00:18:04.230> and<00:18:04.500> compromises<00:18:05.190> a 00:18:05.360 --> 00:18:05.370 align:start position:0% little for efficiency and compromises a 00:18:05.370 --> 00:18:07.790 align:start position:0% little for efficiency and compromises a little<00:18:05.670> bear<00:18:05.820> instance<00:18:06.210> and<00:18:06.420> for<00:18:07.410> everyone 00:18:07.790 --> 00:18:07.800 align:start position:0% little bear instance and for everyone 00:18:07.800 --> 00:18:09.350 align:start position:0% little bear instance and for everyone else<00:18:07.890> in<00:18:08.160> the<00:18:08.280> room<00:18:08.310> that<00:18:08.640> might<00:18:08.790> not<00:18:08.970> care<00:18:09.210> so 00:18:09.350 --> 00:18:09.360 align:start position:0% else in the room that might not care so 00:18:09.360 --> 00:18:10.820 align:start position:0% else in the room that might not care so much<00:18:09.480> about<00:18:09.540> that<00:18:09.780> when<00:18:10.440> you're<00:18:10.530> developing 00:18:10.820 --> 00:18:10.830 align:start position:0% much about that when you're developing 00:18:10.830 --> 00:18:13.280 align:start position:0% much about that when you're developing your<00:18:11.250> own<00:18:11.520> PBS<00:18:12.120> fees<00:18:12.360> you<00:18:12.660> should<00:18:12.840> really<00:18:13.020> look 00:18:13.280 --> 00:18:13.290 align:start position:0% your own PBS fees you should really look 00:18:13.290 --> 00:18:15.050 align:start position:0% your own PBS fees you should really look back<00:18:13.500> at<00:18:13.710> the<00:18:13.830> chart<00:18:14.070> and<00:18:14.190> consider<00:18:14.670> which<00:18:15.000> of 00:18:15.050 --> 00:18:15.060 align:start position:0% back at the chart and consider which of 00:18:15.060 --> 00:18:17.120 align:start position:0% back at the chart and consider which of the<00:18:15.300> four<00:18:15.480> properties<00:18:15.720> you've<00:18:16.230> seen<00:18:16.470> do<00:18:17.040> you 00:18:17.120 --> 00:18:17.130 align:start position:0% the four properties you've seen do you 00:18:17.130 --> 00:18:19.880 align:start position:0% the four properties you've seen do you really<00:18:17.460> want<00:18:17.670> to<00:18:17.760> optimize<00:18:17.880> for<00:18:18.300> so<00:18:19.230> that's<00:18:19.650> it 00:18:19.880 --> 00:18:19.890 align:start position:0% really want to optimize for so that's it 00:18:19.890 --> 00:18:30.320 align:start position:0% really want to optimize for so that's it thank<00:18:20.280> you<00:18:20.400> so<00:18:20.610> much 00:18:30.320 --> 00:18:30.330 align:start position:0% 00:18:30.330 --> 00:18:36.450 align:start position:0% thirty<00:18:31.330> seconds<00:18:31.840> yeah<00:18:32.250> one<00:18:33.250> question<00:18:34.049> yes<00:18:35.460> yes 00:18:36.450 --> 00:18:36.460 align:start position:0% thirty seconds yeah one question yes yes 00:18:36.460 --> 00:18:39.120 align:start position:0% thirty seconds yeah one question yes yes they<00:18:36.730> might<00:18:37.029> consider<00:18:37.710> bulletproof<00:18:38.710> more 00:18:39.120 --> 00:18:39.130 align:start position:0% they might consider bulletproof more 00:18:39.130 --> 00:18:41.610 align:start position:0% they might consider bulletproof more secure<00:18:39.669> than<00:18:40.000> starts<00:18:40.570> and<00:18:40.809> starts<00:18:41.200> more 00:18:41.610 --> 00:18:41.620 align:start position:0% secure than starts and starts more 00:18:41.620 --> 00:19:14.039 align:start position:0% secure than starts and starts more secure<00:18:43.110> so<00:18:46.230> I<00:19:11.970> do<00:19:12.970> think<00:19:13.450> Starks<00:19:13.779> and<00:19:13.929> more 00:19:14.039 --> 00:19:14.049 align:start position:0% secure so I do think Starks and more 00:19:14.049 --> 00:19:15.840 align:start position:0% secure so I do think Starks and more secure<00:19:14.409> than<00:19:14.559> starts<00:19:14.919> I<00:19:15.100> don't<00:19:15.130> really<00:19:15.610> a<00:19:15.639> very 00:19:15.840 --> 00:19:15.850 align:start position:0% secure than starts I don't really a very 00:19:15.850 --> 00:19:17.430 align:start position:0% secure than starts I don't really a very trusted<00:19:16.360> set<00:19:16.570> up<00:19:16.690> security<00:19:17.139> can<00:19:17.409> be 00:19:17.430 --> 00:19:17.440 align:start position:0% trusted set up security can be 00:19:17.440 --> 00:19:19.620 align:start position:0% trusted set up security can be compromised<00:19:18.130> if<00:19:18.519> the<00:19:18.970> cronies<00:19:19.299> pollute 00:19:19.620 --> 00:19:19.630 align:start position:0% compromised if the cronies pollute 00:19:19.630 --> 00:19:21.180 align:start position:0% compromised if the cronies pollute together<00:19:19.929> and<00:19:20.289> I<00:19:20.529> think<00:19:20.740> knowledge<00:19:20.919> of 00:19:21.180 --> 00:19:21.190 align:start position:0% together and I think knowledge of 00:19:21.190 --> 00:19:23.190 align:start position:0% together and I think knowledge of exponent<00:19:21.789> is<00:19:21.970> a<00:19:22.000> non-standard<00:19:22.570> assumption 00:19:23.190 --> 00:19:23.200 align:start position:0% exponent is a non-standard assumption 00:19:23.200 --> 00:19:25.259 align:start position:0% exponent is a non-standard assumption that's<00:19:23.380> not<00:19:23.559> well<00:19:23.769> understood<00:19:24.070> so<00:19:25.029> if<00:19:25.149> I 00:19:25.259 --> 00:19:25.269 align:start position:0% that's not well understood so if I 00:19:25.269 --> 00:19:27.299 align:start position:0% that's not well understood so if I personally<00:19:25.960> as<00:19:26.139> a<00:19:26.169> photographer<00:19:26.830> but<00:19:26.980> if<00:19:27.100> feel 00:19:27.299 --> 00:19:27.309 align:start position:0% personally as a photographer but if feel 00:19:27.309 --> 00:19:29.070 align:start position:0% personally as a photographer but if feel comfortable<00:19:27.730> using<00:19:27.909> it<00:19:28.090> other<00:19:28.510> people<00:19:28.929> might 00:19:29.070 --> 00:19:29.080 align:start position:0% comfortable using it other people might 00:19:29.080 --> 00:19:30.840 align:start position:0% comfortable using it other people might feel<00:19:29.230> differently<00:19:29.649> but<00:19:30.309> according<00:19:30.549> to<00:19:30.730> my 00:19:30.840 --> 00:19:30.850 align:start position:0% feel differently but according to my 00:19:30.850 --> 00:19:31.710 align:start position:0% feel differently but according to my definition 00:19:31.710 --> 00:19:31.720 align:start position:0% definition 00:19:31.720 --> 00:19:33.779 align:start position:0% definition I<00:19:31.750> think<00:19:32.559> sharks<00:19:32.769> are<00:19:32.980> a<00:19:33.039> little<00:19:33.159> less<00:19:33.370> secure 00:19:33.779 --> 00:19:33.789 align:start position:0% I think sharks are a little less secure 00:19:33.789 --> 00:19:35.130 align:start position:0% I think sharks are a little less secure than<00:19:33.820> Starks<00:19:34.360> the<00:19:34.450> little<00:19:34.690> critters 00:19:35.130 --> 00:19:35.140 align:start position:0% than Starks the little critters 00:19:35.140 --> 00:19:38.280 align:start position:0% than Starks the little critters and<00:19:35.620> why<00:19:36.070> bulletproof<00:19:36.809> bulletproof<00:19:37.809> sir 00:19:38.280 --> 00:19:38.290 align:start position:0% and why bulletproof bulletproof sir 00:19:38.290 --> 00:19:40.110 align:start position:0% and why bulletproof bulletproof sir based<00:19:38.470> on<00:19:38.710> discrete<00:19:39.070> log<00:19:39.309> and<00:19:39.700> the<00:19:39.790> discrete 00:19:40.110 --> 00:19:40.120 align:start position:0% based on discrete log and the discrete 00:19:40.120 --> 00:19:41.549 align:start position:0% based on discrete log and the discrete log<00:19:40.299> problem<00:19:40.330> and<00:19:40.900> that's<00:19:40.990> a<00:19:41.170> very<00:19:41.320> well 00:19:41.549 --> 00:19:41.559 align:start position:0% log problem and that's a very well 00:19:41.559 --> 00:19:43.140 align:start position:0% log problem and that's a very well understood<00:19:41.700> cryptography<00:19:42.700> assumption 00:19:43.140 --> 00:19:43.150 align:start position:0% understood cryptography assumption 00:19:43.150 --> 00:19:45.150 align:start position:0% understood cryptography assumption that's<00:19:43.270> been<00:19:43.480> around<00:19:43.570> for<00:19:43.870> a<00:19:43.929> long<00:19:44.049> time<00:19:44.559> yeah 00:19:45.150 --> 00:19:45.160 align:start position:0% that's been around for a long time yeah 00:19:45.160 --> 00:19:47.610 align:start position:0% that's been around for a long time yeah yeah<00:19:45.580> but<00:19:45.850> the<00:19:46.090> bullet<00:19:46.480> proofs<00:19:46.840> are<00:19:47.049> based<00:19:47.440> on 00:19:47.610 --> 00:19:47.620 align:start position:0% yeah but the bullet proofs are based on 00:19:47.620 --> 00:19:52.380 align:start position:0% yeah but the bullet proofs are based on discrete<00:19:47.980> log<00:19:48.280> only<00:19:49.059> if<00:19:49.480> you<00:19:51.240> make<00:19:52.240> them 00:19:52.380 --> 00:19:52.390 align:start position:0% discrete log only if you make them 00:19:52.390 --> 00:19:54.480 align:start position:0% discrete log only if you make them interactive<00:19:53.020> right<00:19:53.260> make<00:19:54.070> them<00:19:54.280> non 00:19:54.480 --> 00:19:54.490 align:start position:0% interactive right make them non 00:19:54.490 --> 00:19:57.930 align:start position:0% interactive right make them non interactive<00:19:55.120> to<00:19:55.480> require<00:19:56.160> random<00:19:57.160> or<00:19:57.340> the 00:19:57.930 --> 00:19:57.940 align:start position:0% interactive to require random or the 00:19:57.940 --> 00:20:04.530 align:start position:0% interactive to require random or the same<00:19:58.890> yes<00:20:02.309> series<00:20:03.309> one<00:20:03.549> of<00:20:03.730> you<00:20:03.880> a<00:20:03.910> free<00:20:04.120> mother 00:20:04.530 --> 00:20:04.540 align:start position:0% same yes series one of you a free mother 00:20:04.540 --> 00:20:09.330 align:start position:0% same yes series one of you a free mother no<00:20:05.140> thanks<00:20:05.650> I<00:20:07.260> don't<00:20:08.260> know<00:20:08.350> if<00:20:08.410> that's<00:20:08.710> true<00:20:09.070> I 00:20:09.330 --> 00:20:09.340 align:start position:0% no thanks I don't know if that's true I 00:20:09.340 --> 00:20:11.159 align:start position:0% no thanks I don't know if that's true I agree<00:20:09.429> random<00:20:10.179> Oracle<00:20:10.600> is<00:20:10.780> a<00:20:10.809> slightly 00:20:11.159 --> 00:20:11.169 align:start position:0% agree random Oracle is a slightly 00:20:11.169 --> 00:20:12.990 align:start position:0% agree random Oracle is a slightly non-standard<00:20:11.890> cryptographic<00:20:12.220> assumption 00:20:12.990 --> 00:20:13.000 align:start position:0% non-standard cryptographic assumption 00:20:13.000 --> 00:20:15.600 align:start position:0% non-standard cryptographic assumption and<00:20:13.270> a<00:20:13.720> lot<00:20:14.110> of<00:20:14.140> things<00:20:14.559> you<00:20:14.740> said<00:20:15.010> you<00:20:15.280> want<00:20:15.490> to 00:20:15.600 --> 00:20:15.610 align:start position:0% and a lot of things you said you want to 00:20:15.610 --> 00:20:17.250 align:start position:0% and a lot of things you said you want to add<00:20:15.700> return<00:20:16.030> a<00:20:16.059> frequent<00:20:16.600> interactive<00:20:17.169> you 00:20:17.250 --> 00:20:17.260 align:start position:0% add return a frequent interactive you 00:20:17.260 --> 00:20:19.200 align:start position:0% add return a frequent interactive you almost<00:20:17.620> always<00:20:18.010> need<00:20:18.429> the<00:20:18.730> option<00:20:18.880> where 00:20:19.200 --> 00:20:19.210 align:start position:0% almost always need the option where 00:20:19.210 --> 00:20:20.909 align:start position:0% almost always need the option where you're<00:20:19.750> going<00:20:19.900> to<00:20:19.960> get<00:20:20.110> a<00:20:20.140> random<00:20:20.410> particle 00:20:20.909 --> 00:20:20.919 align:start position:0% you're going to get a random particle 00:20:20.919 --> 00:20:23.700 align:start position:0% you're going to get a random particle out<00:20:21.070> so<00:20:21.429> it<00:20:21.669> depends<00:20:22.179> first<00:20:22.960> in<00:20:23.140> a<00:20:23.200> person<00:20:23.559> what 00:20:23.700 --> 00:20:23.710 align:start position:0% out so it depends first in a person what 00:20:23.710 --> 00:20:25.440 align:start position:0% out so it depends first in a person what you<00:20:23.740> feel<00:20:23.950> most<00:20:24.160> comfortable<00:20:24.309> with<00:20:24.669> I<00:20:25.030> think 00:20:25.440 --> 00:20:25.450 align:start position:0% you feel most comfortable with I think 00:20:25.450 --> 00:20:27.750 align:start position:0% you feel most comfortable with I think this<00:20:25.780> is<00:20:25.929> just<00:20:25.960> an<00:20:26.230> opinion<00:20:26.440> and<00:20:26.919> I<00:20:27.250> understand 00:20:27.750 --> 00:20:27.760 align:start position:0% this is just an opinion and I understand 00:20:27.760 --> 00:20:29.669 align:start position:0% this is just an opinion and I understand that<00:20:27.850> other<00:20:28.030> people<00:20:28.090> maybe<00:20:28.600> not<00:20:28.900> know<00:20:29.290> feel<00:20:29.530> so 00:20:29.669 --> 00:20:29.679 align:start position:0% that other people maybe not know feel so 00:20:29.679 --> 00:20:31.440 align:start position:0% that other people maybe not know feel so comfortable<00:20:29.950> of<00:20:30.250> random<00:20:30.580> articles<00:20:31.000> and<00:20:31.270> don't 00:20:31.440 --> 00:20:31.450 align:start position:0% comfortable of random articles and don't 00:20:31.450 --> 00:20:32.790 align:start position:0% comfortable of random articles and don't want<00:20:31.600> to<00:20:31.690> use 00:20:32.790 --> 00:20:32.800 align:start position:0% want to use 00:20:32.800 --> 00:20:35.790 align:start position:0% want to use from<00:20:33.670> any<00:20:33.850> cryptographic<00:20:34.240> use<00:20:34.690> cases<00:20:34.990> it 00:20:35.790 --> 00:20:35.800 align:start position:0% from any cryptographic use cases it 00:20:35.800 --> 00:20:38.670 align:start position:0% from any cryptographic use cases it would<00:20:35.950> be<00:20:36.100> better<00:20:36.820> for<00:20:36.970> us<00:20:37.210> to<00:20:37.450> utilize<00:20:38.140> things 00:20:38.670 --> 00:20:38.680 align:start position:0% would be better for us to utilize things 00:20:38.680 --> 00:20:39.840 align:start position:0% would be better for us to utilize things it's<00:20:38.860> great<00:20:39.070> that<00:20:39.280> people<00:20:39.520> want<00:20:39.640> to<00:20:39.700> utilize 00:20:39.840 --> 00:20:39.850 align:start position:0% it's great that people want to utilize 00:20:39.850 --> 00:20:41.130 align:start position:0% it's great that people want to utilize knowledge<00:20:40.390> of<00:20:40.480> exponent 00:20:41.130 --> 00:20:41.140 align:start position:0% knowledge of exponent 00:20:41.140 --> 00:20:43.550 align:start position:0% knowledge of exponent you<00:20:41.260> know<00:20:41.320> honestly<00:20:41.770> help<00:20:42.190> us<00:20:42.310> find<00:20:42.580> you<00:20:43.420> know 00:20:43.550 --> 00:20:43.560 align:start position:0% you know honestly help us find you know 00:20:43.560 --> 00:20:45.900 align:start position:0% you know honestly help us find you know understanding<00:20:44.560> bar<00:20:44.800> has<00:20:45.100> people<00:20:45.280> implemented 00:20:45.900 --> 00:20:45.910 align:start position:0% understanding bar has people implemented 00:20:45.910 --> 00:20:48.420 align:start position:0% understanding bar has people implemented but<00:20:46.600> for<00:20:47.020> many<00:20:47.440> years<00:20:47.620> cases<00:20:47.980> where<00:20:48.130> we<00:20:48.250> want 00:20:48.420 --> 00:20:48.430 align:start position:0% but for many years cases where we want 00:20:48.430 --> 00:20:51.870 align:start position:0% but for many years cases where we want to<00:20:48.610> build<00:20:49.350> for<00:20:50.350> the<00:20:50.380> long-term<00:20:50.680> future<00:20:51.220> we 00:20:51.870 --> 00:20:51.880 align:start position:0% to build for the long-term future we 00:20:51.880 --> 00:20:53.490 align:start position:0% to build for the long-term future we want<00:20:52.090> to<00:20:52.210> do<00:20:52.360> stuff<00:20:52.420> that<00:20:52.660> we<00:20:52.930> know<00:20:53.080> and 00:20:53.490 --> 00:20:53.500 align:start position:0% want to do stuff that we know and 00:20:53.500 --> 00:20:55.200 align:start position:0% want to do stuff that we know and understand<00:20:54.040> very<00:20:54.310> very<00:20:54.550> well<00:20:54.730> now<00:20:54.850> just 00:20:55.200 --> 00:20:55.210 align:start position:0% understand very very well now just 00:20:55.210 --> 00:20:56.730 align:start position:0% understand very very well now just thread<00:20:55.540> and<00:20:55.660> work<00:20:55.780> alone<00:20:56.080> which<00:20:56.260> is<00:20:56.290> the 00:20:56.730 --> 00:20:56.740 align:start position:0% thread and work alone which is the 00:20:56.740 --> 00:21:01.350 align:start position:0% thread and work alone which is the discrete<00:20:57.040> log<00:20:57.190> problem<00:20:57.750> as<00:20:58.750> well<00:20:58.950> so<00:21:00.180> yeah<00:21:01.180> I'm 00:21:01.350 --> 00:21:01.360 align:start position:0% discrete log problem as well so yeah I'm 00:21:01.360 --> 00:21:02.850 align:start position:0% discrete log problem as well so yeah I'm also<00:21:01.540> agree<00:21:01.840> that<00:21:01.870> knowledge<00:21:02.230> of<00:21:02.350> exponent<00:21:02.770> is 00:21:02.850 --> 00:21:02.860 align:start position:0% also agree that knowledge of exponent is 00:21:02.860 --> 00:21:05.340 align:start position:0% also agree that knowledge of exponent is not<00:21:03.100> very<00:21:03.820> well<00:21:04.060> and<00:21:04.330> as<00:21:04.450> well<00:21:04.630> there's<00:21:04.900> either 00:21:05.340 --> 00:21:05.350 align:start position:0% not very well and as well there's either 00:21:05.350 --> 00:21:09.210 align:start position:0% not very well and as well there's either discrete<00:21:06.070> logic<00:21:06.220> or<00:21:07.860> rather<00:21:08.860> part<00:21:09.100> of<00:21:09.160> the 00:21:09.210 --> 00:21:09.220 align:start position:0% discrete logic or rather part of the 00:21:09.220 --> 00:21:11.820 align:start position:0% discrete logic or rather part of the model<00:21:09.490> but<00:21:10.180> between<00:21:10.840> their<00:21:11.050> own<00:21:11.200> the<00:21:11.620> same 00:21:11.820 --> 00:21:11.830 align:start position:0% model but between their own the same 00:21:11.830 --> 00:21:17.910 align:start position:0% model but between their own the same kind<00:21:15.450> the<00:21:16.450> argue<00:21:16.780> it's<00:21:16.930> not<00:21:16.990> been<00:21:17.500> it's<00:21:17.710> like 00:21:17.910 --> 00:21:17.920 align:start position:0% kind the argue it's not been it's like 00:21:17.920 --> 00:21:20.640 align:start position:0% kind the argue it's not been it's like well<00:21:18.160> study<00:21:18.610> and<00:21:18.910> used<00:21:19.600> quite<00:21:19.960> as<00:21:20.080> much<00:21:20.320> time 00:21:20.640 --> 00:21:20.650 align:start position:0% well study and used quite as much time 00:21:20.650 --> 00:21:22.290 align:start position:0% well study and used quite as much time it's<00:21:21.010> better<00:21:21.190> than<00:21:21.310> understanding<00:21:21.910> but<00:21:22.180> I'm 00:21:22.290 --> 00:21:22.300 align:start position:0% it's better than understanding but I'm 00:21:22.300 --> 00:21:24.150 align:start position:0% it's better than understanding but I'm happy<00:21:22.540> to<00:21:22.570> talk<00:21:22.810> with<00:21:22.870> talk<00:21:23.710> to<00:21:23.950> you<00:21:24.040> about 00:21:24.150 --> 00:21:24.160 align:start position:0% happy to talk with talk to you about 00:21:24.160 --> 00:21:26.310 align:start position:0% happy to talk with talk to you about this<00:21:24.460> like<00:21:24.730> after<00:21:25.120> it's<00:21:25.330> a<00:21:25.450> crystal<00:21:25.810> incident 00:21:26.310 --> 00:21:26.320 align:start position:0% this like after it's a crystal incident 00:21:26.320 --> 00:21:27.540 align:start position:0% this like after it's a crystal incident and<00:21:26.440> even<00:21:26.620> setting<00:21:26.830> aside<00:21:26.950> the<00:21:27.250> hardness 00:21:27.540 --> 00:21:27.550 align:start position:0% and even setting aside the hardness 00:21:27.550 --> 00:21:30.820 align:start position:0% and even setting aside the hardness metric<00:21:27.970> obviously<00:21:28.360> the<00:21:28.480> trusted<00:21:28.900> set<00:21:29.110> up 00:21:30.820 --> 00:21:30.830 align:start position:0% metric obviously the trusted set up 00:21:30.830 --> 00:21:37.910 align:start position:0% metric obviously the trusted set up one<00:21:31.830> of<00:21:31.920> the<00:21:32.010> dots<00:21:36.170> that's<00:21:37.170> also<00:21:37.590> part<00:21:37.800> of 00:21:37.910 --> 00:21:37.920 align:start position:0% one of the dots that's also part of 00:21:37.920 --> 00:21:40.820 align:start position:0% one of the dots that's also part of security<00:21:38.520> at<00:21:39.480> least<00:21:39.660> times<00:21:39.900> that's<00:21:40.320> partisan 00:21:40.820 --> 00:21:40.830 align:start position:0% security at least times that's partisan 00:21:40.830 --> 00:21:44.540 align:start position:0% security at least times that's partisan yeah<00:21:42.140> yeah<00:21:43.140> but<00:21:43.320> I<00:21:43.380> think<00:21:43.620> we<00:21:43.680> can<00:21:43.770> argue<00:21:44.520> that 00:21:44.540 --> 00:21:44.550 align:start position:0% yeah yeah but I think we can argue that 00:21:44.550 --> 00:21:54.000 align:start position:0% yeah yeah but I think we can argue that the<00:21:44.790> ZTR<00:21:47.210> locality<00:21:48.210> years 00:21:54.000 --> 00:21:54.010 align:start position:0% 00:21:54.010 --> 00:21:56.270 align:start position:0% River<00:21:54.790> into<00:21:55.330> the 00:21:56.270 --> 00:21:56.280 align:start position:0% River into the 00:21:56.280 --> 00:22:02.840 align:start position:0% River into the already<00:21:56.580> returning<00:21:57.240> from<00:21:57.600> girlfriends<00:22:01.850> thank 00:22:02.840 --> 00:22:02.850 align:start position:0% already returning from girlfriends thank 00:22:02.850 --> 00:22:04.090 align:start position:0% already returning from girlfriends thank you 00:22:04.090 --> 00:22:04.100 align:start position:0% you 00:22:04.100 --> 00:22:07.490 align:start position:0% you you<00:22:04.990> literally<00:22:05.990> need<00:22:06.200> a<00:22:06.410> girl 00:22:07.490 --> 00:22:07.500 align:start position:0% you literally need a girl 00:22:07.500 --> 00:22:11.129 align:start position:0% you literally need a girl interactions<00:22:08.309> in<00:22:08.809> technology 00:22:11.129 --> 00:22:11.139 align:start position:0% interactions in technology 00:22:11.139 --> 00:22:14.649 align:start position:0% interactions in technology but<00:22:12.139> it's<00:22:12.259> actually<00:22:12.350> these<00:22:13.330> people<00:22:14.330> they<00:22:14.450> just 00:22:14.649 --> 00:22:14.659 align:start position:0% but it's actually these people they just 00:22:14.659 --> 00:22:18.960 align:start position:0% but it's actually these people they just absorb<00:22:14.809> it 00:22:18.960 --> 00:22:18.970 align:start position:0% 00:22:18.970 --> 00:22:21.130 align:start position:0% [Music] 00:22:21.130 --> 00:22:21.140 align:start position:0% [Music] 00:22:21.140 --> 00:22:26.470 align:start position:0% [Music] cool<00:22:22.510> thanks 00:22:26.470 --> 00:22:26.480 align:start position:0% 00:22:26.480 --> 00:22:33.170 align:start position:0% [Applause]